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THE LIFE

OF

GENERAL, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR DAVID BAIRD, Bart.

G.C.B. K.C. &c. &c.

23561

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

xx e 13

LONDON:
RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET.
(LATE COLBURN AND BENTLEY.)
1832.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY HENRY BAYLIS.
Fleet Street.

THE following Memoir of SIR DAVID BAIRD has been carefully collated from the voluminous papers and extensive correspondence of that eminent and estimable man.

If to those, better acquainted with the subjects treated of, than the writer, there should appear any omissions or imperfections in the detail of the services which he performed for his country, they may be attributed to the inherent modesty which ordinarily accompanies exalted merit, and which, in the case of Sir David Baird, led him at all times sedulously to avoid referring to his own exploits, or alluding to the dangers and difficulties which he had encountered during his long, arduous, and distinguished career.

For the valuable assistance which the writer of this memoir has received from several quarters, his acknowledgments will be found specifically made in those parts

of the work which more particularly derive their interest from it. For himself, his object has been faithfully to transcribe what has now become matter of history; and wherever it appeared to him that a question of opinion might *possibly* arise, he has taken the direct course of submitting to the reader the letters of the different individuals concerned in the discussion.

London, Oct. 28, 1832.

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ERRATA

VOL. I.

P. 5, line 10, *for* "East India ships" *read* "the East India ships."
P. 10, line 22, *for* "councils" *read* "their councils."
P. 58, line 9, *for* "had been poisoned at Mysore on the 5th" *read* "had been poisoned at Mysore; on the fifth," &c.
P. 60, line 14, *for* "alone that for their own sakes" *read* "nor was it for their own sakes alone."
Ibid. bottom line, *for* "was Stringer" *read* "Stringer was."
P. 116, line 29, *for* "letter" *read* "letters."
P. 155, line 5, *for* "discovered all" *read* "discovered that all."
P. 177, line 26, *for* "Paiswash" *read* "Paishwa."
P. 201, note, *for* "Sre. Ranga Patæna under Seringapatam" *read* "Sre. Ranga Patana Undê Seringapatam."
P. 253, line 10, *for* "effects" *read* "influence."
P. 334, line 25, *for* "that" *read* "who."
P. 394, line 8, *for* "seems" *read* "serves."
P. 429, line 28, *for* "boats" *read* "boat."

THE LIFE

OF

GENERAL, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

SIR DAVID BAIRD, BART.

G.C.B., K.C., &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

BIRTH—MILITARY EDUCATION—APPOINTMENT TO AN ENSIGNCY—JOINS HIS REGIMENT AT GIBRALTAR—PROMOTED TO A COMPANY IN THE 73D—ORDERED TO INDIA—PROCEEDS TO GUERNSEY—RETURNS TO PORTSMOUTH—INSUBORDINATION AMONG THE TROOPS—SAILS FOR MADEIRA—GOREE—CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—MADRAS.

SIR DAVID BAIRD, the distinguished subject of the present memoir, was the fifth son of William Baird, Esq., of Newbyth, N. B., at which place he was born in December, 1757. Mr. Baird died when his son David was only eight years old; but his mother, a remarkably clever woman, very soon discovered the promise of future excellence in her favourite boy. His temper and disposition were every thing that could be desired:—active, spirited, and daring, yet gay, gentle, and affectionate. Blessed with a great

share of natural talent, he was too volatile to attend closely to study. He seemed to have been born a soldier, and the evident inclination of his mind and character for a military life was very early gratified; for, on the 16th of December, 1772, just as he had completed his fifteenth year, he entered the service as an ensign in the second regiment of foot. He was then placed at Locie's academy, at Chelsea, where he remained some months actively and zealously improving himself in the knowledge of military tactics, a pursuit congenial with his taste and inclinations, and which, eventually, he turned to such noble account. He however joined his regiment, at Gibraltar, in the year 1773.*

* An anecdote related by one of his companions at the time to which we now refer, will serve to illustrate his early sense of discipline. At Mr. Locie's academy, as is now the case at Sandhurst, the pupils were subjected to all the routine of military service. One evening, when young Baird was on duty as sentry, one of his companions, considerably his senior, wished to get out, in order to fulfil some engagement he had made in London, and tried to persuade Baird, over whom he was conscious he had great influence, to permit him to pass. "No," said the gallant boy, "*that* I cannot do, but if you please you may knock me down and walk out over my body."

Another instance of a similar determination to let nothing interfere with duty, occurred soon after he joined his regiment at Gibraltar. One evening, when he was on guard, having dined with some of his brother officers, they resolved to detain him with them, and locked the door of the room to prevent his visiting his sentries at the usual time. Baird found remonstrance in vain; but fixed in his resolution, he sprang to

In 1776, Lieutenant Baird returned to England, and on his arrival in this country obtained leave of absence for the purpose of visiting his mother, and the other branches of his family, in Scotland, to all of whom he was most affectionately attached, and with all of whom he was a great and deserved favourite.

Our young soldier, however, was not destined to enjoy, for any great length of time, either the society of his nearest and dearest friends, or the repose and tranquillity of private life. In 1777, when ten new regiments were raised, he was appointed captain of the light infantry company in Lord Macleod's regiment of Highlanders, the celebrated 73d, (afterwards the 71st,) which was raised at Elgin. In the spring of 1778 the regiment was formed at Fort George.

The personal appearance of Captain Baird at this period, is described as adding greatly to the chivalrous bearing of his manner. His figure was tall and symmetrical; his countenance, cheerful and animated, was indeed the index of his mind; and on his open manly brow were legibly displayed the indications of that lofty courage, that firmness of purpose, and that vigour of intellect, which so conspicuously marked the splendid course of his after-life.

the window which overhung the rampart, and with an agility and dexterity for which he was always remarkable, threw himself out, escaped unhurt, and was at his post at the very minute appointed.

When the 73d arrived at Portsmouth, the East India Company's ships were not ready to receive it. For the moment, therefore, its destination was changed, and it was sent to Guernsey, where it remained for six months; at the end of which period, that fine regiment, a thousand strong, returned to quarters in Portsmouth, in order to await the still delayed sailing of the India fleet.

While the corps was thus stopped, *in transitû*, a serious and diabolical attempt was made by some vile incendiaries to poison the minds of the Highlanders composing it. To effect their purpose they endeavoured to persuade the men that they were sold to the East India Company; that their officers were only to accompany them until they were on board the vessels destined to convey them to their place of banishment, and that when they had once seen them safely off, they were to return.

The minds of the Highlanders (naturally suspicious), removed, in the first instance, as the men had been, to a remote distance from their native homes, were seriously operated upon, by the detestable falsehoods of the hidden traitors who incessantly laboured to deceive them; and the effect produced by the exertions of these people, in representing to the brave soldiers of the king and country that they had been trucked and trafficked away to a joint-stock company of merchants in London, was such, that one company of the regiment (Captain Shaw's), which was quartered at Fareham, actually mutinied, and positively refused to march.

Reason and reflection, however, shortly got the better of the treacherous falsehoods which had been so actively propagated; but the extent to which the machinations of the plotters had been carried may be pretty clearly estimated, by the fact that they had gratuitously furnished disguises of various sorts for the men, in order to enable them to desert with impunity.

In January 1779, the protracted difficulties with respect to the departure of East India ships having been at length overcome, the regiment was embarked, Captain Baird being in command of a hundred and fifty men on board the Earl of Oxford. But although the important preliminary step of getting the troops afloat had been achieved, it was not until the 7th of the March following, that they actually sailed.

On that day the fleet, under the command of Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, left Portsmouth. It consisted of six sail of the line, some frigates, and about twenty East Indiamen, and carried out, besides the 73d regiment, the 75th, and a part of the African corps, under the command of Governor Wall, who was destined at that period to assume the command at Goree in the event of its capture, and who, as the reader will no doubt remember, was executed in front of Newgate, twenty-three years afterwards, for an act of tyranny committed during his government in that settlement, in the year 1782.

At the end of March, the ships arrived at

the beautiful Island of Madeira, and remained there three weeks, and from its richly clad shores proceeded to the confined and wretched settlement of Goree, the taking of which had been determined upon by our government; but scarcely had the preparations for attacking it commenced, when it was discovered that the French had, upon the appearance of our fleet, considered it prudent to evacuate the place. The ships then came to anchor in the bay, and the 75th, a remarkably fine body of young Welshmen, and the African corps, intended for the garrison of the island, were landed.

During the stay of the ships at this horrid place, Captain Baird went on shore to attend the funeral of a brother officer, who had died on board. Some native Africans, who were employed to dig the grave, remained to witness the melancholy and impressive ceremony of interment. One of them approached Captain Baird, and looking anxiously in his face, gave him to understand, by signs, that all the white men who had come that day, would soon be there—pointing to the grave. And this prediction was too truly and fatally fulfilled, for nearly the whole of the 75th were buried in that wretched settlement; than which, not even the hateful Sierra-Leone, nor the delusive Fernando Po, is more baneful and destructive to European constitutions.

From Goree the fleet proceeded to the Cape of Good Hope. The Earl of Oxford, and another of the Indiamen, got into Table Bay on the

1st of August 1779. The men-of-war, and the other Indiamen, stood round for Simon's Bay, in False Bay, the usual naval rendezvous and anchorage, where the dockyard and other marine departments are established; some of them, it appears, did not get to anchor until three weeks after the arrival of the two companion ships in Table Bay.

At the Cape, however, which at that period was a Dutch colony, the fleet remained for three months: a period little less than that which is now occupied by a whole voyage from England to India; and during this unaccountably long detention, a homeward bound India fleet arrived.

It was not until November, 1779, that the outward-bound fleet was again on its way to India; and it was not until January, 1780, that Lord Macleod and his gallant Highlanders landed at Madras; an entire year having been consumed in the completion of the voyage from the date of their first embarkation at Portsmouth.

CHAPTER II.

STATE OF AFFAIRS AT MADRAS—CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF FORT ST. GEORGE—HYDER ALY—HIS WAR WITH THE MAHRATTAS—APPEAL TO THE EAST INDIA COMPANY—THEIR REFUSAL—HIS JUNCTION WITH THE FRENCH—IMPROVEMENT OF HIS ARMY—COALESCES WITH THE MAHRATTAS—ADVANCES TO THE MOUNT—DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN THE COUNCIL—LORD MACLEOD REFUSES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY—SIR HECTOR MUNRO TAKES THE COMMAND—CAPTAIN BAIRD MARCHES WITH COLONEL FLETCHER TO CONJEVERAM—JOINS COLONEL BAILLIE—ATTACK OF HYDER AND TIPPOO—SANGUINARY BATTLE—TREACHERY AND BARBARITY OF TIPPOO—THE ENGLISH FORCE BETRAYED AND CUT TO PIECES—CAPTAIN BAIRD DESPERATELY WOUNDED.

At the time of the arrival of the 73rd at Madras, the general appearance of affairs was favourable to tranquillity; but those to whom the administration of the government was entrusted should have penetrated below the surface, aware, as they ought to have been, of the hatred—not perhaps altogether unjustified—which Hyder Aly Cawn bore the English, and more especially the presidency of Fort St. George.

In order to understand the causes of this peculiar animosity, it may be necessary to state, that in the year 1769, eleven years before the period to which we are now referring, Hyder Aly, after

having been engaged with varying success against the English, had suddenly appeared within a few miles of Madras, greatly to the embarrassment of the government of that presidency, which, besides being extremely reduced in point of revenue, had been for some time divided and distracted by dissensions among the council and superior officers, and driven to expedients which, it must be confessed, reflect no great credit upon the integrity of those who devised them, or upon the wisdom of those who put them into execution.

Matters, however, pressed, and with the enemy almost at their gates, they found it necessary to check his farther proceedings by negociation, into which he, on his part, was equally ready to enter; and accordingly a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded between Hyder and the British government, on the 3rd of April, 1769, the principal condition of which was understood to be, that the forts and places taken on either side should be restored to their original possessors, and each party sit down contented. But in point of fact there was another article in the treaty which was still more important—it was specially agreed, that in case either party was attacked by its enemies, the other should lend the party so attacked its aid and assistance; and to make this compact more binding, the actual number of troops to be supplied for the purpose was distinctly stated. Whether from forgetfulness of that to which they had pledged themselves, or from carelessness of

a distant enemy, at whom they had trembled when near at hand, it is not our province to determine; but certain it is, that when Hyder Aly, a short time after the ratification of this treaty, became involved in a war with the Mahrattas, and applied to the Madras government for the guaranteed assistance, the Madras government flatly refused to afford it, because, as they alleged, if they took a decided part with Hyder against the Mahrattas, they should in all probability become involved in a Mahratta war themselves.

Stung by the flagrant injustice of this paltry evasion, in a case all the difficulties of which the Madras government should have considered before they pledged themselves; Hyder, after numerous applications, which were constantly refused, resolved upon making up his differences with the Mahrattas as soon as he could, and revenging himself upon his faithless allies, the English. Painful it is, indeed, to think that the English name should have been so sullied in the presidencies of the Honourable East India Company and councils.

To this shameless breach of faith may fairly be traced the combination of miseries and misfortunes which subsequently involved and overwhelmed thousands of our countrymen, and amongst them, the gallant and distinguished subject of this memoir; for the course taken by Hyder to satisfy his thirst for revenge upon the English, was one which led to a chain of events, the extent and magnitude of which were not in the slightest de-

gree anticipated by the Madras government, when, upon a cool calculating principle of self-preservation, they resolved to violate the faith of their engagements, and outrage the sanctity of their treaties.

Hyder knew by experience, and by the common course of events, that the French, if made acquainted with the facts of the case, and the feelings of our discarded ally, would not hesitate for a moment in affording him any means that he might require for reducing his Indian enemies, as the first important step towards wreaking a future vengeance on his English friends. Hyder's anticipations with respect to succour and support from this quarter were fully justified by the event: the French supplied him liberally with arms and ammunition; and French officers were permitted, if not encouraged, to enter into his service, to train and organize his armies, and to form a powerful force of artillery upon the European system.

The effect of this improvement upon the discipline of his troops was sensibly and rapidly felt; and in a much shorter space of time than even he himself could have hoped or expected, he found himself enabled to take the field against the Mahrattas, and the result of his brilliant campaign was a treaty in the highest degree advantageous to his interests.

But, as if to shew in more glowing colours the real character of the evasion with which the Madras government met Hyder's requisition, on

the faith of their mutual compact made by him; and to exhibit the fallacy of their expressed apprehension of involving themselves in hostilities with the Mahrattas; we find the Madras government immediately afterwards actually involved in a Mahratta war; and as the causes which led to that war seem to be quite as creditable to the then government of Bombay, as those which induced the former pacific resolutions of the government of Madras, we shall briefly lay them before the reader, more especially as they may tend to throw light upon subsequent important transactions.

The seat of the Mahratta government was originally fixed at Setterah, and the government itself was vested in a Rajah; and although, in the course of time, the sole and absolute power of the prince had been deteriorated, and the nation become divided into numerous small states, the chiefs of all those states continued to own allegiance to the ram-rajah, to whom they still conceded the right of assembling them, or of calling out their troops whenever he felt inclined to do so.

But at length the greatness of the ram-rajah became little more than a shadow, and his dignity little else than a name; the whole power of the government being in the hands of the paishwa, or chancellor. The paishwaship being usurped, as we are told, by the family of Nana-Row, the reigning paishwa seized the ram-rajah, and threw him into a dungeon at Setterah.

When the paishwa died he left two sons, Mada-

Row, and Narain-Row, of whom Mada-Row, being the eldest, succeeded to the paishwaship, to which, however, his uncle, Roganaut-Row, laid claim. Mada-Row, anxious for his own safety, and the peaceable enjoyment of a dignity to which he was unquestionably entitled, had this uncle seized and placed in confinement; but being himself attacked by illness, he released him before his death, recommending, in his last moments, his brother, Narain-Row (who was of course to succeed to the paishwaship), to his special care and affection.

It is not very difficult to anticipate the fate of the unhappy heir to the honours of his fond brother, when he was confided to the hands of another and more desperate claimant of them. Narain-Row was shortly after murdered by his uncle, who fled to the East India Company's government at Bombay, where, on *promising to cede a certain portion of the territories which he was to acquire, as the price of his nephew's blood,* the Company's government were pleased to approve his pretensions to the throne of Poonah, and gave him their protection and countenance in supporting them.

Against this most flagrant act, the Mahrattas, shocked and disgusted at the heartless conduct of the sanguinary monster, whose hands were imbrued with the blood of his nearest living relative, and that relative committed to his fostering care and protection, strongly and pathetically remon-

strated; but, will it be believed, that the principle then apparently laid down by the Honourable East India Company, of availing themselves, whenever they can, of any civil dissensions amongst the natives, in order to extend their own territorial possessions, prevented any notice whatever being taken of their appeal?

The outraged Mahrattas then, having resolved upon revenge, formed a coalition not only with Hyder Aly Cawn, but with many other powerful princes and rajahs, (who naturally sympathized with their feelings,) for the purpose, if possible, of expelling from amongst them, a race of people, whom (to use the words of an able writer upon the subject) "no concessions could satisfy, and no treaties could bind."

But, as if the previously cautious and calculating government of Madras had been inclined to excite their enemies to mischief, they chose, just at this period, to march a body of troops through a part of Hyder's* territory, without his permission, in order to assist a prince who was not in alliance with him;

* Hyder Ally Cawn, the Regent of Mysore, had attained that dignity by a combination of powerful abilities and daring crimes, by bravery in arms and by policy in negociation. He entered the service of the Rajah, whose throne he afterwards possessed, as a corporal, and like another hero, who seems to have emulated his vices and successes, was distinguished by the appellation of *Corporal* for many years. He rose to the command of the army, and on the death of the Rajah seized the government, and confined the heir to the throne, and the whole of the royal family, in the fortress of

and as if to cement more firmly the union which existed between him and his new friends, the French, they at the same time thought proper to take possession of the French settlement of Mahie, on the Malabar coast, which formed part of his dominions, at a moment when he declared the French were actually under his protection.

While these things were in progress, the Madras

Seringapatam, occasionally shewing them to the people to assure them of their existence and safety.

He could neither read nor write, but such was the power of his mind, that he invited and encouraged the manufacturer and workman of every nation to settle in his territories. His army was disciplined in the European manner, and he ultimately succeeded in the formation of dock-yards and the establishment of a navy.

The writer, to whom we are indebted for much information, in his "Memoirs of the War in Asia," says, speaking of this extraordinary man, "At the same time that he was sublime in his views, he was capable of all that minute attention which was necessary for their completion. His ends were great—his means prudent—a regular economy supplied a source of liberality, which he never failed to exercise whenever an object which he could render in any shape subservient to his ambition solicited his bounty. He rewarded merit of every kind, but he was particularly munificent to all who could bring important intelligence. He made a regular distribution of his time, and although he sacrificed to the pleasures of life as well as to the pomp of state, in business he was equally decisive and persevering.

The extent of population in his dominions at the time of which we now treat (1780) was never accurately ascertained. His army, however, at that period, amounted to three hundred thousand men, and his annual revenue to above five millions sterling.

government remained in a state of stupid security, and Hyder, who had been availing himself of every opportunity for making the most extensive warlike preparations, found his way through the Ghauts, and burst like a mountain-torrent into the Carnatic, driving all before him.

No care whatever had been taken to guard the passes or defiles, nor did Hyder meet with the slightest impediment or opposition to his passage, beyond that which naturally arose from the narrowness or difficulty of the passes themselves. Some idea may be formed of the dismay of the presidency, and as it should seem its surprise, when the government found that the invading power amounted to nearly 100,000 men, including a large force of European troops, officered by Frenchmen, and commanded by a very distinguished person, Colonel Lally.

When the crisis which suddenly presented itself came to be discussed in council, a very great difference of opinion arose at the board, as to the most adviseable mode of repelling the invaders. One party wished to keep Sir Hector Munro, the commander-in-chief, at the presidency, in order to retain a majority in the council, and to despatch Lord Macleod in command of the army (which did not exceed, at that period, six thousand men), against Hyder; and this it was proposed to do without an hour's delay, and without, of course, waiting for the necessary equipment of a body of troops destined

for such an arduous service. This could hardly be believed, if the facts were not recorded; and much less would it be credited, that although the council themselves admitted Hyder's force to exceed 80,000 men, a great proportion of whom were cavalry, fully prepared for the field; the opinion they entertained, or, perhaps, affected to entertain, of the efficiency of his army, in order to palliate their own former ignorance or neglect, was such, that even the enormous inequality of numbers in his favour was scarcely considered as a serious disadvantage.

Lord Macleod, however, who was an able man, and a good soldier, took a calmer and wiser view of the subject. He readily agreed to assume the command of the army, when it should be properly formed and equipped for service, but positively refused to do so while it was in its present state; at the same time offering readily to march instantly at the head of his own regiment.

In his remonstrance to the council upon what can be called nothing but the absurdity of their conduct, Lord Macleod used the following expression, which, though perhaps somewhat rough, proved, in the sequel, awfully prophetic:—"I," said his lordship, "have been a great many years in the service, and I have always observed, that when you despise your enemy, he generally gives you a d—d rap over the knuckles."

In consequence of Lord Macleod's refusal, Sir Hector Munro took the command.

On the 24th of July, 1780, the cavalry of Hyder Aly were within nine miles of Madras; and his troops burned all the villages on the road, which had been abandoned on their approach by the unhappy inhabitants. Things now began to wear an extremely serious aspect, and in order to assemble the English force with all possible expedition, a despatch was sent off to Colonel Baillie, who was in the Northern Circar, with from three to four thousand men, to join Sir Hector Munro's army at the Mount at Madras. Most unfortunately, however, the order was subsequently changed, and Colonel Baillie was directed to proceed direct to Conjeveram, a place about forty miles from the Mount on the road to Arcot, by which change an opportunity was afforded Hyder (of which he took advantage) of throwing himself between the two British commanders.

Sir Hector Munro marched from the Mount on the 25th of August, 1780, to Conjeveram. In the meanwhile Baillie, who was on his way to join him there, fell in with a detachment of Hyder's army, under the command of his son, Tippoo, consisting of 30,000 cavalry, 8,000 foot, and twelve pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding the vast numerical superiority of this force over that of Colonel Baillie, which was considerably weakened by a mutiny in the first regiment of cavalry, which it had been found necessary to march prisoners to Madras, they were most decisively repulsed. This victory, splendid as was the achievement, was dearly

bought, since, by again diminishing the effective strength of his little army, he considerably added to the dangers and difficulties of his situation.

At this juncture, Colonel Baillie sent off a messenger to Sir Hector Munro, informing him of the precarious state in which he found himself. The severe loss he had sustained, rendered him incapable of advancing, while the distressing want of provisions, under which his troops were suffering, made it equally impossible for him to remain long where he was. This representation from Colonel Baillie greatly embarrassed Sir Hector Munro, for it was clear he must either decide on marching to his relief, leaving his sick and stores at Conjeveram under a guard, or on remaining himself at Conjeveram, and sending a detachment to strengthen Colonel Baillie where he was.

Unfortunately—as it turned out—for it is the common disposition of man to judge of conduct by consequences—Sir Hector decided on the latter alternative, and a detachment was sent to Colonel Baillie's assistance, under the command of Colonel Fletcher, of which detachment the flank companies of the 73d, under Captain Baird, formed part; there were two other companies of European grenadiers, and eleven companies of Sepoys, making altogether about a thousand men.

The security of this force, and the probability of its effecting a junction with Colonel Baillie, appeared to Colonel Fletcher to depend so very

much upon the silence of its proceedings, that he refused four six pounders which were offered him, and marched on the 8th of September, at nine o'clock at night. It appears, however, that Hyder, notwithstanding all the caution that was observed, had obtained accurate intelligence of the movement of this detachment, and accordingly despatched a strong body to intercept it. Colonel Fletcher and Captain Baird, however, having reason to suspect some project of the sort, suddenly altered their line of march, and by a wide *detour*, which, although it added to their fatigue, ensured their safety, succeeded in joining Colonel Baillie on the morning of the 9th, having, nevertheless, fallen in with Hyder's picquets, close to his position at Perambaukum.

The troops of this detachment, wearied as they were, were permitted to halt only till the evening, when the whole force marched, under the command of Colonel Baillie, to join Sir Hector Munro. Hyder had again obtained the most correct intelligence of their movements, and taking advantage of the necessary delay in the return of this gallant body of troops, enfiladed every part of the road by which they were to march, with artillery, and placed his best infantry in ambuscade at every available point.

The English troops had not proceeded more than four miles, when an alarm was given that the enemy was on their flank. They immediately

formed, but finding the attack was not serious, continued their march. The road lay through an avenue of banyan trees, with a jungle on either side, and upon their entrance into this road, they were again attacked on the flank, by the enemy's opening two or three guns, and commencing a fire of some musquetry from the thick part of the jungle. They instantly halted, and immediately afterwards endeavoured to take the guns, but the darkness frustrated their efforts; and then it was, that Colonel Baillie determined to halt till day-light—a determination at first sight incompatible with the admitted necessity of making the march by night; while it not only afforded an opportunity to the enemy to draw off his cannon to another and stronger point, which the English had inevitably to pass in the morning, but practically announced to Tippoo the exact position in which he had checked them, and moreover of suggesting to Hyder the importance of advancing, in order, to take advantage of their unexpected halt. Colonel Baillie's words explanatory of his decision addressed to Captain Baird were, "that he was determined to halt till day-light, that he might have an opportunity of seeing about him."

At day-light they accordingly re-commenced their march, and as the column moved out of the avenue into the plain, a battery of eight guns opened upon it, supported by a strong body of cavalry and infantry. Baillie immediately ordered

Captains Kennedy and Gowdie, with the native grenadiers, to attack them; they did so, and succeeded in taking most of the guns, and in driving back the troops who supported them.

But at this moment the heads of the different columns of Hyder's army appeared, (Hyder having passed Sir Hector Munro in the night,) moving down upon the line, which induced Kennedy and Gowdie immediately to call off their detachment from the captured guns to join the main body. At this juncture, Baillie formed his force, consisting of little more than three thousand men, in line upon the bank of an old nullah, or water-course, and opened his guns upon the enemy. But Hyder, too powerful an antagonist for a mere handful of men, so disposed his immense army, as completely to surround him, and commenced a destructive fire upon him from his artillery in every direction.

The various descriptions of this memorable and most unequal contest, however, all agree in confirming the belief, that vast as was the disparity between the contending armies, and although Hyder had upwards of seventy pieces of cannon in the field, the day would have been won by the English, if the fortune of war had not been so decidedly against them. The enemy were repeatedly and continually repulsed, their infantry gave way, while their cavalry were falling in all directions, and, it is said, Hyder was only prevented from

retreating, by the persuasions of Colonel Lally, who represented to him, that retiring would bring him in contact with Sir Hector Munro, who was in his rear; and at this moment, and while the English were actually sustaining the combined attack of Hyder and his son Tippoo, two of their tumbrils exploded, and in an instant the brave men who were on the eve of gaining one of the most splendid victories ever achieved, were deprived of their ammunition, and the services of all their artillery. In this helpless, dreadful state, under a heavy and tremendous fire of cannon and rockets, these gallant but unfortunate soldiers remained from half-past seven until nine o'clock.

The slaughter of the British began to be tremendous, as the enemy closed in upon them on every side. Colonel Fletcher had carried off the grenadier company of the 73d to support the rear-guard, and was never heard of more. Hyder Aly came with his whole army on their right flank, charging them with columns of horse, while the infantry kept up a heavy fire of musquetry. These were followed by the elephants and Mysore cavalry, which completed the overthrow of the gallant band of heroes. In the midst of this, Colonel Baillie, wounded as he was, formed his men into a square, and, without ammunition, received and repulsed thirteen different attacks of the enemy's squadrons. At length the case became evidently

hopeless, and the Sepoys, under Captain Lucas, having been broken and dispersed, Colonel Baillie, seeing that further resistance was vain, tied his handkerchief on his sword as a flag of truce, and ordered Captain Baird, who was now second in command, to cease firing.*

Hyder's officers refused to attend to Colonel Baillie's signal, pointing to the Sepoys who in their confusion were still continuing to fire; this, however, being explained, they agreed to give quarter, and Colonel Baillie directed Captain Baird to order his men to *ground their arms*. The order was of course obeyed, and the instant it was so, the enemy's cavalry, commanded by Tippoo Saib in person, rushed upon the unarmed troops before they could recover themselves, chopping down every man within their reach.

* In a letter written by Mr. (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro, and recently published in Mr. Gleig's able and interesting life of that distinguished officer, Mr. Munro, in describing this event, which he does only upon hearsay evidence, says, "Colonel Fletcher, holding up his handkerchief on the point of his sword as a signal for quarter, was wounded in the arm, and wrapping the handkerchief round it, he received a cut across the belly—his bowels dropped out, and he fell dead from his horse." It was Colonel Baillie, and not Colonel Fletcher, who made the signal for quarter, and he was not killed, but lingered long afterwards in captivity. Nothing can more clearly prove the difficulty of ascertaining the truth even in the country where the events have happened. Mr. Munro had heard the account, no doubt, and repeated it as he heard it.

The greater part of Captain Baird's company were literally cut to pieces by these wretches, and he himself having received two sabre wounds on his head, a ball in his thigh, and a pike-wound in his arm, fell senseless on the ground.

CHAPTER III.

CAPTAIN BAIRD PROVIDENTIALLY ESCAPES DEATH—HYDER RETREATS TO DAMAL—BARBARITY OF HIS TRIUMPH—COLONEL BAILLIE—CAPTAIN PHILLIPS—DR. WILSON—CAPTAIN BAIRD'S SUFFERINGS AFTER THE ACTION—SIR HECTOR MUNRO RETREATS TO MADRAS—ARRIVES THERE SAFELY, CLOSELY PURSUED BY HYDER'S CAVALRY—CAPTAIN BAIRD REACHES THE FRENCH CAMP AND SURRENDERS HIMSELF TO M. LALLY.

On recovering, Captain Baird found himself in the midst of the dead and dying, and still surrounded by the merciless enemy, who were yet busily employed in the horrid work of slaughter. The very circumstances of his moving and opening his eyes, were sufficient to attract the attention of these blood-thirsty barbarians, and in an instant, one of Tippoo's men raised the spear with which he was armed, to despatch him, when another unfortunate soldier happening to stir at the same instant, the new object diverted the fellow's notice, and received the deadly blow. And thus, by an almost miraculous accident, the gallant Baird was preserved by Providence to revenge the fatal

devastation of Perambaukum, by the glorious conquest of Seringapatam.*

Nothing can exceed the horrors of the scene which this defeat produced. Amidst the wounded and bleeding English, the horses and elephants of Hyder were paraded and marched in fiend-like triumph; and those miserable sufferers, who were not at once released from their agonies, by being trampled to death by these animals, were doomed to linger out a wretched existence, exposed during

* The following note has been communicated by Captain Mackenzie, late 71st Regiment.

"The writer of this had, in the year 1796, the honour and good fortune to go over the field of Perambaukum, (called by the soldiers the field of blood,) with Colonel Baird; when he described with great animation and strong feeling the various occurrences of the memorable 10th of September 1780, and clearly traced and remembered the different positions and movements of Colonel Baillie's unfortunate detachment on that dreadful day, from the very commencement of the action to the last position taken up by them on the rising ground where the flag of truce was hoisted and quarter promised by the enemy; a promise broken the moment their confiding opponents had grounded their arms, when they rushed in upon them, and commenced the massacre, the issue of which is so well known.

"At the time the writer visited the field, fragments of pouches still remained lying about, and many of the buttons of the 75th Regiment were picked up. The scene brought to the Colonel's brave and generous mind reflections that deeply affected him; little imagining at the moment that in less than three years he should fully retaliate for his own sufferings and those of his gallant companions, by overthrowing a treacherous tyrant, and annihilating his government, which he amply did by the capture of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May 1799."

the day to the raging heat of a vertical sun, and through the night to the ravages of tigers and jackals, allured to the scene of their misery by the scent of human blood.

Hyder, who, naturally apprehensive of pursuit from Sir Hector Munro, had retreated after the action to Damal, six miles from the field of battle, gratified his vengeance by enjoying the sight of his prisoners and the heads of the slain, as he sat in his tent, enthroned as it were, on a chair of state. Colonel Baillie, wounded as he was, was dragged to his presence on a cannon, and while he, and several other officers, in an equally dreadful condition, lay on the ground, in the open air at his feet, they experienced the additional misery of seeing the heads of many of their late companions in arms, presented to the heartless conqueror. Nay, to such a pitch of barbarity were his cruelties extended, that the duty of presenting these bleeding trophies of his victory, was imposed upon the yet surviving English prisoners. One English gentleman in particular was forced to carry two heads to the tyrant, which proved to be those of his intimate friends Captain Phillips, and Doctor Wilson. For every European head brought in, Hyder gave his people five rupees, and for every European prisoner alive, ten.

Amongst the victims who had as yet escaped the misery of these scenes was Captain Baird. One of Hyder's horsemen, who found him wounded on the field, took charge of him,

and strange to say, had the humanity to give him a little water to drink. From loss of blood he fainted twice on his way towards the camp, and twice his guard and conductor stopped and waited for his recovery, in order to obtain the reward paid for bringing in a prisoner; but when the unfortunate sufferer a third time sank under pain and fatigue, the patience of the soldier was exhausted, and he left him to die.

Here then, stretched upon the ground, covered with wounds, still bleeding, lay the noble-minded subject of our memoir, without a human being to minister to his wants, without a living creature to compassionate his sufferings. How long he remained in this state is not known, but at length his eyes were gratified by the appearance of a serjeant and a private of his own company. The latter was disabled in both arms, and the former, (Serjeant Walker,) in one. They had fortunately escaped so far from the field; and as they could both walk, while the Captain, from the wound in his thigh, could not move without the greatest pain and difficulty, they raised him from the ground, and helped him along as well as they could, and procured him water to drink, a luxury, the extreme value of which, no one who has not suffered the parching thirst caused by still reeking wounds, under a burning sun, can at all appreciate.

Captain Baird, while he lay senseless on the field, had been stripped by the enemy, who left him nothing but his shirt and trowsers, which

were saturated with blood; and yet, thus tortured as he was, he, and his equally destitute and bleeding companions crawled on, animated by the hope of reaching Sir Hector Munro's camp, which they naturally concluded could be at no very great distance, since they had left it only two days before. But they greatly miscalculated, if not the distance of Sir Hector's camp, the military tactics of Sir Hector himself.

Sir Hector Munro had been near enough to hear the firing when the action between Hyder and Colonel Baillie began, and, it is generally believed, that his first impulse was to move forward to Baillie's assistance; but before he had proceeded far on his march, in pursuance of this intention, he met some runaways from the scene of action, and in consequence of what these fugitives, under *their* impression of affairs, told him, Sir Hector Munro went to the right about, leaving Colonel Baillie and his gallant and devoted little army to their fate.*

So strong was the impression made upon the mind of Sir Hector Munro by what he had heard, although his informants had given practical evidence of the value of their opinion by saving them-

* When the orders were given by Sir Hector Munro to go to the right about, Lord Macleod remonstrated with him in the strongest manner; nay, the brave old soldier from whose mouth this statement was taken, declared that his lordship went on his knees to Sir Hector, to entreat that he would at any rate allow him to go to the relief of "his own poor fellows;"—the flank companies of the 73d, his lordship's regiment.

selves, that he proceeded rapidly to Conjeveram, which he reached by six o'clock in the evening. Here he proceeded to give orders to destroy his cannon, being twenty-four pounders, and a vast quantity of ammunition, which appeared likely to encumber the movements which he had decided to make as rapidly as he could towards Chingléput, to which place, at two o'clock in the morning, the British force moved off without beat of drum, and reached it at day-break on the 12th. The next morning they moved again, and at one o'clock in the morning of the 14th arrived safe at the Mount, at Madras, having been very much annoyed all the way by Hyder's horse, which continued to pursue, and hover about their rear.

It is impossible to quit this part of the subject, without stating the opinions and feelings to which the sudden retreat of the army to Madras gave rise. The grief which the loss of so many gallant officers excited, was scarcely less powerful than the alarm consequent upon the probable result of their defeat. Many of the inhabitants made preparations for quitting the Presidency, and flying to England. Others looked for assistance from Bengal. But such a demonstration of popular feeling perhaps modern history can scarcely afford: every inhabitant of Madras put on mourning. The negligence, indolence, infatuation, or stupidity of certain individuals, who had neither prudence to foresee dangers, nor fortitude to withstand them when they came, were the themes of

general invective and discontent amongst both the civil and military population; while the peculiar character of the general sentiment might be clearly understood, by the manner in which the same individuals extolled the characters of Colonel Fletcher and the brave officers and men who perished with him, and did justice to the valour of Baillie, and applauded the advice given by Lord Macleod; who, as we have already said, used his most earnest endeavours to prevail upon Sir Hector Munro to move forward to the relief of Baillie's force.

But to return to our narrative. Captain Baird and his weak and wounded companions, still under the delusion of hope, continued moving as well as they could in the direction of Sir Hector Munro's encampment; but although they pursued the track they had selected as the best, they saw nothing to encourage them; on the contrary, the enemy were visible in every direction, in small bodies, and evidently in perfect security. These appearances disheartened them, and completely worn out by fatigue and loss of blood, they resolved to abandon all further efforts to escape, and to resign themselves to a fate, which now seemed, alas! too truly, inevitable; and, accordingly, they laid themselves down under a banyan-tree, where, in spite of all his tortures, mental and bodily, Captain Baird slept soundly, for several hours.*

* It was a peculiarity in Sir David Baird that he could sleep soundly for the period which he had allotted for repose,

When he awoke from his slumber he was told by his faithful companions, who had watched by him, that a large body (they imagined the whole) of Tippoo's cavalry had passed by, near where he lay, in pursuit of Sir Hector Munro; for as soon as Hyder was convinced that Sir Hector, instead of pursuing him, had moved off towards Chingléput, he became pursuer in turn, and so continued, as we have seen, to harass and annoy his enemy during the whole retreat, even to the neighbourhood of Madras itself.

In this position of affairs, and being perfectly convinced that their lot must be captivity, Captain Baird resolved to attempt to find M. Lally's camp that day, where he hoped that himself and his companions might be made prisoners to the French, instead of falling into the hands of the merciless author of all their misfortunes. Accordingly he and his companions took the direction of the French head-quarters, and by the aid of Providence reached them before night.

under the most trying and difficult circumstances; a peculiarity attributable perhaps to the general tranquillity of his mind. Without this power he never could have been equal to the arduous and important tasks, which in the course of his eventful life he had to perform. He has often said that he never slept better than he did, after having made all the necessary arrangements the night before the Storming of Seringapatam.

CHAPTER IV.

RECEPTION BY THE FRENCH OFFICERS—REMOVED TO HYDER'S CAMP —DETAINED WITH THE ARMY—MARCH—TIPPOO'S DUPLICITY— ARRIVAL AT SERINGAPATAM—DESCRIPTION OF THEIR PRISON—PUT IN IRONS—DREADFUL ILLNESS OF CAPTAIN BAIRD—DEATH OF CAPTAIN LUCAS AND MR. HOPE—HYDER PROPOSES TERMS TO SUCH OFFICERS AS WOULD ENTER HIS SERVICE—HIS OFFERS REJECTED —DEATH OF COLONEL BAILLIE.

THE reception which Captain Baird and his fellow sufferers met with in the French camp was such as might have been expected from a brave and generous enemy. The officers gave them tea and refreshments, and a surgeon was immediately ordered to attend them and dress their wounds: but although these personal attentions were shewn them, they were made to understand that they must not expect protection, nor be permitted even to remain where they were; the orders of the French being imperative to deliver up all prisoners to Hyder himself.

Every hope, which these unfortunate men had till now entertained of escaping the barbarities of their cruel foe, vanished; and they found, to their inexpressible grief and mortification, that the kind-

ness which they had experienced, in the French camp, was but the forerunner of cruelties and persecutions, which that very kindness served only to make more dreadful. Remonstrance, however, was in vain, and accordingly they were sent under a guard to the camp.

When Captain Baird arrived near Hyder's tent he was conducted into a circle formed by centinels, in which were a few tents pitched under some trees. Here he found Colonel Baillie and the rest of his ill-fated brother officers, who had survived the dreadful slaughter of Perambaukum. The men were separated from the officers, but were lodged in a similar place at a little distance.

Previously to Captain Baird's arrival all the officers had been carried before Hyder; but the tyrant having satiated his vengeance by the protracted scene of cruelty which he had been enjoying, this ceremony of exhibition was in Baird's case dispensed with, and he remained, with Colonel Baillie and the others, in the place to which he had been at first conveyed until the 14th, where a regular allowance of rice was served out for their subsistence.

At about eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 14th, Hyder being about to move his camp to the neighbourhood of Arcot, Kistna-Row, Hyder's treasurer, went into the quarter where the English officers were, and ordered such of them as were capable of walking, to stand up. This order having been of course obeyed, an immediate division of

the prisoners took place. Colonel Baillie, Captains Baird, Rumley, Lucas, Sherlock, and Wragg, with Lieutenants Lindsay and Fraser were ordered to remain with the enemy's camp; and palanquins, which had been taken by Hyder, with the baggage of Baillie's corps at Perambaukum, were sent for their conveyance.

The officers who were not wounded, amounting to twenty-three, were sent to Bangalore and the Mysore country, and there put in irons; and those who were wounded, in number twenty-seven, were sent to Arnée, a fort about fifteen miles from Arcot. The wounded privates were by a similar arrangement sent to Arnée, and those not wounded to Bangalore; and this measure of separation was carried into effect with such rapidity by Hyder and his officers, that the prisoners had not the opportunity of exchanging a syllable with each other; and after the division had actually taken place, any attempt of the one party to communicate with the other would have been visited in all probability with the severest punishment.

Painful as it is to record such scenes of misery as those in which these unhappy prisoners were doomed to bear a part, we should not do justice to the firmness and fortitude with which our gallant countrymen endured their sufferings, if we did not describe, in the words of one of the victims, the departure of those who had been ordered to the different forts, for the places of their destination.

"Soon after this," says the writer, "some doolies were brought for the party destined for Arnée—i. e. the wounded. These doolies are the most inhuman vehicles in which Europeans were ever placed. The common sort are from three feet and a half to four feet long and about two feet and a half broad; they consist of a frame made of bamboo or common wood, with four posts at the corners to which the sides and ends are fastened at about eight inches from the ground. To each of these posts is fixed a bamboo or large pole by means of which the machine is carried by four coolies, or bearers. The frame is lashed together by ropes made of the fibres of the cocoa-nut, and sometimes by small rattan canes, which, at the same time they serve to fasten the machine, supply the place of a seat. The doolies are usually covered with coarse cotton cloth, but as ours had no covering of any kind, many of our gentlemen suffered very severely.

"The poor soldiers, who laboured under every misery, were some of them put into these doolies, and above fifty of them placed on arrack-bandies or carts. It is impossible to describe the sufferings of these unfortunate men, desperately wounded, their bodies exposed to a severe sun, placed six or eight together in these vehicles, knocking against each other from the jolting, and refused even a drop of water."

Captain Baird and his six unfortunate companions were destined, as we have already said, to move and

subsequently remain with the army; and accordingly when the camp broke up, they accompanied it. During the first day's march Tippoo came up, in his palanquin, to Colonel Baillie, and spoke to him in the handsomest manner, complimenting him upon his gallantry, and bidding him keep up his spirits, as his defeat was attributable only to the uncertain fortune of war. He also assured him that it was the intention of his father, Hyder Aly, to render him every assistance, and not to suffer him to want for anything during his captivity; and even went so far as to request Colonel Baillie, if he found at any time any cause for complaint, to send to *him*, promising to see the grievance, whatever it might be, properly adjusted.

It will scarcely be believed, that at the very moment Tippoo was making these professions and protestations, he knew perfectly well that it never would be in Colonel Baillie's power to send any complaint or remonstrance to *him*, except with the permission and through the medium of his father, whatever might be his wants and sufferings, or the wants and sufferings of his fellow prisoners.

It would be difficult to account for this piece of hypocritical acting in Tippoo, unless we should attribute it to a malignant desire of raising false hopes and exciting illusory expectations; but after the first day's march he never came near the prisoners; nor, as will be seen in the sequel, did he ever evince the slightest disposition to shew them favour, or even mercy, when, after his father's

death, they became entirely subject to his power, and completely under his control.

Although Hyder had suffered so considerably at Perambaukum, that he studiously concealed the extent of his loss, he was not prevented from undertaking the siege and effecting the capture of Arcot, a city belonging to one of the most faithful allies of the English. By his success, in getting possession of this place and an adjoining fort, an immense quantity of ammunition and stores fell into his hands.

While he was carrying on his operations against Arcot, the English prisoners were kept in the neighbourhood; their place of confinement was a tent, pitched in the skirts of a village, to which a black doctor was occasionally sent, to look at and dress their wounds. We say occasionally, for it not unfrequently happened that several days passed without his taking the trouble to visit them. The consequences of this inhuman neglect were almost too dreadful to relate; but such was the state to which the unhappy sufferers were reduced from the combined effects of negligence and the dreadful heat of the climate, that while they lay languishing in agony, their wounds were literally crawling with maggots.

In this dreadful condition did they remain for a fortnight, when Captain Baird, together with Lindsay, Bentinck, and Wragg, were separated from Colonel Baillie (with whom Rumley and Fraser remained) and were marched to Seringapatam.

During the march to that scene of Baird's protracted captivity and future glory, nothing of any importance occurred. At the different forts where they halted for the night, the natives seemed disposed to treat the prisoners with pity and respect; and hard indeed must have been the heart that could refuse such a tribute to sufferings like theirs. Nothing in nature could be more pitiable than their appearance, nothing more hopeless than their position, marching under the accumulated sufferings of pain and fatigue to the horrors of a dungeon, whence, in all human probability, death alone could release them.*

When the captives reached Seringapatam they were conducted to the Durbar; whence, after a considerable, and as it appeared needless delay, they were conducted to their prison, which was situated at the other end of the square.

As this hideous place was destined for so

* Natural as these gloomy reflections appear to the narrator of such a history, they are widely different from those which filled the heart of the gallant subject of these memoirs. At a later period of his valuable life he used often to say that he never for a moment yielded to despondency: he never doubted that he should somehow and at some time get out of the hands of his enemies, and when in aftertimes he was induced to speak on the subject of his sufferings, which in point of fact commenced only when he reached Seringapatam, it was with so much simplicity, and so little disposition to dwell upon the most painful circumstances of the history, that he seemed desirous of lessening the horror they were calculated to inspire, rather than of exciting the feelings of his auditors.

Opposite p. 41.

PLAN OF THE PRINCIPAL PRISON OF SERINGAPATAM.



1. Corner Rooms, each containing 4 cotts.
2. Verandas matted off, each containing 7 cotts.
3. Inner Yard.
4. Old Cook Room, containing 6 cotts.
5. Mr. Massy's Kitchen Garden.
6. Sied Ibram's Berth.
7. Pyals.
8. Sied Ibram's Cook Room.
9. House.

a. Hospital, 2 cotts.
b. Collery Guards.
c. Servants Huts.
d. Prison Cook Room.
e. Captain Baird's Garden.
f. Old Mud Walls.
g. Mud Wall, 18 feet high.
h. Outer Door of the Prison.

N.B. Each corner room of the Prison about 16 feet long by 10 feet wide.

long a period to be the residence of our unhappy countrymen, a particular description of it cannot fail to be interesting.

The prison consisted of an oblong square, about seventy feet in length, with a sort of shed inwards, and open in the middle, like a square of open stalls for cattle. The space appropriated to cooking was at one end, opposite to the entrance where the guard was stationed. There were four dark rooms at each corner of the square, wholly unfurnished except with mats, which were laid upon the floor, and intended for beds, and this was the extent of the accommodation provided for the wretched tenants of this dismal habitation.

In lieu of provisions, or any of the necessaries of life, the prisoners were allowed one gold fanam (about sixpence per diem), out of which they were to supply themselves with food, clothing, and every thing they might require; and as a special indulgence, they were permitted to appropriate enough of these funds to buy one bottle and two-thirds of a bottle of arrack each per week. This favour was granted on account of the dampness of the climate.

In addition to these kindnesses a Frenchman, who called himself a surgeon, was permitted to attend and dress the still open wounds of Captains Baird and Lindsay; and two or three black boys, who had been taken with them, were allowed to stay in the prison, and permitted to go to the bazaar to purchase their provisions. It was through

the medium of these menials that the anxious inmates of the dungeon sometimes heard rumours of what was going on. The French surgeon occasionally brought them news; but from the extraordinary caution with which he appeared to speak, and the natural suspicion with which they listened to his reports, they gained but little from his communications.

They remained in this state for about six weeks, when they were joined by a party of their wounded countrymen from Arnée. On the 23d of December, 1780, at about five o'clock in the evening, this detachment of prisoners reached Seringapatam, and increased the number of the whole to five-and-twenty. The newly arrived captives were not all prepared to find Captain Baird and the other officers at Seringapatam; nor had they anticipated (which under the circumstances afforded them indescribable pleasure) that they should be permitted to share the horrors of imprisonment with their former companions in arms.

Our space will not permit us to avail ourselves of the entire journal kept by one of the sufferers during the whole period of their confinement; but we shall so far borrow from its contents, as to record the occurrence of any remarkable events which for the most part sadly distinguished one day from another, through the monotonous course of time, in their wretched incarceration.

On the 29th of January, 1781, their number

was increased by the arrival of Captain Lucas and Ensign Macauley, and, on the 8th of March, Colonel Baillie, Captain Rumley, and Lieutenant Fraser, the two former in irons, were brought from Arcot, two hundred and forty English miles, to Seringapatam; Mr. Skardon, resident at Pondicherry; Mr. Brunton, an ensign in the Company's service; and Mr. M'Neal, mate of a country ship. Mr. Skardon was the only one of this detachment lodged in the prison with the others, and the pittance allowed him was but six cash per diem, and one sear of rice, half a sear of dholl, and a little ghee. But it is one of the most remarkable and beautiful features of this dreadful captivity, that every man during its continuation seemed more anxious for his fellow-sufferers than for himself; and that every opportunity was seized by the whole party, to ameliorate the condition of those who were at times even worse off than themselves.

On the 10th of May, the French surgeon's visits were prohibited, and all the prisoners, except Captain Baird, were put in irons, weighing about nine pounds each pair; and this seemed to be generally considered the first step of a deliberate system which had been adopted of ending their existence without absolute violence; and so it really proved to be. No reason, other than a desire of eventually exterminating the unhappy captives, could be adduced for this new act of severity; but it seemed, from what transpired at the time, that they

had only hitherto escaped this additional cruelty through the humanity of those who had charge of them, without the privity or sanction of Hyder. It is in vain to attempt to describe the feelings of the captives when the order for their being ironed was announced to them; they remonstrated, but remonstrance was vain, and, as we have just said, the order was carried into effect.

When about half the prisoners were manacled, the Myar seemed considerably relieved from an apprehension of danger, which had previously affected him; for although he had only to enforce compliance with his orders upon five-and-twenty captives, he was evidently alarmed lest they should make any determined shew of resistance.

When they were about to put the irons upon Captain Baird, who was completely disabled in his right leg, in which the wound was still open, and whence the ball had just then been extracted, his friend Captain Lucas, who spoke the language perfectly, sprang forward, and represented in very strong terms to the Myar the barbarity of fettering him, while in such a dreadful state, and assured him, that death would be the inevitable termination of Captain Baird's sufferings, if the intention were persisted in.

The Myar replied, that the Circar had sent as many pair of irons as there were prisoners, and they must be put on. Captain Lucas then offered to wear two sets himself, in order to save his friend. This noble act of generosity moved the compassion

even of the Myar, who said he would send to the keeladar to open the book of fate. He did so, and when the messenger returned, he said the book had been opened, and Captain Baird's fate was good; and the irons were in consequence not put on at that time. Could they really have looked into the volume of futurity, Baird would undoubtedly have been the last man to be spared.

On the 20th, Lieutenant Coke, taken at Pandalore, arrived. On the 4th of June, being the anniversary of the birth of King George the Third, these staunch subjects of that excellent monarch drank his majesty's health in a chatty of sherbet.

On the 16th of September several of the unhappy prisoners, after having been in irons for four months, solicited the keeladar to release them from the sufferings which they occasioned, but in vain. On the 10th of November Captain Baird was put in irons, and thenceforward, things continued with little variation until the 27th of January, 1782, when a Circar Bramin arrived at the prison, and ordered all the captives to be brought before him; after examining them closely, he selected six: Captains Baird and Wragg, Lieutenants Lindsay, Bowser, and Cooke, and Ensign Macalister.

On the 17th of March, Colonel Baillie's irons, and those of Captain Rumley and Lieutenant Fraser, were taken off; those of Captain Baird

were removed on the 9th of April, on account of his sickness. The next day, Lieutenant Lind's irons were removed, and on the 14th he died.

On the 27th of March, the Myar made his appearance in the prison, and described the object of his visit to be to ascertain how many more inhabitants it could contain. This announcement astonished the captives, since they were already crowded to suffocation, yet they told him they were ready to make any sacrifice to accommodate others; for they hoped to obtain some information from the new comers. The Myar told them that eighteen or twenty more European officers would be sent in almost immediately.

The conjectures of the prisoners as to whom these new comers could be, were various; they turned out to be seventeen officers of Colonel Braithwaite's detachment, who had fallen into the hands of Tippoo in the Tanjore country, in the previous February. Tippoo had been extremely kind to them; he had furnished them with clothes and money, and given orders to his keeladar to be attentive to them during their march to Hyder's camp; but when they arrived there they were stripped of every thing, and threatened with the loss of their noses and ears, if they concealed the most trifling article. Colonel Braithwaite himself was detained in the camp.

The information received from these gentlemen was only calculated to increase the gloom and despondency of their fellow-captives; in addition to all other reports, it appeared that our army was lying useless near Madras for want of carriage bullocks, and that a French fleet had passed Pulicat. To a question put by Captain Baird to Dr. White, the medical officer of the detachment, whether there were any rational hopes of release, that gentleman declared his sincere belief that there were none, unless, indeed, very great exertions were made from home.

On the 15th of May, the servants of the prisoners were prohibited from visiting the bazaar. On the 31st, Ensign Graham's irons were removed, in consequence of sickness. Again, on the 4th of June, the sufferers did all the honour they could to the celebration of another anniversary of their king's birthday.

Towards the middle of June more European prisoners arrived, who were kept separate from those in the dungeon. On the 22d, Mr. Hope's irons were taken off, on account of illness, and the following week those of Captain Lucas and Ensign Macauley were also removed.

At this period symptoms of violent disease exhibited themselves amongst the captives, but all applications to the keeladar for medicine or medical attendance were wholly disregarded. On the 5th of July died Captain Lucas, whose conduct towards

Captain Baird, which we have recorded, will speak volumes in his praise, and whose amiable and engaging manners, and cheerfulness and vivacity of temper, made his loss a matter of deep calamity to his fellow-sufferers. On the 7th died Mr. Hope, Captain Baird's particular friend, and the eldest son of Sir John Hope; a slight medicine would have relieved—saved him—but it could not be obtained. On the 9th, Ensign Machonochy also fell a victim to similar barbarity.

Captain Baird himself, at this period was suffering dreadfully from dysentery, and he has often described the torture, when under the blessing of Providence he was recovering, that he experienced from hunger, which the scanty prison allowance did not afford the means of allaying, even with the coarsest food. He used frequently to declare, that the inclination he felt to snatch a portion of their food from others was almost unconquerable, and that if the least morsel was left by any of them, he swallowed it with the greatest eagerness and delight.

During this period Hyder sent some of his principal officers to endeavour to induce the English to enter his service. He offered them three times as much pay as they received in our army, as many horses, palanquins, *and wives*, as they chose, and promised that they should be considered and treated as his children. Of course these offers never obtained a moment's consideration. The

prisoners assured the emissaries of the tyrant that nothing in the world could tempt them to serve any sovereign except their own, and desired never again to be insulted by a repetition of such a proposal.

Towards the close of the year 1782, the arrival of European prisoners became very numerous, and most of them had, previous to their arrival, been forced to embrace the Mahommedan religion, and undergo all the frightful ceremonies connected with its adoption. On the 13th of November Colonel Baillie expired, an event which, it should seem, had been anticipated and provided for, by the tyrant; for during the whole course of his confinement, and his severe and painful illness, he never received medicine or assistance, nor even the advice of a medical man.

The second year of their captivity was now drawing to a termination. They had from time to time been tantalized by various reports, which had sometimes excited in their breasts a faint hope of regaining their liberty; such as Colonel Macleod's having landed on the Mahratta coast, subsequently a similar rumour with respect to General Matthews, and accounts of victories said to have been gained by Sir Eyre Coote. At length, however, these flattering fables died away, and nothing appeared before them but the prospect of languishing for the rest of their lives in dismal captivity. Captain Baird, however, as has been already noticed, never gave way to despair;

he always anticipated, even against all probability, that he should again see his native country, and this one hope, by God's blessing, supported him through incalculable sufferings both of mind and body, under which almost any other man would have sunk.

CHAPTER V.

DEATH OF HYDER—DISAPPOINTMENT OF THE HOPES ENTERTAINED OF TIPPOO'S LENIENCY—HIS RELIGIOUS ZEAL IN FORCING THE EUROPEANS TO EMBRACE MAHOMMEDANISM—COLONEL BRAITHWAITE—CAPTAIN LEECH—ALARMING REPORT—ACCOUNT OF ONE OF TIPPOO'S SONS—AFFECTING LETTER FROM GENERAL MATTHEWS—HIS DEATH—INSANITY OF LIEUTENANT STRINGER—HIS ACCUSATION—THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES—MURDER OF SIXTEEN OFFICERS—PROSPECT OF RELEASE—THE PROSPECT REALIZED—REJOICINGS AND CONGRATULATIONS—DEPARTURE FOR MADRAS.

It was on the 2nd of November, that Tippoo and Lally proceeded to the coast, and on the 15th of December intelligence was received in the prison, by means of the washerman, that Hyder was dead. Anticipating as they did from the general character of Tippoo, as well as their own experience of his conduct, a favourable change in their circumstances from this event, the prisoners hesitated to believe it implicitly, although they observed an unusual bustle about the fort and amongst the guards, which seemed to corroborate the report. Shortly, however, new keeladars arrived, and new officers took charge of the prisons, which again excited hopes not only of the truth

of the rumour, but of the justice of their hopes of an amelioration of their position; on the 27th of December these hopes were in a very considerable degree increased by the fact that the news of Hyder's death was made public at the Cutcheree, and orders were given that the naggars (great drums beaten every day at twelve o'clock in the great square) were not to be ˇ ounded for three days in consequence.

The intelligence thus authenticated, they anxiously waited for the realization of their hopes in its results; but they were disappointed. So far from any change for the better taking place in consequence of the accession of Tippoo to the sovereignty, it turned out, that besides proving himself as great a political tyrant as his father, he added to his sanguinary disposition for conquest, the fiercest bigotry, and believing, (perhaps sincerely,) that the surest mode of rendering himself acceptable in the sight of the prophet, was making proselytes to his religion by any means, all his efforts, from the moment he ascended the throne, were directed to that one great end. He commanded that all the handsomest and youngest of the European soldiers should undergo the hateful ceremonies of Mahommedanism; a compliance with which odious mandate was only secured by giving them a quantity of deleterious stuff called majum, which deprived them of their senses while the barbarians effected the horrid object of their misdirected zeal.

Of Captain Baird's company, eighteen men were selected for these ceremonies, and in a state of stupefaction delivered over to the priests and their myrmidons; and after their recovery from the maltreatment to which they had been subjected, they were compelled to act as drill sergeants to Tippoo's slave battalion of Carnatic boys, who had been driven out of their country like flocks of sheep.

The first day that Captain Baird saw, from the window of his prison, these Highlanders on the parade, in the square, in their capacity of serjeants, his distress and horror at beholding men of his own company voluntarily, as he thought, doing duty in Tippoo's service, are not to be told. He was observed by some of the poor fellows peeping through the grating of his dungeon, and overcome by the sight of their much-loved officer, they rushed from the ranks and called out to him, "Captain Baird, rely upon us, this is not *our* fault," and wept bitterly. Captain Baird's feelings may be more easily conceived than described, when his guards forced him from the grating, in order to prevent his committing the inexpiable crime of replying to his gallant countrymen and comrades.

Tippoo was in the Calicut country when his father died, and immediately on hearing of his death, having, with the natural, or at least usual love of change so conspicuous in regal successors, appointed a new keeladar at Seringapatam, pro-

ceeded with Colonel Lally to take the command of the army in the Carnatic.

On the 25th of January, 1783, Colonel Braithwaite and Ensign Holmes arrived at Seringapatam, not in irons; and the same day Captain Leech was brought in, but placed in a different prison. On the 6th of February Lieutenants Lindsay and Massy were put in irons. On the 26th of the same month Captain Rumley and Lieutenants Fraser and Sampson were removed to Mysore, the last almost dying when he left Seringapatam. On the 22nd of March the body of Hyder Aly Cawn was interred in the Loll Baug garden, one mile from the fort.

On the 4th of June the prisoners, for the third time since their dismal captivity, celebrated the king's birthday.

On the 26th of June a letter was received by the prisoners from General Matthews, who, it appeared, had been a prisoner in the fort ever since the 27th of May.

On the 8th of August it was reported to the prisoners that they were all to be burned as a retaliation for some loss experienced by Tippoo on the Malabar coast.

At this period, one of the sons of Tippoo, who afterwards became an object of interest, by being one of the hostages to Lord Cornwallis, was in the habit of taking the air in Seringapatam daily, and we copy from the journal, to which we have before alluded, the account given by one of the

captives of the exhibition made upon the occasion.

"We peeped," says the journalist, "eagerly through some small apertures which we had found means to make or improve a little, in the walls of our prison. 'The young sultan was mounted on a beautiful maneged Arabian horse, finely caparisoned. He was preceded and attended by a number of people, some of whom bore his umbrella, others fanned his face, others proclaimed his rank and high descent. At one particular place which he passed and repassed, two elephants were stationed to pay their compliments to the young prince amongst the rest of his adorers. The creatures were not only taught to kneel at his approach and shew other marks of obedience, but to fan his face as he went along with fans which they grasped and wielded with their trunks."

On the 11th of August the guard over the prisoners was increased, and on the 17th they heard, through the usual medium of the washerman, who had been a havildar or serjeant, and had been taken with Baillie's detachment, that General Matthews had been put in irons.*

* General Matthews tells his own story in the letter just mentioned, dated the 20th of June, which he sent to the prisoners, in a manner so simple and unaffected that we cannot but think (explaining too, as it does, his peculiar situation) it will be acceptable to our readers.

"I am sorry for the misfortunes of my friends. Rumley is dead—Featherstone was killed. I was a brigadier-general and

Having felt it necessary to attract the reader's attention to the case of General Matthews, it may be as well to conclude the sad history of that

commander-in-chief on the Malabar Coast. Mangalore has a very good garrison, and I think will hold out till relieved from Madras. Our fleet is superior to the French in India. Our army victorious in the Carnatic, likewise in the Cuddapa Country. Lang, a brigadier-general, has taken Corrore, and has 10,000 good men under him. Our affairs wear a tolerable aspect. The Mahrattas have made peace and alliance with us. I had 300 Europeans and 800 sepoys effective, at Nagram, and made a treaty with Tippoo, which he broke, plundered us, and made us close prisoners. I think that Tippoo wishes for peace with us, and that something towards it may take place in November. I am used ill, but not in irons. I have neither pen, ink, nor paper, and it is dangerous to correspond. All the strong forts are in our possession. I took the whole Malabar Coast. I brought from Bombay 400 Europeans, and 1,000 sepoys, and was afterwards joined by the Calicut army. The number of places taken by me required all my troops to garrison, and I had not any support from any place. We knew not of your situation—if we had I should not have been a prisoner. General Stewart commands at Madras. The troops of the French, landed, have been defeated. For myself, two European servants, and one black, I am allowed one fanam and a half per day, with one sear of meat, three of bad rice, and three of ghee. I am compelled to receive what they give, and not allowed to buy any other from the bazaar. I cannot procure any thing but through the Hircarrah. Should any thing happen to my life, I beseech you to remember that the Company owe me for money advanced by me during my command, 33,000 rupees, besides all my pay and allowances from the time of my arrival in India. The troops that were with me are some in the Nabob's service, the rest sent in irons to different parts of the country.

"RICHARD MATTHEWS."

ill-fated officer, with another extract from the journal.

"Sept. 8th, 1783. The washerman gave us the melancholy account of General Matthews's death. He died the 7th, and at the time he departed this life, he was in irons.

"The General, when he learnt from a combination of suspicious circumstances, as well as hints let fall from those who were occasionally about his person, that it was the Sultan's intention to cut him off by poison, was afraid to taste the victuals that were sent to him, at stated times, from the keeladar; some of the guards, and even the servants who carried the poisoned food, took compassion, and gave him some of theirs.

"The havildar, who had charge of the General, connived at these acts of humanity at first, but when it was found that General Matthews still protracted his melancholy existence, this officer was sent for by the keeladar, who told him that the General's life, if much longer continued, must be paid for by the havildar's death. Upon this, the havildar communicated his orders with the threat that accompanied them, to his unfortunate prisoner, who had now no alternative left, but perishing by poison or famine. The anxious love of life for several days maintained a struggle with the importunate calls of hunger. These, however, prevailed in the issue of the contest; he ate of the poisoned food; and drank too, whether to quench the rage of inflamed thirst, or to drown

the torments of his soul in utter insensibility, of the poisoned cup; within six hours after this fatal repast, he was found dead. This is a faithful and true account of the death of Lieutenant General Matthews, which has been set forth in various ways."

October the 3rd, the prisoners heard that their companions, Rumley, Fraser and Sampson, had been poisoned at Mysore on the 5th; they received further information from Comrah, Sepoy, a Tanjore man, that eighteen or twenty officers confined at Kavel-Drook, had been poisoned by order of Tippoo. On the 9th of November, Lieutenant Butler died absolutely of neglect.

From this time, until the 7th of March, 1784, another dismal period of five months, nothing but increasing arrivals of European Mussulmans occurred to vary the sameness of the scene; but on that day, one of the prisoners became insane, and during the paroxysms of his dreadful disorder, unfortunately raved upon subjects the most vitally important to the hopes and interests of his almost bewildered companions.

This officer, Lieutenant Stringer, unluckily knew the language so perfectly as to converse fluently with his guards, and the first act of his insanity was to go to the officer on duty, and request that he might be permitted to speak to the keeladar, as he had something of the greatest importance to communicate to him. The consternation occasioned amongst the other prisoners by this appli-

cation, is not to be described: there was no possibility of guessing what a madman might say, actuated as he was, by a spirit of animosity against his fellow sufferers, upon whom he was prepared to charge the intention of poisoning him. They had, amongst others, one very serious cause of alarm, for although the use of pen and ink was prohibited, on pain of death, they had contrived to obtain them, and several of the officers kept journals, and, as we have already shewn, corresponded with prisoners in other places of confinement. It was quite clear, that if this very important infringement of the regulations was detected, the extreme punishment awarded for it, would be inflicted.

In these trying circumstances it was debated, whether it would not be expedient, for the common safety, to smother the unhappy maniac during the night. Against this barbarous proposition, suggested only by the natural feeling of self-preservation, Captain Baird resolutely opposed himself; and although he did so, upon the high principles of feeling and duty, he made it appear to those, who were but little inclined to put sentiment in opposition to security, in such an extremity, that, it would be most inexpedient, as a matter of policy, and that the sudden death of one of them, who had manifested a desire to make some communication to the keeladar, would certainly cause a dreadful consternation, which even the wild disclosures of the lunatic himself

might not have the effect of producing. At the same time, he entreated his companions to wait the event of the morning, and to occupy the previous hours of the night in disposing of all written documents which they might have in their possession.

In pursuance of this advice, the party proceeded to burn some of their papers, digging holes and hiding others, or depositing them under the tiles of the prison, until some future period; and in the course of the night, they destroyed upwards of an hundred sheets of paper, which they had collected, by stealth, in order to amuse themselves by learning different languages. Nor was it alone that for their own sakes they were so anxiously engaged; it was quite certain, that all those who had contributed to the clandestine introduction of the prohibited materials, would have been equally compromised.

Nothing could be more dreadful than this night; the unhappy maniac, with a pair of irons, weighing nine pounds, began to walk about the prison at five o'clock in the evening, and continued to do so incessantly at a rapid pace until two in the morning, vowing the most terrible vengeance against all his fellow-sufferers. Next morning the Myar came, and asked to see Stringer; and at this moment, the feelings of all the prisoners were worked up to the highest pitch of excitement. The question upon which their safety or preservation hung, was, whether was Stringer to be carried before the keeladar, or

not? Their satisfaction can scarcely be imagined, when they found that the keeladar declined seeing him, and had authorised the Myar to receive any communication he might have to make.

This was another awful moment of suspense to his companions, who now gathered round him, and of course were unable to anticipate the nature of his charge or communication. After much delay, the effect of which was greatly to prejudice the Myar against him, Stringer said that his life was in danger, that a conspiracy had been formed against him, and, as a proof of the fact, he drew from his pocket a piece of bread which he affirmed was poisoned. Captain Baird was next him at this moment; the Myar seemed struck by the proof adduced, when Baird, having stated that the man was mad, and not to be credited, snatched the bread from his hand, and ate it: thus, by a prompt and judicious movement, terminating an affair which, even in its lightest consequences, might have been to the captives a matter of the most serious importance.

The unfortunate officer was afterwards confined in a lunatic asylum, at Madras, where, many years afterwards, Captain Baird saw him; and although, after the period at which he made his charge to the Myar, he had become more tranquil and composed, there appeared not the slightest hope of his future restoration to reason.

It was just at this time that a guard, who had been for some time placed over Captain Baird,

but who had been ordered to a hill fort called Assee-Droog, with the officers of General Matthews, returned; he appeared melancholy and cast down, and extremely shy of communicating with the prisoners, although before his departure he had been on remarkably friendly terms with them. At length, however, the mystery was solved, and he disclosed the fatal history to which we have before cursorily alluded, of the death of sixteen of General Matthews's officers, who had been poisoned with the milk of the cocoa-nut tree.* Besides these it was ascertained, that Lieutenant Matthews of the Bengal establishment, brother to the unhappy General, and Lieutenant Wredon, of the Bombay army, were, by Tippoo's orders, taken out of the fort at Bednore, at ten o'clock at night, carried to a retired place overgrown with grass, and there cut to pieces. Indeed it was certain that orders had actually been issued by the Sultan, to murder all the English officers in his different prisons, who would not enter his ser-

* The following are the names of the English officers who suffered:—

Capt. Campbell, 98th regt.	Lieut. Barnwell.
Capt. Alston, 100th.	Capt. Jackson.
Capt. Fish, do.	Captain Richardson.
Assist.-Surgeon Gifford, do.	Lieut. Olivier.
In the Company's Service.	Capt. Eames.
Brigadier-Major Young.	Capt. Lendrum.
Major Fewtrill.	Capt. R. Culloch.
Capt. Clift.	Commissary Stewart.
Capt. Gottick.	Dep.-Commiss. Cheek.

vice, but that intelligence having arrived in the middle of the bloody work, that the commissioners for negociating a treaty of peace had set out from Madras, the barbarous orders were for the present countermanded.

Rumours like these, which reached the prisoners one day, only to be contradicted the next, as it may easily be conceived, kept them in a constant state of excitement, fluctuating between the brightest hope and the darkest despair. The days passed on, and no new events occurred, by which to form any just idea of the probability of results, except that on the 19th of March, the Subadars, who were confined in another prison, with Captain Leech, were withdrawn, and a servant of the late General Matthews's was removed. These alterations, however, indicated nothing important; but on the 2nd of March, the Myar and a Bramin, whose duty it was to pay the prisoners their scanty allowance, called upon Captains Baird, Lindsay, and Montrath, and having directed that their irons should be struck off, ordered the prisoners to accompany them to the presence of the keeladar.

Baird, who was convinced that this mandate had been issued only because the keeladar had determined to put into execution the barbarous threats which he had some time before fulminated against him, positively refused to stir unless he was informed of the true reason of his being sent for. The Myar, seeing that he was determined,

and knowing that the season for violence was past, announced to him, that peace had been proclaimed—that he had orders to conduct him to Colonel Braithwaite, who had letters for him.

Letters! Home! Friends! Liberty!—all in a breath—who can attempt to describe the crowd of happy thoughts and delightful images that these few words conveyed to his mind?—Those who knew and loved him best, describe the animation of his noble countenance, when, in after-life, his eyes glistened at the recollection of this sudden reverse, when all that was dear to him was restored, at the very moment in which he expected to be doomed either to death or eternal captivity.

When Baird and his companions were conducted to the keeladar, there was a considerable crowd gathered about the Kutcheree, or Court-house, amongst whom were several of the poor lads who had been compelled to become Mussulmans, and to take service in Tippoo's army. The moment they saw Captain Baird, and comprehended the object of his being brought thither, they ran to him, and entreated, on their knees, that they might not be exempted from the general liberation and left behind, and when the keeladar, addressing Captain Baird, told him that, in consequence of the conclusion of peace, he was free! Captain Baird said, "I hope that ALL the British are to be included." "Ah!" replied the keeladar, "not so much as a dog shall be left be-

hind." "Then," said Captain Baird, taking hold of one of the English boys in the Mussulman dress, "I claim these;" upon which the keeladar, treacherous to the last, made a sign to the guard, who instantly surrounded the boys, and drove them away. They were seen no more.

Captain Baird was then conducted to Colonel Braithwaite's prison, where, according to the promise of the Myar, he had the inexpressible delight of receiving the first and only letters from his family and friends, that had reached him for three years and eight months—the tedious period of his horrid captivity; besides which, he found an essential supply of money, from the officers of his regiment for his own use and that of his gallant companions belonging to the 73rd, who had been his co-mates in prison.

With Colonel Braithwaite, Captain Baird found Lieutenant Holmes, of the East India Company's service, who had been taken prisoner with him. They were in a small, dismal dungeon, similar to his own, and had been used very much in the same way that he and his companions had been. After this interview, they were removed from the fort into a Choultry, at Soomna Pettah, a village distant two miles from the fort, where, the next day, they were joined by all the other prisoners, from Seringapatam.

The description which we find in the journal to which we have several times before alluded, of the feelings which were excited in the breasts of the

captives, by the announcement of their immediate liberation, tells us that the pleasure they experienced almost amounted to pain. The whole prison resounded with the frantic voice of excessive joy and exultation.

"This tumult," says the writer, "having in some degree subsided, a proposal was made, and most heartily embraced, to collect all the ready money in our possession, without the least regard to shares or proportions, and to celebrate our approaching deliverance with a regale of plantain fritters and sherbet—the only articles of luxury we could command, on account of our extreme poverty.

"By nine o'clock at night, supper was announced, consisting of sixty dozen of plantain fritters, and a large chatty of sherbet; every one being seated on the ground, the repast was received with the utmost content and satisfaction. Friends and toasts were drunk as long as our chatty stood out; and such was the agitation of our minds, that there was not one of us who felt the least inclination, or, indeed, who possessed the power, to compose himself to sleep.

"We now waited with the utmost impatience for the return of day, and were impressed with a strong desire that our irons might be knocked off immediately; but, to our great mortification, there arrived, about seven in the morning, only one armourer. Every one struggled to have his fetters knocked off first: promises, threats, bustling and

jostling, every expedient that could be imagined was put in practice, in order to obtain that which would come unsought, in the course of a few minutes, or hours at farthest. The same men who had suffered for years the rigours of imprisonment and the menaces of a barbarous policy, with invincible patience and resolution, as well as with general sympathy, were so transported by the near prospect of liberty, that the delay of a few moments seemed now to be more insupportable than even the tedious languor of our long, most alarming, and anxious confinement. About two or three in the afternoon our irons were all knocked off, and we were conducted to the keeladar."

Their limbs being released from restraint, they joined their former companions, Baird and the others, and proceeded with them to Soomna Pettah; on their arrival at which place, having an opportunity of conversing with the soldiers, they had the gratification of receiving every mark of affection and respect from their humbler companions in arms.

At Soomna Pettah they were permitted to walk about, and bathe in the river. Every object and every recreation, however simple, became a source of ardent delight. All the satiety which the free enjoyment of the beauties of nature generates, had been overcome by years of restraint and abstinence; and the mere sight of the country, with all the advantages of scenery and climate, from which they had been so long excluded,

excited of itself alone the most agreeable emotions in their hearts and minds.

One physical fact is curious, but natural; although their irons were knocked off, it was a long time before these liberated prisoners recovered the use of their limbs, so as to walk with perfect freedom. "Never," says the writer of the journal, "was the inveterate power of habit more forcibly displayed, than on this occasion; we could never get the idea of being in fetters out of our heads. No effort of our minds, no act of volition, could, for several days, overcome the habit of making the short and constrained steps to which we had been so long accustomed. Our crippled manner of walking was a subject of laughter to ourselves as well as to others."*

* It may not be uninteresting to the reader, to enumerate the articles which were manufactured by the prisoners during their capitivity. They are as follows:

Hats of leather.

Caps of coarse dungeree.

Stocks of ditto.

Bungar shirts of ditto.

Sir David Baird used frequently to jest about his expertness in cutting out and making his own shirts. One of them he long kept as a memento of his captivity; but it was lost with his carriage and baggage, many years after, during Sir John Moore's retreat at Corunna.

Jackets, ditto.

Waistcoats, trowsers, socks.

Buttons of thread.

Tables of bamboo, covered with mat.

Stools of ditto.

After Captain Baird and his companions had remained some time at Soomna Pettah, in order to procure clothing, and make other necessary preparations for their journey, they set out for Bangalore, escorted by a party of Tippoo's troops. On their arrival at that place, they were detained for a fortnight, and confined with a strictness and severity for which it was very difficult to account, more particularly as Mr. Sadlier, the chief commissioner for negociating the peace, was actually living in Tippoo's bungalow, in his garden, on his way back to Madras.

Captain Baird and some of the officers were

Cots of bamboo, made by means of an old knife, notched into a saw, the cot lashed with coarse rope made from the cocoa-nut.

Bamboo bird-cages.

Bamboo trunks, 1,100 pieces in one trunk.

Rat-traps of ditto.

Squirrel-traps.

Forks.

Backgammon-tables.

Dice, sawn with an old knife, the ivory procured by stealth from the bazaar.

Chess-boards, of paper and cloth.

Cards, two folds of paper and one of cloth, stuck together with thick congee, and polished with the jaw-bone of a sheep.

Ink made of lamp-black, with a little gum-water. One chatty was placed over another to collect the smoke of the wick, which was swept off every day.

Pens of fowl quills.

This catalogue affords a striking example of the power of the human mind, and the convertibility of its resources in the time of need.

permitted to dine with that gentleman. It was the first dinner, properly so called, that they had seen for nearly four years; and, under all the circumstances of the case, confessed by themselves to be one of the most agreeable that they had ever partaken of in their lives.

At length, after various needless delays, the prisoners were allowed to proceed, and on their arrival at Calle, they were joined by Lieutenant Dallas (who had been appointed by the commissioners to receive the prisoners) with a detachment of Madras cavalry, and two companies of Sepoys.

Here, then, the captives were finally released. Lieutenant Dallas had brought out with him clothes, wine, and other necessary stores, from Madras, by order of the government, for their relief. And at this place, once again at liberty, the gallant subject of our memoir took leave, for a time, of Tippoo's territories, to return to them, however, under very different circumstances. It is needless to add, that the rest of the liberated sufferers lost no time in taking advantage of their emancipation, and pushing forward with all possible speed to Madras.

CHAPTER VI.

CAPTAIN BAIRD PROCEEDS TOWARDS MADRAS—INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN ROBERTSON—AT MADRAS FINDS HIMSELF ANTICIPATED IN A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE MAJORITY OF HIS REGIMENT—MEMORIAL OF HIS BROTHER OFFICERS—CONFIRMATION OF GENERAL STEWART'S RECOMMENDATION REFUSED—CAPTAIN BAIRD ASSUMES THE COMMAND OF THE 73D—SECURES THE MAJORITY—PROCEEDS TO ENGLAND—PURCHASES A LIEUTENANT-COLONELCY, AND EXCHANGES INTO HIS OWN REGIMENT—RETURNS TO INDIA—JOINS LORD CORNWALLIS'S ARMY—APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF A BRIGADE—CAPTURE OF HILL FORTS—SIEGE OF RUNDYDROOG—ITS FALL.

In his way to Madras, Captain Baird fell in with a body of his own gallant regiment, the 73d, and it is impossible to describe his feelings, upon recognising his companions in arms, and their recognition of him. In the course of the ensuing evening, he reached Poonamallee, where his particular friend, Captain Robertson, was stationed.

At the time of Captain Baird's arrival at his quarters, Captain Robertson was playing at cards, in the verandah, and Baird, softly stealing behind him, placed himself on the corner of the chair on which he was sitting. Robertson started, and

turned round to see who was the intruder; when, in spite of the change that severe wounds, continuous privation, and nearly four years of rigorous captivity, may be supposed to have worked in the appearance of his gallant young friend, he instantly recognised him, and caught him to his heart.

To this meeting Sir David Baird used frequently to recur, as one of the most gratifying events of his early life.

The next day Robertson accompanied Captain Baird to Madras, and, it was upon his arrival there, that the latter was doomed to receive his first, but by no means the last, severe mortification which he encountered in his professional career. He found, to his inexpressible regret, and, we may justly add, surprise, that during the period of his sufferings, and at the end of a series of active services, General Stewart had recommended Lord William Murray, a junior captain from the half-pay, over his head, for the majority of his regiment, and that, until the appointment were confirmed from home, his lordship was actually in command of the regiment.

The feelings which would be naturally excited in the breast of Captain Baird, by this most unaccountable proceeding, had been anticipated by his brother officers, who, before his return to the regiment, had forwarded a memorial to England, representing the cruel injustice that the confirmation of such an appointment would inflict, not

only upon Captain Baird, the next officer for promotion, personally, but upon the regiment generally.

The eventual result of this memorial, was the refusal, on the part of the Secretary at War, to confirm the appointment to the majority; which (as if in order to exhibit the impropriety and indelicacy of the case in the strongest possible light) turned out not to have been vacant at the time Lord William Murray was nominated to it.

The letter of the Secretary at War, which contained the refusal to ratify General Stewart's nomination, contained some extremely flattering compliments to Captain Baird, who shortly after had the gratification of assuming the command of the 73d, as senior captain, during the absence of Captain Dalrymple, at Pondicherry.*

Captain Baird, after he rejoined the 73d, continued to do duty with his regiment at Madras and Arcot, and then proceeded with it to Bombay, where he experienced the only attack of illness, excepting from wounds, that he ever suffered, during his long and glorious course of service in India.†

* It was not until about this period that the ball which Captain Baird received in his thigh at Perambaukum was extracted.

† Sir David Baird, in speaking of this illness, used to attribute his recovery, under providence, to the care and kindness of Mr. and Mrs. Crawford Bruce, who took him to their country-house, and treated him with the greatest care and kindness.

In the year 1787, Captain Baird received the majority, of which he had before been so nearly deprived; and the same year, having obtained leave of absence, he proceeded to Europe, to enjoy the unspeakable gratification of again beholding his numerous relations and friends.*

Major Baird, whose affection for his family neither time nor circumstances could alter or weaken, arrived safely in his native country. The delight and welcome with which he was received may easily be imagined, and the unmitigated happiness he at that time enjoyed was never effaced from his recollection.

It was while he was staying at his elder brother's

* Major Baird had a very extensive family connection in Scotland. His eldest sister had long been married to Mr. Erskine, of Dunn[redacted], a gentleman of good fortune, and representative of an old family in Angus-shire; of this marriage, the only surviving issue (1831) is the Marchioness of Ailsa. Sir David's second sister married Mr. Renney, of the same neighbourhood; and in 1777, before his departure for India, Sir David was present at the marriage of his favourite sister, favourite, because nearest his own age, to Mr. Wauchope, of Niddrie. She, at the period of his return, in 1787, was the mother of a fine family, whom he had never seen. In his absence, also, his youngest sister, who was remarkably beautiful, had married Lord Haddo, the eldest son of George, Earl of Aberdeen, who died before his father, October 2d, 1791, leaving seven children. His eldest brother, Mr. Baird, of Newbyth, had also married, and lived at the family seat in East Lothian, and he arrived in England in time to be present at the marriage of another sister, to Mr. Gordon, of Haughead, in Aberdeenshire, a near relation of Lord Haddo.

at Newbyth that he received, by express from London, a letter from his friend Captain Dalrymple, from India, which began by entreating him before he read two lines of it, to order post-horses and start for the Horse Guards instantly, wherever he might happen to be.

Captain Dalrymple then proceeded to state, that Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone, of the 71st, had been put on board ship, on the day his letter was despatched, so ill that in all human probability he would not survive the next fortnight; and advised Major Baird immediately to start for head quarters and endeavour to secure the lieutenant-colonelcy for himself, and—the majority for his anxious correspondent.*

Baird, all zeal and activity, and really as anxious for the welfare of his friend as for his own, obeyed the injunctions contained in his letter, and posted day and night to London; but with all his energy and expedition he arrived, alas! too late. Not only had the fatal prognostications respecting Lieutenant-Colonel Elphinstone been but too surely verified; not only had the announcement of his death reached the Secretary of War, before Major Baird's arrival, but the ulterior step of filling up the vacancy had been taken, and

* It may be proper to remark that, just previous to the period here referred to, the 73d Regiment had changed its number to the 71st Highlanders, and that it was in fact the lieutenant-colonelcy and majority of Baird's own regiment to which Captain Dalrymple's letter referred.

Colonel Baring had been actually appointed to the lieutenant-colonelcy.

Major Baird, however, very shortly ascertained that Colonel Baring had no very particular inclination to join his regiment in India, and that if Major Baird could find any officer willing to sell his lieutenant-colonelcy, he (Colonel Baring) could exchange with him, by which means Major Baird might still attain his favourite object of becoming lieutenant-colonel of that regiment in which he had served so long, and to which he was so warmly attached by numerous ties and feelings.

All this, however, was sooner said than done, for Colonel Baring not only stipulated that Major Baird should pay the full price for the lieutenant-colonelcy, but that he should take all the trouble and risk connected with the arrangement of the affair upon himself, and that the various exchanges and commissions should appear simultaneously in the gazette.

In order to facilitate the completion of this somewhat complex arrangement, Major Baird proceeded by another rapid journey to Dublin, (where the officer of whom he was to purchase the lieutenant-colonelcy in the first instance, was quartered,) in order personally to make the necessary arrangements with him, as well as to have an audience of the Lord Lieutenant, whose consent to the sale and purchase was absolutely necessary. Every thing, however, eventually turned out as he

wished; and after a short delay, occasioned as it is represented by the negligence of his agent, the commissions were gazetted as required by Colonel Baring, and the matter was finally and agreeably settled.*

In March, 1791, Lieutenant-Colonel Baird again left England for India, and arrived at Madras in

* When Major Baird was in London at this time, and upon this business, he happened one morning to go into a coffee-house, and was expressing to a friend, who was with him, the annoyance he felt at the negligence of his Scotch agent, who had neglected to send up the money requisite for concluding the purchase of the commission. He had not observed that Mr. Ewen, a Madras civil servant, who had been his fellow passenger on the voyage home, was sitting in the adjoining box, and had been paying particular attention to what he had been saying.

Mr. Ewen, however, followed him out when he quitted the coffee-house, and confessing that he had overheard his conversation, offered him any pecuniary accommodation he might require. Major Baird, although he declined the offer (apprehensive that something more serious than negligence might have delayed his agent's remittances), was yet sensibly touched by the kindness of the proposition, for which he expressed his warmest thanks. But it is curious to observe that in consequence of this very piece of delicacy on his part, coupled with the unwarrantable delay of his man of business, Lord Cavan, Lord Ludlow, and Sir John Moore, were gazetted before him; and trifling as that circumstance appeared at the moment, its consequences were afterwards most striking. With all these officers Sir David afterwards met on service, and was of course their junior (by three or four days), instead of commanding them, both in Egypt and in Spain. Nothing can more fully justify the common remark, that the most important effects frequently result from the most trivial causes.

the June following. Upon reaching that place he found that his regiment (now the 71st,) had taken the field with the army under Lord Cornwallis. It may naturally be supposed that with *his* feelings and anxiety for service, Colonel Baird remained no longer at Fort St. George than was actually necessary for his equipment; he joined the troops at Oussoor, in company with his gallant friend the Hon. Colonel Knox, of the 36th regiment (a brother of Lord Northland's), a most particular friend of his, and who had been his fellow-passenger on the voyage from England.

As soon as Colonels Knox and Baird arrived at head-quarters, Lord Cornwallis nominated the former, who was the senior officer of the two, to the command of a brigade of Europeans; Colonel Baird was appointed to the command of a brigade of Sepoys; and with this appointment commenced his first campaign against Tippoo.

It may be here proper to give the reader some slight idea of the actual state of affairs in India at the time of Colonel Baird's joining the forces in the field.

On the 27th of May, after overcoming a series of difficulties which it is not necessary to recapitulate, Lord Cornwallis's army had encamped opposite to Seringapatam, in front of what are called the French Rocks, having previously ascertained that the army of Purseram Bhow, amounting to 20,000 horse and foot, and two battalions of Sepoys commanded by Captain Little, were approaching

to effect a junction with the English, and that they would be almost immediately followed by 12,000 horse commanded by Hurry Punt.

Tippoo obtained intelligence of this proposed union of his enemies, and although he had been greatly elated by the disasters which the climate and other misfortunes had occasioned in Lord Cornwallis's army, he resolved, if possible to conclude a peace with his lordship, before this formidable concentration of force could be effected; and accordingly on the day succeeding that on which they took up their position, Tippoo sent a flag of truce and presents of fruit for the use of the English Commander-in-chief. The flag and the fruit were returned with an answer declaring that the English could make no peace which did not include their allies; and that no negociation, even should Tippoo agree to that stipulation, would be entered into, unless, as a preliminary step, all British subjects who were prisoners in Tippoo's dominions were, in the first instance, unconditionally liberated. To this part of the proposition Tippoo replied by denying that he had any British subjects prisoners.

On the 28th, the British army fell back towards Milgotah to effect its junction with the Mahratta forces. The meeting and conference between Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows, and the chiefs Hurry Punt and Purseram Bhow were highly satisfactory to all parties.

The junction was effected most seasonably, for this immense force came provided with every article not only of necessity but luxury; and the English soldiers, after having been subjected to the greatest privations, ran with delight and eagerness to purchase (at exorbitant prices, it is true,) comforts to which they had been for some time utter strangers.*

Lord Cornwallis had a difficult card to play to keep on friendly terms with his allies. He was obliged to defer to all their superstitions, and to endure their constant inattention to their appointments; want of punctuality being with them a mark of dignity. Nor was it less necessary for his lordship to be constantly on the alert in order to induce them to keep steadily to the arrangements entered into for the prosecution of the

* The description of the appearance of the Mahratta camp, as given by Major Dirom in his work on this campaign, is extremely graphic.

"The Mahratta camp," says the writer, "was at the distance of above six miles from ours, and on approaching it had the appearance of a large irregular town; for the chiefs pitch their standards, and take up their ground around the general, without order; and their tents, being of all sizes, and many different colours, at a distance resembled houses rather than canvass. The streets too of the camp, crossing and winding in every direction, display a variety of merchandize, as in a great fair. There are jewellers, smiths, mechanics, and people of every trade and description, as busily employed in their occupations, attending as minutely to their interests, as if they were at Poonah and at peace."—*Vide Dirom's Campaign*, p. 10.

war, since it appeared equally characteristic of their high caste to be as careless of promises, as unmindful of appointments.*

Lord Cornwallis, however, continued actively and zealously employed in strengthening himself on all sides, and on the 10th of August he was joined by a reinforcement from Amboor, consisting of one hundred elephants, marching two and two abreast, (on the foremost of which was displayed the British flag,) accompanied by six thousand bullocks loaded with rice, one hundred carts loaded with arrack, and several thousand Coolies with trunks and baskets of private supplies.

About this period another attempt was made by Tippoo to open negociations with the confederated powers, and for that purpose he despatched a Vakeel, named Apagy Row, to Oussoor (where Colonel Baird joined the army), but it was soon evident, from his pertinacious adherence to matters of mere form and ceremony, that he had been

* Major Dirom gives the following trait illustrative of their customs and discipline.

"The ground," says he, "upon which our army had encamped at the junction, being bare of grass and extremely dirty, Lord Cornwallis was desirous of marching, and sent to the Mahratta chiefs to request they would move next morning, as their camp lay directly in our route; they returned for answer, 'that they should be happy to obey his lordship's commands, but as they had halted eight days, it was not lucky, nor could they, according to the custom of their religion, march on the ninth day.' His lordship gave way to their superstitious prejudice and deferred his march."

sent rather as a spy than an ambassador, (not always incompatible characters,) and he was sent back to his master without having been permitted even to enter the camp.

It was after this occurrence, and after he had taken every precaution with regard to the efficiency of his commissariat, that Lord Cornwallis resolved upon the reduction of several hill forts, which lying between Bangalore and Gurramconda, interrupted his free communication with the Nizam's army, and endangered the regularity of whatever supplies he might expect from that quarter, or which might be brought by that route from the Carnatic. These forts were called Raymanghur, Ambajee - Durum, Chillum - Cottah, Rundy-Droog, and Callarumconda, in the neighbourhood of China Balaporam, a highly cultivated and fertile district, through which our army had already passed, in going to join the Nizam's troops, after the reduction of Bangalore.

Of these forts, Raymanghur was taken by Major Gowdie and Captain Read; and on the 18th of September, Ambajee-Durum, and Chillum-Cottah, the former five, and the latter ten miles from Raymungur, surrendered at the first summons of the latter officer.

It was immediately after the arrival of Colonel Baird that the siege of Nundy Droog was decided upon, and the particulars of the execution of that design are much too important to be passed over without particular notice.

Nundy Droog, the capital of a very extensive and valuable district, is built upon the summit of a mountain one thousand seven hundred feet in height; three-fourths of its circumference are positively inaccessible, and the only side on which it can be ascended was protected by two strong walls and an outwork, which, covering the gateway, afforded a formidable flank fire.

The great object was to cut a road to the top of a hill near the mountain, upon which a battery was erected, and guns carried up with infinite labour; but when all these extraordinary preparations had been made, it was discovered that the distance was too great, and the battery wholly ineffective. Under these circumstances there was no alternative but to abandon the attack, or attempt to work up the face of this rugged and stupendous mountain to within breaching distance of the fort. The latter was adopted. The exertions and labour required to form a gun-road and erect batteries in the front of this work, exceeded any thing previously known in India, and for a fortnight the troops were employed in the arduous work under a constant and tremendous fire.

On the 17th of October two breaches were reported practicable, and the following day Lord Cornwallis, with a view to intimidate the garrison, encamped within four miles of the fort, and having examined the breaches, ordered the firing to be continued against the fort till night, and that the rising of the moon should be the signal for

attack. The period for the assault was afterwards delayed till a later hour.

Captain Robertson, the senior officer of flank companies, whose name has been before mentioned in this memoir, led the grenadiers of the 36th and 71st regiments to the breach in the curtain, and Captain Hart took the command of the light companies which were to attack the outwork, while Captain Doveton, with the flank companies of the 4th native infantry, were destined to escalade the inner wall. General Medows, second in command of the army, himself headed the storming party.*

No sooner had the gallant band rushed forward to the attack, than they were discovered by the enemy. The fort was instantaneously illuminated with blue lights, and a heavy fire of cannon, musketry, and rockets was immediately opened upon the assailants. Luckily it was ill-directed; but, nevertheless, infinite mischief was done by heavy stones thrown down the rock, which gaining increased power and velocity in their descent, made great havock amongst the ascending troops. The storming party, however, effected a lodgement in both the breaches, and having

* When every disposition had been made for the attack, and the time for moving forward had nearly arrived, some one observed, inconsiderately, in the hearing of the troops, that it was reported there was a mine very near the breach, General Medows, overhearing the remark, said, "A mine! If it be a mine, my boys, it must be a mine of gold."

pursued the enemy with sufficient rapidity to prevent their barricadoing the gate of the inner wall, forced it open and entered the body of the place.

The slaughter which must have ensued would have been dreadful, if great numbers of the inhabitants had not effected their escape over a low wall on the other side. To this circumstance in some degree, but still more particularly to the humane exertions of Captain Robertson, who, seeing the place was carried, made every exertion to save the effusion of blood, may be justly attributed the smallness of the loss on the part of the enemy.

The principal people and fighting men taken, were sent prisoners to Vellore; the women and Brahmins were conducted to a small hill fort about six miles from the scene of action.

For this gallant affair, the consequence of which was the immediate surrender of Cummeldroog, a hill fort dependent on Nundy Droog, the troops concerned, received the thanks of Lord Cornwallis.

CHAPTER VII.

SIEGE OF SAVENDROOG—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BAIRD COMMANDS A BRIGADE—CAPTURE OF THE FORT—LORD CORNWALLIS CONCENTRATES HIS FORCES—MARCH OF THE ALLIED ARMIES FROM HOOLEADROOG—ARRIVE BEFORE SERINGAPATAM—ACCOUNT OF THAT PLACE—ORDERS ISSUED FOR THE MARCH—DETAIL—COLONEL BAIRD ATTACHED TO THE THIRD COLUMN—GALLANT ATTACK AND PURSUIT OF THE ENEMY—PERILOUS SITUATION—JOINED BY COLONEL STEWART—GENERAL MEDOWS DECEIVED BY HIS GUIDES—FAILS TO EXECUTE LORD CORNWALLIS'S DESIGN—HIS FEELINGS ON THE OCCASION—COLONEL BAIRD ORDERED TO RE-CROSS THE RIVER—ARRIVAL OF THE BOMBAY ARMY.

EVEN after the fall of Nundy Droog, and the other Droogs which we have enumerated, there yet remained another more important object to be attained—namely, the reduction of Savendroog, the enemy's possession of which, appeared to Lord Cornwallis to be one of the most serious obstacles to the reduction of Seringapatam. It was a place of immense strength—one huge mountain rising to the height of half a mile from a base eight or ten miles in circumference, enclosed by a wall on every side, and defended in every possible way, wherever it seemed to have been left vulnerable by nature. It had the peculiar advantage of

being divided, towards its summit, into two hills, both of which being strongly fortified, formed, in fact, two citadels, capable of holding out, independently of the lower works, and naturally affording shelter and security to the garrison, even in the very last extremity.

Situated eighteen miles west of Bangalore, its position, in a military point of view, was formidable and commanding. It was no less celebrated for its strength and age, than for its noxious atmosphere, whence it derived its fearful name of Savendroog—the rock of death. The garrison to whose care it was entrusted, at the period of which we are speaking, confided greatly in this combination of defences, more especially as the rock itself was surrounded on all sides by a bamboo jungle. Indeed, Tippoo is said to have been very highly elated when he was apprised of Lord Cornwallis's intention to attack it, and even congratulated his army on the rashness of his enemy's undertaking an affair which must end in their discomfiture, seeing, as he expressed himself, that half the Europeans who besieged it would be killed in the attack, and the other half destroyed by the noxiousness of the climate.*

* The labour of penetrating such a jungle or wood, can only be appreciated by those who are acquainted with the peculiar character of that shrubby bush, the bamboo, which grows in clumps, from the corners of rocks, and more effectually, perhaps, than any other tree resists the influence of fire, or the operation of the axe. A jungle, or "bound hedge" as in this case it was

The preliminary measures of this memorable siege, having been taken under circumstances of inconceivable difficulty, (the troops being in many places obliged to drag the guns over rocks of considerable height, and nearly perpendicular,) two batteries were opened on the 17th of December, one at a thousand, and the other at seven hundred yards. On the 19th, another battery was opened, which had been advanced to within two hundred and fifty yards of the wall; and in the course of that and the succeeding day, made a practicable breach; whereupon Lord Cornwallis ordered the assault to be made on the 21st.

The storming party was entrusted to the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Nesbitt, and directed to four different attacks. Captain Gage, with the grenadier and light infantry of the 76th, to gain the eastern hill on the left; the Honourable Captain Monson, with the light company of the 52d to scour the works towards the western hill; and the Honourable Captain Lindsay and Captain Robertson, with the flankers of the 71st, to attack whatever works or parties they might discover in the hollow or ravine between the eastern and western peak of this military Parnassus. The 52d and 72d regiments were to follow the flankers.

termed (and the word will be found hereafter to recur frequently in the account of the sieges of Seringapatam), surrounded the whole of the lines of the stupendous fortress of Savendroog.

Lieutenant-Colonel Baird, with his brigade of Sepoys, was directed to proceed, very early in the morning, to the opposite side of the mountain, to make his way through the jungle, and shew himself in force just at the time that the assault was made on the other side, in order, in the first instance, to draw off the attention of the garrison, and, in the second place, to be prepared to cut them off, should they attempt to escape on that side.

This service Colonel Baird most successfully executed, notwithstanding the difficulties which the nature of the ground opposed to him; and made good his entrance into the fort on one side, at the very moment the storming party had carried the place on the other; and such was the ardour of the attack, that Captain Monson, with his own company of the 52d, and a serjeant and twelve grenadiers of the 71st, entered the different barriers, mingled with the retreating enemy, and killing a considerable number (amongst whom was the second keeladar), they never relaxed their exertions, till they got possession of the top of the mountain, when the head keeladar was captured. Some idea may be formed of the boldness and rapidity of the pursuit, when the reader is told, that the man who was shutting the first gate against the assailants, was shot by Serjeant Leary, of the 71st.

The promptness and gallantry of our troops need little eulogy on this occasion, further than

the statement, that the hitherto-believed impregnable fortress of Savendroog fell into their possession, after a storm in open day, *without the loss of one individual,*—one soldier only having been wounded in the attack.—In a few hours after the completion of this important conquest, in which he bore so effective a part, Col. Baird and his brigade returned to the camp.

On the 24th the important fortress of Outredroog, twelve miles from Savendroog, was taken by Lieut.-Col. Stuart's detachment, without the loss of a single man; and on that day Lord Cornwallis followed with the army, and encamped at Magré, a place lying between the two places.*

* "Colonel Stuart, on his arrival before Outredroog, sent a party to summon the place. The keeladar, who, when summoned the year before, had answered that he would not surrender his post till we had taken Seringapatam, seemed still determined in that intention, and, to avoid any communication, fired on the flag of truce.

"In consequence of this conduct, Colonel Stuart made his disposition to attack the lower fort and Pettah next morning. Captain Scott, of the Bengal Establishment, with four battalion companies of the 52d and 72d regiments, and his own battalion of Sepoys, were sent on this service: while another body made a feint and opened some guns on the opposite side of the fort.

"Captain Scott carried the lower part of the fort by *escalade* so rapidly, that the keeladar sent to request a parley; while this took place, an appearance of treachery was observed in the upper fort, and that the garrison were employed in moving and pointing guns to bear upon the assailants. Fired at this sight, and impatient of delay, the troops again rushed on

These conquests were followed by the capture of several other important places, the garrisons of which, strongly affected by the fate of Savendroog, no longer seemed disposed to offer resistance to a force which they began to believe irresistible.

It would be foreign to our purpose to enter into the details of Lord Cornwallis's arrangements subsequent to the fall of the places we have enumerated, and the siege and relief of Gurramcondah. Suffice it to say, that having, towards the end of January, 1792, concentrated his forces, and made every necessary disposition for carrying into effect his intended expedition against the capital of the Mysore country, he commenced the march of the

to the assault. Lieutenant M'Innes, of the 72d regiment, led the storm with part of the Europeans and the pioneers, commanded by Lieutenants Dowse and Macpherson, supported by Captain Scott, who followed in more regular order with the rest of his force. Some of the gateways were broken open, others escaladed, till passing five or six different walls which defended the steep and difficult rock, the troops at length gained the summit, and put the garrison to the sword. So infatuated were the enemy, that whenever they saw a single European above the walls they fled, and although such was the steepness and narrowness of some parts of the road in the ascent, that a few resolute men might have defended the place against an army, it was only at the last gateway that they attempted any resistance, and that only by firing a few musquet shot, by which two soldiers were wounded. The keeladar was made prisoner; a number of the garrison were killed, and many, terrified at the approach of the Europeans with their bayonets, are said to have precipitated themselves over the rocks."—*Dirom's Narrative, pp.* 74, 75.

allied armies from Hooleadroog on the 1st of February in that year, and on the 5th of the same month, having arrived on its ground, took up its position under the French rocks, about six miles from Seringapatam.

The camp was divided by the Lockany, a small stream whose course is from the lake below Milgotah, through the valley to the Cavery, of which it is a tributary stream. The right wing of the British army reached from the river, along the rear of the French rocks, to a large tank which covered that flank; the left wing with the artillery reached from the other side of the Lockany to the foot of the hills which had been last passed. The stores and baggage being parted between the line and the reserve (joined afterwards) at about a mile distance.

The whole force was so disposed as to create the least possible alarm to Tippoo, who was encamped with all his force under the walls of Seringapatam, having previously cleared the country of every thing like forage, which might otherwise have been within reach of his enemies.

From the position taken up by the English, there was a perfect view of the city, and of the sultan's fortified camp. Colonel Baird was not a man who ever enlarged upon his personal feelings on any occasion,—yet even *he* admitted that the sensations he experienced on his return to Seringapatam, under circumstances so utterly at variance with those under which he first beheld it, were of

no ordinary nature, nor could they be easily controlled when he found himself in a proud situation of command, reconnoitering the spot where for nearly four years he had suffered the torture of an unmitigated confinement, aggravated by the barbarity of the tyrant with whom he now came to cope upon equal ground.

As we shall have to recount the events of two sieges of this most important fortress of Seringapatam, it may not be unnecessary (although perhaps the subject may be familiar to many of our readers) to give a short topographical sketch of its position and defences.

Seringapatam is situated on an island in the river Cavery; on either side of which, a space of land, opposite to the island, is enclosed within what is called a bound hedge, or fringe of bamboo jungle. This jungle is the limit of the capital, and moreover offers shelter to the people of the country, being on the outer side, from incursions of predatory cavalry. The space within this bound hedge, on the south side of the river, was filled with inhabitants—that on the north side was occupied by Tippoo's troops.

The space comprized within the bound hedge on the north side of the river, is about three miles in length, and of a breadth varying from half a mile to a mile, stretching from the western end of the island to the estuary of the Lockany, where it falls into the Cavery. Within this enclosure was the most commanding ground, on the north side of the

fort, for besides the bound hedge, it was covered in front by rice-fields, by a large canal, and partly by the windings of the Lockany itself. The left of the encampment was covered by a very large and powerful redoubt, near a mosque on a rising ground within the north-west of the hedge, while four other redoubts upon elevated positions, although not so much advanced as the one already mentioned, added most strikingly to the strength of a position, the right of which was not only equally well covered by the Lockany, but beyond that river by the great Carrighaut Hill, which Tippoo had recently fortified most efficiently, and which being opposite to the lower part of the island, actually commanded the ford.

The eastern end of the island was fortified towards the river by various redoubts and batteries, so that the island itself formed a second line, which supported the defence of the first line, on the other side of the river; thus it was clear, that if the enemy were beaten from their posts on the main land, they could with perfect safety retreat into the island, and then into the fort, as if they were falling back from outworks to the body of a place.

Tippoo had most judiciously fortified himself. In his first line, a camp—in which camp he had at least a hundred pieces of cannon, and in the island and fort (which, as we have just observed, formed in fact his second line,) at least three times that number.

Having taken up his position then, on the 5th of February, Lord Cornwallis, on the morning of the 6th, ordered Colonel Maxwell, who commanded the left wing, to proceed with the chief engineer, and a strong party from Colonel Baird's brigade, which Baird himself commanded, to reconnoitre the right of the enemy's position:—very shortly after Colonel Maxwell had made his report to Lord Cornwallis, the following orders were issued—

"February 6, 1792.

"The army marches in three divisions, at seven this evening, to attack the enemy's camp and lines. Picquets to join field-pieces, quarter and rear-guard and camp to stand fast.

Right division—General Medows.

36, 76 } Regiments—Lieut.-Col. Nesbitt.

3rd Brigade—Lieut.-Col. Cockerell.

22d Native Battalion—Capt. Oram.

Lieut. Lennox's Pioneers, a detachment of officers from the Engineer Corps, and a proportion of scaling ladders.

Centre—Lord Cornwallis.

52, 71, 74 } Regiments—Lieut.-Col. Knox.

4th Brigade—Major Russell.

2nd, 21st } Native Battalions—Major Langley.

Lieut. Dowse's Pioneers, a detachment of officers from the Engineers, and a proportion of scaling ladders.

Left division—Lieut.-Col. Maxwell.

72nd Regiment, 5th Brigade } Lieut.-Col. Baird.

Ensign Sloper's Pioneers, and a proportion of scaling ladders.

In the right division there were 900 Europeans, and 2,400 Natives—together, 3,300 men.

In the centre, 1,400 Europeans, and 2,300 Natives, making 3,700.

And in the left division, 500 Europeans, and 1,200 Natives, making 1,700. Altogether comprising 2,800 Europeans, and 5,900 Natives. A total of 8,700 men.

Nothing could be more beautiful or more imposing than the movement of these gallant troops; the evening was cool and calm, and the moon shone in all its splendour, and as the steady columns moved to the attack, not a sound could be heard but the tramp of their feet as they marched to victory.

The plan of the attack was as bold as it was novel, and perhaps its boldness and novelty may best account for Tippoo's disbelief in its probability. With *his* views and ideas of military tactics he could not be persuaded that Lord Cornwallis would think of attacking a fortified camp—a powerful army—and a large train of artillery—with infantry alone, without cannon; and at night; nor were our allies themselves at all convinced of the prudence of the Commander-in-chief in trusting his infantry to fight at such odds; but when they were told that he was gone himself personally to mingle in such a conflict, their amazement knew no bounds.

We shall, of course, notice the proceedings of the different divisions of the army, but the third or left column being that to which the gallant sub-

ject of this memoir was attached, it is the only one of which we are enabled from his personal observations to give a distinct account.

The troops proceeded in silence along the hills on the left of the line to the enemy's post on the Carrighaut Hill. This was about half-past ten; and just as the centre column within a mile of the bound hedge had disturbed the enemy's grand guard, a body of cavalry who were advancing towards our camp to harass and annoy us with rockets as they had previously done, rapidly retired, the moment they discovered the approach of the column, leaving, however, the rocket-boys to endeavour to impede its march.

Just at this moment the great Carrighaut Hill became illuminated with the fire of the musquetry of the left division; the whole line being alarmed by the rocketing below, and the sentries having fired on the advance of Colonel Baird's column, he instantly dashed forward, sprang over the breastwork before they were aware of his intention, and, gallantly backed by his brave comrades, drove all before him at the point of the bayonet. The enemy fled to a post lower down, near a pagoda, into which Colonel Baird followed them till they were forced from the hill, when he was compelled to halt his men and wait for Colonel Maxwell, who, upon his arrival, also halted for a short time to observe the movements of the centre column, which at that time had become generally engaged. As soon as he perceived, by watching the line of fire, that this

column was evidently gaining ground, he ordered Colonel Baird to proceed down the hill with the advance, and pointed out the road, which proved to be nothing better than a difficult, steep, rocky, and winding path; and when Baird, whose anxiety to get forward nothing could check, reached a water-course to which it appeared the path only led, and with which it terminated, his astonishment may be better conceived than described, when, on turning round, he found himself accompanied but by one officer (Wheatly), and about twelve grenadiers of the 72d regiment, and a few Sepoys.

At this moment a heavy firing began on his left, and, true to his principle of advancing, he again pushed forward at the head of his little band, and luckily fell in with the rest of his men, who having been less eager than their commander in the pursuit of glory, had continued to descend the hill by an easier though somewhat more circuitous rout. Thus strengthened and cheered, Colonel Baird continued to follow the enemy even across the Lockany river into their own camp.

The troops of this column were very much galled by the enemy during their descent, for besides being harassed from the other side of the water-course, they had to sustain the fire of the right of Tippoo's line within the bound hedge; they however eventually dashed through the enemy's camp, and effected a junction with the centre of Lord Cornwallis's division. In descend-

ing the hill Captain Mackenzie of the 72d regiment was killed, and Major Fraser of the same regiment severely wounded.

Colonel Baird, when he reached the enemy's camp, fell in with Major Petrie, and a small party of the 72d regiment, and immediately expressed the most anxious desire to cross the north branch of the Cavery, but the water was deep and rapid, the bottom rocky and uncertain, and the attempt appeared extremely hazardous. It was however made, and in spite of all the natural difficulties, considerably aggravated by a heavy fire from the lines and batteries on the island, Colonel Baird, after a desperate struggle, in which the 71st and 72d regiments lost a great many men, gained the opposite bank, with Lieutenant Sutherland, and about twenty men of the 72d, and was almost immediately followed by Major Petrie, and another small party. The moment they had reached a place of safety, if dry land exposed to fire may be so called, they discovered, that in fording the river, which in some places was neck deep, they had destroyed all their ammunition, and found themselves actually on the island, within the lines of their ferocious enemy, without a serviceable cartridge; the British weapon, the bayonet, was, however, left them, and no doubt exists, that had its use been necessary, it would have been found as efficient upon that occasion as it has been in British hands, every where else in the world. It fortunately was not

required, for as the party advanced towards the batteries in front of which they had landed, they found that the enemy had been just driven out of them by Colonel Knox's division.

Colonel Maxwell had discovered a better ford to the left, than that by which the more impetuous of the troops had passed, and entered the island, followed by Colonel Stewart, who having joined Baird and Knox at the Pettah, a town on the outside of the fortress of Seringapatam, assumed the command of the whole, as senior officer.

It would occupy a larger space of our memoir than we should be justified in giving to details which have already been before the public, were we to enter into a minute description of the operations of the other divisions of the victorious army; but in order to give some idea of the results, it is necessary to state, that the intention of Lord Cornwallis was to penetrate with the centre division the centre of the enemy's position; and in pursuance of these intentions, his lordship's orders were that the two other columns, the right under General Medows, and the left under Colonel Maxwell, should turn the two flanks and move forward, so as to join the centre column through the middle of the enemy's camp—that is to say, from flanks to centre.

In these arrangements, the centre and the left completely succeeded; but unfortunately, the right being misled by their guides, got too near the Eadgeah, a redoubt near the mosque, which

we have already noticed as protecting the enemy's left flank, and which Lord Cornwallis had no intention whatever of disturbing, but which, as it turned out, Colonel Herbert, who commanded the advance of this column, found himself absolutely compelled to attack.

This proved an extremely severe business, and, although ultimately successful, caused a great loss of time and strength; besides which, in consequence of the exertions necessary to secure that redoubt, they were obliged to leave the enemy in possession of two others, which lay in their line of march, and the capture of which did actually form part of Lord Cornwallis's plan of attack.

The possession of those redoubts by the enemy, situated as they were in the centre of the camp, compelled the British forces to return to the outside of the bound-hedge, after having passed it, and so to march towards the centre division; under the immediate command of Lord Cornwallis, which by some fatality they missed, and it was not until they found their way to the Carrighaut Hill, on the extreme left, that they fell in with any part of the English army.

The feelings of General Medows, at this most untoward frustration of his own hopes, and the designs of the Commander-in-chief, may easily be imagined, although it was universally admitted, that no blame whatever could personally attach to him. Sir David Baird used, whenever he related

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the particulars of this affair, to state his entire conviction, that the whole misadventure arose from the stupidity of the guides; and added, that in night-attacks such mistakes must often occur.*

Although the success of the British force had been eminent, much yet remained to be done, in order to secure the rich harvest of victory. Colonel Baird was ordered to remain with Colonel Stewart, who took up a position across the island, of which Colonel Baird commanded the left division.

The gallant conduct of the troops, on every occasion during this trying service, but particularly the defence of the Sultan's redoubt, by Captain Sibbald, of the 21st, who gloriously fell within it, are already chronicled in the annals of fame. Suffice it therefore to say, that the successes of the following night put Lord Cornwallis in a situation to commence operations against the fortress of Seringapatam, on the 9th of February, 1792, when he made his arrangements for the siege. Colonel

* When General Medows at last *did* meet Lord Cornwallis on the Carrighaut Hill, which the reader will recollect was on the extreme left of the whole line, he naturally exclaimed, "Why, Medows, where have you been all night?" "Your Lordship may well ask that question," said the mortified General, and after giving all the explanation he could of the disaster, perceiving Lord Cornwallis to be wounded in the hand, he said, with an expression of stronger feeling than the words convey, "It is I, my Lord, and not you, who should have got a rap over the knuckles on this occasion."

Stewart was then ordered to maintain his position in the island, while Colonels Knox and Baird were directed to re-cross the river with their brigades, and take up their positions in the new camp; where on the 16th Lord Cornwallis was joined by the Bombay army, under the command of General Sir Robert Abercromby.

CHAPTER VIII.

ORDERS FOR OPENING THE TRENCHES—TIPPOO'S DISTRESS AND REVENGE—DESTRUCTION OF HIS BEAUTIFUL GARDENS—ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE LORD CORNWALLIS—FRUSTRATED—ATTEMPT TO DISLODGE GENERAL ABERCROMBY—ITS FAILURE—TIPPOO'S DEFEAT—EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE SIEGE—STOPPED BY NEGOCIATION—TREATY—DELAYS OF TIPPOO—HIS SONS SENT AS HOSTAGES—ACCOUNT OF THEIR RECEPTION—STRIKING ANECDOTE OF GENERAL MEDOWS—TREACHERY OF TIPPOO—HOSTAGES PUT UNDER RESTRAINT—TIPPOO'S EXPLANATION—TREATY SIGNED AND DELIVERED—PEACE CONCLUDED—THE ARMY RETURNS TO THE DIFFERENT PRESIDENCIES.

THE arrival of the Bombay army was an event of the highest importance; consisting as it did of four European regiments, and seven battalions of Sepoys, it put at the disposal of Lord Cornwallis a force of 2,000 Europeans, and 4,000 natives; and his lordship thus reinforced, issued his orders, on the 19th of February, for opening the trenches, giving directions for a diversion to be made simultaneously from the island, in order to break up the enemy's horse-camp, on the south side of the river.

It does not appear necessary, in this place, to detail minutely the progress of this vastly important siege, which was carried on with the most consummate skill and unqualified courage. Tippoo, as the work of conquest proceeded, became more and more irritated; the condition of his mind may be better imagined than described, when he saw his beautiful gardens hacked to pieces by the enemy, and that, too, merely as a preparatory step to the destruction of his citadel. He could not command his feelings, but indulged his animosity and revenge, by firing, from all parts of the fort, towards an army which, being out of range of his shot, witnessed with scorn and impunity the ill-judged effects of his malice and indignation.

Tippoo, however, had recourse to expedients more dangerous to the interests of his enemies than these displays. He despatched a party of horsemen in the night, to assassinate Lord Cornwallis; and in all probability they would have effected their sanguinary purpose, had they not betrayed their intentions, by too anxiously inquiring for his lordship's tent. When they were discovered, they galloped off with such rapidity, that they suffered little for their rashness—a rashness by no means indicative of inherent bravery, but rather attributable to the state of intoxication to which it is necessary to bring the troops of the native princes before they can be excited to undertake such perilous expeditions.

Tippoo, at length, wearied with the sight of

his progressive ruin, resolved to make one desperate effort to dislodge General Abercromby, who was in command of the Bombay army. But as that effort was unsuccessful, so it was his last. After maintaining an action for the whole day under the guns of the fort, he was forced to retreat towards evening, and thenceforward abandoned all hope of retrieving his broken fortunes.

On the nights of the 22d and 23d of February, the second parallel was completed, and the ground for breaching batteries was marked out within about five hundred yards of the fort, and furnaces for heating shot were prepared. These batteries, one of twelve and the other of twenty guns, would have been ready to open on the 1st of March; which, together with the cross fire from the island, and Sibbald's redoubt, with the mortars and howitzers of the train, would have brought no less than fifty pieces of ordnance to bear upon the enemy. In addition to this force, Purseram Bhow's army, consisting of 20,000 cavalry, and several thousand infantry, with thirty pieces of cannon, were, as well as a brigade of Sepoys, commanded by Captain Little, hourly expected. Major Cuppage, from the Coimbettore country, with a European brigade, three battalions of Sepoys, and several field-pieces, had already ascended the Guzzelhatty Pass, to which place supplies, to a vast amount, from Trichinopoly and Pulgautcherry were in readiness to be brought up. Lord Cornwallis had the entire command of the

grain merchants in all quarters, whilst a constant supply was ensured from the Malabar coast, in communication with General Abercromby.

With such prospects and advantages, what had the besiegers to fear? But, under the same circumstances, what had the besieged to hope? It is impossible to describe the dejection, the sorrow, the disappointment, which filled the breast of every soldier in the army, when, on the very eve of conquest, and on the threshold of glory, orders were received from head-quarters, on the morning of the 24th, to discontinue working at the trenches, and to desist from all further hostilities.

The preliminaries of peace between the confederated powers and Tippoo had been settled the previous night; a fact, the announcement of which was not rendered more palatable to the troops by being coupled with another; namely, that long since the negociations had been entered into, and even after they had actually received the order to desist from work and hostilities, a heavier fire than ever was kept up upon them from the great guns, and even musketry, of the fort, wherever they could be brought to bear upon them; nor was it until noon that this outrageous infraction of every honourable principle was put a stop to.

By the four articles of the treaty which had been entered into, it was stipulated:—

I. That one-half of Tippoo's dominions, of which he was possessed before the war, should be ceded to the allies.

II. That he should pay three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, in gold mohurs, pagodas, and bullion.

III. That all prisoners of the four powers should be unequivocally released.

IV. That two of Tippoo's three eldest sons should be given as hostages for the performance of the treaty.

This last article has formed the subject of so many works, literary and graphic, and was so replete with interesting consequences, that we shall not hesitate to give a condensed account of its fulfilment, from the work of Major General Dirom, to whom we are already indebted for many particulars connected with this campaign, in which he himself bore a distinguished and honourable part.

Some time was spent in persuading Tippoo to consent to the terms which were proposed to him, and even when, as a last sacrifice, he had made up his mind to part with his children, the uneasiness their proposed departure excited in the seraglio was extreme, and another day was begged, under the pretence that they were not quite prepared to attend his lordship. Lord Cornwallis, not insensible to the ties of nature, kindly granted the request.

On the 26th, at noon, it was found that the step must be taken, and accordingly the young princes left the fort, which was everywhere crowded to witness their departure. Their father was on the rampart over the gateway. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired as they left the

fort; another salute of twenty-one guns was fired as soon as they reached our camp, and the line which they passed, turned out and received them with all the honours of royalty. They were met by Sir John Kennaway, the Mahratta and Nizam vakeels, and so conducted to Lord Cornwallis's tent.

Their procession was splendid and picturesque in the extreme. It was led by several camel hurcarrahs and seven standard-bearers, carrying small green standards suspended from rockets, followed by a hundred pikemen, bearing spears inlaid with silver. The princes were mounted each on an elephant richly caparisoned, seated in silver howdahs, and attended by their vakeels. Two hundred Sepoys and a body-guard of horse brought up the rear. As they approached the English headquarters, the battalion of Bengal Sepoys, commanded by Captain Welch, formed a street through which they passed.

Lord Cornwallis, surrounded by his staff, and attended by the principal officers of his army, received the princes at the door of his tent, and having embraced, led them, one in either hand, to seats which had been prepared for them, placing himself between them. When he had done so, Gullam Ally, the chief vakeel, addressed his lordship, and said: "These children were this morning the sons of the sultan, my master; their situation is now changed, and they must look up to your lordship as their father."

Lord Cornwallis, who had received the princes as though they had been his own children, assured the vakeel, as well as the princes themselves, that every attention should be paid them, and every care taken of their persons. Their little faces brightened up; the scene became highly interesting, and not only their own attendants, but all the spectators, were delighted to see that their confidence was established, and that they would be soon reconciled to their new friends.

The grace and elegance of both the boys, and the propriety of their manners, had a striking effect upon the English, particularly those of the younger one; independently of being, not only the favourite son of Tippoo and his intended heir, but moreover handsomer in his person and more amiable in his manners, he became an object of increased interest from the fact that his mother, a beautiful delicate woman, sister of Burham-ud-Deen, who was killed at Sottimungulum, had actually died of alarm in the early part of the siege. After some conversation, Lord Cornwallis presented each of them with a gold watch, which pleased them greatly. Betel nut and otto of roses being served according to custom, they departed, and the next day Lord Cornwallis went in state, to visit them at the tents which had been pitched for their reception, when they presented his lordship with two Persian swords; Lord Cornwallis, in return, gave the elder a fowling-piece, and the younger a pair of pistols. The

splendour and magnificence with which, even in their captivity, they received Lord Cornwallis, produced a very extraordinary sensation in the minds of the Europeans who witnessed them.*

After this interesting ceremony, which seemed to mark the termination of hostilities, great delay

* On the day of the arrival of the princes in camp, a circumstance occurred productive of great alarm and uneasiness, but which fortunately did not terminate fatally. General Medows, to whose bravery, skill, and good conduct, Lord Cornwallis repeatedly and pointedly referred, in private conversations and public orders, during the siege, never recovered the mortification he experienced by the failure of his division of the army in the night attack, which, although (as we have already shewn,) it originated in the negligence and ignorance of his guides, preyed deeply upon the General's spirits. One of the first evident effects of his feelings was his constant and heedless exposure of himself to fire upon all occasions, in spite of the remonstrances of his brother officers.

On one occasion, he placed himself on the top of the trenches in the thick of the musketry from the fort, and when his aid-de-camp, Colonel Harris, afterwards Lord Harris, found him deaf to his entreaties to move from such a perilous position, he jumped up and placed himself beside him, saying, "If you, Sir, think it right to remain here, I know it is my duty to stand by you." This had its effect for the moment, but the same disposition to invite destruction frequently evinced itself during the siege. At length, after the affair had terminated brilliantly, and on the very day of the arrival of Tippoo's sons in the camp, General Medows, declining to be present at their reception, retired to his tent, and drawing one of his pistols from his holster, lodged the contents in his side. By one of those interventions of Providence which frequently occur, it appears that the ball had accidentally dropped from the pistol, and the wadding alone entered his body. But even under these

and procrastination took place on the part of Tippoo, who, during the period of negociation, continued the military improvement of the fort, a proceeding contrary to the usual practice of war; until at length Lord Cornwallis, tired of the frivolous evasions of his adversary, gave notice that the hostage princes should be moved to the Carnatic; and their guard and escort were made prisoners, and treated accordingly.*

The princes themselves were very much affected by this change, and when the order came to prepare themselves for the journey, they declined entering the palankeens which were to convey them, unless they were assured that they belonged to Lord Cornwallis himself.

At this juncture the vakeels pressed for another

fortunate circumstances the wound assumed a very serious appearance, and for some days his life was despaired of.

A short time after this, the Honourable Colonel Knox (who had obtained leave of absence to return home) called on the General, to know if he had any commands for England. He said to him, "Knox, you are going to England, you will see many of my friends, tell them that Mr. Medows and General Medows have had a quarrel, but that they have settled it like gentlemen, and are now perfectly good friends."

* Upon receiving Lord Cornwallis's first remonstrance upon his unwarrantable conduct in strengthening his military works pending the consideration of a treaty, Tippoo is reported to have replied to his lordship, with a degree of courageous effrontery, that his lordship must have been misinformed as to his actions; but that for his lordship's satisfaction, if he desired it, he would throw down one of the bastions that he might see into the fort.

day's delay, in the course of which Tippoo sent to assure Lord Cornwallis, that desiring as he did that the treaty might be delivered into his lordship's hands by his sons themselves, the postponement arose only from his anxiety that it might be done with all due solemnity. On the 18th, the vakeel returned from Tippoo, the princes' guard was restored to them, and the next day fixed for the delivery of the treaty.

On the 19th, the princes went, in similar state to that which had been observed on their first arrival, to the tent of Lord Cornwallis, by whom they were again received with the greatest kindness and cordiality, and the eldest boy, after having been seated, rose and delivered the treaty in triplicate to his lordship. This part of the ceremony he performed with great ease and grace, but when he was told that he was to deliver the two other copies to the vakeels of the other Native Powers, his manner assumed an air of constraint and dissatisfaction, wholly different from that which accompanied his presentation of the copy for the English government.*

Thus terminated the war with Tippoo in 1792,

* One of the vakeels who received the treaty (for neither the Nizam's son, nor Hurry Punt thought it consistent with their dignity to appear in person) muttered something as he took it from the Prince, who, without giving him time to explain himself, told him, "that they might as well be silent, for certainly their masters had nothing to complain of." This remonstrance, indicative of the boy's manliness and spirit, made a powerful impression on the bystanders.

in which he lost 49,340 men, 801 guns, and no less than 67 forts, together with the territories we have mentioned as ceded under the treaty, and three crores and thirty lacs of rupees.

The results of this brilliant campaign have already employed the pen of the historian, to whom we refer such of our readers as may not have turned their attention very much towards Indian politics. In the capacity of biographers it is our duty merely to state, that immediately after its termination the army broke up and returned to the different presidencies.

CHAPTER IX.

COLONEL BAIRD PROCEEDS TO WARRIENNE AS COMMANDANT—STATE OF THE 71ST REGIMENT—ORDERED TO THE SIEGE OF PONDICHERRY—COMMANDS A BRIGADE—SURRENDER OF PONDICHERRY—71ST ORDERED TO TANJORE—EXTRAORDINARY CONDUCT OF MR. M——— WITH REGARD TO THE RAJAH—CORRESPONDENCE WITH COLONEL BAIRD—LORD HOBART—GENERAL FLOYD—SALUTE FIRED—CONSEQUENCES RESULTING THEREFROM—THE 71ST ORDERED TO PONDICHERRY—THEIR DESTINATION CHANGED—PROCEED TO WALLAJAHBAD—GENERAL ORDER—ORDERS TO DISBAND THE 71ST—COLONEL BAIRD'S FEELINGS UPON THAT OCCASION.

Upon the dispersion of the troops, Colonel Baird returned with the southern division of the Madras army to Warrienne, where he was commandant, and thence proceeded with his own regiment to Secundumallee, and two companies were detached under Major Dalrymple.

Few regiments ever were in so high a state of order and discipline as the 71st at this period; in none were there fewer corporal punishments; nothing indeed but the most serious crimes, subjected the men to flogging. The punishment inflicted by Colonel Baird for more venial offences, consisted of some additional hours labour in a garden from which the regiment was supplied with vege-

tables. The men were every morning put through some few manœuvres, by which means they were kept in constant practice without inordinate fatigue. Officers and men were on parade every day at sunrise, excepting two days in the week, on which the officers were permitted to hunt, and on Sunday the barracks were minutely inspected by Colonel Baird, the officers of each company being in the barrack-rooms ready to receive him.

Colonel Baird paid the greatest attention to the comforts of his men; under his care the regimental fund rapidly increased; not only was the regimental school entirely supported by it, but each woman received a weekly allowance if she kept her children neat and clean; and when on the Sunday mornings they appeared respectably dressed, the women themselves received little rewards to encourage their good conduct.

Temperate and regular in his own conduct, Colonel Baird succeeded more than almost any commanding officer in securing at once the respect and obedience of the soldiers, while his known courage and dauntless presence of mind in action gave them that confidence in him as a leader, which more than any thing else contributes to the successful issue of the most desperate enterprises.

Ample evidence of Colonel Baird's conscientious care for the prosperity and comfort of his regiment is before us in his letter addressed, during this period, to General Gordon, their colonel, and to Ross and Ogilvie the agents in London; but it

would be needless to make extracts on this point, when we are permitted to make use of the communications contained in the note below; one from General Robertson, who will be remembered by the reader as the gallant Captain Robertson so often mentioned already in this memoir, and the other, from Captain Mackenzie, also living in Scotland, and who served in the 71st during the whole period that Colonel Baird commanded it.*

In 1793, Colonel Baird was again destined for active service. The capture of Pondicherry had been resolved upon by the East Indian Government, and an army was ordered to be formed, under the command of Colonel Braithwaite, for

* General Robertson says, "Whenever any new regiments arrived at Madras from England, the officers were anxious to know the best method of managing the men, and settling the economy of their corps; the commander-in-chief recommended them to go up to Wallajahbad, where they would see the 71st regiment, in the highest state of discipline, not only with respect to their movements in the field, but with regard to their interior economy and arrangement."

Colonel Baird never lost sight of the personal comforts of his men, and took care that their different allowances were regularly and duly delivered; and in 1793 he established a regimental mess, which at that period was a very uncommon thing.

Captain Mackenzie says, speaking of the discipline of the corps, "Yet with all this he was the sincere friend and social companion of his officers, joining in their amusements, and enjoying their happiness. Parties of them were constantly invited to his house to partake of his hospitality, where the suavity of his manners engaged their esteem, as his undoubted ability commanded their respect for their commanding officer."

the purpose of carrying this resolution into effect; and of this force, the European brigade was to be commanded by Colonel Baird.

Pondicherry, on the Coromandel Coast, is a large town situated on a flat; the anchorage for ships being at least a mile and a half from the shore. The fort is an irregular brick building, covered with chunam, about two hundred paces from the sea. All its fortifications had been destroyed in 1761, when Sir Eyre Coote took it from the French, but in 1763 the settlement had been restored to them.

For the reduction of Pondicherry, which, from the barrenness of the surrounding country, is chiefly indebted to extraneous supplies for support, the troops took up a position on the Red Hills, and shortly after preparations were made for commencing the siege, but no resistance was offered, and the place surrendered. The fact was, that the garrison were in a state of open mutiny. Intelligence had been received of the "glorious revolution" in France, and anxious to follow the noble example of the liberal cut-throats of Europe, the myrmidons of the colonies were everywhere in the highest possible state of excitement.

The British troops, while before the place, received accounts of the martyrdom of the unfortunate Louis XVIth, in Paris, and in order that the garrison might as speedily as possible be made acquainted with so great a result of liberalism and reform, newspapers and prints, descriptive of the

execution of the murdered king, were thrown into the place in dead shells by the commanding officer of artillery.

After the surrender of Pondicherry, the army again broke up, and the 71st were ordered to Tanjore, of which place Colonel Baird was appointed to the command; and there, in fact, his more distinguished career of public service began, under circumstances, which, without stopping to designate the conduct of the great body to whom he was opposed, we must say, reflected the highest honour upon his firmness, his wisdom, and his benevolence.

The Rajah of Tanjore was a man of extremely good character and high principle, and exceedingly well disposed towards the British Government. He had been placed by Sir Archibald Campbell, on the musnud on the death of his brother, who left only an adopted son. During the early part of Colonel Baird's military command at Tanjore, he acted also in the capacity of civil resident, but not being duly acknowledged by the Madras government, and finding that letters for the Rajah were forwarded direct to his highness by the ordinary post, Colonel Baird, on the 3rd of October, 1794, addressed Lord Hobart, the Governor of Fort St. George, upon the subject; and after stating that upon the abolition of the civil residency at Tanjore, the senior military officer (as in the case of Colonel Maxwell, to whom he had succeeded,) had always acted as

civil resident, added, that he should feel gratified by being so considered, which, as it would add to his personal weight, would naturally give increased respectability to his character as senior military officer; the request, however, was not acceded to, and shortly after the office of civil resident was revived in the person of Mr. M——— of the Honourable East India Company's service.

Mr. M——— had not long assumed the functions of his office, before the Rajah, who had a warm affection for and an implicit confidence in Colonel Baird, began to complain bitterly of his conduct, which he represented as not only disrespectful, but positively harsh; and, in the course of time, circumstances gradually transpired which convinced, not only the Rajah, but Colonel Baird himself, that this civil servant of the Honourable East India Company had been placed at the court of Tanjore for no other purpose than that of inducing, or even (if necessary,) compelling, the unfortunate Rajah to give up his territory and become a pensioner of the said Honourable East India Company for the remaining term of his natural life.

We have had occasion, in an earlier part of this memoir, to shew that in those days, whatever may be its mercy and moderation now, the Honourable East India Company was not exceedingly scrupulous as to the means by which territory was to be acquired; and Mr. M———'s proceedings in furtherance of the object of his mission at length

became so evident and so oppressive to the Rajah, that his highness stated to Colonel Baird that Mr. M——— was far exceeding the just limits of his duty; that he had expressed to him his readiness to abide by the treaty into which he had entered with the Company, and that he was ready and willing to continue to pay in full, the tribute which had been agreed upon by that treaty, and which guaranteed to him under such payment the quiet and undisturbed possession of his kingdom; but it was perfectly clear that Mr. M——— was not to be so satisfied, and that the primary object of his mission was to make new terms with the Rajah while under the influence of fear. To the proof of this fact we shall presently come.

To persons conversant with such subjects, it will not be necessary to make any observation upon what can only be considered the honourable jealousy which exists between civil and military officers on service, and perhaps that jealousy is not decreased upon occasions where the one individual belongs to the king's army, and the other to the writer's department of the East India Company's service. In the present case, it is placed beyond a doubt, that the hostility which confessedly manifested itself on the part of Colonel Baird to the arbitrary proceedings of Mr. M——— had its origin in no such feeling; he was actuated by sentiments of a much higher character, and by feelings of an infinitely more generous nature.

While matters were in this delicate state, and while the Rajah was pouring his fears and lamentations into the ear of Colonel Baird, the colonel, at nine o'clock in the evening of the 28th of December, 1795, received the following letter from Mr. M———.

*To Lieut.-Col. Baird, commanding Tanjore.**

Sir,

Having received some instructions from the government for the execution of certain objects, to perform which, I am to call upon you for a military force, I have to request that on receipt of this, you will be pleased to order a company of your regiment to march with all possible expedition, and halt in the street, near the New Gate of the Palace, with orders to the officer commanding the party to follow such directions as he may receive from me.

I have the honour to be, &c.

A. M———, *Resident.*

Tanjore, 7 p. m. 28*th Dec.* 1795.

Colonel Baird, whatever his private feelings or opinions might be, did not hesitate for a moment in sending the troops, under the command of a captain; but they had scarcely reached the appointed spot, when Mr. M——— sent out a verbal message from the interior of the palace that *the troops might go.*

On the following morning, Colonel Baird, in

* One of the numberless peculiarities which distinguish the public correspondence of the Honourable East India Company, is that of addressing their letters at the top, and dating them at the bottom.

consequence of this conduct, wrote to Mr. M———, and after recapitulating that part of his letter which contained his request for the soldiers, their consequent march, and their ultimate dismissal, the Colonel says, "but I beg to acquaint you that the government order of the 10th of December, 1794, draws the line so clearly between the power of the civil and military, that it is out of my power to comply in future with any requisition from you for troops, unless I am at the same time made acquainted with the nature of the service to be performed, when I shall be enabled to judge what force will be adequate to the execution of it."

This correspondence Colonel Baird forwarded to Lord Hobart and Colonel Floyd, and in his letter giving cover to it, stated to his lordship the great inconvenience (putting the principle out of the question,) of the interference of Mr. M——— with military details, shewing that from that gentleman's ignorance of the meaning of the word company, the greatest mischief might arise. "The established strength of a company in the 71st regiment," said Colonel Baird, "is one hundred rank and file, but from the reduced state of the corps at this time, the company sent out on the requisition of Mr. M——— at a minute's warning last night, besides its men sick, on duty, leave, and detachment with the artillery at Trichinopoly, regimental works, &c. consisted of no more than thirty-four rank and file."

This course of proceeding, which Colonel Baird felt it his duty to adopt, was very much at variance with that which the Honourable East India Company considered most conducive to its interests, and the abrupt conduct of Mr. M——— was justified and supported by the following letters which Colonel Baird received; the first in answer to his letter to Lord Hobart, the second in reply to that which he addressed to Colonel Floyd.

To Lieut.-Col. Baird, commanding at Tanjore.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the President and Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 29th ult., and to acquaint you that as the situation of the Resident at Tanjore is merely political, the order of the 29th of December 1794, does not apply to him.

You will be pleased in future to acquiesce in any recommendation of Mr. M———'s for granting an armed force, that may be consistent with the safety of the garrison under your command.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

W. C. JACKSON, *Secretary.*

Fort St. George, 17*th Jan.* 1796.

Colonel Floyd's was an infinitely more elaborate letter, but as the case is one of peculiar interest, and well calculated to throw a light upon the civil proceedings of the East India Company,

we think it will not be unamusing to the reader, to sift the affair to the bottom.

Lieut.-Col. Baird, or Officer commanding at Tanjore.

SIR,

MR. M———, Resident at Tanjore, has stated in an official letter to me, dated the 2d instant, that he is charged by Government to execute some objects of a secret nature, which make it necessary he should have a considerable military force at his disposal—that he is so strictly enjoined to secrecy that he is not at liberty to disclose the nature of those objects to me at present, and that it is important it should not be known that Mr. M——— wishes to call in troops till the moment they are wanted.

For these reasons I have judged it necessary to comply with the Resident's desire, and shall immediately report to Government accordingly, not doubting but such compliance will be approved.

You will therefore be pleased, upon the requisition of Mr. M———, Resident at Tanjore, in the name of the Right Honourable the President in Council, to give him such troops as he may deem necessary, and order the commanding officer to comply with such instructions as Mr. M——— finds it necessary to give.

You will please to reserve a sufficient portion of your garrison for the purpose of temporary security, and with the reflection of the very great improbability of any serious attack being made upon you.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble Servant,

T. FLOYD,
Colonel, commanding the Southern Division of the Army.

Trichinopoly, Jan. 3, 1796.

Thus encouraged in his pretensions, and supported in his operations against the unfortunate Rajah, it is not to be supposed that Mr. M——— lost any time in exhibiting the power and authority with which he was invested, and accordingly, on the 23rd of January, he addressed *several letters* to Colonel Baird.

In the first, he says, "In consequence of instructions which I have received from government, I beg leave to require, in their name, that you give orders, so that neither Shiverow, the Rajah's Sirkeel, nor either of his brothers, Trimbee, or Shankerow, be permitted to pass out of the fort." And in this he encloses a second, beginning:—

My Dear Sir,

Exclusive of the accompanying letter, I have in my hands a public letter, directed to you, and to be delivered to you or not, as occasion may require. I may probably have occasion to send it in the course of this day. It respects the employment of a large part of your garrison

Yours, very truly,

Alexander M———.

23rd.

Circumstances, which certainly were not then allowed to transpire, but which we will charitably suppose to have been of more importance than Mr. M———'s mere anxiety to display his potentiality, occurred, which induced that gentleman, in the course of the same day, to send Colonel Baird the

following letter, enclosing a copy of that from Colonel Floyd, which the reader has already seen. The style and diction of the following epistle need no comment.

To Lieut.-Col. Baird, commanding at Tanjore.

SIR,

ENCLOSED I have the honour to send a letter from the officer commanding the Southern Division of the Army, I have also another order from Government to the same effect, but as it is not directed immediately to you, and involves public circumstances which I do not think myself authorized to communicate, I do not send it.

I have now to require, in the name of Government, that you order as large a portion of your garrison, both Europeans and sepoys, as you can spare, from the necessary guards, &c., consistently with the defence of the fort, to parade in front of the Resident's house in the fort, with orders to the officer commanding the party to follow such directions as he may receive from me.

The first paragraph of your letter of this date seems to suppose that my orders from Government extend merely to the restriction of the Sirkeel and his brothers to the fort. The orders extend much further.

In your letter you have been pleased to suppose it possible that the military force may be employed against the person of the Rajah, and that such employment of it would tarnish the honour of our country. As representative of the Honourable Company here, I am entrusted with a certain portion of the British honour, which I will take care shall never be tarnished; I will further take care that the suspicion of the possibility of having it tarnished, shall not, as far as respects my representations, pass without remark and explanation.

When the military force above required shall be assembled, I shall do myself the honour to communicate to you the object of the Government orders, and to rely upon you for the execution of it.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient Servant,

ALEXANDER M———.

Tanjore, 6 p. m. 23*rd Jan.* 1796.

Upon the receipt of this requisition, Colonel Baird, whose generous nature recoiled at the idea of the service to which it but too plainly appeared his brave soldiers were to be devoted, and anxiously alive to the peculiar situation of the unfortunate Rajah, sent to Mr. M——— to entreat him to explain his object then. This Mr. M——— positively refused to do.

The results are so pleasingly, so candidly, and so honourably stated by Colonel Baird, in a letter, which on the following morning he wrote to Lord Hobart, the governor of Madras, that they cannot be given to the reader in any way so touching and affecting as in his own words. Copies of the same letter he despatched to Colonel Floyd and General Clark.

To the Right Hon. Lord Hobart, President in Council, &c. &c. &c.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for your Lordship's information, copies of two letters received from Mr. M———, the Resident, yesterday, together with a copy of my answer, and of another received from Mr. M——— in the

evening, enclosing Colonel Floyd's orders to furnish the Resident with any number of troops he might require in the name of the Right Honourable the President in Council; in consequence of which I instantly complied with the requisition made in the Resident's letter, and put all the troops under arms, went myself to Mr. M———, whom I found at the house of Mr. Swartz, and endeavoured to prevail on him not to employ the troops, assuring him repeatedly, that I could answer with my life for the compliance of the Rajah, without force, with any demand I should make of him in the name of Government, and that it would be more for the honour of our country to carry the orders of Government into effect in this mild manner, than by offering any personal affront to the Rajah, by marching troops, with an appearance of using violence against him; which was the meaning of the expression in my letter to Mr. M———, and not what he seems to have misunderstood it, that the employment of the force that might be directed would tarnish the honour of our country—and this I explained last night to Mr. M———. Mr. M——— still requiring the march of the troops, I sent orders for that purpose (taking such precautions as were necessary for the security of the place), directing that they should halt in the street between the Resident's house and the palace. I then earnestly requested Mr. M——— would allow me to accompany him into the palace, being confident from the attention I have ever paid to the Rajah, and the good footing we have been on, that he considered me as his real friend, and that what I might say on the occasion could not fail to have great weight.

But Mr. M——— declining my offer, and not communicating to me his instructions from Government, I went and placed myself at the head of the troops, determined to take upon myself the execution of the orders of Go-

vernment, and to take care of the personal safety of the Rajah, should matters have proceeded to extremities.

But after halting in the streets for several hours, I received a note from Mr. M———, informing me that he had no further occasion for the force under my command.

I beg leave to inform your Lordship that I have this day received your instructions to acquiesce in future in any recommendation of Mr. M———'s for granting an armed force that may be consistent with the safety of the garrison under my command, which shall be strictly complied with.—I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) D. BAIRD, *Lieut-Col.*

Tanjore, 24th Jan. 1796.

Colonel Baird, when he had despatched this letter and its enclosures, felt that he had performed his duty to his country and to the Rajah, who was living under its protection. But whatever satisfaction he might himself have derived from those feelings, his efforts on behalf of the unfortunate prince were unavailing; for on the following day, the unhappy man communicated to Colonel Baird, that at the dictation of that most zealous minister, Mr. M———, and under the positive influence of fear, he had been induced, on the preceding evening, to sign a document, ceding the whole of his territory to the management of the Honourable East India Company; but that, considering how much he had been alarmed by threats, and how grossly deceived by misstatements, he

resolved to address the governor general, and appeal to him for the restoration of his country.

From this determination, he was certainly not discouraged by Colonel Baird, who was so deeply impressed with the justice of his claims, and the rectitude of his intentions, that he himself forwarded a copy of the correspondence here published, to Sir John Shore, at Calcutta. The consequences of this measure to Colonel Baird are yet to be seen.

As far as the Rajah was concerned, his own remonstrances, coupled with the explanations and statements of Colonel Baird, induced the governor general to order restitution to be made; and so far Colonel Baird succeeded to the full extent of his wishes, and had the gratification of seeing his much injured friend reinstated in his rights and sovereignty; but even in this unwilling act of justice, there were quibbles and delays, the meanness of which, if they were minutely examined, would astonish the reader. Amongst others, Mr. M——, having received orders to replace the Rajah in possession of his territories, refused to do so, unless he became security for whatever *private debts* his people might owe to British subjects.

The Rajah's answer to this demand, translated literally, by a native writer, is so cogent, and yet so simple, that we think, as a contrast to the more polished literary effusions of the oriental diplomatist with whom he had to treat, it may be acceptable to the reader.

To Alexander M———, Esq., Resident at Tanjore.

SIR,

I have received your letter, last night, at ten o'clock, and have understood the contents. You mentioned in your's, that the three Soubah's collectors as advanced some money to the inhabitence for Vurkum and Morromett, and moreover that I should be answerable for the debts of the inhabitence, to let you know on the subject if the collectors sends the account of what money advanced for the Vurkum and Morromett, and if the inhabitence acknowledges that they have received whatever amount rises in the time of arvest, I shall pay the amount to the Company's treasure; and if the inhabitence have contract any private debts, what business of mine to be responsible for their debt. If my country is restored, I shall give such necessary order to the inhabitence to pay their debts.

Your's, &c.

Tanjore, 5th August, 1796.

Colonel Baird was quite aware that the part he had taken in the affair, however congenial to his own feelings, and consonant with the purest principles of justice, would subject him to the frowns of the Madras government.

The disposition he thus anticipated manifested itself at the very first possible opportunity—upon the occasion of the restoration of the Rajah, when, at his Highness's request, Colonel Baird caused a salute to be fired from the battery. This was complained of by Mr. M———, and a reproof was in consequence forwarded from the presidency.

If this conduct of Colonel Baird's should require any explanation, the following letter, which he addressed to Lord Hobart, will not only amply afford it, but will throw additional light upon the wavering and undecided conduct of those who had received the commands of the government to carry its orders into execution.

To the Right Hon. Lord Hobart, President in Council, Fort St. George, &c. &c. &c.

My Lord,

I have the honour to inform your lordship, that his excellency the Rajah sent to me yesterday, acquainting me that Mr. M——— had informed him, that your lordship had been pleased to order the delivery of his countries to him at twelve o'clock. At the same time he informed me, that he had published it to all his nobles and principal men, and that he would be ready to receive their congratulations at that time, and requested that I would order a royal salute to be fired.

As my instructions from Sir Charles Oakeley, on being appointed to this command, were to pay every attention in my power, and comply with all proper requisitions from the Rajah, and being well convinced that these are your lordship's sentiments, I immediately gave the order for the salute, but directed the non-commissioned officer who commanded not to fire till his excellency sent him word to do so. No salute being fired by half-past two o'clock, I sent my hurcarrah to learn the reason; on his return he acquainted me that Mr. M——— had sent his dubash to the Rajah in full durbar, when they were waiting for the ceremony, who told his excellency, that he was desired by his master to inform him, that he could not give up the countries till

next day, as he understood a salute was to be fired, and that he must write to your lordship on that subject.

I of course ordered the men from the battery; they had not got to the little fort, when they were sent after by the Rajah, requesting they would come back and fire the salute, which was complied with. His excellency fired afterwards a number of guns in his own palace on this occasion. Of course I conceived the countries were delivered over to him. But this morning I was astonished to be informed from his excellency, that the countries were not delivered over to him, agreeably to Mr. M———'s promise, made in your lordship's name, and that, rather than submit to the disgrace of acknowledging that he had been deceived, in the eyes of his people, he desired the salute to be fired.

As the circumstances are so very particular, I considered it my duty to acquaint your lordship with these particulars, which I trust will meet your lordship's approbation.—I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect and esteem, your lordship's most obedient servant,

D. Baird.

Tanjore, 3d Sept.

The restoration of the Rajah, and the firing of the salute, took place on the 2nd of September; on the 7th of that month, Colonel Baird received the following letter from head-quarters.

To Colonel Baird, commanding at Tanjore.

Sir,

I am directed by the Right Honourable the President in Council to acquaint you, that orders have been this day transmitted to Major General Floyd, for the immediate removal of the whole of the 71st regiment to Pondicherry. This communication is made to you that there may be no

delay in the execution of the orders, after you have received them from General Floyd. It is of course meant that all the officers of the corps, yourself included, should proceed to Pondicherry.—I am, Sir, your most obedient servant.

W. C. JACKSON, *Secretary.*

Fort St. George, 7th Sept. 1796.

To this letter, Sir David Baird wrote the following answer:—

To W. C. Jackson, Esq., Military Secretary.

SIR,

I AM honoured with your letter of the 7th instant, acquainting me, by order of the Right Honourable the President in Council, that orders had been that day transmitted to Major General Floyd for the immediate removal of the whole of the 71st regiment to Pondicherry. I have the honour to request that you will acquaint the Right Honourable Lord Hobart in Council, that his Majesty's 71st regiment has always been, and is ready to march at an hour's warning. I expect to receive General Floyd's orders for the march to-morrow morning, and am only sorry that I cannot march the regiment in the evening, as I know the state of the stores cannot furnish us with camp equipage. But as I am determined that no time shall be lost on my part, I have this day indented on the stores at Trichinopoly for what articles this place does not furnish.

You will oblige me by informing me, if it is the Right Honourable the President in Council's wish that his Majesty's 71st regiment should make forced marches to Pondicherry.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

D. BAIRD.

Tanjore, 11th Sept. 1796.

On the 14th, Colonel Baird received the following, from the military secretary, which is worthy of a place here, as having elicited the manly answer of Colonel Baird, which follows it.

To Colonel Baird, commanding His Majesty's 71st Regiment.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Right Honourable the President in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 3rd instant, and to acquaint you, that his lordship is decidedly of opinion that the orders issued by you for firing a royal salute on the occasion of the surrender of the Soubahs to the authority of the Rajah of Tanjore, was unnecessary and improper, and that, in receiving a message from the palace, and acting upon it, without any communication with the resident, you opposed yourself to the general order of government dated the 27th of November, 1795, which specially enjoined all Europeans from having communication with the Rajah of Tanjore but through the channel of the Company's resident.

As you have, however, been recalled from Tanjore, the President in Council refrains from further animadversion on your conduct.—I am, Sir, your most obedient servant,

W. C. JACKSON, *Secretary.*

Fort St. George, 14th September, 1796.

It was not until Colonel Baird's arrival at Madras that he received this letter, and several very important events had occurred in the interim. This, however, appears to be the proper place for the insertion of the answer which he returned to it.

To W. C. Jackson, Esq. Military Secretary, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

I WAS only yesterday honoured with your letter of the 14th September, informing me of the Right Honourable President in Council's decided disapprobation of the order issued by me at Tanjore for firing a royal salute on the restoration of the country to the Rajah.

I request you will be pleased to express to his Lordship in Council my regret that he should have formed an opinion of my attempting to oppose myself to the orders of government on such an occasion, when in reality I conceived I was paying equally proper respect to the government by whose orders the restoration was made, as to his excellency the Rajah; especially as at his request a royal salute had been fired on a similar occasion formerly, and as it had been usual, ever since the arrival of the resident at Tanjore, to fire salutes and grant guards at the request of the Rajah's people without any remark or objection having been offered. I therefore did not then conceive it necessary that it should come through the resident, nor possible it could in any way be construed into the slightest disrespect to government, so contrary to my intention on this and on all occasions.

You conclude by saying, that as I have been recalled from Tanjore, his Lordship in Council refrains from further animadversions on my conduct. I must beg leave to state that I was not recalled, which would have perhaps implied a censure; but ordered to march with the 71st regiment, to which I belong, and have the honour of commanding, and the reason I have since learnt was to have us at hand to embark for the Cape, and, if necessary, to form part of an army in the field. Let me add, that being unconscious of deserving the animadversions of the Right

Honourable President in Council, I am truly sorry that any part of my conduct should have been misconstrued into the slightest intention of disrespect to government.—I have the honour to be, Sir, yours obediently,

D. Baird, *Colonel.*

Madras, 9th Nov. 1796.

It will be easily seen how unacceptable to the Madras government and its agents the independent conduct of Colonel Baird was; he was necessarily removed with his regiment from Tanjore, where his presence afforded very great satisfaction to the Rajah, and deprived of what, in a pecuniary sense, was the only advantageous command he ever held during the long period of his service in India, and sent to Pondicherry, where the climate is execrable, and the command was worth nothing; and, what is worse, as the sequel will shew, any temporary advantages which arose, from his strenuous exertions in behalf of the Rajah, and of justice, turned to no other account than that of affording Colonel Baird the gratifying reflection of having acted honourably. The Rajah was devoted, and ere long, added another proof, to the many already existing, that whenever policy or aggrandisement seemed to warrant the measure, a pretext was never wanting to the *Honourable* East India Company, to remove a native Prince.

It is as impossible for us to deny, as it was impossible for his candid generous nature to conceal, the mortification which Colonel Baird

experienced at the abrupt and sudden order for his removal, and that of the regiment. At first, conscious of having done nothing, but that which honour and generosity prompted, and which justice and wisdom must have approved, he imagined that intelligence had been received of a projected invasion of Pondicherry by the French, or rather that they had actually landed there, and hence, his anxiety to ascertain whether it were considered essential to push forward by forced marches to its relief or defence; than which nothing would have given him greater pleasure,—but no—having reached Trichinopoly, on his way to Pondicherry, where every thing was perfectly quiet, he there found another order, changing the route of his regiment, and ordering it to Wallajahbad,—this alteration at once unveiled the mystery, and explained the real cause of his removal from Tanjore.

But unpleasant as was this manifestation of the feeling of the Honourable East India Company's government towards him, which he could only have excited by the generous and humane conduct that he had adopted with regard to the persecuted Rajah, there were yet greater trials in store for him.

At Wallajahbad, Colonel Baird remained till the autumn of 1797, and considering the arrangement which very shortly afterwards was made, it will not perhaps be considered out of place, to give here the official description of His Majesty's

71st regiment, at that period from the general order of Major General (now Field-marshal) Sir Alured Clark.

G. O.—By the Commander-in-chief.

MAJOR General Clark experienced infinite satisfaction this morning at the review of his Majesty's 71st regiment. He cannot say that on any occasion of field exercise he ever was present at a more perfect performance. Where a corps is so striking in its appearance, and so complete in every branch of its discipline, little can occur to the Commander-in-chief to particularize—he cannot, however, but notice that the 71st has excited his admiration from its expertness in those parts of its exercise which are most difficult and most essential to execute. He alludes to its order and regularity when moving in line, its extreme accuracy in preserving distance, and the neatness and promptitude that are so evident in all its formations. So much perfection in a corps, whose services in India will long be held in remembrance, does the greatest honour to Lieutenant-colonel Baird and all his officers, to whom, and the corps at large, the Commander-in-chief desires to offer his best thanks.

Signed, BARRY CLOSE,
Asst. Ad. Gen. of the Army.

Head-quarters, Wallajahbad, 2d Jan. 1797.

A general order, more flattering, more gratifying than this, is rarely, if ever, to be met with, and no one certainly ever conveyed a stronger idea of the efficiency of a regiment than it does.

At no very considerable distance of time, from the period at which Colonel Baird experienced all

the pleasureable feelings which such a testimonial could not fail to excite in the heart of a thorough soldier, he found, one day, on returning from field exercise to his quarters, a number of letters, each of which was opened and read in its turn, until at length he found in his hand, an order immediately to break up his regiment, and draft the men fit for service, into the 73rd and 74th, directing him then himself to proceed with the colours, officers, non-commissioned officers, band and drummers to Madras, so as to arrive there within four days from the receipt of the order.

Words would but inadequately describe Colonel Baird's sensations, when he had read this letter. He had been in the 71st regiment from the day it was raised; he had served with it constantly; had risen after long and hard service to command it—had commanded it for six or seven years, during which period (as we may easily judge, by General Clark's order, were there no other evidence of the fact) he had brought it to a perfect state of discipline. Attached to his men by every tie that exists between soldiers and their commanders who have fought and bled together, he was completely overcome by the very unexpected mandate he had received; but duty (to which every personal consideration of Colonel Baird's succumbed,) was to be done, and *that*, as he was directed to do it, promptly.

He ordered the men of the regiment to remain in barracks till he came to them, as he had some-

thing to communicate to them from head-quarters. Shortly afterwards, he proceeded to the barrack-yard; the men were ordered to fall in; and he attempted to read the order for their dispersion, and for his eternal separation from them; but the effort was vain; and the lion heart, for which war had no terrors, danger no fear, melted at the thought of parting from comrades who had so long and so nobly shared his toils, his perils, and his glory.—He gave the paper to the adjutant, who read the order.

The effect produced by it was beyond description. It seemed as if a sudden dismay had seized the whole regiment. The old men who had families in India were distressed that they should be forced to leave them, while the young ones were equally affected by the prospect of being drafted into other regiments, and left behind. It was a moment of trial in which there was something awful; but Baird, who knew his duty, and who always did it, addressed the men thus: "My poor fellows—not a word—the order must be obeyed." And then, to conceal emotions of which even he need not have been ashamed, he turned round, and ordered the band to strike up the popular Scottish air, the chorus of which is in these words—

"The king commands, and we'll obey,
Over the hills and far away."*

* The power of their own national music over the minds of Highland soldiers is inconceivably great, as has been indeed

Having performed thus much of his painful task, he returned to his quarters to make all necessary arrangements for its completion; and those who are conversant with military matters will easily comprehend what the internal state of the 71st at that period was, when they are told that after settling every detail, paying up every account, and regulating every part of its economy, every thing was ready for the literal fulfilment of the government order, and that on the fourth morning from that in which it was received, the regiment was dispersed, and the colours, officers, band, and invalids, were on their march to Madras.

They were accompanied for some part of the way by their comrades, who now being turned over to other regiments, had at the moment they took leave of their fellow soldiers, no prospect whatever of revisiting their native country.

Such scenes as these never can recur—thanks to the kind, the humane, the excellent Duke of York—the soldier's friend—The barbarous custom of transferring the effective men from one regiment to another, in India, has been abolished, and soldiers now have the option of coming home with

proved on many occasions. Baird himself was passionately fond of the native airs of his country; they were associated with the home of his childhood, and he used frequently to speak with the most affectionate delight of the way in which his mother used to sing them, and had them similarly arranged for the band of his regiment.

their colours, if they choose, and no man can be so far enslaved as to be drafted from one regiment into another without his own consent.*

Colonel Baird proceeded in the command of his regiment to Madras, where he arrived on Saturday, the 14th of October, according to the very letter of his instructions, and we find the subjoined order issued on the Monday following:—

Fort St George, October 16, 1797.
G. O.—By Government.

THE officers non-commissioned officers, drummers and privates of the 71st regiment under orders for Europe, to embark to-morrow morning at six o'clock.

The President in Council has much satisfaction in expressing the just sense entertained by the government of the active, zealous, and important services of the 71st regiment during the eighteen years they have been stationed in India, by which they have contributed so largely to the reputation of the British army, and so essentially promoted the interest of the East India Company.

By order of the Right Hon. the President in Council.

Signed, T. WEBBE,
Secretary to Government.

This high testimonial of the approbation of the civil government, was accompanied by the following mark of commendation from the military commander-in-chief:—

* Several of the men now left behind were in the trenches at Seringapatam, in 1799, with Colonel Baird, when he, as General Baird, commanded the memorable attack and conquest of that place.

General Orders by Lieutenant-General Harris.

THE Commander-in-chief cannot think of parting with a corps that has been so eminently distinguished as the 71st regiment in India, by a series of long, spirited, and arduous services, without requesting Colonel Baird, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and every man belonging to that regiment, to accept of his warmest acknowledgments for conduct which has been equally honourable to themselves and advantageous to their country. The alacrity with which Colonel Baird has arranged, at a short warning, every thing relative to the drafting, confirms Lieutenant-General Harris in the favourable opinion he had formed of the internal order and discipline of that corps, and he trusts that the regularity and zeal of the men destined for the 73d and 74th regiment will be such as to maintain the high reputation they have so deservedly acquired.

Signed, J. ROBERTSON,
Dep. Adj. General.

Head-quarters, Choultry-plain, Oct. 16, 1797.

If any thing could alleviate the regrets which a commanding officer must naturally experience at parting from a regiment receiving such praises as these public documents convey, it was the assurance that it deserved them, and a consciousness, which (however modest he might be) Colonel Baird could not fail to feel, that he himself had mainly contributed to bring the corps to that state of discipline and good order, which had elicited the commendations it obtained. Ac-

cording to the instructions above quoted, the skeleton of the regiment embarked on Tuesday, the 17th of October 1797, on board an East Indiaman, for the Cape of Good Hope.

CHAPTER X.

REAL CAUSES OF COLONEL BAIRD'S REMOVAL FROM INDIA—HIS CONSCIENTIOUS FEELINGS UPON THE POINT—INJUSTICE OF THE TREATMENT HE RECEIVED—ARRIVES AT THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—SENT FOR BY LORD MACARTNEY THE GOVERNOR—OFFERED A COMMAND THERE, WITH THE RANK OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL—EXPLANATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS—HE ACCEPTS IT, AND TAKES CHARGE OF A BRIGADE—COLONEL MIDDLEMORE'S REPORT OF THEIR CONDITION AND IMPROVEMENT—FRENCH POLICY WITH REGARD TO INDIA—TIPPOO SENDS AMBASSADORS TO MAURITIUS—PERILOUS SITUATION OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AT MADRAS—ARRIVAL OF LORD MORNINGTON AT THE CAPE—MEETS LORD HOBART—CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL BAIRD ON THE STATE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE EAST—ORDERS FROM THE COURT OF DIRECTORS CONCERNING TANJORE—BAIRD'S ANXIETY TO KNOW THEIR CHARACTER—LORD MORNINGTON DECLINES COMMUNICATING THEM—SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY.

THE regret which Colonel Baird so deeply felt in leaving India, at this period, arose not only from a repugnance to quit his noble regiment, but from seeing it dispersed and scattered, while in point of fact it had not been so long from Europe as several others; and what made the case even still stronger, was the circumstance of drafting the men of the 71st principally into the 73rd,

the regiment of the longest standing in India, except the 71st itself; and from which it would have been just as proper to draft men into other regiments which had arrived many years after it. In fact, it was upon military feeling alone, that his disinclination to return to England was founded, because upon every other account he was anxious to be removed.

By his conscientious partizanship in the cause of the Rajah, and by the earnestness with which he had espoused the cause of that unhappy prince, he had made an implacable enemy of Lord Hobart and the Madras government; for, in consequence of Colonel Baird's letter on the subject, to Calcutta, having been much spoken of, Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, called for the official correspondence which had occurred respecting Tanjore; and it is clear that Sir John's subsequent reprobation of the conduct which had been observed towards the Rajah, was, as has been already suggested, the real cause of the removal of Colonel Baird, by Lord Hobart, who had encouraged if not originated all the measures of the resident.*

* Sir John Shore, eldest son of John Shore, Esq., of Melton, in Suffolk, was born in 1751, and early in life proceeded to India, as a writer. He rose progressively in the service, until in 1792, he succeeded Lord Cornwallis, as Governor-General, in which year he was created a baronet, and on the 7th of November 1797, he was created an Irish peer, by the title of Baron Teignmouth. His lordship married, in 1786, Charlotte,

It appears also that this was not the only mark of displeasure which had been manifested by the Madras government towards Colonel Baird; for about the time of which we are now speaking, it had been resolved to undertake an expedition against Manilla, the preparations for which had proceeded so far that the first division of the fleet, with part of the troops, had actually sailed for Prince of Wales's Island, where the whole force was to assemble, when an overland despatch, announcing that the Emperor had made peace with France, caused the undertaking to be abandoned. This expedition was to have been commanded by Sir James Craig; and Colonel Baird, always eager for service, concluded, that from the acknowledged and declared efficiency of the 71st, his regiment would have been amongst those to be employed in this enterprize; but the same influence prevailed against him, and the 12th, under Colonel Harvey Aston, and the 33rd, under Colonel the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, (the present Duke of Wellington,) were selected for the purpose, although neither of those regiments were thoroughly formed, but were at that time in every respect inferior in the essen-

only daughter of James Cornish, Esq., of Teignmouth, by whom he has three sons and four daughters.

His lordship has published the Life and Works of Sir William Jones, and a variety of tracts and pamphlets with reference to the propagation of Christianity in India, and to the proceedings of the African Institution.

tials for active service to the 71st, which, besides its own merits, had the advantage of a strong recommendation from General Clarke, whose opinion we have already recorded in his general order from Wallajahbad.*

All these things combined to harass Colonel Baird severely. He felt himself marked for injustice and persecution, and as he himself says, in one of his letters, written about this period, "I have often thought of returning to Europe, but at such a time, how is it possible to absent myself from my post."†

With respect to the order for drafting the regiment, Colonel Baird had been given to understand that such a measure was decided upon so early as the latter end of August; but he still entertained hopes that the active preparations of the enemy would at all events delay, if not supersede it altogether. The effect it produced upon him when it actually arrived, we have seen, and

* Colonel Harvey Aston, who was for a long period a prominent member of fashionable society in England, was subsequently killed in a duel in India.

† It appeared highly probable just then, that war would almost immediately be declared by Tippoo, who had collected a very large army, and seventy pieces of artillery, in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam. Colonel Baird, in a letter to General Gordon, dated August 29, 1797, from Wallajahbad, mentions that fact, and adds, "it is reported that he expects to be supported from France." How completely these reports were eventually confirmed, our record of subsequent events will best shew.

a reference to the expression of his personal feelings, contained in his private letters, completely proves that that effect was excited entirely by an affection for the corps which he had so long served with, and commanded.

Colonel Baird, with the skeleton of his regiment, arrived at the Cape of Good Hope, in December 1797, a day made memorable in that colony by the execution of several sailors, who had been the ringleaders in a mutiny which had broken out on that station, in the fleet under the command of Admiral Pringle, and which had just been suppressed.

As Colonel Baird and his fellow passengers rounded into Table Bay, the yellow flag of death flying on board the men-of-war at anchor, told from afar that the dreadful work of retribution was yet in progress. It is curious to observe the wide spread of those detestable principles, which, in the earlier part of the same year had overthrown the discipline of our sailors at home, and excited that formidable naval revolt at the Nore, which, luckily for the country, was terminated by the same awful results as those which we have just stated to have occurred in Africa.

As soon as Colonel Baird landed, he proceeded to the government-house, to pay his respects to the governor, Lord Macartney, not merely as a matter of ceremony, but because he had been well known to him in India. His reception was as extraordinary as it was uncourteous

—not by his lordship, but by one of those subordinate ornaments of a government-house, who are not unfrequently in the habit of displaying airs somewhat at variance with the characters and dispositions of their chiefs. An aid-de-camp who received Colonel Baird, not only refused him admittance to the governor, but told him, in a scarcely civil manner, that his excellency could not see him.

The importance of this gentleman must, however, very soon after his abrupt dismissal of the gallant and distinguished soldier, have undergone a painful degradation, when he found himself made the medium (if not by actually carrying, at least by writing, a note to Colonel Baird) of expressing his Excellency's deep regret at not having seen the colonel when he did him the pleasure of calling, and begging that he would do him a similar favour the next morning.*

If these indications of Lord Macartney's feelings towards Colonel Baird had any effect upon the miscalculating subordinate who had thought it high and fine to treat him in a very different manner, he and his colleagues must have felt them-

* Although Colonel Baird did not think it worth while to notice to Lord Macartney the ill-breeding of this member of his personal staff, he never forgot it; and he has been heard to say that this officer's behaviour taught him to keep what he called "a sharp look-out" after his own aids-de-camp when he himself was called to high commands, so that no officer who came to him, should meet with the same sort of reception as that with which he was greeted upon this occasion.

selves in a somewhat difficult position when they learnt that Lord Macartney's earnest desire to see Colonel Baird the next morning, arose from his anxiety to make a proposal to him, of no less importance than that of sending the skeleton of the 71st home, and retaining the colonel himself at the Cape, with the rank and command of brigadier-general.

This flattering offer Colonel Baird hesitated at the moment to accept. He begged Lord Macartney to allow him four-and-twenty hours to consider whether he could with propriety, and without injury to the service, avail himself of it. His request was immediately granted, and as soon as their interview was over, he proceeded to find General Dundas, the commander of the forces, who was an old and esteemed friend of his: but, anxious as he was to see that officer before he gave his definitive answer to Lord Macartney, he was foiled in his hopes, for the general had gone into the country, and was not expected to return until after the hour appointed for Col. Baird's announcement of his determination to the Governor.

Finding this to be the case, and having satisfied himself as to the propriety of accepting the command offered him, he returned to Lord Macartney, and told him that for himself, he should be happy to meet his Excellency's wishes, and remain on the Cape staff: but that his motive in requesting the delay of four-and-twenty hours was, that he might have the opportunity of consulting General

Dundas, and ascertaining whether his stay there would be equally consonant with the general's views and wishes.

Lord Macartney, who in a moment saw that this caution and delicacy on Colonel Baird's part arose from his friendship for Dundas, and from a recollection of a serious misunderstanding which had arisen in India between his lordship and the king's officers at Madras, put an end to all his apprehensions lest the appointment might have been proposed to him in consequence of the existence of some unpleasant feeling between the governor and the general, by telling him that he had himself consulted the general on the point, that he was equally anxious with himself for his stay at the Cape, that he, Lord Macartney, had full power to appoint him to the staff, and, added his lordship, "had I known as much of you military gentlemen, when I was in India, as I have learned since, we never should have had any difference; for I should have put the general between myself and the army, as I have done in the present instance."

Treated in this liberal and candid manner, and encouraged by the approbation of his friend, Colonel Baird no longer resisted the wish of the governor, and his name appeared the same day in general orders as brigadier-general, and president of a court martial, to assemble for the trial of Lieut.-Colonel Robinson, of the 86th, on charges of disrespectful conduct towards General Dundas.

The circumstances which gave rise to this trial, were but the prelude to future scenes of insubordination, and Brigadier-General Baird had been at the Cape but a very short time before he discovered all the officers in command of regiments were violently opposed to the general: opposed in so serious a degree as to render the appearance of military affairs in the colony any thing but agreeable or satisfactory. To Baird, who had been for many years the personal friend of Dundas, this was particularly painful; but the course he pursued was at once so active and so judicious, and its effect so striking, that we shall avail ourselves of a communication from Colonel Middlemore, now inspecting field officer at Cork, then a captain of the 86th, and an eye-witness of what he so vividly describes, to give the reader a just idea of its complete success.

"General Baird," says Colonel Middlemore, "soon after his arrival at the Cape, was appointed to the command of a brigade, composed of the 86th and the Scotch brigade, each 1000 strong, and both remarkably fine bodies of men. This brigade he employed himself in drilling and completing on the new (Dundas's) system."

"These young regiments," continues the colonel, "required a master's hand to perfect them in discipline: and we (the 86th) had the good fortune to form part of the brigade.

"By some mischance we happened to labour under the ban of an ill name, and it must be ad-

mitted, that we felt somewhat uneasy, not to say indignant, under the constant animadversions of our superior; but the very idea of becoming one of Brigadier-General Baird's regiments, roused us into zeal and energy. His open, manly, kind manner, soon won our hearts; and could you have seen a fine body of men, a thousand strong, levelling before them, at his command, a whole wood, to form a field for exercise, you might have judged the effect of a stimulus given to exertion, by the voice of authority, when mingled with encouragement and approbation.

"We were placed in a perfect wilderness, and until *he* taught us first to laugh at difficulties, and then to overcome them, had despaired of ever having ground to work upon; but he instructed us how to use, and yet husband, our strength, by mingling judgment with labour; and in a week we had changed the whole face of the country, and animated by his constant presence, and his cheering praise, had formed a regular and excellent parade, where a few days before was a forest, which had stood undisturbed for ages.

"Our intervals of labour, and our time of relief from hard work and hard drills, were occupied in hunting, a diversion to which our chief was extremely partial, and on these occasions we were favoured by invitations to his hospitable table."*

* Sir David Baird was an excellent horseman, and like all his family, exceedingly fond of the sports of the field, hunting especially. An anecdote is related of him in Scotland con-

"Our review was excellent. The commander-in-chief was delighted to witness our great and rapid improvement. Nor was ours the only regiment that became perfect in order and appearance, under General Baird's care and abilities. The whole brigade was in the highest state of discipline, and every man that served in it gloried in belonging to General Baird."

If General Baird, by constant activity, urbanity, and a display of all those qualities which soldiers first admire, and then try to emulate, rendered himself so popular with those immediately under his command, his satisfaction was not a little in-

nected with its pursuit, highly illustrative of that quickness in emergency, and presence of mind in the midst of peril, which so much distinguished him on greater occasions.

He was once following his elder brother, the late Mr. Baird, after the hounds, at full speed, when the horse of the latter, in attempting to take a hedge, fell with his rider into a ditch on the opposite side. Major Baird (as he was at that period) was so close upon them that it was utterly impossible to pull up or avoid them; but seeing his brother's danger, the only mode of preserving him from farther mischief occurred to him with the rapidity of lightning, and instead of hesitating or endeavouring to avoid the objects before him, he stuck spurs into his horse, and taking the leap which the other had missed, cleared hedge and ditch, together with the horse and its master, who were still lying in it. He used often to joke Mr. Baird, who was also a capital rider, upon this event, who did not above half like to be reminded of it; although the dexterity and anxiety of the major would not be a little enhanced in value in the opinion of a great many sportsmen of the present day, by the recollection that Mr. Baird was the major's elder brother.

creased by the uniform and unqualified kindness of Lord Macartney, the governor, and the unvarying friendship of General Dundas, the commander-in-chief.

It will be recollected that previous to General Baird's departure from Madras, it was believed there that the French nation had serious intentions of assisting Tippoo with all the means in its power, against the government of British India; a very short time only was wanting to disclose the whole of their designs, the countenancing and furthering of which, appeared extremely natural in Tippoo, whose hatred of the English was increased to an inconceivable ferocity by his defeat at Seringapatam. But besides Tippoo, there were other powers of great consideration, all at liberty to unite themselves with the French against our troops and territories. More than two-thirds of the ancient Mogul empire remained in the possession of princes professing the Hindoo or Mahomedan faith. Of these, the Nizam and the King of Mysore, held the first rank; while in the states which were independent of those, five powerful Mahratta chiefs, professing Brahmanism, maintained unlimited sway.

It had been the policy of the old French government, and a policy which had succeeded admirably well, to engage some of those princes in the French interest, and thus divide the forces which they were able to throw into the scale of either contending power; but the new republican

government, not satisfied with half measures, proposed to unite the whole of these magnates in one great confederation against the English. Spies and agents had been sent out, officers from France had disciplined their troops, and for several years the system had been working with the view of undermining British influence in India, until the opportunity should arrive for exploding it altogether.

The Island of Mauritius was at that time possessed by the French, and afforded a certain shelter for any force proceeding from Europe with a view to operations in the east; thither Tippoo sent ambassadors, who were received with the greatest cordiality and respect by the governor, General Malartic, as well as by the inhabitants, who were at that period inflamed with the wildest and most savage notions of republicanism, and an innate hatred of the English, which our subsequent possession of the island, and kind treatment of its population, have not even up to this time entirely eradicated.

The certainty that the objects of this mission from Tippoo, were connected with his extensive projects against the British possessions, in conjunction with France; the knowledge of the formidable preparations making by the French in the Mediterranean; the peculiar position in which the court of Hyderabad was placed; the avowed threats and suspected intentions of Zemaun Shah; the critical state of our alliances in the

Deccan; the weakness of the Madras army, owing to the necessary detachments made from it to the recently captured Dutch East India islands, as well as to different parts of the Carnatic, and to Ceylon, all combined, rendered the situation of British India at this particular juncture, perilous in the highest degree.

It was at this period, but before all the suspicions which had been excited were verified, and before the anticipations of such a vast combination were realized, that the Earl of Mornington, now Marquess Wellesley, was appointed governor-general.

In his way out to assume his authority, Lord Mornington touched at the Cape of Good Hope, where he met Lord Hobart, who was on his return to England. Lord Mornington was extremely anxious to obtain from General Baird whatever information he could, with respect to the state of India when he quitted it; and General Baird, with his characteristic openness, gave all the details of which he was in possession, as well as his views and opinions upon the facts and circumstances connected with them.

Upon the subject of the Tanjore country, (one particularly exciting to General Baird,) Lord Mornington's inquiries were extremely numerous and minute; and General Baird discovered, in the course of their conversations on this topic, (which appeared to be as interesting to the governor-general as to himself,) that his lordship actually

carried out with him definitive orders relative to its settlement, founded, of course, upon the representations which had been made to Leadenhall-street; and he was naturally anxious to ascertain the probable fate of the oppressed Rajah, and whether he was to be eventually permitted the quiet enjoyment of his own territories.

Having candidly expressed his own opinion, General Baird, with his accustomed frankness, inquired of Lord Mornington what were really the intentions of the Honourable East India Company upon this important and delicate matter; but Lord Mornington stated that he felt himself bound not to answer General Baird's questions at that period, the decision of the Court of Directors being only known to himself and the secret committee.

This diplomatic avoidance of giving him any information, General Baird too justly construed into an unfavourable result for the Rajah. What the specific instructions from Leadenhall-street actually were, General Baird never discovered; but Lord Mornington had not long been in India, before, as usual, a pretext was formed, and the *adopted son* of the Rajah's elder brother was placed on the musnud, although his claims, which had been formally and carefully investigated long before, had been disallowed by Sir Archibald Campbell and all the lawyers at Madras.

But what have legal decisions in India to do with strokes of state policy? or who shall be

of sufficient importance to stop the progress of a resolution of the secret committee of East India directors? Interest declared for the possession of Tanjore—justice upheld the claims of the Rajah, the undoubted heir, the legally acknowledged prince, the actual possessor of the territories. But when the Honourable East India Company discovered that this prince, who had sense enough to resist their usurpation of his rights, until actually frightened by British bayonets (how misused!) into an opposite line of conduct, was, in his present state, not sufficiently subservient to their will, the claims of the *adopted son* were again seriously brought forward and admitted; and an unknown foundling was placed on the Rajah's throne, upon condition that he would cede the revenue of his country to the company, and become their pensioner for the rest of his precarious life.

We have traced this case from its beginning to its end, rather with a view of illustrating the generous firmness of Colonel Baird's attachments and friendships, than of entering into any disquisition upon the policy of the company's government in its conduct and termination.

CHAPTER XI.

LORD MORNINGTON ARRIVÉS IN INDIA—COMMENCES OPERATIONS AGAINST TIPPOO—MALARTIC'S PROCLAMATION AT MAURITIUS—IGNORANCE OF TIPPOO OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN THAT ISLAND—HIS BASENESS AND DUPLICITY—COLONEL BAIRD PROMOTED TO THE RANK OF MAJOR-GENERAL—APPOINTED TO THE STAFF IN INDIA—LEAVES THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—ARRIVES AT MADRAS—MEETS THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL—CO-OPERATION OF THE NIZAM—AFFAIR OF HYDERABAD—OVERTHROW OF FRENCH INFLUENCE—VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS AT THE DIFFERENT PRESIDENCIES—GENERAL HARRIS ENTERS THE MYSORE—NEGOCIATIONS WITH TIPPOO—GENERAL BAIRD APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF A BRIGADE—COLONEL WELLESLEY COMMANDS THE NIZAM'S FORCE—GENERAL BAIRD'S REMONSTRANCE AND LETTER TO GENERAL HARRIS—COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN TIPPOO AND GENERAL HARRIS—MARCH TOWARDS SERINGAPATAM—BATTLE OF MALLAVELLY—DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY—ADVANCE BEYOND MALLAVELLY—TIPPOO'S ANXIETY AND WANT OF DECISION.

WHEN Lord Mornington arrived in India, he immediately set about commencing operations against Tippoo, a step to which he was led without hesitation by the general appearance of affairs, which we have already attempted to describe; but amongst all the *authenticated* circumstances which had transpired relative to the views of the sultaun, none produced the effect which was cre-

ated by the arrival in Bengal, in June, 1798, of copies of a proclamation issued at Mauritius by the governor, Malartic, upon the arrival there of the ambassadors from Seringapatam, whose mission we have before noticed.

This proclamation, considering that its contents were the first, and remain almost the only official declaration of Tippoo's real objects and resources, as well as from the effect its receipt in Calcutta produced, may not be considered unworthy of a place here.

LIBERTY!—EQUALITY!

The French Republic One and Indivisible.

PROCLAMATION,

By Anne Joseph Hippolite Malartic, Commander-in-chief and Governor-General of the Isles of France and Reunion, and of all the French establishments eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.

CITIZENS,—Having for several years known your zeal and attachment to the interests and to the glory of the republic, we are very anxious, and we feel it a duty to make you acquainted with the propositions which have been made to us by Tippoo Sultaun, through two ambassadors whom he has despatched to us.

This prince has written particular letters to the colonial assembly, to all the generals employed under the government, and has addressed us a packet for the executive directory.

1. He desires to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and proposes to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the troops that may be sent to him.

2. He promises to furnish every necessary for carrying on

the war, wine and brandy excepted, with which he is wholly unprovided.

3. He declares that he has made every preparation to receive the succours which may be sent to him, and that on the arrival of the troops the commanders and officers will find every thing necessary for making a war to which Europeans are but little accustomed.

4. In a word, he only waits the moment when the French shall come to his assistance, to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India.

As it is impossible for us to reduce the number of soldiers of the 107th and 108th regiments, and of the regular guard of Port Fraternité, on account of the succours which we have furnished to our allies, the Dutch, we invite the citizens who may be disposed to enter as volunteers, to enrol themselves in their respective municipalities, and to serve under the banner of Tippoo.

This prince also desires to be assisted by the free citizens of colour; we therefore invite all such who are willing to serve under his flag, to enrol themselves. We can assure all the citizens who shall enrol themselves, that Tippoo will allow them an advantageous rate of pay, the terms of which will be fixed with two ambassadors, who will further engage, in the name of their sovereign, that all Frenchmen who shall enter into his armies, shall never be detained after they have expressed a wish to return to their own country.

Done at Port North-West, the 30th of January, 1798.

(Signed) MALARTIC.

There are some circumstances connected with this proclamation which are worth noticing, in order to exhibit the extraordinary mixture of intellect and ignorance, bravery and treachery, which existed in the mind and character of Tippoo.

As a specimen of his ignorance, take for example, that his final direction to his ambassadors to Mauritius, was to bring back with them 30,000 cavalry, and 40,000 infantry, with 100 guns and mortars, from that island, the troops in which, never at any time exceeded 1500 or 2000 men, and did not, when General Decaen made his own terms of surrender to General Abercrombie, at the head of an army of 13,000 men, in the year 1810, possess a greater force (marines included) than about 900.

As a proof of his baseness and duplicity, take his letter to Lord Mornington, dated 25th December, 1798, explaining the nature of this very negociation. He says, " In this Sircar, (the gift of God) there is a mercantile tribe, who employ themselves in trading by sea and land. Their agents purchased a two-masted vessel, and having loaded her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It happened that she went to Mauritius, whence forty persons, French, and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants, paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment; such as chose to take service were entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the confines of this Sircar (the gift of God); and the French, who are full of vice and deceit, have, perhaps, taken advantage of the departure of this ship, and put about reports, with a view to ruffle the minds of both Sircars."

But a previous letter, dated 20th of November, is, if possible, more declaratory of the attributes of his character, than this; it is as follows:—

"It has lately come to my ears, that in consequence of the talk of interested persons, military preparations are on foot. Report is equally subject to the likelihood of being true or false. I have the fullest confidence, that the present is without foundation. By the favour of God, the conditions or obligations of peace established between us, have obtained the utmost degree of strength and firmness; under the circumstances of their having been firmly observed and adhered to, of the daily increasing union and friendship, and of the constant intercourse of correspondence, the report cannot be possibly entitled to credit. But the promulgation of such reports. My friendly pen writes this. I hope your lordship will be pleased to gratify me by writing of it. From a desire to maintain the obligations of treaty and engagement, I have no other intention or thought, than to give increase to friendship; and my friendly heart is, to the last degree, bent on endeavours to confirm and strengthen the foundations of harmony and union.

"Let your lordship continue to gratify me with gladdening letters, notifying your welfare."

Lord Mornington, who received these professions with a confidence regulated by information obtained from other quarters, never doubted the course to be pursued, and the absolute necessity of striking a great blow before Tippoo could receive any available assistance from the French, and while he was labouring under disappointment, created by the weakness of the reinforce-

ments which they had as yet been able to afford him, and under anxiety excited with respect to those which were to follow.*

It is a remarkable coincidence, that at this period the English government were employed in framing instructions for the administration of affairs in India, (rendered necessary by the presence of a French force in the Mediterranean, and by Malartic's proclamation at Mauritius,) and that Lord Mornington having devoted his mind to the same subject, so completely anticipated those instructions, that upon a comparison of the two papers, there does not appear the most minute variation between the orders of the ministry at home, and his lordship's propositions, previously recorded in council at Calcutta.

While these matters were in progress on the continent of India, a reference to which we have considered essential, in order to keep up the chain of the narrative, (shortly to be rendered interesting to our readers, by the prominent part borne in coming transactions by the distinguished object of our memoir,) H. M. S., Albatross, arrived at the Cape of Good Hope, from England, bringing Brigadier-General Baird intelligence of his promotion to the rank of Major-General; accompanied by orders for him to rejoin the army in India, to the staff of

* At the very time Tippoo wrote the letter from which the last extract is made, he was in actual correspondence with Buonaparte, who was at Cairo.

which he had been appointed, and to take with him the Scotch brigade, and the 86th regiment, and the men of the 28th dragoons, who were to be drafted into the different dragoon regiments already in India.

With his usual promptitude, General Baird obeyed these instructions, and embarked as speedily as possible on board H. M. S., Sceptre, for Madras, where he arrived in January, 1799. There he found the governor-general, who had come thither from Calcutta, for the purpose of collecting and forming the army, which he had determined should take the field against Tippoo, the hollowness of whose professions, and the idleness of whose delays, in coming to terms, had become too evident to admit of further doubt or qualification. Indeed, if the intentions of Lord Mornington could have been earlier carried into effect, they would not have been so long delayed; but he had been informed, that from the dispersed state of our military forces on the Coromandel coast, it would occupy a much greater space of time than he had previously conceived necessary, to assemble a body of troops equal to any offensive movements against the enemy; and thence arose the postponement of the execution of his design.

At Bombay, the governor-general's orders were carried into effect with the greatest alacrity; but the difficulty of mustering the Carnatic army, combined to force him into abandoning his first

intention of taking the field immediately, and therefore his lordship applied himself to the arrangement of such a system as, while it would restore to the Madras government the power of repelling any hostilities on the part of the sultaun, might enable his lordship to demand a just indemnification for the expences which Tippoo's unjust violation of faith had occasioned, and an available security against the consequences of his coalition with the French. While, therefore, the armies were gradually collecting on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, his lordship devoted his attention to the improvement of the defensive alliance, which had been formed with the Nizam and the Peishwah, under several treaties, so as to keep in check the insatiable ambition of their common enemy; for, as matters stood, when Lord Mornington first took his extended view of the subject, the English appeared to him to have lost every advantage deriveable from the cessions extorted at the surrender of Seringapatam, by the actual weakness of their allies, and by the establishment of a French force of 14,000 troops, which were now close at hand, for the service of the sultaun, on the very frontier of the Carnatic.

In October, the British succeeded, in co-operation with the Nizam's army, in surrounding the French camp at Hyderabad, and taking advantage of a mutiny, which had broken out among the combined forces, achieved without bloodshed the important object of disarming no fewer than

eleven thousand men. This was a blow of the greatest importance; in fact, the overthrow of the French influence was its almost immediate result, and that too, at the very moment when all the energies of the revolutionized republic were devoted to the spread of conquest and the annihilation of the British power in India, and indeed every where else in the world.*

But when in addition to this partial, however important success, intelligence was received at Calcutta, on the 31st of the same month, of Lord Nelson's glorious victory of the Nile, the appearance of affairs was totally changed; for as the events at Hyderabad had quieted the uneasiness of the govenor-general, with respect to the power of the French near at hand, so the decisive blow struck by our fleet in the Mediterranean, calmed his apprehensions of attack from the French force in Egypt; and accordingly, having assembled what he considered an adequate military force, to maintain his demands, he commenced those negociations with Tippoo, of which the letters we have already extracted, to exhibit the sultaun's baseness and duplicity, formed part.

It was in the midst of these preparations,

* The French officers taken in this affair, who were with difficulty preserved from the violence of their own men, were treated with every respect due to their respective ranks, and sent to Bengal in his Majesty's frigate Bombay, where they were allowed every indulgence compatible with the security of their persons.

and with a view to accelerate them, that Lord Mornington quitted the usual seat of the supreme government, and proceeded to Madras, where his excellency's presence inspired the merchants and bankers, as well as the civil servants of the presidency, with such zeal and activity, that a large sum of money was raised by way of loan for the public service, so that, aided by the simultaneous exertions of Sir Alured Clark, whom he had left vice-president in council at Calcutta, Lord Mornington, in so short a time that the movement of the army was not delayed for an hour, had raised an additional aid of twenty lacs of rupees, or £240,000 sterling.

Finding it impossible to bring Tippoo to any thing like a serious consideration of the objects proposed to him, General Harris was directed, on the 3d of February, to enter the Mysore country with the army under his command; the same day orders were issued to Lieut.-General Stuart to be in readiness to co-operate from Malabar; and notice was given to Admiral Rainier, as well as to the company's allies, that the governor-general considered the British government to be at war with Tippoo Sultaun.

It is not here necessary to go into a vindication of Lord Mornington's policy, the results of which have been so long and so advantageously known; but it may be right, even now, to say (especially as the praise we are bound to bestow, we are by no means induced universally to afford to all orien-

tal proceedings) that the course adopted in this crisis by the government towards Tippoo, is generally admitted to have been marked by every prudent consideration, and an anxiety for permanent peace; while, on the other hand, the sultaun's bearing towards the English was indicative of a carelessness amounting to insolence, and a studied neglect of communications and appeals, which too clearly proved that he was not likely to be satisfied with the mere enjoyment of the territories he yet possessed, but that his restless ambition sought to recover those which he had previously been compelled to surrender.

At the time of Major-General Baird's arrival at Madras, the army under the command of Lieut.-General Harris was assembled at Vellore, where Gen. Baird was appointed to the command of the first European brigade, consisting of his majesty's 12th, 74th, and 94th regiments, and the Scotch brigade. On the 11th of February the army moved towards Mysore, and on the 28th encamped at Carimungalum, where, on the 18th of February, it was joined by the Nizam's force, consisting of above 6,000 of the company's troops subsidized by his highness—about an equal number of his own infantry, including a portion of a French corps, (late Peron's,) now commanded by English officers, and a large body of cavalry.

At the head of this force Meer Allum, the Nizam's son, was nominally placed, but the whole body of troops was in fact under the command of

Colonel the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, brother to the governor-general.

The circumstance of placing an officer so much junior in rank to General Baird in a command so considerably superior, occasioned a strong remonstrance on the part of the general, who expressed to General Harris a deep sense of the grievance, considering himself as he did, upon all established principles, entitled to the preference. Accordingly, after consulting several officers of high reputation on the subject, he addressed the following letter, on the 4th of March, (the day the army encamped at Ryacottah,) to the commander-in-chief on the subject:—

Dear General,

By a conversation I had with Captain Young this morning, I was happy to learn your private sentiments with regard to myself, and to find, that the reasons which have induced you to appoint a junior officer to a higher command in this army than that which I hold, were such as would have been satisfactory to me, had they been publicly known. I am perfectly sensible that you have the right to select such officers as you may think proper for every service that may occur, without being obliged, or expected, to assign your reasons to any one; and I am the very last who would expect you to act inconsistently with your situation.

It must, however, appear to every one, extraordinary that a major-general, sent out expressly by his Majesty to serve on the staff in India, should remain in command of three battalions, while a lieutenant-colonel, serving in the same army, is placed at the head of seven, or rather thirteen corps.

Meer Allum's request to have the brother of the governor-general in command of the troops under him, is certainly a reason; but this is only made known to *me* privately, whilst, as the order now stands, I am apparently degraded in the eyes of the army, and of my friends at home. Under these circumstances, I trust to your adopting such measures as to you may appear proper, that the real cause may be made known, why Colonel Wellesley is appointed to a superior command.

I have the honour, &c.

To General Harris. D. BAIRD.

This appeal was most natural, but it produced no result. General Baird's long and distinguished services in India, and his perfect knowledge of the local circumstances of the country to which they were going, where, seven years before, he had commanded a brigade, and of the enemy to whom they were to be opposed, (for his previous service against whom, under Lord Cornwallis, he had received no common share of approbation and applause,) all strengthened his claim, in a military point of view, to the command which had been conferred upon Colonel Wellesley; more especially as his promotion to the major-generalship was made, and he was sent back to India by the Duke of York, without any application on *his* part, *for the express purpose of serving in this particular campaign.* It should be here distinctly understood, that, although General Baird felt these circumstances deeply, yet his feelings were not of a nature to deteriorate, in the slightest degree,

the high opinion which he always entertained of his more favoured companion in arms.

From Ryacottah, General Harris forwarded a letter addressed to Tippoo, from the governor-general, expressive of his regret at the line of conduct which his highness had thought proper to adopt, assuring him that his desire was still for peace, that nothing but his continual delays and procrastinations had induced the movement of the troops, and that General Harris was fully authorized, even now, to receive any communications that the sultaun might be inclined to make, or any ambassadors whom he might feel disposed to send. The same day General Harris published his lordship's declaration against Tippoo (which was made in the name of the allied powers), and commenced hostilities by sending a detachment, under the command of Major Cuppage, against the hill-forts of Neeldurgun and Anchitty. This force, however, met with no opposition; the forts had been abandoned and dismantled before their approach.

On the 7th March Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver took possession of Oodeadurgum; and another hill-fort called Ruttengheri, was captured, after a slight resistance, by a small detachment under Captain Urton: on the 9th, the whole army, consisting of 30,959 fighting men, exclusive of 6000 of the Nizam's cavalry, were assembled at Kelamungalum, and never was force in India more perfectly equipped or victualled, as the details (which even if we had room for them,

it would be superfluous here to insert) clearly shew. The cavalry was more numerous than any European power had ever brought into the field in India. General Stuart's division on the Malabar coast, was equally efficient; that under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown in the south, and that of Lieutenant-Colonel Read from the Barramaul, were also in the highest order; and the simultaneous appearance of Admiral Rainier's fleet, with two large Indiamen (which at such a distance might, by inexperienced eyes, be mistaken for line-of battle ships), off Tippoo's coast, added to his embarrassments, as destroying at once all his hopes of succour or reinforcement from the French. The gloom which this combination of circumstances tended to cast over the sultaun's affairs, was rendered more powerfully effective by the prosperous appearance of things on the part of his enemies. The court of Hyderabad, whose policy hitherto had been considered questionable, and whose ardent co-operation had been by many very much doubted, had now in the most unequivocal manner, evinced its readiness and zeal. The Nizam's force was actually in the field, and besides that, a considerable force was expected in aid of the Marhattas from Bombay, and the Paishwash had promised to lend his assistance with a large body of cavalry. At the same time it was known that Tippoo's finances were in no flourishing state, and that his councils were disunited; in short,

it seemed, as it eventually proved, that the sun of his splendour was near its setting.

It would be foreign to our purpose here, to describe in detail each day's march of the army towards Seringapatam; but it may be necessary to observe, that on the 6th of March, Tippoo crossed his own frontier, and made an attack upon part of the Bombay army, under General Stuart, which, however, proved unsuccessful. Tippoo's defeat in this affair, was decisive, and he retreated rapidly to Periapatam, having lost about 1500 killed and wounded; the loss of the Bombay army being only 29 killed, 98 wounded, and 16 missing.

To shew, however, that a delusion very similar to that which has been prevalent amongst the French generals and subalterns in later battles, existed in the mind of the sultaun, we beg leave to submit to the reader a memorandum which was found in his own hand-writing, relating to this affair; nor should we do justice to the extraordinary attributes of his mind, were we not to add, that he was principally incited to the hazardous undertaking, because it rained very hard on a particular day, a circumstance which he has recorded, as being of most auspicious omen.

The autograph memorandum of Tippoo, is as follows:

"On Wednesday, the 30th, or last day of the month Razy, of the year Shadid, 1226 from the birth of Mahommed, corresponding with the 29th

of Ramzan, (when the moon is not visible,) 1213, of the Hegira, or 6th of March, 1799, the victorious army of the sultaun, having left their baggage at Periapatam, and formed themselves into three divisions or detachments, entered the woods of Coorga, by three different roads, where the Christians had taken post, and advancing, gave battle, fighting with firelocks and spears, and the whole army of the infidels was routed, some of the Christians taking to flight."

On the 10th of March, the army under General Harris moved from Kelamungalum by the right; the cavalry in advance, the baggage on the right, and the Nizam's contingent, which had marched by the left, moved parallel at some distance on the right flank of the army—the army reached Callacondapilly, where it remained until the 12th, when it marched and encamped two miles south-east of Jiggeny. It continued moving forward with little or no interruption, and on the 24th, encamped on the west bank of the Madoor, on the same ground which Tippoo's army had occupied for five days. Here it was that General Harris received the first official intelligence of Tippoo's attack upon the Bombay army, which we have just mentioned.

This intelligence was highly important, as it clearly proved that at the very moment the sultaun was expressing a wish to negociate, he had himself commenced hostilities upon the English, and that too, without waiting a sufficient time to

allow of his receiving an answer to the last letter he had addressed to the governor-general.

On the 25th, the army again moved, and on the 26th, encamped at Mallavelly; here the enemy's advanced posts were visible upon a distant ridge of hills, but they by degrees disappeared. At daybreak of the 27th, the army marched from its left flank; the Nizam's force moving in a parallel line on the left, to cover the baggage, or ready to act as circumstances might render it necessary for it to do so.

A division under Major-General Floyd, consisting of five regiments of cavalry, formed the advance; but a large body of the sultaun's horse being discovered on the right flank, with a considerable force of infantry resting on the heights beyond Mallavelly, it halted at the distance of a mile from the village. At this period, the enemy were employed in moving several guns to the right of their line, towards a rising ground, whence it appeared to be their intention to open a fire upon the troops, as they crossed the valley. It was determined to foil this attempt, by immediately attacking them.

Colonel Wellesley's division was ordered to attack their right flank, supported by General Floyd's five cavalry regiments, and the right wing of the army, under Major-General Bridges, was to march with the picquets under Colonel Sherbrook, straight through the village of Mallavelly to the centre of the enemy's line, while the left wing

and the rear-guard were to remain in Mallavelly, under the command of Major-General Popham.

Upon the first movement of the Nizam's troops under Colonel Wellesley, the enemy withdrew his guns to a second rising ground, farther removed, and here his infantry took post. General Harris, who had led the piquets and the right wing himself, was at Mallavelly, and so convinced was he that the enemy had actually begun to retire, that he ordered Colonel Richardson, the quarter-master-general, to mark out the ground for the day's encampment; but the moment Colonel Richardson proceeded to execute this duty, supported by the piquets, the king's 25th light dragoons, and the 2nd regiment of company's cavalry, twelve or fourteen of the enemy's guns opened upon them at the distance (General Beatson says) of two thousand yards; they soon got the range and did some execution; but when Colonel Richardson had completed his duty, Colonel Sherbrook pushed forward and drove the enemy out of a village in front of their left, in which Colonel Cotton, with the 25th dragoons, maintained his position, and kept in check a body of the enemy's cavalry, which were on our right flank.

The action here, in reality, commenced, for the piquets being so much in advance, although posted with great judgment, by Colonel Sherbrook, and the cannonade continuing, orders were given for the 5th brigade to advance and

form upon Sherbrook's left, while Baird advanced with the first or European brigade, to form on the left of the 5th, and the 3d on that of the 1st, and Wellesley with the Nizam's force, advanced *en echelon* of battalions, supported by Floyd with the three remaining regiments of cavalry.

The line thus formed moved slowly, so that the whole might act together. Such field pieces as could be brought up answered the enemy's cannonade, and the action became general along the whole front, but Wellesley and Floyd bore the brunt of it.

It was at this period that General Baird observed a body of the enemy's cavalry coming rapidly down on the left of his brigade, upon which he ordered three companies of the 74th to advance, give fire, and fall back—but it is no easy task to moderate the courage of British troops when once elated, and instead of obeying these orders, the whole regiment fired, cheered, and rushed forward to the charge.

At the instant this occurred, General Baird perceived a second mass of cavalry, coming at the charge from the right—the danger of the 74th was imminent, but Baird was in an instant resolved, and galloping into the front (although by so doing he exposed himself to the fire of both parties), he succeeded in restoring order and compelling the men to halt and form, while a steady and well directed fire from the gallant 12th, and the Scotch brigade, on his right, checked the attack of Tip-

poo's horse: such however was the intrepidity of the sultaun's troops, that many of them succeeded in penetrating the intervals in the British line, and passing so far beyond it, as to fall in with General Harris and his staff, with some of the officers of which, they even exchanged pistol-shots. It is scarcely necessary to add that to these adventurous men there was "no return," and that they all paid the forfeit of their temerity with their lives.

A body of 2,000 men moved forward in the best order towards Colonel Wellesley's regiment, the 33d, which reserved its fire, and received that of the enemy at a distance of about sixty yards, when it rapidly advanced upon the approaching column, which instantly gave way; this advance being seconded by General Floyd, who made a rapid charge with his cavalry, completed the disorder, and the enemy retreated before the whole of our line, which immediately moved forward. The retreat was continued until the enemy was beyond the reach of guns, when General Harris considering that no serious advantage was derivable from further present pursuit, ordered the troops to return to camp at Mallavelly. The loss of the enemy in this engagement amounted to 1,000 killed and wounded, but the moral effect produced upon the mind of Tippoo by so decided a defeat of a chosen body of his troops, was, even, of greater importance than any immediate result of the action. He became unsettled

and anxious, in a degree which he had never evinced before, and, as will be perceived by the variations of his designs and movements in the subsequent part of the campaign previous to the siege, doubtful upon the most important points of his conduct.*

On the 28th, the day following the battle, the army quitted Mallavelly, and took up a position four miles to the south-west of it, it being General Harris's intention to cross the Cauvery at Sosilay, a determination which it was quite certain the enemy did not anticipate.

* The loss of the allied forces in this brilliant affair was very trifling: six Europeans killed, and thirty-four wounded—one native killed, sixteen wounded, and six missing—twelve horses killed, thirty-three wounded, and three missing.—*Beatson.*

CHAPTER XII.

MARCH TO SOSILAY—DESCRIPTION OF THE SURROUNDING COUNTRY—ALARM OF THE INHABITANTS—PASSAGE OF SOSILAY—PASSAGE OF THE CAUVERY—RETROGRADE MOVEMENTS OF TIPPOO—AFFAIR OF THE SULTAUNPETTAH TOPE—GENERAL BAIRD'S RETURN—LIEUTENANT LAMBTON AND THE STARS—SECOND ATTACK UNDER COLONEL WELLESLEY WITH THE 33D, AND COLONEL SHAW WITH THE 12TH—COLONEL WELLESLEY RETURNS IN THE NIGHT TO CAMP—A THIRD ATTACK ORDERED UNDER THE COMMAND OF COLONEL WELLESLEY—HIS ABSENCE FROM PARADE TO TAKE THE COMMAND—GENERAL BAIRD DIRECTED TO ASSUME IT—HIS GENEROUS CONDUCT—COLONEL WELLESLEY ARRIVES AND TAKES THE COMMAND—EXPLANATION OF THE CAUSES OF HIS ABSENCE—CAPTAIN MACKENZIE'S STATEMENT—PARTIALITY OF GENERAL BEATSON—GENERAL HARRIS'S ARMY TAKES UP ITS FINAL POSITION—TIPPOO OPENS FRESH NEGOCIATIONS—CURIOUS CORRESPONDENCE—DEMANDS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY — FINAL CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOCIATIONS.

THE country leading to the ford at Sosilay having been reconnoitred, and the reconnoitreing force, consisting of about 300 men, having returned in the night, with a favourable report, the army was put in motion at day-break, on the 29th.

The country which the troops had just entered was fertile and open, and the beauties of nature

appeared yet uninjured by the devastating hand of war. The villages, although the inhabitants had fled, were full of forage, and in the open fields numerous stacks still remained untouched; but as the troops approached Sosilay, they discovered thousands of the former tenants of these peaceful plains huddled in clusters under the walls of the fort. They had deposited their flocks and herds, amounting in number to not less than twelve or fifteen thousand head of cattle, besides abundance of sheep and goats, in the dry ditch which surrounded the place. For the protection of their property they had built themselves temporary huts, and the first object of the British officers was to conciliate them, to overcome their fears and apprehensions, and induce them to remain on the spot where the actual presence of so large a stock of provisions enabled the army to take up its ground before Seringapatam with all the advantage of a well-supplied commissariat.

From intelligence received in the English camp, it was ascertained that the last movement of the English troops had been wholly unexpected on the part of Tippoo, who was so firmly convinced that they would advance by Arakery, that he had not only neglected taking any measures for checking or harassing them on their march, but had despatched the main body of his army to Arakery on the morning of the 30th, for the purpose of giving them battle.

The line, however, taken by General Harris

was in every respect the most advantageous; for, besides the good which naturally arose from gaining Sosilay and all the *materiel* which it afforded, the possession of it not only facilitated the communication with the Bombay army, but enabled General Harris to obtain supplies from the stores which had been providently prepared in the Coorga country, while at the same time it gave him the power of ensuring the approach of the convoys from the Barramaul and the southern districts.

At two o'clock the tents were struck, and the army, except one battalion left to cover the rear and give protection to the people at Sosilay, crossed the Cauvery. This river, the name of which is already familiar to the reader, is a fine clear stream with a sandy botton, and, at the ford, three hundred yards wide and about three feet deep.

On the 31st, when the troops halted, it was ascertained that Tippoo had, with his cavalry, re-crossed to the south side of the river, and that all his guns and infantry had gone to Seringapatam.

The following day the army had arrived within thirteen miles of Seringapatam. On the 2d of April they marched by the left; but owing to some negligence on the part of the Nizam's cavalry, a considerable delay took place, and the army encamped for the night only three miles in advance of their position on the 1st.

This day Tippoo in person reconnoitred the enemy's forces from a hill, and his cavalry continued in front of it during the whole of the day, at the close of which, the British army encamped within five miles of Seringapatam. From this position the island and city of Seringapatam were distinctly visible, and from the appearances which presented themselves, it was evident that the sultaun had anticipated an attack from the eastward, and had regulated his proceedings and preparations accordingly.

On the 3d and 4th the army marched by the left, along the high grounds about four miles from Seringapatam; and of this march Tippoo on the latter day was an eye-witness. What he then saw, probably had the effect of disconcerting his previous arrangements, and making alterations in his plans of defence; for when he returned from reconnoitreing on the 2d, it was ascertained that he had formed the intention of opposing the march, of which he was now a peaceable spectator, by cannonading the enemy *from the very ground over which they were actually passing;* and had even gone so far in his proceedings towards this operation, as to send, in addition to his cavalry, seventeen or eighteen thousand infantry, and twenty guns, across the river. It was clear, whencesoever this indecision and change of measures had arisen, that his plans were totally altered; for he had taken up a position under the east and south faces of the fort of Seringapatam, and,

having destroyed and abandoned all the pettahs on the eastern part of the island, had determined upon a defence likely to be available if the enemy commenced a similar course of attack to that which they had adopted in the last siege.

It was on that day that a body of troops and rocket-men assembled in considerable force in front of the line under cover of a betel tope,* called the Sultaunpettah Tope. General Baird was directed, with part of his brigade, to dislodge them. He marched at eleven o'clock at night, and after scouring the tope in all directions, (at no time a work of easy operation, on account of ditches five or six feet deep by which it is intersected for the purpose of watering the betel plants, and rendered infinitely more difficult by the darkness,) he discovered that the enemy had already quitted their post. Their retreat rendered General Baird's further stay in the tope unnecessary, and he accordingly prepared to return to the camp, and an officer, who had been attached to his force as a guide, confidently undertook to lead the way.

At that period, Lieutenant Lambton of the 33rd regiment, (afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel Lambton, whose scientific labours have made his name so familiar to the learned of all countries,)

* A tope is a small wood or thicket. Betel, is the *piper betel* of Linnæus, and an article of universal consumption amongst the natives of India.

who was on General Baird's staff, came up to him, and assured him that the troops were moving in an opposite direction to that which was intended, and were in fact marching directly towards the enemy. The guide was again appealed to, and was confident as before, although Lieutenant Lambton supported his opinion by the fact, that as the night was clear, he had convinced himself by watching the stars, that instead of proceeding in a southerly direction, which it was necessary to do, to regain head-quarters, they were travelling due north.

In this dilemma, General Baird took a compass from his pocket, and putting a fire-fly upon the glass, ascertained beyond a doubt that Lieutenant Lambton was right, or as he used humourously to observe, that the "stars were correct," and immediately the troops were faced about; but owing to the detour which they had made, they fell in with one of the enemy's piquets, which they surprised, and having made prisoners of several of the men composing it, and seized their horses, they returned to camp, whence next morning the army was to march, to take up its ground before Seringapatam.

The next day, however, the enemy again possessed themselves of the Sultaunpettah Tope, as well as of some other neighbouring posts, whence it was deemed absolutely necessary to expel them. For this purpose, his Majesty's 33d regiment, commanded by Colonel Wellesley, was directed

to perform a similar duty to that which it would have been General Baird's province to execute the night before, if the enemy had not abandoned their position; and Colonel Shawe, with the 12th regiment, was ordered to take possession of some other posts to the left.

This force marched at sunset—Colonel Shawe got possession of a ruined village, and completely succeeded in his object; but Colonel Wellesley advancing at the head of his regiment, the 33d, into the tope, was instantly attacked, in the darkness of the night, on every side, by a tremendous fire of musquetry and rockets—the men gave way, were dispersed, and retreated in disorder, several were killed, and twelve grenadiers were taken prisoners.

The report of this disaster, ran through the camp like wildfire, and the mortification and distress of Colonel Wellesley himself, are described as having been excessive.

On the following morning, General Harris ordered a detachment to be formed, consisting of the 94th regiment, two battalions of Sepoys, and five guns, under Colonel Wellesley's command, to make a second attempt upon the tope. As the 94th regiment formed part of General Baird's brigade, he accompanied it to the parade, where he found General Harris walking about. Upon the arrival of the 94th, all was in readiness for the march, but Colonel Wellesley did not appear

to take the command. The troops having waited more than an hour under arms for their leader, General Harris became impatient, and ordered General Baird himself to take the command of them. He instantly mounted his horse, and called his aid-de-camp; but a moment afterwards a generous feeling towards Colonel Wellesley, (although he seemed destined to be his rival throughout the campaign,) induced him to pause, and going back to General Harris, he said, "Don't you think, Sir, it would be but fair to give Wellesley an opportunity of retrieving the misfortune of last night?" General Harris listened to the kind and considerate proposal, and shortly afterwards Colonel Wellesley appeared, took the command of the party, and at its head succeeded in getting possession of the tope.

This plain statement, while it successfully vindicates Colonel Wellesley from any imputation but that of ill success in a night attack upon the tope, establishes the magnanimity and honourable feeling of General Baird, in the highest degree; and it ought to be added, that it was with the greatest difficulty, in after times, that General Baird could be brought ever to allude to the circumstance; and it was only a most absurd report connected with Colonel Wellesley's conduct upon the occasion, that induced the general to explain the case which, as it occurred on parade, and in the face of the whole army, is universally

known to have been exactly as it is here described.*

* What we have given above, is that which occurred within General Baird's own knowledge. By statements of various persons, and especially that (which is subjoined) of Colonel M'Kenzie, who was with Colonel Wellesley in the tope, his absence from parade is easily accounted for.

"When the light company of the 33d, with which Colonel Wellesley was leading the column, pushed perhaps too eagerly into the tope, they came suddenly on a work of the enemy, who opened a heavy fire upon them: the men, too much in advance, finding themselves not supported, retreated precipitately, leaving Colonel Wellesley and Captain M'Kenzie by themselves. In such a helpless and hopeless situation, the only thing for these two individuals to do, was to endeavour to regain the division; but in attempting it, the darkness of the night was such, that they lost their way, and it was not until they had groped about through strange ground for several hours, that they alone reached the camp.

"When they arrived, Colonel Wellesley proceeded to head-quarters, to report what had happened; but finding that General Harris was not yet awake, he threw himself on the table of the dinner tent, and, worn out with fatigue and anxiety of mind, fell asleep."

This is the statement made by the gallant Colonel M'Kenzie, who was Colonel Wellesley's companion in the adventure. We give it as it has been repeated to us, and as we believe it; but we cannot quit the subject without remarking on the invidious partiality of Colonel Beatson (who, before he wrote his history of the war with Tippoo, had been an aid-de-camp of Lord Wellesley's), who, in describing the affair of the discomfiture of Colonel Wellesley's detachment in the tope, says:—"Colonel Wellesley advancing about the same time, to attack the Sultaunpettah Tope, was, upon entering it, assailed on every side by a hot fire of musquetry and rockets. This circumstance,

The possession of the Sultaunpettah Tope, and the other posts which had now fallen into our hands, enabled General Harris to proceed with the regular approaches of the siege. General Floyd, on the 6th of April, with four regiments of cavalry, and the whole left wing of the army, except Meuron's regiment, marched to Periapatam, to join the Bombay army.

On the 7th the army took up its final position—the enemy were employed in fortifying a ruined powder-mill at the distance of seven hundred and fifty yards from the north-west angle of the fort, and their cavalry marched towards Periapatam.

On the 9th General Harris received the following letter from Tippoo, who appeared considerably moved by the extensive preparations which he saw in progress.

joined to the extreme darkness of the night, the uncertainty of the enemy's position, and the badness of the ground, *induced him to confine his operation to the object of causing a diversion, and to postpone the attack of the enemy's post until a more favourable opportunity should offer.*"

Did Colonel Beatson imagine that such a misrepresentation, however it might please Lord Wellesley, would gratify such a man as his brother? or did Colonel Beatson's concealment of the whole affair which transpired on parade the next morning, arise from the fear of exciting Lord Wellesley's displeasure, by exhibiting General Baird's magnanimity and high feeling in their proper colours? The tone given to this portion of Colonel Beatson's narrative is somewhat too courtier-like to be satisfactory to the man who reads for information.

"The governor-general, Lord Mornington Bahander, sent me a letter, the copy of which is enclosed—you will understand it. *I have adhered firmly to treaties. What,* then, is the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and the occurrence of hostilities? Inform me. What need I say more?"

To this General Harris, on the following day, returned this answer:—

"Your letter, enclosing copies of the governor-general's letter, has been received. For the advance of the English and allied armies, and for the occurrence of hostilities, I refer you to the several letters of the governor-general, which are sufficiently explanatory of the subject. What need I say more?"

"April 10, 1799."

The peculiar style of oriental diplomatic literature, will perhaps render this letter and answer worthy the notice of the reader. General Harris, however, continued his operations, and no further communication took place between his lordship and the sultaun until the 20th of the same month, by which time numerous batteries had been erected, several important outposts taken, and the means of defence upon which he had relied turned against himself—again Tippoo made an appeal, and General Harris, on the evening of the 20th, received the subjoined address from him.

"In the letter of Lord Mornington it is written, that the clearing up of matters at issue is proper, and that, therefore, you having been empowered for the purpose, will ap-

point such persons as you judge proper for conducting a conference, and renewing the business of a treaty. You are the well-wisher of both Sircars. In this matter, what is your pleasure? Inform me, that a conference may take place. What can I say more?"

To this General Harris made the following reply, which was despatched from camp by noon of April 22, 1799.

"Your highness's friendly letter has been received, and its contents understood.

"The governor-general, Lord Mornington Bahander, informed you in his letter of the 8th of November, that the British government and the allies wishing to live in peace with all their neighbours, entertaining no projects of ambition, nor any other views in the least incompatible with their respective arrangements, and looking to no other objects than the permanent security and tranquillity of their own dominions and subjects, will always be ready, as *they now are*, to afford you *every demonstration of these pacific dispositions.*

"The governor-general in that letter expressed his desire of communicating to your highness a plan calculated to promote the *mutual* security and welfare of *all** parties, and proposed to depute Major Doveton to you for that purpose. You rejected the pacific advances of the governor-general and the allies, and you refused to receive Major Doveton, until the lateness of the season had compelled the governor-general to order the armies to advance. But since you now express a desire to know my pleasure upon the adjustment of the business at issue, and as I hope this request is made with sincerity, and with a regard to your

* Sic orig.

true interests, I have to inform you in reply, that being *vested* by the governor-general with full powers of treating and concluding a treaty, the demands contained in the enclosed draft of a preliminary treaty, are those alone on which any negociation can be founded—and I have further to acquaint you, that unless these demands are agreed to and your acquiescence signified to me under your seal and signature within twenty-four hours from the moment of your receiving them, and the hostages and *specie delivered!* within twenty-four hours more, the allies reserve to themselves the right of extending these demands for security, even to the possession of the fort of Seringapatam, till a definitive treaty can be arranged, and its stipulations carried into effect.

"The four sons demanded of your highness as hostages are, Sultaun Padshaw, Futteh Hyder, Moyer ud Deen, and Abdul Khalick; the four sirdars, Meer Kummer ud Deen, Meer Mahomed Sadick, Syed Goffar, and Purneah.

"What need I say more?"

It would be rather difficult to answer this *naïve* official question; but it appears that General Harris *did* say much more in his draft of a treaty, amongst the other conditions of which, were these —that Tippoo was not only instantly to dismiss all the French, and other Europeans in his service or dominions, but to send them to the British camp, in forty-eight hours. That he was to surrender half the dominions of which he was in possession before the war, agreeably to the selection of the allies. He was to relinquish all claims to any thing he had ever disputed with the allies; to grant a free and uninterrupted communication

with the Malabar coast, and the Carnatic; to release all prisoners, and to pay two crores of sicca rupees, one immediately, in pagodas or gold moheers, or in gold and silver bullion, and the other crore in six months.

These were amongst the conditions which the Honourable East India Company deigned to offer to the same Tippoo whom they had condescended to relieve, by a similar process of treaty, of three crores and thirty lacs of rupees, just seven years before.

During these amicable negociations the building of batteries went on with undiminished activity, various posts were carried and taken possession of, and by the 1st of May all the preparations were completed.

Tippoo had indeed made another attempt at negociation on the 28th of April, but General Harris, in reply, told him that he had allowed the time to elapse which he had mentioned for treating, and that now he was prepared to reject any ambassadors who did not come fully prepared to agree to all the conditions of the treaty, and bring the money with them.

With this letter, and its concluding question, "What need I say more?" the negociations for ever terminated.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BREACH REPORTED NEARLY PRACTICABLE—GENERAL BAIRD VOLUNTEERS TO COMMAND THE STORMING PARTY—HIS ANSWER TO COLONEL AGNEW — LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS — DETAIL OF STORMING PARTY — ORDERS — BAIRD LEADS THE PARTY, AND CROSSES THE RIVER—COMPLETE SUCCESS OF THE ASSAULT—DETAILS OF THE BATTLE WITHIN THE FORTRESS—ATTACK OF THE PALACE—THE PRINCES SURRENDER THEMSELVES—REPORT OF TIPPOO'S BEING WOUNDED—SEARCH MADE FOR HIM—DETAIL OF HIS PROCEEDINGS DURING THE DAY—EFFECTS OF DISASTERS UPON HIS MIND—HIS DETERMINED BRAVERY—IS WOUNDED—RECEIVES A SECOND MUSKET SHOT CLOSE TO THE FIRST—TREMENDOUS SLAUGHTER BY THE FIRE OF THE 12TH REGIMENT —PERSONAL RENCONTRE OF THE SULTAUN WITH A SOLDIER —WOUNDS THE SOLDIER, AND IS SHOT DEAD BY HIM — HIS BODY DISCOVERED BY GENERAL BAIRD — REMOVED BY HIS ORDER TO THE PALACE—RECOGNIZED BY HIS PEOPLE—SHAMEFUL MISCONDUCT OF CERTAIN OFFICERS—GENERAL BAIRD ESTABLISHES HIS HEAD-QUARTERS IN THE PALACE—GENERAL ORDER FROM GENERAL HARRIS—PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL BAIRD—ORDER RESTORED—GENERAL BAIRD SUPERSEDED IN THE COMMAND OF SERINGAPATAM BY COLONEL WELLESLEY.

On the 3d of May the breach was considered nearly practicable, when General Baird, who had gallantly volunteered his services to command the storming party, (it having been determined that

the storm should take place the following day,) was sitting with General Harris in his tent, discusssing some details of service, together with Colonel Agnew, the deputy-adjutant-general, when a sudden explosion took place in one of the batteries which had taken fire. General Baird and Colonel Agnew instantly ran to the front to discover the cause not only of the explosion, but of a heavy firing which was kept up upon those who were attempting to extinguish the flames, in which service many lives were lost, amongst others, that of Captain Henry Cosby, who was killed by a grape-shot after he had descended from the merlons into the battery.

In looking at this affair, General Baird saw in an instant that the whole strength of the enemy's fire came from a number of guns planted all round the breach. This he observed to Colonel Agnew, and also observed that under the circumstances he thought it would be better to give the breach an additional four-and-twenty hours' firing, in order to knock off those defences, and prevent the needless loss of a great number of men in the assault.

Colonel Agnew replied, "If *you* knew our actual situation as well as *I* do, you would not think so. We have but two days' rice in camp for the fighting men, and if we do not succeed to-morrow, we must go."

"I am answered, Sir," said General Baird, "either we succeed to-morrow, or you will never

see me more;" and he instantly prepared to proceed on the service.*

The following is a copy of the official letter from Colonel Barry Close, adjutant-general of the army, containing General Baird's instructions.

To Major-General Baird.

SIR,

You have been informed by the commander-in-chief, that he proposes placing you in the command of the troops which are to assault the fort of Seringapatam.

A statement of the troops intended for this service is by his desire enclosed. He wishes the whole to be lodged in the trenches during this night, in the order detailed in the enclosure, from which you will perceive that the European flank companies, from the division under Lieutenant-General Stuart, are to lead the attack.

Of the troops destined for the supporting party in the trenches, the 2d battalion, 5th regiment, is to be ordered from camp—it will be on the general parade at 3 o'clock, and there wait to receive your orders.

The whole of the troops for the assault will be placed under your orders this evening, and you will be pleased to direct the different corps to proceed to the trenches at such hours during the night, and in such succession as will place them in the trenches agreeably to the order required, a little before daybreak.

Colonel Sherbrooke, coming on the duty of a general

* Seringapatam lies in Lat. 12° 26′ N., 76° 51′ E. In the Mysore country Seringapatam is called Patana; and in their maps, *Sre. Ranga-Patæna*—under Seringapatam. It is distant from Calcutta 1170 miles, from Bombay 622, and from Madras 200.

officer of the trenches, will be directed to obey such instructions as you may have occasion to send him relative to the movement, or disposition, of the troops in the trenches.

When the whole of the troops intended for the assault have left camp, you will report on the subject to the commander-in-chief, who will then give you his further instructions.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your very obedient servant,

BARRY CLOSE,
Adj. Gen. of the Army.

Head Quarters, Camp before Seringapatam, 3d May, 1799.

The force appointed for the storming party is detailed in the following official return:—

Return of the Strength of the different Corps composing the Assault on the Fort of Seringapatam, on the 4th May, 1799.

	Lt.-Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Ct. Lieuts.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Surgeons.	Assistant Surgeons.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.	Subidars.	Jemidars.	Havildars.	Naigs.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	Tindals.	Puckallys.
HIS MAJESTY'S TROOPS.																				
Flank companies of the 75th regiment.....	1		2		6				1	6	6	200								
.. .. of the 77th ditto.....			2		4		1	1		8	6	200								
.. .. of the Scotch brigade.....			2		4				1	5		119								
.. .. of the regiment de Meuron			1		2	1	1			8	5	102								
His Majesty's 12th regiment.....		2	2	1	11	4			1	25	11	386								
33d ditto.....	1	1	3	1	11	3	1	1	2	36	13	413								
.. .. 73d ditto.....		1	2		13	2	1	1	2	28	14	417								
.. .. 74th ditto.....		1	2		13	3	1			24	20	403								
THE HONOURABLE COMPANY'S TROOPS.																				
Artillery																				
Flank companies of the Bombay Europ. regt.					6					8	4	200								
10 do. do. of Bengal Sepoys.....			3		5													900		
8 do. do. of Coast do.....													8	8	33	34	16	498		8
6 do. do. of Bombay do.....	1		4		4			1							30	30	6	420		12
Total.....	3	5	23	2	79	13	5	4	7	148	79	2494	8	8	63	64	22	1818		20

N.B. 100 men not included in the above belonging to the artillery.

Natives....1882

Total.....4376
100

Total....4476

Naigs.... 64

1882

This force, under General Baird's orders, was disposed of as follows:—

Disposition of the troops ordered for the Assault of the Fort of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May 1799, under the command of Major-General Baird.

Left attack, under Lieut.-Col. Dunlop, to consist of six companies of European flankers from the Bombay army.

His Majesty's 12th regiment.

33d ditto.

Ten companies of Bengal Sepoy flankers, under Lieut.-Col. Gardiner.

Fifty artillery-men, with a proportion of gun Lascars, under Capt. Prescott.

To move in column, left in front.

To take possession of the cavalier, close to the breach, and move along the north rampart of the fort; to proceed till they join the night attack, leaving a battalion company of the 33d regiment in charge of the cavalier already mentioned, close to the breach, and occupying such other parts on the ramparts, by detachments from the 12th and 33d regiments, as shall be thought necessary by Lieut.-Col. Dunlop.

Right attack, under Col. Sherbrook, to consist of four companies of European flankers, from the Scotch brigade, and regiment de Meuron.

His Majesty's 73d regiment.

74th ditto.

Eight companies of Coast Sepoy flankers, under Lieut.-Col. Dalrymple.

Six companies of Bombay Sepoy flankers, under Lieut.-Col. Mignard.

Fifty artillery-men, with a proportion of gun Lascars, under Major Bell.

To move in column, right in front.

To move along the south rampart of the fort, leaving such parties as may be thought necessary by Colonel Sherbrook, from the 73d or 74th regiments, in charge of such parts of

the ramparts as he may deem it essentially necessary to occupy.

Half of the European, and half of the Native pioneers, to accompany each attack with hatchets, the European pioneers to carry the scaling ladders, assisted by forty men from the battalion companies of each of the leading regiments; the native pioneers to carry a proportion of facines.

If the road across the river and the breach shall be deemed sufficiently broad, the two attacks to move out to the assault at the same moment; on coming to the top of the breach they are to wheel to the right and left, so as to get on the face they are ordered to move on, but if the road and breach are too narrow, the left attack is to move out first.

The leading companies of each attack to use the bayonet principally, and not to fire but in cases of absolute necessity.

Each attack to be preceded by a serjeant and twelve volunteers, supported by a subaltern officer and twenty-five men.

The leading flank companies of each attack to be provided with hand-hatchets.

The whole of the troops here detailed were in the trenches before day-break on the 4th, and in passing along, General Baird, as has been already mentioned in a note, recognized a number of his old companions of the 71st, (who were, as the reader will recollect, drafted into other regiments,) and even some of his fellow sufferers in his original captivity at Seringapatam. To these he spoke with his usual kindness and affability, and bade them recollect that they would soon have an opportunity of "paying off old scores." It may easily be imagined that such an appeal from their old commander had its effect.

In the course of the forenoon General Baird

received the following communication from Colonel Close, the adjutant-general.

To Major-General Baird, commanding the Troops ordered for the Assault of Seringapatam.

SIR,

The breach being reported practicable, the commander-in-chief desires that the assault may be made this day, at 1 P. M.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,

BARRY CLOSE,
Adj. Gen. of the Army.

Head Quarters, Camp, 4th May, 1799.

P.S. You are requested to shew this order to Major-General Popham, senior officer in the trenches.

B. C.

It was ten minutes past one o'clock in the afternoon, when General Baird, having completed all his arrangements for his heroic enterprise, stepped out of the trenches, and drawing his sword, exclaimed to the men, in the most gallant and animating manner, "Now, my brave fellows, follow ME, and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers."

The effect was like magic. In an instant both columns rushed forward, and entered the bed of the river, and being of course immediately perceived by the enemy, were in a few minutes assailed by a tremendous fire of musketry and rockets.

The night before the assault Lieutenant Far-

quhar had crossed the river and placed sticks, indicating the best ford of the Cauvery. Colonels Sherbrook and St. John of course led the flankers of each column. General Baird had intended to lead the left column himself, but observing that the troops, being very severely galled by the enemy's fire, had swerved from the line of marks which had been made to direct their passage over the river, and had got into deep water, (where, although they found themselves protected by the high bank of an old tank, their progress was necessarily retarded,) dashed forward himself by the shortest and most exposed passage.*

By this intrepid movement he gained the opposite bank just at the moment the head of the first column reached it. He cheered the men by his personal example, and himself rushed onwards close to the forlorn hope, which in spite of the determined opposition of the enemy, made good its lodgment in the breach, in which, in six minutes from the first assault, the British colours were seen proudly floating in the breeze, by the troops, who were eagerly following their noble leaders. The gallantry and rapidity of this attack overcame all obstacles.

In a few minutes more, the breach was crowded with men, who, according to General Baird's

* An eye-witness has described this scene as most extraordinary. General Baird, he says, went forward with a cool, steady intrepidity, as if "he bore a charmed life," while the shot fell around him in every direction like hail.

orders filed off to the right and left. As the troops pressed forward, the enemy retired, and in a very short space of time, another British flag was hoisted on the north-west bastion.

When General Baird had reached the top of the breach, he discovered, to his inexpressible surprise, a second ditch full of water within the outer wall. The almost insurmountable difficulty of overcoming this unexpected impediment staggered him, and he exclaimed, "Good God! how shall we get over *this?*" Fortunately, however, in leading the troops along the ramparts, he discovered some scaffolding, which had been raised for the use of the workmen who had been repairing the wall, by availing himself of which, he was enabled to surmount that which at first appeared an unconquerable obstacle. Having immediately taken advantage of the opportunity which thus luckily presented itself, he crossed the inner ditch, and proceeded by the ramparts to the other side of the fort, where the two columns were to meet, and enter the body of the town.*

The attack was so sudden and even unexpected, being made in the broad noon of day, and at the general hour of dinner, that the assailants met with no very considerable resistance. The left

* General Baird's official report of the storm made to General Harris, will be found in a subsequent page, where, as it was not forwarded to head-quarters until the 6th of May, it is placed for the purpose of coming in chronological order.

column, however, was more vigorously opposed; they proceeded along the north rampart, which they found traversed and well defended. It was there Tippoo placed HIMSELF—he was the last man to quit the traverses, as they were successively taken possession of by the European troops, and was seen firing upon his enemies with his own hand, his attendants loading and handing him the firelocks; being wounded, however, he endeavoured to return with his people through the sally-port into the fort.

It is necessary to observe that part of the 12th regiment, not in strict obedience to orders, instead of proceeding with the rest of the left column along the ramparts, pressed forward into the body of the town, and kept along the inside of the rampart, and found themselves opposite the sally-port, through which the sultaun proposed returning. They instantly halted, and commenced firing from the inside, while the rest of the column were firing from the outside, so that Tippoo was literally placed between both fires; and it is to this accidental variation from the orders given to the 12th, that his death may be attributed, for it was on this very spot, as we shall presently see, that he was found buried under the bodies of hundreds of his faithfully devoted subjects and defenders.

Meanwhile, General Baird, with the right column, having cleared the south rampart, halted at the east cavalier to give the men breathing-

time after the fatigue they had endured under a burning sun, before they entered the town to summon the palace; and while they were resting, Colonel Close came to General Baird, and told him, that a native officer who accompanied him, assured him that Tippoo had caused the twelve grenadiers of the 33d regiment, whom it will be recollected had been taken prisoners on the night of the 5th of April in the Sultaunpettah Tope, to be murdered.

General Baird desired Colonel Close to be extremely particular in his inquiries touching the truth of his report, which the Mussulmaun persisted in repeating; and when General Baird marched towards the palace, he told Colonel Wallace, of the 74th, that if the man's story was true, the instant he laid hands on Tippoo, he would deliver him over to the grenadiers of the 33d regiment, to be tried for the murder, in cold blood, of their comrades.

As the troops were now in possession of every part of the ramparts, and it appeared hopeless in the sultaun to make further resistance, General Baird sent forward Major Allan, to offer protection to all persons, Tippoo himself included (for General Baird did not believe the story of the murder of the English soldiers, knowing the mendacity of natives, who may be interested in doing mischief), provided they all surrendered themselves unconditionally; and this proposition was made, with

the alternative, that if it were not accepted, the palace would be instantly assaulted, and no quarter given.*

Upon arriving at the palace, Major Allan found Major Shee, with part of the 33rd drawn up opposite to the gate, in the balcony, over or near which, several of the sultaun's family appeared, evidently in a state of great alarm and agitation. In a short time, however, Major Allan, together with Captain Scohey and Captain Hastings Frazer, were admitted into the palace by the killadar, and brought into the presence of two of the younger princes, whom the British officers endeavoured to re-assure by promises of protection; and for the purpose of calming all their personal apprehen-

* Although General Baird could not bring himself to credit this report, it eventually proved to be true. Captain William Macleod, who conducted what in Indian phraseology is called "the intelligence department of government," subsequently made an official report upon the subject to General Harris.

Eight of those who suffered death were men belonging to the 33d, who had lost their way on the night of the Sultaun-pettah Tope affair, a fact ascertained by Colonel Wellesley, who sent some of the officers of the regiment, by whom the body of one of their men was identified, a Peon having undertaken to show where the European prisoners were buried.

These unfortunate captives, it seems, were murdered at night, in parties of three at a time—the mode of killing them was by twisting their heads, while their bodies were held fast, and thus breaking their necks. It seems, therefore, not improbable that much of the desperation of Tippoo, which has been dignified into heroism, arose from the consciousness of what he himself deserved, should he fall into the hands of his enemies.

sions, Major Allan offered to remain with them himself.

Soon after this, General Baird arrived at the gates of the palace, when Major Allan communicated to him what had occurred with regard to the two princes, who both continued most solemnly to declare that they knew nothing of the sultaun, their father, except that he was not in the palace; but as far as they themselves were personally concerned, they were ready to surrender themselves and the palace itself on the promise of protection from the British.

General Baird at this period utterly disbelieved the statement of these youths that the sultaun was not in the palace, and, entering as he did, into the feelings which were quite natural in their state, hesitated to grant terms to the sons, in hopes that they might be excited by the delay to give information of their father's place of concealment; threatening at the same time, if they refused, to search the most private quarters of the palace. but as their repeated denials of any knowledge of the sultaun were persisted in with apparent innocence and simplicity, he resolved at all events to take charge of the princes, and convey them out of the fort before it became dark; and accordingly he gave them into the charge of Major Allan, who having received them with every mark of kindness, and given them every assurance of personal safety, delivered them over to Lieutenant Colonel Agnew and Captain Marriot, who con-

ducted them, under a suitable escort, to General Harris in camp.*

It still remained a point of the greatest political importance to ascertain the actual fate of Tippoo himself; and General Baird was so fully impressed with the absolute necessity of reducing this question to a positive certainty, that, accompanied by Colonel Close and Major Allan, he proceeded to search the palace, scrupulously avoiding, however, the zenana, over which a sufficient guard had been placed to prevent the sultaun's escape, should he have taken refuge in its sanctuary. The killadar, however, who attended them, betrayed such emotions on being severely questioned, that they no longer entertained any expectation of finding him there, and at length that officer, who seemed anxious as long as possible to conceal the truth, admitted his having heard that the sultaun had been severely wounded in a gateway in the north face of the fort, and that he still lay there; adding that he would conduct them to

* The following passage from Major Allan's narrative we feel it right to submit to the reader:—"The indignation of General Baird was very justly excited by a report which had reached him soon after he had sent me to the palace, that Tippoo had inhumanly murdered all the Europeans who had fallen into his hands during the siege: this was heightened probably by a momentary recollection of his own sufferings during more than three years' imprisonment in that very place; he was nevertheless sensibly affected by the sight of the princes; and his gallantry in the assault was not more conspicuous than the moderation and humanity which he displayed on this occasion."

the spot, and if found to have deceived them would willingly suffer death.

Upon receiving this information General Baird quitted the palace, accompanied by several officers, and proceeded to the gateway pointed out by the killadar. The details of the result of this search, as collected from the killadar of Seringapatam and some of the sultaun's servants, are so curious and interesting, that, although they are somewhat lengthened by the account of what had previously occurred to Tippoo on the day of his overthrow, we are inclined to submit them to our readers entire.

"When the sultaun left the palace he was dressed in a light-coloured jacket, wide trowsers of fine flowered chintz, a sash of dark red silky stuff, and a turban with one or two distinguishing ornaments. He wore his sword in a rich belt slung over his right shoulder, and a small cartridge-box hung to another embroidered belt thrown over his left shoulder; his talisman was fastened under the jacket on his right arm, a little below the shoulder. He went out early in the forenoon, as was his custom daily, to one of the cavaliers on the outer rampart of the north face, whence he could observe what was doing on both sides. He remained there till about noon, when he took his usual repast under a pandal. It would appear that he had at that time no suspicion of the assault being so near; for when it was reported to him that our parallels and approaches were unusually

crowded with Europeans, he did not express the least apprehension, nor take any other precaution but desiring the messenger to return to the west face, with orders to Meer Goffar, and the troops on duty near the breach, to keep a strict guard.

" A few minutes afterwards he was informed that Meer Goffar had been killed by a cannon-shot near the breach; which intelligence appeared to agitate him greatly. He immediately ordered the troops that were near him under arms, and his personal servants, to load the carbines which they carried for his own use, and hastened along the ramparts towards the breach, accompanied by a select guard and several of his chiefs, till he met a number of his troops flying before the van of the Europeans, who he perceived had already mounted and gained the ramparts. Here he exerted himself to rally the fugitives, and, uniting them with his own guard, encouraged them by his voice and example to make a determined stand. He repeatedly fired on our troops himself; and one of his servants asserts, that he saw him bring down several Europeans near the top of the breach.

" Notwithstanding these exertions, when the front of the European flank companies of the left attack approached the spot where the sultaun stood, he found himself almost entirely deserted, and was forced to retire to the traverses of the north ramparts. These he defended, one after another, with the bravest of his men and officers; and, assisted by the fire of his people on the inner

wall, he several times obliged the front of our troops, who were pushing on with their usual ardour, to make a stand. The loss here would have been much greater on our part, had not the light infantry, and part of the battalion companies of the 12th regiment, crossing the inner ditch, and mounting the rampart, driven the enemy from them, and taken in reverse those who, with the sultaun, were defending the traverses of the outer ramparts.

"While any of his troops remained with him, the sultaun continued to dispute the ground, until he approached the passage across the ditch to the gate of the inner fort. Here he complained of pain and weakness in one of his legs, in which he had received a bad wound when very young; and, ordering his horse to be brought, he mounted: but seeing the Europeans still advancing on both the ramparts, he made for the gate, followed by his palankeen, and a number of officers, troops, and servants. It was then, probably, his intention either to have entered and shut the gate, in order to attack the small body of our troops which had got into the inner fort, and, if successful in driving them out, to have attempted to maintain it against us, or to endeavour to make his way to the palace, and there make his last stand; but as he was crossing to the gate, by the communication from the outer rampart, he received a musket-ball in the right side, nearly as high as the breast: he, however, still pressed on, till he was stopped,

about half way through the arch of the gateway, by the fire of the 12th light infantry from within, when he received a second ball close to the other. The horse he rode on, being also wounded, sank under him, and his turban fell to the ground. Many of his people fell at the same time, on every side, by musketry, both from within and without the gate.

"The fallen sultaun was immediately raised by some of his adherents,* and placed in his palankeen, under the arch, on one side of the gateway, where he lay, or sat, for some minutes, faint and exhausted, till some Europeans entered the gateway. A serjeant, who has survived, relates, that one of the soldiers seized the sultaun's sword-belt, which was very rich, and attempted to pull it off: that the sultaun, who still held his sword in his hand, made a cut at the soldier with all his remaining strength, and wounded him about the knee; on which he put his piece to his shoulder and shot the sultaun through the temple, when he instantly expired.†

"Not less than three hundred men were killed,

* "Loyal subjects" would, perhaps, have sounded as well in a conqueror's account of the death of a sovereign prince.

† One cannot but regret, for the honour of human nature, and even for the sake of England, that the end of such a man as Tippoo (for, let it never be forgotten in this great contest, who were, in fact, the oppressors), that he should have been shot in cold blood by a man who was endeavouring to rob him. Doubtless the feeling that prompted the blow which actually cost him his life, was that of rage at the indignity and contamination he had suffered by the attack of the private soldier. Let us hope the man was a Sepoy.

and numbers wounded under the arch of this gateway, which soon became impassible, excepting over the bodies of the dead and dying.

"About dusk, General Baird, in consequence of information he had received at the palace, came with lights to the gate, accompanied by the late killadar of the fort, and others, to search for the body of the sultaun; and after much labour it was found, and brought from under a heap of slain, to the inside of the gate. The countenance was no ways distorted, but had an expression of stern composure. *His turban, jacket, and sword-belt were gone!* but the body was recognised by some of his people, who were there, to be the sultaun, and an officer who was present, with the leave of General Baird, took from off his right arm the talisman, which contained, sewed up in pieces of fine flowered silk, an amulet of a brittle metallic substance of the colour of silver, and some manuscripts in magic Arabic and Persian characters, the purport of which, had there been any doubt, would have sufficiently ascertained the identity of the sultaun's body. It was placed on his own palankeen, and, by General Baird's orders, conveyed to the court of the palace, where it remained during the night, furnishing a remarkable instance to those who are given to reflection, of the uncertainty of human affairs. He who had left his palace in the morning a powerful imperious sultaun, full of vast ambitious projects, was brought back a lump of clay; his kingdom overthrown, his capital taken, and his palace occupied

by the very man (Major-General Baird), who, about fifteen years before, had been, with other victims of his cruelty and tyranny, released from near four years of rigid confinement in irons, scarce three hundred yards from the spot where the corpse of the sultaun now lay.

"Thus ended the life and the power of Tippoo. It will require an able pen to delineate a character apparently so inconsistent; but he who attempts it must not decide hastily."*

After General Baird had discovered the body of the sultaun, and had caused it to be brought to the palace, he despatched officers and parties in every direction, to endeavour to restore order and prevent the plunder and confusion which hardly any efforts could entirely suppress at the first moment of success; although it ought to be

* In another very interesting account of this scene by Major Allan, a more particular description is given of the personal appearance of the sultaun.

"When Tippoo," says Major Allan, "was brought from under the gateway, his eyes were open, and the body was so warm that for a few moments Colonel Wellesley and myself were doubtful whether he was not alive—on feeling his heart and pulse, that doubt was removed: he had four wounds, three in the body and one in the temple, the ball having entered a little above the right ear and lodged in the cheek.

"Tippoo was of low stature, corpulent, with high shoulders and a short, thick neck; but his feet and hands were remarkably small—his complexion was rather dark, his eyes large and prominent, with small arched eyebrows, and his nose aquiline—he had an appearance of dignity, or perhaps sternness, in his countenance, which distinguished him above the common order of people."

stated, to the honour of the victors, that although eight thousand of the enemy's troops fell in the assault, very few of the unarmed inhabitants suffered, and those who did, subsequently proved to have been hit accidentally, a circumstance highly indicative of the admirable discipline of the troops, and the humane exertions of their officers.

The loss of the European and Indian army during the siege, was twenty-two officers killed, and forty-five wounded, one hundred and eighty-one European non-commissioned rank and file killed, six hundred and twenty-two wounded, and twenty-two missing, one hundred and nineteen natives killed, four hundred and twenty wounded, and one hundred missing—of the officers twenty-five were killed and wounded in the assault.

Upon his return to the palace, General Baird took with him the 74th and the 33d regiment, ordered them to pile their arms in one of its magnificent courts, and posted guards for the protection of the zenana, and after the fatigues of the eventful day, laid himself down to rest on a carpet in the verandah; thus ensuring and enforcing by his presence the protection he had promised to the helpless women and the family of the dead sultaun, who had in the days of his ascendancy inflicted on him the horrors of a long and dismal imprisonment, and that too, as has been observed, within a few paces of the very spot where he then reposed, HIS CONQUEROR!

Several of General Baird's staff, and Colonel Wallace, of the 74th, were, like the general, en-

joying the comfort of rest after their toils; but their quiet was soon disturbed;. for very shortly after they had lain down, intelligence was brought to them that the town was on fire in several places, and that the followers of the camp, who had come in, were committing all sorts of excesses. General Baird instantly roused himself, gave the necessary orders for checking the irregularity, and then again settled himself to sleep, when a new alarm was raised that the soldiers had gained access to the treasury, and were loading themselves with gold.

Colonel Wallace and his aid-de-camp were immediately despatched to the spot, which proved to be the " expense" treasury, where Tippoo always kept an immense store of money and jewels for present use. This treasury had been pointed out to General Baird, and he had posted a strong guard over it, but a door had been discovered which opened into it from another court of the palace, through which the marauders had entered.

Colonel Wallace, on his arrival, found the place filled with soldiers and (to their shame be it said) officers, loading themselves with gold and jewels. One *gentleman* in particular, when he perceived Colonel Wallace and the aid-de-camp approaching, affected to be highly incensed against the men, and actively employed in preventing the pillage, while at the very moment they saw him filling his own pockets. That individual is now dead, and General Baird never would run the risk of paining

his family by the chance of the story reaching their ears—he knew, but never mentioned his name.

Soon after the dawn of day, one of Tippoo's sons, Abdul Khalick, was brought to General Baird—he had surrendered himself to an officer outside the fort, who had been reconnoitring. He was received by the general with the greatest kindness, who, after a short time had elapsed, inquired of him if he knew any thing of the sultaun, his father. He replied—No—but earnestly begged to be informed if the general did. The general told him that it was thought he had fallen in the assault, and that a body, supposed to be that of his highness, lay in the adjoining apartment.

"That may be easily ascertained," said the prince; at the same time requesting permission to send for an old man, one of his attendants, in order that he might go and look at the corpse—the permission was granted—the old man went—he returned bathed in tears.

The young prince looked stedfastly at him for an instant, and laying his finger on his lips to impose silence, turned to the general with a calm dignity, and without uttering a syllable, signified by the expression of his countenance that the body was his father's.*

* "The remains of the late sultaun were interred in the evening of the same day; the bier was supported by the attendants of the late court, preceded by two companies of English grenadiers, and followed by a similar force. Abdul Khalick followed the corpse on horseback, attended by the killadar and

It was on this day, the 5th, that General Harris issued the following general order from head quarters, and although the insertion of that order just at this point of time may involve us in something like an anachronism, it seems more convenient, with reference to circumstances which closely follow, to give it in this place.

G. O.—By the Commander-in-chief.

Camp at Seringapatam, 5th May, 1799.

THE commander-in-chief congratulates the gallant army which he has the honour to command on the conquest of yesterday. The effect arising from the attainment of such an acquisition as far exceeds the present limits of detail as the unremitting zeal, labour, and unparalleled valour of the troops, surpass his power of praise. For services so incalculable in their consequences, he must consider the army as well entitled to the applause and gratitude of their country at large.

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other officers on foot. The cauzee chanted some verses from the Koran, which were repeated by the attendants.

"The streets were thronged with the inhabitants, the greater part of whom prostrated themselves before the earthly remains of their late monarch and master. At the entrance of the town, Baug Meer Allum, and the chief of the Nizam's army, after paying their respects to the prince, fell into the procession; when, having reached Hyder's mausoleum, the grenadiers formed a street and presented arms. The burial service having been performed, a keerout, or charitable gift of 5,000 rupees, was distributed by the cauzee to the different Facquirs and to the poor who attended the funeral; and, to add to the solemnity of the scene, the evening closed with a most dreadful storm, attended by rain, thunder, and lightning, by which two officers, and some others in the Bombay camp, were killed, and many severely hurt."—*Beatson's War with Tippoo.*

While Lieutenant-General Harris sincerely laments the loss sustained in the valuable officers and men who fell in the assault, *he cannot omit* to return his thanks in the warmest terms to Major-General Baird, for the decided and able manner in which he conducted the assault, and the humane measures which he subsequently adopted for preserving order and regularity in the place. He requests that Major-General Baird will communicate to the officers and men who, on that great occasion, acted under his command, the high sense he must entertain of their achievements and merits.

The commander-in-chief requests that Colonel Gent, and the corps of engineers under his orders, will accept his thanks for their unremitting exertions in conducting the duties of that very important department; and his best acknowledgments are due to Major Beatson for the essential assistance given to this branch of the service by the constant exertion of his ability and zeal.

The merits of the artillery corps are so strongly expressed by the effects of their fire, that the commander-in-chief can only desire Colonel Smith to assure the officers and men of the excellent corps under his command, that he feels most fully their claim to approbation.

In thus publicly expressing his sense of their good conduct, the commander-in-chief feels himself called upon to notice, in a particular manner, the exertions of Captain Dowse and his corps of pioneers, which, during the present service, have been equally marked by unremitting labour, and by the ability with which that labour was applied.

On referring to the progress of the siege, so many occasions have occurred for applause, that it is difficult to particularize individual merit; but the gallant manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Sherer, the Hon. Col. Wellesley, Lieut.-Col. Moneypenny, the Hon. Lieut.-Col. St. John, Major Macdonald, Major Skelly, and Lieut.-Col. Wal-

lace, conducted the attacks on the several outworks and posts of the enemy, demand to be recorded; and the very spirited attack led by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, of H.M.'s 74th regiment, which tended so greatly to secure the position our troops had attained in the enemy's works on 28th ultimo, claims the strongest approbation of the commander-in-chief.

The important part taken by the Bombay army since the commencement of the siege, in all the operations which led to its honourable conclusion, has been such as will sustain its long established reputation. The gallant manner in which the village of Agrar was seized by the force under Colonel Hart, the ability displayed in directing the fire of the batteries established there, the vigour with which every attack of the enemy on the outposts of that army was repulsed, and the spirit shewn in the assault of the breach by the corps led by Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, are points of particular notice for which the commander-in-chief requests that Lieut.-General Stuart will offer his best thanks to the officers and troops employed.

Lieutenant-General Harris trusts that Lieutenant-General Stuart will excuse his thus publicly expressing his sense of the cordial co-operation and assistance received from him during the present service; *in the course of which he has ever found it difficult to separate the sentiments of his public duty from the warmest feelings of private friendship.*

Having, with a view to exhibit distinctly the feelings of exultation, praise, and gratitude, which pervade the general order of the commander-in-chief, submitted a copy of the original document in this part of our narrative, we shall return to what was doing in the interior of the palace on the morning of the day upon which that order was issued.

In spite of all his anxious exertions, General Baird perceived that plunder was still going on, and he therefore sent out the *tom-tom* (or great drum used upon all occasions of making proclamation), and announced publicly that any man, be he whom he might, detected in pilfering, should be hanged; and in order to shew the earnestness of his intention upon this important point, the provost marshal was ordered to be in attendance. This decision had considerable effect.

General Baird having done this, was proceeding to make further arrangements for the tranquillization and regulation of the town, when Colonel Wellesley arrived at the palace, bringing with him an order from General Harris to General Baird, directing him to deliver over to *him* (Colonel Wellesley) the command of Seringapatam; the city which he had conquered the day before, and the conquest of which was to him, above all living men, most glorious—and, to use the memorable words of the hero himself (found in the copy of a letter in his possession), "Before the sweat was dry on my brow, I was superseded by an inferior officer."

Deeply did General Baird feel this unexpected blow—but his regret, though mingled with surprise, we may even add, with indignation, partook of no personal feeling of hostility against Colonel Wellesley, whose actual merits, as we have already observed, he always justly appreciated, and whose future exaltation he always confidently anticipated.

CHAPTER XIV.

GENERAL BAIRD RETURNS TO CAMP—TRANSMITS HIS DESPATCH ANNOUNCING THE DETAILS OF THE CAPTURE OF SERINGAPATAM TO GENERAL HARRIS—ADDITIONAL ORDERS—LETTER OF GENERAL BAIRD—OFFICIAL REPLY THROUGH THE MILITARY SECRETARY—GENERAL BAIRD'S ANSWER—SECOND LETTER—COLONEL WELLESLEY PRESENTS GENERAL BAIRD WITH THE STATE SWORD OF TIPPOO—CLAIMED BY THE PRIZE COMMITTEE—PRESENTED BY THEM TO GENERAL BAIRD—GENERAL BAIRD RECEIVES ANOTHER SWORD—THANKS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS—MR. DUNDAS'S SPEECH—THANKS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY—DISTRIBUTION OF GENERAL OFFICERS—COLONEL WELLESLEY LEFT IN COMMAND OF THE MYSORE—GENERAL BAIRD PROCEEDS TO MADRAS.

When General Baird returned to camp (which he did immediately after he was superseded), and not before, he discovered that, *without waiting for any report from him*, General Harris had issued the general orders which we have already given in a preceding page, in which, as the reader will have seen, thanks were offered to the storming party, particularizing several officers, and omitting the names of several others who had distinguished themselves as much as those who were named, if not more. By what rule, or upon what *data* the commander-in-chief had regulated his praises and commendations of individual merit in the begin-

ning of that order, it is difficult to guess; for the fact is, that the first report his excellency ever received from General Baird, of the storming or any thing connected with it, was *after his having been superseded by Colonel Wellesley, and after his return to camp.*

This report is here subjoined.

To Lieutenant-General Harris, Commander-in-chief, &c. &c.

SIR,

HAVING, in obedience to your orders, taken the command of the troops ordered for the assault of the fort of Seringapatam, consisting of a corps of the six companies of European flankers from the Bombay army under Lieut.-Col. Dunlop, a corps of four companies of European flankers from the Scotch brigade, and the regiment de Meuron, under Colonel Sherbrooke.

His Majesty's 12th, 33d, and 74th regiments, ten companies of Bengal Sepoy flankers under Lieut.-Col. Gardiner, eight companies of coast Sepoy flankers under Lieut.-Col. Mignan, one hundred artillery-men, with a proportion of gun-Lascars, under Major Bell, the European and native pioneers, under Captain Dowce, amounting, as per enclosed return of men actually under arms at the assault, to

Firelocks { European..... 2494 / Natives..... 1882 } Total...4376

I have now the honour to report to you the measures I took to secure the success of the important object intrusted to me, and the result, and to enclose a return of the killed and wounded on the assault. Having received your instructions to make the capture of the ramparts, my first object, as the force under my command was not deemed sufficient to assault the ramparts and the town at the same time, when defended by Tippoo's whole army, I directed

Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, with six companies of Bombay European flankers, supported by his Majesty's 12th and 33d regiments and ten companies of Bengal Sepoy flankers, with fifty artillery-men, to assault the north ramparts, and to push on with the European flank companies until he met the south attack under Colonel Sherbrook, consisting of the flank companies of the Scotch brigade and regiment de Meuron, reinforced by the grenadier companies of his Majesty's 73d and 74th regiments, in consequence of the vigorous resistance there was reason to apprehend at the several heavy batteries on the south face of the fort; and supported by his Majesty's 73d and 74th regiments, eight companies of coast natives, and six of Bombay native flankers, with fifty artillery-men, when the whole were directed to form on the east face until arrangements were made for the attack of such of the cavaliers as might not have already been seized, or for proceeding to the attack of the body of the place, if with the force remaining, such a measure should be deemed advisable.

The assault commenced, in obedience to your orders, at one P.M. Colonels Sherbrook and Dunlop were directed on no account to quit the inner rampart, previous to their junction, for any other object but that of seizing on the cavaliers in the neighbourhood of their respective attacks, and to lose no time in regaining their situation on the ramparts as soon as that object should be obtained; and every cavalier, or post, on the ramparts, which it might be deemed essential to secure, were immediately to be occupied by a battalion company, or companies, from the supporting European regiments; so that the whole of the ground once captured might be secured, and the flankers, on their junction, be in full force to follow up their success by an attack on any of the cavaliers which had not fallen in their way, or by an assault on the body of the town and the palace of the sultaun.

In the success of every part of this plan my warmest wishes were gratified. The whole of the ramparts and every cavalier in the fort were, in a vigorous assault of a few hours, in the possession of our troops, who were too well acquainted with the value of their conquest to render their retaining it against the whole of Tippoo's army at all doubtful.

The place, therefore, being so securely our own, I was not anxious, by an immediate attack on the palace, to bring on a fresh and unnecessary slaughter; and, indeed, the exhausted state of the gallant flankers rendered it expedient for me to halt a short time before I proceeded to the attack of the palace, which, if Tippoo was in it, there was every reason to suppose would, if possible, be as gallantly defended as attacked.

During this halt two fresh battalions of Sepoys arrived, and, trusting that by this time the sultaun would see how fruitless any further resistance must prove, I requested Major Allan, deputy quarter-master-general, who had just arrived from camp, and who, from his knowledge of the language, was well qualified to execute the duty, to proceed with a flag of truce to the palace, and offer quarter to Tippoo Sultaun, and every person in his palace, on his immediate and unconditional surrender of himself and family to me; at the same time informing him, if there was the smallest hesitation in accepting this offer, that an immediate assault on the palace would take place, and every man in it be put to the sword.

The grenadier and part of the 12th regiment, under Major Craigie, with the 2d battalion, 9th regiment of Sepoys, accompanied Major Allan to put this threat into immediate execution, if necessary; and I prepared the flankers, now a little recovered from their fatigues, to follow to the attack of the palace on the first signal of hostilities having recommenced (for the firing had ceased on all

sides for upwards of an hour). In the mean time, I received intelligence from one of the prisoners of whom I caused inquiry to be made, as to the place where the English soldiers, who had been taken in the different assaults on the enemy's outposts during the siege, were confined, that they had all been put to death, about ten days before, in the most barbarous manner, by having nails driven through their skulls. On this, I immediately advanced with the flankers of the 74th regiment, and the light infantry and remaining part of the 12th regiment, resolved, if quarter had not already been granted, and the dreadful accounts of the fate of our fellow-soldiers were confirmed, to sacrifice the tyrant to their manes.

On reaching the palace, Major Allan came out to me, and informed me he had been with Tippoo's two youngest sons, who were ignorant where their father was, but were disposed to surrender themselves and the palace on a promise of protection. Anxious, if possible, to discover Tippoo, who, I had been informed, was certainly in the palace, I hesitated to agree to these conditions unless they would inform me where their father was, and threatened to search the most secret recesses of the palace if he was not instantly produced; but not being able to learn from them where the sultaun was, and wishing to get them out of the fort before it was dark, after giving them every assurance of protection and kind treatment, I sent them off to you under charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, your public secretary, and Captain Marriott, your aid-de-camp, escorted by the light infantry company of his Majesty's 33d regiment. The palace was thus taken possession of without opposition.

I now proceeded to search the palace, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Close and Major Allan, taking care, however, to avoid the zenana, round which I had posted a sufficient force to make his escape from it impracticable.

In the palace we found a man who, on being severely threatened, said that the sultaun was killed in attempting to escape through the northern sally-port, and offered to conduct us to the body; we accordingly proceeded thither, and, under a slaughtered heap of several hundreds, many of whom were men of consequence in his service, had the pleasure to discover the body of the sultaun. He had been shot through the head and body, and was quite dead: I caused him to be immediately put into a palanquin and conveyed to the palace, where the body was identified by some of the principal men who had fallen into our hands, and by two of the eunuchs belonging to his haŕam.

I now proceeded to give such protection to the inhabitants as was in my power; and, although it was by this time dark, as I have heard no complaints of outrage or insult being offered to any after the conflict ceased, I think I may venture to say the natives of India will be satisfied that the British soldiers are not more brave than humane.

Early the next morning Abdul Khalick, the second son of Tippoo, and the elder of the two who were delivered to Lord Cornwallis as hostages, at the conclusion of the last war, was met by Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple coming from the island to deliver himself up; he was immediately assured of protection and the most liberal treatment, and I went to meet him, to shew him how much satisfied I was with the confidence he placed in us, by thus delivering himself into our hands when the means of escape were perfectly in his power. Having been led to expect you in the fort yesterday morning, I waited with Abdul Khalick to deliver him into your own hands, but, on being relieved by Colonel Wellesley, I proceeded with him to camp, and delivered him over to you.

I perceive in the general order of yesterday that no mention is made of Colonel Sherbrooke; this, I presume,

is owing to that order being published before I had time to make any report to you of the conduct of the troops under my command in the assault, which was highly exemplary throughout; and if, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack.

I make no doubt Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, who commanded a party of equal force with that of Colonel Sherbrooke, would have merited equal praise for his exertions, had he not, most unfortunately, been disabled by a wound very early in the assault,—a circumstance I most sincerely regretted, as, from the well-known character of that officer, and the clear manner in which he understood the instructions I gave him relative to the attack he was to lead, I felt the greatest confidence in its success.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

D. BAIRD.

Camp, Seringapatam, 6th May, 1799.

The effect produced by this letter of General Baird was the publication of an additional extract from general orders, which follows.

Seringapatam, 8th May, 1799.

LIEUTENANT-General Harris has particular pleasure in publishing to the army the following extract of a report transmitted to him *yesterday* by Major-General Baird, as it places in a distinguished point of view the merit of an officer on the very important occasion referred to, whose gallantry and good conduct, since he has served with his

army, have not failed to recommend him strongly to the commander-in-chief:—

"If, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack."

True copies. (Signed) P. A. AGNEW,
Military Secretary.

Although General Baird, by making the report just given, had fulfilled his duty to his superior officer, it appeared to him that there yet remained a duty to be done to himself. It was impossible for him to sit down patiently and quietly under the injury which he considered had been done him by his removal from Seringapatam. To have been eventually relieved from the command, would have been nothing—perhaps even as it was, not much, had he not been superseded by a junior officer, and that junior officer one who had previously, and several times, been "preferred before him," and one for whom (although that had nothing to do with mere details of duty) he had shewn a noble and generous consideration; but it *was* something—it was much, very much, that he should have been removed so abruptly, so suddenly, and with as little courtesy or ceremony as if he had failed in the attack, instead of having achieved a conquest, the vital importance of which to the integrity of British India, is amply detailed in the despatches of Lord Wellesley himself, and universally acknowledged by every individual at all conversant with oriental politics.

General Baird had of course no alternative but submitting to authority—yet he felt it, as we have just said, a duty incumbent on himself to put upon record such a protest against the proceedings by which he felt himself aggrieved, as might vindicate his character to the army in India, and his friends in Europe; and accordingly he accompanied the official report above given, by the following letter addressed to General Harris:—

To Lieutenant-General Harris, Commander-in-chief, &c. &c.

SIR,

HAVING, in a letter which I had this morning the honour to address to you, given a detailed account of the assault of the fort of Seringapatam, the conduct of which you did me the honour to intrust to me, permit me now, Sir, to address you on the subject of the events which have taken place since that time.

Having been honoured with the conduct of the assault, and having executed that duty to your satisfaction, I naturally concluded that I should have been permitted to retain the command of Seringapatam, or, at least, that I should not be superseded in it by a junior officer. Judge, then, my surprise, when expecting to have the honour of delivering to you the keys of Seringapatam, in the palace of the late Tippoo Sultaun, and of congratulating you on the most brilliant victory that ever graced the British arms in India, to have an order put into my hands by Colonel Wellesley, by which I found myself instantly superseded in the command by that officer. I am really ignorant what part of my conduct could merit such treatment.

When, on a former occasion, Colonel Wellesley was appointed to the command of the detachment serving with his highness the Nizam, while I remained in charge of a

brigade, you informed me that matters of a political nature made it necessary to have that officer with the Nizam's army. Although I severely felt the appointment of a junior officer to so distinguished a command, while I remained in an inferior station, I submitted to the necessity which you informed me dictated the measure; but this second supercession I feel most sensibly, as it must have the effect of leading his Majesty and the commander-in-chief in England to believe that I am not fit for any command of importance, when it has been thought proper to give the command of Seringapatam to Colonel Wellesley, while he, at the same time, continues to hold the command of the Nizam's detachment.

In camp it is rumoured to have been at my own request that another officer was appointed to the command of Seringapatam; you, Sir, must know that this is not the case. The request, if made, must have been made by me to you; and, so far from its ever being my intention to make such a request, if (after the assurances I have repeatedly received from you, that you would take the first opportunity of placing me in a situation more adequate to the rank I hold than that of the command of a brigade,) I had deemed it necessary to make any request to you, it would have been to be placed *in the command* of Seringapatam; and when I reflected that my two seniors, belonging to the coast army, continued to stand appointed to the northern and southern divisions of the Carnatic, and that the Hon. Col. Wellesley, the next junior to me, stood appointed to the command of an *army*, while I remained in charge of a *brigade*, I should have felt that I was hinting a doubt, which I never entertained, of the sincerity of those assurances, if I had made a particular application for the command of Seringapatam—indeed, I could not think it necessary.

Some mistake may have arisen from my having, through

Major Beatson, expressed a desire that the whole storming party might be relieved from camp; so that order might be established, and troops more equal to take the fatigue of guard mounting during the night, be placed in the fort; and I wished to be relieved for a short time that I might myself have had the honour of reporting our success, and informing you in person of every particular relative to the storm. This not having been found convenient, I desired Captain Young, deputy adjutant-general of his Majesty's troops, who was proceeding to camp at daylight next morning, to inform you that, as I was much recovered from the fatigues of the preceding day, I wished not to be relieved till I had examined the state of the works and ascertained the number of cannon captured. I received a letter from Captain Young, long before Colonel Wellesley superseded me, informing me that he had made my request known to you.

I cannot but feel obliged by your having enabled me to act so distinguished a part in the storm, though I find so little attention has, in every other instance, been paid to my requests, that I am almost led to believe my being employed on that occasion, was owing to my being the only officer of rank who had made a voluntary offer of his services.

I request that copies of this letter may be transmitted to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander-in-chief, for the information of his Majesty, that, at the same time he is informed of my having been twice superseded by Colonel Wellesley, he may be in possession of such reasons as you shall think proper to give for it, that he may be satisfied the measure was dictated by necessity, and not by any want of capacity on my part to fill the situation.

I have the honour, &c.

D. Baird.

Camp, Seringapatam, 6th May, 1799.

The official answer to this letter, written, or rather signed by Colonel Agnew, the military secretary (for we cannot imagine that a military secretary would venture to originate so much of himself in a matter of such importance,) we lay before our readers; and we believe we may challenge the annalists of history to find either precedent, or parallel, or prototype for such an address to a victorious general two days after his having achieved a conquest, the memory of which will live till time shall be no more.

8th May.—Camp, Seringapatam.

To Major-General Baird, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

THE commander-in-chief directs me to inform you that he has this day received from Major of brigade Falconer, your report of the assault intrusted to your conduct on the 4th instant, and that, ever ready to do justice to the merits of officers under his command, he is happy in the occasion you have given him *for taking particular notice of the conduct of Colonel Sherbrooke!*

I am also directed to acknowledge the receipt of the *very improper letter* which accompanied your report.

The distinguished command for which you were selected by the commander-in-chief, and the sentiments he has so publicly and recently expressed on that occasion, sufficiently mark what was his sense of your military merit; and it is with regret that he now finds himself compelled to blame *a total want of discretion and respect* in an officer of your high rank and length of service, in terms so opposite to those in which he was lately so happy to applaud your gallantry, humanity, and zeal.

Lieutenant-General Harris is persuaded that an officer *who thinks himself authorized to remonstrate with his immediate superior, can never be usefully employed in the army he commands.* Should you, therefore, continue to hold sentiments so opposite to the principles of military subordination, you have his permission *to proceed by the first safe conveyance to Fort St. George.*

The commander-in-chief will certainly forward to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, copies of your letter and his reply.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your very obedient servant,

(Signed) P. A. AGNEW,

Mil. Sec. to the Commander-in-chief.

To this letter, which we have already taken the liberty of characterizing, General Baird made the following reply, addressed to General Harris :—

SIR,

I YESTERDAY received a letter from Lieut.-Col. Agnew, your public secretary, which has created in me the greatest astonishment.

Conceiving myself injured, and my military character in some degree impeached, in the repeated preference that had been shewn to my junior, the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, in nominating him to distinguished commands, while I, serving with the same army, was still left in my original situation of commandant of a brigade; and feeling, as I conceived every military man in a similar situation would have felt, on being superseded by the same officer in the command of the important fortress of Seringapatam, I thought it due to my own character to address you on that subject, and I can safely affirm that, in that

address, it was my firm intention to make to you the *most respectful* statement of facts.

On the receipt of your secretary's letter, I again and again perused the one I had had the honour to address to you; and, after every attempt, must acknowledge myself unable to discover one paragraph, or even one word, which can be construed into the smallest disrespect. God knows, such an idea was the farthest from my thoughts. I, therefore, feel with double sensibility the unmerited asperity of your secretary's letter, which I can hardly bring myself to believe to contain your real sentiments. If, however, I am wrong in this conjecture, I trust you will enable me to clear myself before a general court martial, from which I can have nothing to fear, being satisfied in my own mind that there is not an officer in this, or in any army, who more abhors the crime of which I stand accused.

It was my intention, from the moment I was superseded in the command of Seringapatam, to apply for permission to quit the army, as soon as I deemed my services to my king and country no longer required my remaining with it. My wish is still to do so, and I shall, when there is no longer an appearance of the army's being actively employed, make an application to you to that effect. If, however, you should still persevere in your determination of ordering me from the army, in consequence of the respectful representation I have thought myself authorized to make to you, I shall, in that case, only have to regret the necessity there will be for making my removal from the army, and the circumstances which occasioned it, equally public.

(Signed) D. Baird.

This explanation of General Baird's feelings and views seemed to have no effect upon the commander-in-chief, who, again through the medium

of his military secretary, made the following reply to it:

To Major-General Baird, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

THE commander-in-chief has received your letter of the 9th instant, and directed me to inform you in reply that the explanation therein given *has produced no change in the sentiments expressed by his order on the 7th instant, in my letter to you.*

It was not the words, but the tenor of your letter of the 6th instant that the commander-in-chief thought it his duty to remark. He never can admit the right of any subordinate officer to remonstrate with him on the propriety of measures he has adopted for the public service, or on his selection of officers for situations of public trust. In assuming this privilege, he still thinks that you have been wanting in discretion and respect; *and your letter of yesterday has in a great measure removed the concern he felt at the necessity which obliged him to inform you that such were his opinions.*

Lieutenant-General Harris desires that this letter may conclude a correspondence which you are at liberty to make as public as you think proper.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) P. A. AGNEW,

Mil. Sec. to the Commander-in-chief.

Seringapatam, 10th May, 1799.

There are few people in the world, not versed in the complexity of public arrangements, who would be prepared for such a correspondence between a commander-in-chief and a major-general

who had devoted himself to the post of danger and difficulty, who had overcome both, in the most decisive and victorious manner, and who was chiefly anxious—let his other feelings be what they might—to establish the fact that it was for no professional fault (whatever was the policy of the case) that he had been so suddenly displaced from a command which, at the moment of his removal from it, no human being on earth so unquestionably deserved.

It appears that Colonel Wellesley, to whom no blame whatever but that of accepting promotion when offered (no very heavy charge) could attach, felt a strong personal anxiety to evince his regard and esteem for Major-General Baird; for at the very time that this peculiarly disagreeable correspondence was in progress between the major-general and the commander-in-chief, he wrote a very handsome note to General Baird, accompanied by Tippoo Sultaun's state sword, which had been found in his bed-chamber, requesting General Baird's acceptance of the splendid trophy, to which he said he was convinced the major-general had the best right.

But here the good-natured intentions of Colonel Wellesley were crossed by the interference of the Prize Committee, who, in a letter addressed to the commander-in-chief, General Harris, by General Floyd, its president, stated that it having been understood that Colonel Wellesley had sent General Baird the state sword of the late Tippoo

Sultaun, he, the commander-in-chief, was requested by the committee, in the name of the army, to desire that the sword might be immediately returned to them, as it was theirs and not Colonel Wellesley's to give—and General Floyd added (which it should seem, under the existing circumstances, could not have been a very agreeable announcement to General Harris), that their object in pressing the immediate restitution of the sword was, that they might forthwith fulfil a resolution which they had formed of presenting it themselves to General Baird, *by the hand of his excellency the commander-in-chief, himself.*

This letter coming less in the shape of an appeal than a demand, was answered by the issuing of an order from head-quarters for the general and field-officers to assemble in General Harris's tent, where his excellency "had the pleasure" of presenting the sword to General Baird, "in the name of the army, as a testimonial of their high admiration of his courage and conduct in the assault."*

But additional honours from his brethren in arms were in store for the general; and on the morning of the anniversary of the king's birthday a meeting was held of the field-officers who had served under him at the storming of Seringapatam, when it was unanimously resolved to present him with a sword, as a mark of the high

* This sword is now at Fern Tower, the seat of the late Sir David Baird.

sense they entertained of his admirable conduct on that occasion; and Colonel Sherbrooke, the senior officer present, was desired to write the following letter to General Baird upon the occasion:—

SIR,

I AM requested by the field-officers who had the honour of personally serving under you at the storming of Seringapatam, on the 4th ultimo, to inform you that they have ordered Messrs. Jeffreys and Jones to make a dress sword, value two hundred guineas, bearing the following inscription:—"SERINGAPATAM, *taken by storm the 4th May*, 1799," on one side, and on the other, "*Presented by the Field Officers who personally served under Major-General Baird on that occasion*," which they beg you will do them the honour of accepting as a mark of their esteem, and of their admiration of your personal exertions on that day. Jeffreys and Jones have been directed to send out the sword by the earliest conveyance, and we hope you will receive it before the anniversary of the capture.

I have the honour to be, with respect,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
J. C. SHERBROOKE, *Col.**

Camp, 4th June, 1799.
To Major-General Baird.

To which General Baird returned the following answer:—

SIR,

I HAVE been favoured with your obliging letter, informing me of the honourable testimony of their approbation intended to be presented to me, by the field-officers

*Afterwards SIR JOHN COAPE SHERBROOKE, one of the heroes of the Peninsula, and subsequently Governor of Canada.

who served in the successful and glorious assault of Seringapatam; and I beg you to assure them, that this distinguished mark of the favourable opinion and esteem of those excellent officers, whose gallant exertions secured the memorable victory of that day, will ever be regarded by me as a recompense of the highest value.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
With the utmost respect,
D. BAIRD.

To Colonel Sherbrooke.

The following were the field-officers who served on the occasion, viz. Colonel Sherbrooke, Lieutenant-Colonels Dunlop, St. John, Dalrymple, Mignan, Wallace, Gardiner, and Monypenny, Majors Shee, Picton, Forbes, Craigie, and Bell.

These marks of esteem, regard, and admiration from men who loved him and appreciated his merits, must have been highly flattering and gratifying to General Baird; but, strange to say—and it is a miracle which more than once or twice recurs in the course of the eventful narrative which follows—they were his only rewards.

He received an extremely handsome letter from Lord Mornington, who had been created Marquess Wellesley, in which, after expressing his high sense of General Baird's services, he offered to recommend him either to the Honourable East India Company for a pension, or to the King for the red riband. Can anybody doubt for a moment which Baird would select?—a badge of honour from his sovereign, or an annuity from a company of

merchants in Leadenhall-street, trading to India? He of course made choice of the riband. But for all that happened subsequently, it appears he might as well have chosen the pension, for neither the one nor the other did he receive, nor indeed did he ever hear more from Lord Wellesley on the subject, nor did he even get so far into the history or mystery of the affair as to ascertain whether his lordship actually *ever did* make the application in his favour to the British government.*

The thanks of both houses of parliament were voted, on the 4th of October, 1799, to General Baird, and the other officers who commanded at Seringapatam, upon which occasion Mr. Dundas said, in the House of Commons,

"With regard to the military, I can only say, that from the highest of them to the lowest of them, they vied with each other in doing service to their country—to all of whom a proper acknowledgment should be made by this house. But I cannot help observing here the great praise that is due to General Baird for his brave conduct in the storming of Seringapatam. It is singular that this heroic officer was upwards of three years in

* Lord Wellesley's letter, in which the offer of recommendation for the riband was made, we are unable to lay before our readers, General Baird having, in the year 1821, sent it to Lord Sidmouth without keeping a copy of it. It should be recollected, that at the period when Lord Wellesley's offer was made, the honourable order of the Bath consisted of but twenty-four military and twelve civil knights.

imprisonment by order of the very tyrant whose barbarity in this instance he was the instrument of Providence to avenge."

A copy of the resolution of the House of Commons was transmitted to General Baird, in a letter from Lord Mornington, of which the following is a copy:—

Fort William, April 26, 1800.

SIR,

IN obedience to the commands of the House of Commons of Great Britain, I have the honour to transmit you a copy of their resolutions of the 4th of October, 1799.

It is a peculiar satisfaction to me to be employed to signify to you, in the name of the Commons of Great Britain, their sanction of those sentiments of applause and approbation which it has been my duty to express in public orders on various occasions during the progress and since the termination of the late glorious war in Mysore.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the letter from the Speaker of the House of Commons, which accompanied the resolution.

With the most grateful and cordial sense of your distinguished and meritorious services, I remain, Sir,

Your faithful and humble servant,

MORNINGTON.

Major-General David Baird.

At the East India House, a meeting of the directors and proprietors, or, as it is called there, a general court, was held on the 13th of November, and resolutions of thanks, similar in purport to those of parliament, were unanimously carried; the one more particularly applying to the distinguished subject of our memoir is in the following words:—

"Resolved—That the thanks of this court be

given to the officers of the king's and company's forces *employed in the assault of Seringapatam*, on the 4th of May, 1799, for the rapidity, animation and skill which they manifested in the execution of that important service; and to the non-commissioned officers and privates for the courage and intrepidity of their conduct on that brilliant occasion, and especially for the exemplary humanity displayed by the assaulting party under circumstances which reflect equal honour upon their discipline, valour, and exalted generosity."

A special resolution of thanks to General Baird was proposed, in which a detail of his personal merits and services was most elaborately embodied, but it was withdrawn, on a suggestion from the chairman that a comprehensive resolution was preferable to separate resolutions of thanks to each officer, and because it appeared to some of the proprietors to partake more of the character of a disquisition than a resolution. As we shall in a subsequent part of this memoir refer somewhat at length to the circumstances connected with these proceedings, we shall in this place make no further observation upon them.

Shortly after the capture of Seringapatam, and the consequent subjugation of the Mysore country, the different general officers were directed to return to their several stations and presidencies; an order which left Colonel Wellesley in the command of the whole Mysore country—General Baird went to Madras.

CHAPTER XV.

ARRIVAL AT MADRAS—FLATTERING RECEPTION BY LORD WELLESLEY —OFFERS GENERAL BAIRD A COMMAND IN BENGAL—GENERAL BAIRD DECLINES, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY FOLLOWS LORD WELLESLEY —APPOINTED TO DINAPORE—EXPEDITION PROJECTED AGAINST BATAVIA AND MAURITIUS—INTERVIEW WITH LORD WELLESLEY —REMONSTRANCE—IS FINALLY APPOINTED TO COMMAND—DETAILS OF PREPARATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS—COLONEL WELLESLEY TO BE SECOND IN COMMAND—PROCEEDS TO SAUGUR—OVERLAND DESPATCH FROM ENGLAND—DESTINATION OF THE EXPEDITION CHANGED—DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES—DESPATCHES AND CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LORD WELLESLEY, GENERAL BAIRD, AND COLONEL WELLESLEY—MR. DUNDAS'S DESPATCH—FINAL ARRANGEMENT—GENERAL BAIRD PROCEEDS TO COLUMBO AND POINT DE GALLE—ARRIVES AT BOMBAY, WHERE HE FINDS COLONEL WELLESLEY.

When General Baird reached Madras, he found there, his excellency, the governor-general, who had been created Marquess Wellesley, and who had, as it will be remembered, temporarily removed the seat of supreme government from Calcutta, for the specific purpose of personally superintending and accelerating the war in the Mysore country, which had now terminated so successfully.

As soon as Lord Wellesley was made acquainted with General Baird's arrival at the government-house, he ran down stairs to meet him, caught him in his arms, and embraced him. Words cannot do justice to the warmth of his excellency's reception; and having loaded him with the most gratifying expressions of regard and esteem, his excellency inquired, more particularly with reference to the letter which we have already mentioned, but which we have not in our possession, in what way he could most agreeably and satisfactorily promote his interests in India; indeed, his excellency even went so far as to beg the general to state frankly what command he should like to have.

General Baird, whose opinion of others was formed upon a knowledge of himself, and who met the cordial inquiry by a candid avowal, told Lord Wellesley, that, as he understood his valued friend, General Floyd, was on the point of returning to England, the object of his ambition would be to succeed that distinguished officer in his command of the southern division.

Lord Wellesley (speaking of whom it would be an ill compliment to deny him the character of a finished diplomatist) hesitated for a moment, and then told General Baird, that he considered the southern district to be in the patronage of Lord Clive (Governor of Madras), with whose arrangements, as the general might know, his excellency made a point of never interfering; but he advised

the general himself to make his application to Lord Clive, adding a promise to support that application by his own influence. Lord Wellesley, however, at the same time suggested to General Baird a readier road to the attainment of his object, and one which he most earnestly desired him to take—namely, that of accompanying *him* (Lord Wellesley) to Bengal, assuring him that if he chose to accede to that proposition, any command that he chose to select in that presidency, should be at his service.*

Nothing could be more gratifying to General

* Lord Clive, now Earl of Powis, is son of the governor-general, Lord Clive, one of the most celebrated officers of his age, by whose means the East India Company acquired the extensive territories and vast revenues of the provinces of Bengal, Orissa, and Bahar. His lordship dying in 1774, was succeeded by his son, the present Lord Clive, who was born in 1754; in 1784 his lordship married Lady Henrietta Herbert, daughter of Earl Powis, and, her ladyship's brother dying without issue, she succeeded to the whole of the family estates. In 1794, Lord Clive was advanced to an English peerage, as Baron Clive of Walcot; and, in 1802, was appointed Governor of Madras; he returned to England in 1804, and received the thanks of both houses of parliament for his conduct in his government; in the same year his lordship was created Earl of Powis and Viscount Clive, and was nominated, in 1805, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, which office, however, in consequence of the death of Mr. Pitt, and the consequent change of ministers, his lordship did not assume. Lord Clive, his lordship's eldest son, is married to a daughter of the Duke of Montrose, one of his lordship's daughters is married to Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, and another daughter is the present amiable and excellent Duchess of Northumberland.

Baird than this display of kindness and friendship on the part of the governor-general. But Baird was a soldier, and he considered that Madras would probably continue the seat of war for some time to come, and that events might occur, in the course of which he might again do good service to his country and distinguish himself in the field. This honourable and gallant feeling, added to the circumstance, that as he never *had* served on the Bengal establishment, he should enter upon it as a stranger, instead of being surrounded by officers and men by whom he was perfectly known, and (as he must have been conscious) highly esteemed, induced him to prefer making his application to Lord Clive for the southern district, according to Lord Wellesley's suggestion. But his hopes were completely dissipated by Lord Clive's answer, from which it was clear that his lordship was aware of the pre-determination of Lord Wellesley, to remove the major-general from the Madras establishment, in order, as it might appear to some, that his superior rank should not interfere with the interests of Colonel Wellesley, to whom his excellency (not very unnaturally) was attached as a brother, and whose encouragement of that brother's pretensions to fame, it must be universally admitted, time and circumstances have most fully justified. In a military life, however, in which every step and promotion is regarded, as it should be, with honourable jealousy, men are sensibly alive to the effects of favouritism,

however great the merits of its object; and although in the present instance, as in all the others, where, as if by some fatality, the claims of General Baird and Colonel Wellesley had been brought into collision, he attributed neither blame nor indelicacy to an officer who merely accepted the favours with which his exalted relation took every opportunity of loading him, he could not help feeling their immediate effects.

Under these circumstances, General Baird resolved upon accepting the invitation of Lord Wellesley, to follow his excellency to Calcutta. At Fort William he was received by his excellency with every mark of affectionate friendship and respect; but when they came to business, and General Baird alluded to his excellency's promise of allowing him to select any command which he might prefer, he found, to his surprise and disappointment, that the choice was very closely circumscribed, seeing that *only one* command was actually vacant—that of Dinapore; this, of course, as he had no choice, General Baird accepted, and it was conferred upon him by Lord Wellesley, with renewed expressions of good will.

To Dinapore, General Baird in consequence proceeded, to assume the command, which he continued to hold for upwards of a year, when rumours reached him from Madras, that an expedition was fitting out at that presidency, the object

of which, it was generally believed, was the capture of Batavia, and eventually that of the Isle of France. General Baird, having ascertained from his friends at Fort St. George the correctness of this report, immediately wrote to Sir Alured Clarke, the commander-in-chief, to solicit to be appointed to command it.

To this application his friend, Sir Alured, returned an answer, stating that he would most readily comply with the request, and that in fact he had originally intended General Baird for the service, and had mentioned his name to the governor-general, but as his excellency had taken the whole of the appointments connected with the enterprise into his own hands, he considered it impossible to interfere any further.

Upon the receipt of this information, General Baird requested leave of absence from Sir Alured Clarke, in order that he might make a personal application to Marquess Wellesley on the subject, which Sir Alured not only granted, but gave General Baird special permission to use his name as the authority whence he had derived all his information upon the subject.

On General Baird's arrival at Calcutta, he proceeded to pay his respects to the governor-general, who was at Barruckpore. His excellency received him with all his usual urbanity and kindness; but notwithstanding these agreeable appearances, his excellency spoke so rapidly, and changed the topics of conversation so

suddenly and so frequently, that with all General Baird's anxiety to draw his excellency's attention to the subject nearest his heart, (and indeed the only object of his visit,) he was completely foiled, and actually took his leave of Barruckpore in the evening, without once having found an opportunity of doing so.

General Baird's desire to come to some understanding upon the point, however, having been in no small degree increased, by hearing it positively stated, that the new and extensive force in preparation was to be commanded by Colonel Wellesley, he requested an audience of the governor-general the next morning, which, being granted, he, in the course of a long, and somewhat *stormy* conversation with his excellency, repeated all that he had heard, and urged the injustice that would be committed by giving the command of the proposed expedition to a junior colonel, when he, General Baird (as indeed he had unsuccessfully argued before) had been actually sent back as a major-general from the Cape, without being permitted to reach Europe, because the services of an officer of that rank were expressly required in India, and because he had been personally selected as the best qualified officer to go there.

Truth, the historian's only guide, compels us to state, that this remonstrance had, if possible, a more violent effect upon the noble marquess, than even General Baird's former representation, upon

a similar point, had upon General Harris; and in a high state of irritation, his lordship told General Baird (misunderstanding his intentions), that if he meant to ask him any questions as to the destination of the expedition, he very plainly told him he would not give him an answer.

General Baird expostulated—assured the marquess that he had no desire to know where the expedition was going; all he wished to know was, who was to command it, as he felt it his duty to press his own claim as a major-general on the staff, appointed from home, in preference to that of a regimental officer of inferior rank.

The conversation was warm and animated, and much was said on both sides, until at length General Baird prepared to take his leave, saying, —"I suppose then, my lord, I am to consider your lordship's answer final, and that I am *not* to command" (or to be employed) "on this expedition?"

The marquess, who had by this time overcome the violence of his first excitement, desired General Baird to remain in Calcutta until he heard from him again, and the next day the General received a note from Sir Alured Clarke, desiring him to wait upon the governor-general immediately, which of course he did; when his excellency informed him that he had finally arranged matters so that *he*, General Baird, should command the expedition.

The object of this expedition proved to be, as

the general had heard, and as we have already stated, the capture of the islands of Java and Mauritius. The force to be employed on this service consisted of his Majesty's 10th, 19th, and 80th regiments, with detachments from the 86th and 88th, a corps of Bengal native volunteers, and two companies of European and native artillery, with Lascars attached.

These troops were assembled at Trincomalee; and on the 5th of February, 1801, General Baird received orders to proceed to that place to assume the chief command; the Honourable Colonel Wellesley being the second in command.

Lord Wellesley had long contemplated this undertaking, the advantages of which, although not destined at that period to be achieved, have since been made evident by our possession of both the objects of the then meditated attack.*

The governor-general's orders were, that the whole force which we have just detailed should proceed in the first place to Batavia, and having reduced it by siege or obtained possession of it by capitulation, should then be divided; and whilst an adequate number of troops were left at Batavia with General Baird, who was to remain there with the rank of lieutenant-governor, all who could be

* The attainment of Mauritius from the enemy by any moderate opposing force had always been treated as problematical, from the very well contrived histories of its military strength and natural protections, which had been constantly kept up by the French.

spared from the defence and maintenance of the new conquest were to proceed under the command of Colonel Wellesley to gain possession of Mauritius, an island eminently favoured by nature as possessing a port where ships may securely anchor, and facilities for repairing and refitting in case of any damage having accrued to them before their arrival.

General Baird was directed to proceed with the force assembled at Trincomalee as soon as he should have been joined by Admiral Rainier, without waiting for that division of the army, which was coming from Point de Galle, under the command of Colonel Wellesley; leaving, however, instructions for that officer to make the best of his way to Batavia.

Lord Wellesley had clearly and minutely provided for all contingencies which might arise in the progress of this undertaking.

In case of a capitulation being entered into, before the actual commencement of hostilities, General Baird was instructed, in assuming the lieutenant-governorship and chief military command in the colony, to form a garrison of so many of the Dutch troops as he might consider it prudent or advisable to entertain in his Britannic Majesty's service, together with the whole of the Bengal volunteers and the detachments from the king's regiments which we have already named; in addition to which, the 51st regiment had been ordered to proceed from Point de Galle;

and as Lord Wellesley anxiously expected and anticipated that the reduction of Batavia would be completed by the 30th of March, he was in hopes that this regiment would arrive there in time, partly to strengthen the garrison which was to be left, and partly to co-operate with the force destined for Mauritius.

But to guard against the consequences of their possible delay, the governor-general directed General Baird to select 500 men from his Majesty's 80th regiment and put them under the command of Colonel Champagné; and when these arrangements were completed Colonel Wellesley was forthwith to proceed with the force under his command on the distinct service, the acceleration of which appeared to Lord Wellesley to be a matter of the greatest importance; and the departure of which force he positively commanded should take place the moment it was possible for it to move—naming indeed the 30th of March, the very day upon which his excellency calculated that Batavia would be completely in our possession—and that not even the junction of the 51st regiment from Point de Galle should be waited for, unless Colonel Wellesley himself should consider its aid indispensable to the success of the enterprise.

The adding the 51st to Colonel Wellesley's expedition, or retaining them to strengthen the garrison in case they did arrive, was, however, left to the discretion of General Baird, subject only to some suggestions of Lord Wellesley's, with respect

to the badness of the climate of Batavia; a knowledge of which had induced him to form the determination of keeping down the European force in garrison at that place as much as possible. It was in consonance with this feeling that he directed, in case Colonel Wellesley should *not* require the 51st, and General Baird could possibly spare it, that it should return to the Coromandel coast or to Ceylon, rather than be detained on so unhealthy a station as Batavia.

It was upon this feeling and opinion, too, that Lord Wellesley had given directions to General Baird to raise a native corps in Batavia for the permanent defence of the place, and also to make application to Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, for one of the regiments of native infantry from that presidency for the same service.

If, however, contrary to the expectations Lord Wellesley entertained with regard to the reduction of Batavia, the place held out, and the consequences of a siege and resistance so reduced the troops, or that other circumstances should absolutely require the presence of so large a garrison as to render the force destined for the command of Colonel Wellesley, too weak in *his* judgment to ensure his success, Colonel Wellesley was fully authorized to exercise his own unshackled opinion upon the point, and the detachment was by no means, and in no case, to proceed upon the second expedition without Colonel Wellesley's express consent and approbation; and in case under the

circumstances he should decline proceeding, General Baird was then to select his garrison by rules which were laid down for his guidance, and to send the rest of the forces, under Colonel Wellesley's command, to the nearest port, as in the former case, either in Ceylon or on the Coromandel coast, at the same time communicating the relinquishment of the enterprise against Mauritius to the governor of the Cape of Good Hope, and to the Admiral, Sir Roger Curtis.

At all events (at least in case of success), Colonel Champagné was to remain at Batavia as second in command, and member of the provisional government, which Lord Wellesley proposed eventually to establish for the administration of affairs in that colony: but in case of failure, which Lord Wellesley (knowing the character of the force employed) seemed never to anticipate, General Baird and Colonel Wellesley, if they concurred in opinion that they could jointly make the attack on the Isle of France with whatever remained available of the force under their command, were authorized to undertake it; but upon the clear understanding, as Colonel Wellesley was perfectly master of the whole arrangement and design of the attack upon Mauritius, as projected by his noble brother, that if *he* objected to such a proceeding it was to be abandoned, and the remaining force was to return, as had been already directed under other circumstances, either to Ceylon or the Coromandel coast.

Thus it appears that Lord Wellesley had made the most ample provision for every possible or probable casualty or contingency; for in his instructions to General Baird, he proceeds to say that, "if he and Colonel Wellesley agree to proceed to the Isle of France, he in the chief command and Colonel Wellesley as second in command, the instructions previously given to Colonel Wellesley are to direct General Baird's operations." In case of success at the Isle of France, Colonel Wellesley was to assume the civil and military government of the French islands, and to exercise his discretion as to the formation of the garrison there; in which case General Baird was to return with whatever troops Colonel Wellesley might not feel inclined to retain, to the nearest and most accessible port of India or Ceylon.

All that we have hitherto noticed in detail, relates to the military operations and arrangements at Batavia, or at the Isle of France. Lord Wellesley had, with equal minuteness, furnished other instructions for the establishment and conduct of the civil government; and his excellency hoped that General Baird would duly appreciate the extent of the confidence which he manifested in his temper, judgment, and public spirit, by subjecting in so great a degree to his power the success of an expedition subsequently to be commanded by another officer. He entertained no doubt that he should find his conduct in the whole of the interesting and delicate trust which was

reposed in him answerable to his expectations, and to the character which the general had established in his excellency's estimation by his exertions in the late glorious war in Mysore.

General Baird was further instructed, when the expedition sailed for Mauritius, that Colonel Wellesley was to select such transports as he chose, aided by the Admiral (Rainier), if he were present, and if not, by Mr. Charles Stokes, the agent, or any naval officer he might choose to name.

Several minor difficulties which might present themselves in the course of negotiation, from the incompetency of the Batavian government to negotiate for certain dependencies, Lord Wellesley was equally prepared to meet. Ample funds were allotted to the undertaking and every thing was done that could conduce to its success, to the extremest point of its professions.

The "additional instructions" forwarded to General Baird, from Lord Wellesley, evince the acumen and foresight which his excellency possessed. As they were destined never to be acted upon, we should needlessly occupy our space by recapitulating them here. His excellency, however, issued an order, directed to General Baird, Colonel Champagné, and Richard Conyers Birch, Esq., appointing the first named officer acting lieutenant-governor, and the two latter gentlemen, respectively, councillors; which order contained the form of an oath to be administered to each other, and subscribed by each of them, and by

all persons who might succeed them in the offices of lieutenant-governor and councillors.

The despatches and instructions from which these details are derived, were dated February 5, and we find that General Baird had on that day embarked in the Phœnix, Captain Moffatt, in Saugar Roads, where he remained for two days after the receipt of his instructions.

On the 6th of February, however, only two days after his departure from Calcutta, an over-land despatch was received by the governor-general from Mr. Secretary Dundas, of which the following is a copy:—

(*To Marquess Wellesley.*)

Downing Street, 6th October, 1800.

My Lord,

By the private letter I received from your lordship, No. 25, dated the 5th of March last, and the communications I have since had with Major-General Stewart, I am apprised that the subject of annoying the French army in Egypt, from the Red Sea, has been under your consideration. For that reason, and because I concur in your lordship's sentiments, as stated in the letter above-mentioned, I feel it the less necessary to enter into any details in this despatch; which cannot, indeed, be extended to any great length, as it is to be forwarded over-land. I shall, therefore, confine myself to shortly stating to your lordship that Sir Ralph Abercrombie has received his Majesty's orders to proceed up the Mediterranean, and, by an attack on Alexandria and the coast, to co-operate with the Turkish army assembling in Syria, in whatever plan may be concerted with them for expelling the French

army from Egypt; and that it is thought expedient that a force should also be sent from India to act in such manner as may appear conducive to that essential object, from the side of the Red Sea. With this view, Captain Sir Home Popham, with a proper squadron, will be immediately sent into that sea, taking with him a regiment from the Cape of Good Hope. His first rendezvous will be the Port of Mocha. I enclose for your information, the letter I have written to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the subject of the expedition under his command, and I am to signify to your lordship his Majesty's pleasure that a force of about 1000 Europeans and 2000 native infantry is to be sent from India to the proposed place of rendezvous in the Red Sea, with as little delay as possible, to co-operate with Sir Home Popham in the object of his instructions. The command of these troops should be given to some active and intelligent officer, and care should be taken that they be furnished with every necessary requisite for such a service. I have thought it right to send a copy of this despatch to the governors of Fort St. George and Bombay. To the latter it is necessary, because Bombay is the most proper place from whence to send the proposed force; but I have thought it likewise proper to send it to Fort St. George, in case, upon a full consideration of the places where the force upon the two coasts is at present stationed, it should appear to that presidency expedient to make any new arrangement of any part of the army under their presidency, in order to enable the Bombay government to detach the requisite force from their coast without any real inconvenience to the territories under their own immediate charge.

I have directed those two presidencies to proceed in making those preparations without delay, and even to carry these orders into execution without waiting for your lordship's directions, if they are ready in other respects.

If nothing unforeseen occurs to prevent or to retard it, I hope that the armament under Sir Ralph Abercrombie will reach the coast of Egypt in the month of December; and that Sir Home Popham may arrive in the Gulph of Arabia in the month of February. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the forces from India may join him as soon after as possible; for this reason it will be desirable that you should not wait till the troops are all collected, if it will save time to forward them in two or three distinct detachments.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

HENRY DUNDAS.

The following is Lord Wellesley's private letter to General Baird:—

Fort William, February 6th, 1801.

Major-General Baird.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I WAS upon the point of sealing my instructions, and of dispatching them to you by express this morning, when I received despatches, over-land from England, which will probably render it necessary for me to make some essential variations in the objects of the armament which I have equipped. No change, however, can take place which will deprive you of a respectable and active command.

As much time would be lost by your returning to Calcutta, I desire that you will remain on board the Phœnix, and urge the captain to make every necessary preparation for sailing. In the course of this day I hope to be able to decide the precise nature of such variations as the recent intelligence from Europe will require in my plans. I therefore entertain little doubt that you will receive your

sailing orders within eight and forty hours after the receipt of this despatch.

I have the honour to be, my dear General,
With great esteem, your faithful servant,
WELLESLEY.

The arrival of this over-land despatch changed the whole course of events, and while General Baird was anxiously expecting merely some alteration in his final instructions for the reduction of Batavia, he received the following letter from Colonel Kirkpatrick :—

(*Secret.*)
Calcutta, 10*th February*, 1801, 3 P.M.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

LORD WELLESLEY desires me to inform you that your new instructions are nearly ready. I am in hopes that they will be despatched either to-night or early to-morrow. The over-land packet from England has made it necessary for his lordship to change his whole plan ; and you are now to assist Sir Ralph Abercrombie in driving the French from Egypt instead of seizing on Batavia.

I am, my dear General,
Your's most faithfully,
WM. KIRKPATRICK.

Major-General Baird.

To this letter General Baird wrote the following characteristic answer :—

Colonel Kirkpatrick, &c. &c. &c.
Saugar Roads, Feb. 11, 1801.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

I AM this moment honoured with yours of yesterday, dated 3 o'clock P.M., by express. I request you will as-

sure Lord Wellesley *that I am always ready and willing to serve, wherever I am required by my king and country.* I am also happy to inform you that the ship is ready for sea. I beg you to present my best respects to Lord Wellesley.

I have the honour, dear Colonel, &c.

D. Baird.

It was perhaps one of the most curious coincidences that ever occurred, that at the very moment at which Lord Wellesley was sealing the despatches, which directed the movements of *one* of his most favourite schemes, he should have received Mr. Dundas's letter, which induced, or rather forced him to turn the whole power of his resources to *another plan* which he had not only projected a year before, but on the subject of which, he had been in constant communication with Admiral Blankett, with the view of establishing ports in the Red Sea, and eventually applying the resources of India to the ejectment of the French from Egypt. From putting this plan into execution he had been deterred only by inevitable ignorance of the actual state of the French force in that quarter; but now that he had derived authentic information from England, and found, moreover, that the views of the government at home coincided with his own, he considered the correspondence in which he had been engaged with the admiral, of so much value and importance, as to annex a copy of it to the despatches which were transmitted to

General Baird for his subsequent guidance and information.

The full extent of the objects contemplated by the English government will be best understood by a perusal of Mr. Secretary Dundas's letter to the Board of Admiralty.

Downing Street, 6th October, 1800.

My Lords,

It being judged expedient that measures should forthwith be taken for dispossessing the French of Cosseir, Suez, and any other ports and places they may now occupy upon the coast of the Red Sea, and to encourage the inhabitants of the countries bordering on that part of Egypt to assist in expelling them from the whole of that province, I am commanded to signify to your lordships his Majesty's pleasure that a ship of war of not less than fifty guns, together with such armed troop-ships as may be competent to the accommodation and conveyance of a regiment of not less than 800 men, destined to assist in this service, are forthwith to be fitted for foreign service, and sent to the Cape of Good Hope, where the said regiment is to be embarked.

It will also be necessary that the troop-ships in question should, in the first instance, convey another regiment, amounting to at least the same number of men, from this country to the Cape; and it is therefore his Majesty's pleasure that your lordships should give directions and make the necessary arrangements accordingly.

Your lordships will not fail to select for this service an officer of acknowledged enterprise and ability; and, with respect to the instructions with which he is to be furnished from your lordships, it is his Majesty's pleasure that, after receiving on board the regiment which the commanding

officer at the Cape will be ordered to embark, he should be directed to make the best of his way into the Red Sea, and on his arrival there to endeavour to procure intelligence respecting the number of the enemy at Cosseir and Suez, and the state of defence of each of those places. Should the reports he may receive on this point be such as, in his judgment, and that of the officer commanding the land forces, to warrant an immediate landing and attack on one or both of these places, no time is to be lost in making the attempt; and, should it prove successful, they are to make the best arrangements in their power for retaining possession of the same. As soon as in this, or in any other manner, a secure footing shall have been obtained in the country, or sooner, if possible, every proper method is to be used to conciliate the inhabitants to our interests, and to induce them to make a common cause with us against the enemy. In order to enable them to do this with more effect, it will probably be necessary to supply them with arms and ammunition; and I shall therefore give orders that a certain proportion of side-arms, muskets, and cartridges shall be sent on board the ships of the squadron with a view to this object.

Supposing the enemy to be driven from Suez, Cosseir, and the whole coast, it will then remain for the respective commanding officers of the land and sea forces to take every method in their power for harassing and annoying them in any other posts they may retain in Upper Egypt, and to prevail upon the Arabs, the Mamelukes, and other troops in that part of the country, to act against the French, wherever they may take post, with union and vigour, until they can be finally expelled from Cairo and the remainder of the province, giving the beys, or other officers having command in those countries, such advice and assistance as may appear best adapted for that purpose. Upon this point, as well as upon every other which

relates to the mode and detail of proceeding in the execution of the services I have pointed out as the objects of this expedition, much latitude must be left to the discretion and judgment of the commanding officers; and it is therefore impossible for me to do more than point out, as I have already done, the views for the attainment of which the plan has been formed; and to add, that they are to be pursued with the utmost vigour, and by every means that may suggest themselves to the ingenuity of the commanding officers, provided only they are not inconsistent with those usages which are deemed fair and honourable between nations in a state of war.

It is intended that the land forces to be sent from the Cape should be reinforced as soon as possible by another regiment of Europeans, and about 2000 Sepoys from India. It will be right that the commanding naval officer should be apprised of this circumstance, in order that he may suspend until their arrival the proposed attacks against Cosseir and Suez, unless the prospect of success with the regiment from the Cape is so satisfactory as to warrant the attempt without waiting for a further reinforcement.

Should this last division of troops, on the other hand, find our forces in possession of Suez and Cosseir, they will be employed from thence in making diversions in Upper Egypt; and in annoying and harassing the enemy as much as possible, in conformity to the suggestions already mentioned in these instructions.

In the event (not impossible) of the French having actually evacuted Egypt before the arrival of the expedition in the Red Sea, the troops must be carried back to their former stations; and the ships, in that case, may be disposed of for such other purposes as your lordships may think proper. But should Cosseir and Suez be retaken from the enemy by his Majesty's forces, the one or the

other, as may appear most commodious for the troops and shipping, is, for the present, and until further orders can be transmitted from this country, to be retained by a detachment of his Majesty's forces. The commanding officer, however, taking care, in order to avoid all jealousies, to have it understood that he remains there, not from any intention of interfering with the right of sovereignty vested in the Ottoman Porte, or with the rights and privileges of the native princes, or their subjects; but that, from considerations of military precaution, with a view to our Indian interests, which cannot appear extraordinary after what has happened, the British troops cannot be withdrawn without further authority from home.

Your lordships will not fail to direct the commanding naval officer, and, through him, all other officers serving under him, to maintain and cultivate the friendship and good understanding now existing with the native princes and powers of Asia having ports or territories upon the coast of the Red Sea.

You will also direct the said officer to transmit a detailed report of his proceedings, by every opportunity, for his Majesty's information; and to correspond with the company's governor at Bombay, and with the governor-general in council, who will give the necessary directions to furnish him with any supplies of which he may stand in need, and to pay every attention to such requisitions as he may make for the advancement of the service on which he is employed.

HENRY DUNDAS.

The result of the receipt of these despatches and their enclosures, was, as we have already seen, an immediate change in the destination of the whole collected force, and the necessary instructions for effecting the change were immediately forwarded

to General Baird. As their object has been already made manifest, it would only needlessly occupy a space here to recapitulate them, we therefore omit them, as well as the instructions to Admiral Rainier, and their enclosures, which consist of a long correspondence between Admiral Blankett and the different presidencies, relative to an inquiry concerning the localities of the Red Sea, which had been instituted by Lord Wellesley when he first contemplated the undertaking which he was now officially directed to execute.

The letter of Marquess Wellesley to Colonel Wellesley, as being the shortest we have before us, and yet containing all necessary information upon the subject, we submit.

To the Honourable Colonel Wellesley.

SIR,

1. SINCE the date of my last despatches to you on the subject of the intended expeditions against Batavia and the Isle of France, I have received despatches overland from England, which have determined me to relinquish for the present the prosecution of these expeditions.

2nd. For the contents of those despatches, and for the measures which I now propose to pursue, I must refer you to my instructions of this date to Major-General Baird, which he is directed to communicate to you.

3rd. I have appointed Major-General Baird to command the armament which is now destined to the Red Sea, and I have appointed you to be second in command on that important service.

4th. For my instructions for your guidance, I must

refer you to my above-mentioned despatches of this date to Major-General Baird.

5th. I have forwarded a copy of this letter to Major-General Baird for his information and guidance.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

WELLESLEY.

Fort William, February 10th, 1801.

The following private letter, addressed by the Governor-General to General Baird, and dated the same 10th of February, we lay before our readers, because we consider the answer which General Baird made to it, quite worthy the hero, who had ever exhibited the most friendly feeling towards one who, by events over which, it is true, he himself had no control, had been frequently brought in contact with him, under circumstances which might (as it seems Lord Wellesley anticipated) have excited a sentiment in the bosom of a senior officer, which General Baird most assuredly never entertained.

Fort William, February 10th, 1801.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

YOU will find by your instructions of this date that your present destination is to the Red Sea and Egypt, for the purpose of co-operating in the great object of expelling the French from that most important position. A more worthy sequel to the storm of Seringapatam could not be presented to your genius and valour. I have chosen my brother to second you in this glorious enterprize; and I rely on your giving the public the full benefit of his

talents, by admitting him to your cordial confidence, and by uniting most harmoniously and zealously with him in the prosecution of my wishes.

I have manifested an honourable confidence in you by selecting you for this service, which, if successful, will attract the applause and admiration of the whole world. In return, I claim from you the full benefit for myself and my country, not only of your services, but of those of my brother, and of all the gallant and able officers whom he has brought with him to the army. I desire that you will arrange some mode of confirming in active and honourable stations the whole of his staff, and of those who have accompanied him.

I recommend it to you also to employ Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, of the 84th, whom I shall send to Mocha; he has been active, and has manifested ability at Suez and Aden. I also recommend Captain Wilson, aide-de-camp to Mr. Duncan, on the same grounds of experience in the affairs of Arabia and Egypt.

May the same providential protection which accompanied you to the gates of Tippoo Sultaun's palace conduct you to Cairo; and may you be the happy instrument of completing the expulsion of the French from India; a work so nobly commenced in Mysore. Remember, that the harmony and cordial union of our counsels in the field were the main sources of all our triumphs in that glorious war, which has rendered your name memorable in the annals of your country. For the rest I have no apprehension; and I trust you will preserve my favourable opinion by preserving unanimity in your army.

Believe me, my dear General,

Your obliged friend and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.

To Major-General Baird.

General Baird replied to this letter in the following terms:—

To the Marquess Wellesley.

Saugur Roads, 13th Feb. 1801, 1 *o'clock*, P.M.

MY LORD,

I HAVE this moment been honoured with your lordship's letter of the 10th instant, accompanying your final despatch.

Your lordship may rest assured that every thing in my power shall be done to promote and maintain harmony in the army of which you have honoured me with the command; and particularly with your brother, for whom I entertain the most sincere regard.

I shall have much pleasure in doing every thing in my power for the staff, but your lordship will, I trust, be aware that I must have some of my own confidential staff about me.

I am happy to find that your lordship has ordered Colonel Murray to join me, as from my knowledge of him, as well as from your lordship's mention, I am convinced he will be of the greatest use.

I will also pay particular attention to your lordship's recommendation of Captain Wilson.—I have, &c.

D. BAIRD.

General Baird, in another letter to Lord Wellesley, dated from the ship Phœnix, at sea, tells him, that having studied his orders, and looked at the serious difficulties which must attend their execution, he shall use every exertion to surmount them. "As yet," says General Baird, "I have never met with any obstacles that were not to be got the better of, by steady perseverance,

and I hope I shall not upon this occasion. The greatest difficulties I shall have to encounter are, the absolute necessity of a regular supply of provisions, and the attainment of a power of moving with celerity. But these greatly depend upon your lordship's foresight; and from the arrangements you have already made, I have no doubt that we shall surmount them.

"It is unnecessary, my lord," he continues, "to say more than that the most vigorous measures shall be adopted to endeavour to carry into full effect the grand object of the expedition. Equally unnecessary is it for me to assure your lordship that the talents of your brother, as well as of every other officer in the army, shall have full scope. Trust me, my lord, I harbour no little jealousy—all in *my* breast is zeal for my KING AND COUNTRY.

"I shall endeavour to make such arrangements for the employment of those officers intended for the staff by the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, as I trust will meet with your lordship's approach tion.

"I have now to request your lordship's acceptance of my warmest acknowledgments for the very handsome and friendly manner in which your lordship has been pleased to express yourself towards me, and particularly on this occasion, in your private letter of the 10th instant."

The next we hear of the progress of this most important expedition, one which would alone have

immortalized the name of Baird, we find, in a letter dated on board the Phœnix, at Trincomalee, the 23d of February, in which it appears, that upon General Baird's arrival there, he discovered that Colonel Wellesley *had sailed from that place* and was to touch at Point de Galle.

"I," says General Baird, "shall follow him with all despatch—I also find that the 19th regiment has been left behind to garrison Trincomalee. I trust your lordship will order them to follow—and I have also written to Lord Clive that they may be relieved and forwarded.

"I imagine Colonel Wellesley has not received any of your lordship's despatches, as I have seen Captain Malcolm's orders to the naval commanding officer at this port, for all ships belonging to the expedition to follow him to Point de Galle, Cannanore, and Bombay."

But it seems that General Baird, although placed in the situation which he could have wished, was still destined to encounter fresh worries and anxieties; for having left Trincomalee in pursuit of the force under the command of Colonel Wellesley, where, as he proceeded to join him, he expected to find him, he pushed forward to Point de Galle, whence he again addressed the governor-general, in a letter from the Phœnix, dated the 28th of February, which, as it is strongly indicative of that ardour and energy by which all his public services were characterized, we give.

Hon. Company's Ship Phœnix, Point de Galle, 28th February, 1801.

Marquess Wellesley, &c. &c. &c.

My Lord,

I did myself the honour to address your lordship from Trincomalee on the 23rd instant, a duplicate of which I now enclose.

Having remained only a few hours I omitted, from hurry and my anxiety to follow the troops, to mention to your lordship that I could not procure any certain intelligence respecting his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier; the naval commanding officer at that port, Lieutenant Mayo, of his Majesty's armed brig Providence, mentioned to me that he expected the vice-admiral, but had no information as to the certainty of his excellency touching at that port. On that account, and my being hopeful of overtaking Colonel Wellesley and Captain Malcolm at Point de Galle, I thought it proper to bring on with me your lordship's despatches for Vice-Admiral Rainier, with the view of consulting Captain Malcolm as to the most speedy mode of their being transmitted to his excellency.

I have now to inform your lordship, that on my arrival at this port yesterday evening, I learned, with much concern, that the armament had sailed hence on the 19th instant. From this circumstance, and from my not having found any letters for myself from Colonel Wellesley, I am aware he could not have received any of your lordship's despatches respecting my being appointed to the command of the expedition, though for this I am at a loss to account, considering the time that has elapsed since your lordship first communicated your having been pleased to confer that honour upon me.

Every practicable expedition in my power shall be used

in order to overtake the armament, and I have accordingly ordered Captain Moffat to proceed with me until I fall in with the fleet. The ship Shah Byramgow being a heavy sailer, I have ordered her to follow me under convoy of the Honourable Company's brig Waller, Lieutenant Davidson, to whom I have given sealed instructions as to the port of destination. I have taken out of the Byramgow a quantity of provisions for the use of the troops on board the Phœnix, and the master-attendant at this port has supplied me with water and firewood at my request.

I have thought it proper to leave your lordship's despatches for his Excellency Vice-Admiral Rainier, of the 5th and 11th instant, the letter on service, copies of Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatch to your lordship of the 6th of October 1800, of Mr. Secretary Dundas's letter to the Lords of the Admiralty, and a copy of your lordship's secret instructions to me of the 10th instant, enclosed for his excellency the vice-admiral, with Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple, commanding this garrison, to be by him delivered to the admiral's order. I have written to the commanding naval officer at Trincomalee to communicate to his excellency in the event of his touching at that port. I have also requested of his Excellency the Honourable Governor North to forward by express my despatch of this date to the vice-admiral, whenever he may have heard certain intelligence from his excellency.

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* Frederick North, afterwards Earl of Guilford, was the third son of Lord North, so long prime-minister of England. He was born in 1764, and was early in life appointed one of the chamberlains of the Tally Court in the Exchequer. He was appointed governor of Ceylon, and remained there some years. His lordship died in 1829 unmarried, and was succeeded in his titles and estates by the Reverend Francis North, eldest son of the late Bishop of Winchester, now Earl of Guilford.

Having had several conversations with Mr. Stokes* on the subject of the future supplies of provisions, &c. for the army, I have this day, in consequence, transmitted to the government of Fort St. George an application for the quantity, as per enclosed statement. And I have done this the more, because I am led to believe the armament assembled at Ceylon must have sailed in consequence of orders from the president of Fort St. George, acting under Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatch of the 6th of October, 1800, and, therefore, cannot have provided sufficiently for the extent of the armament intended by your lordship for the Red Sea; and I have again requested of the presidency of Fort St. George that his Majesty's 19th regiment may be relieved and ordered to join the armament with all practicable expedition.

As it is my intention to touch at Cannanore in hopes of receiving information respecting the armament, I shall transmit to the presidency of Bombay the like demand of supplies required for the army as that made on the government of Fort St. George.—I have, &c.

D. Baird.

After having despatched this, General Baird ordered the ship to be got under way for Cannanore, and just as he was on the point of sailing he received a letter from Colonel Wellesley, which was forwarded by General Macdowall, announcing that he had sailed for Bombay for provisions, and that he had left the 19th regiment behind, thinking that Lord Wellesley would perhaps undertake both expeditions at the same time.

It was evident to General Baird, upon the

* Mr. Stokes was agent and commissary of provisions.

receipt of this letter, that Colonel Wellesley had become acquainted with the change in the destination of the expedition, although he had not yet fallen in with him; and accordingly General Baird wrote to Lord Wellesley from Columbo, stating that he had received this announcement from Colonel Wellesley, at the same time detailing all the principal points of his letter; that he had proceeded to Columbo in order personally to make the necessary application for getting the 19th regiment embarked on board the provision ships expected daily at Trincomalee from Calcutta, which it was his opinion should be done with the greatest expedition, and that thence they should proceed, without any delay, to Mocha.

On the following day, when General Baird had reached the Gulf of Manara, he wrote the subjoined letter to Colonel Wellesley.

Phœnix, Gulf of Manara, 5th March, 1801.

Hon. Colonel Wellesley, &c. &c. &c.

My Dear Colonel,

I received a copy of yours to me on the 21st, at Point de Galle, forwarded by General Macdowall. It is much to be regretted that you had not remained at Trincomalee until my arrival, or until you had received some of your brother's letters after my appointment to the chief command, as you would then have learnt that three transports were to sail in the course of a few days after my departure from Calcutta, laden with provisions, &c. for the army—a statement of which I enclose for your informa-

tion—and that Lord Wellesley has made every possible arrangement for supplying the army with provisions, &c. As the above three ships call at Trincomalee, I am in hopes the 19th regiment may be embarked on them, as I have made an application to Governor North for it. These ships, however, are not to be detained but to proceed direct to Mocha.

As the season is so far advanced, I am apprehensive we shall be too late to get to the head of the Red Sea, I therefore request that you will endeavour to have as many of the troops as possible embarked in the men of war and fast sailing transports. I am confident Captain Malcolm will give every assistance in his power to forward the service. I am in hopes, on my arrival at Bombay, I shall find the fleet ready for sea. I send this by the Waller brig, on the chance of her arriving a few days before us. I wrote you yesterday from Columbo by express.

I have the pleasure to inform you that you are appointed second in command.—I am, &c.

D. Baird.

This letter from General Baird was forwarded from the Gulf of Manara on the 5th of March; but it appears from the following despatch, addressed to the General by Lord Wellesley, dated the 18th of the same month, that Colonel Wellesley had, as General Baird anticipated, been put in possession of the change of circumstances, and of Mr. Secretary Dundas's letter long before. As this despatch is of great importance to the thread of our narrative we give it entire.

To Major-General Baird, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

1. ON the 3rd instant I received advices from the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, intimating that he had received from the government of Fort St. George copies of Mr. Secretary Dundas's despatches of the 6th and 10th of October, 1800, to the Right Honourable Lord Clive and to me, and informing me that he had determined, in consequence of those despatches, to proceed with the troops under his command (excepting his Majesty's 19th regiment, for which he could not procure tonnage) to Bombay, and thence to the place of rendezvous pointed out in the despatches from Mr. Secretary Dundas; and, by a subsequent despatch, I am informed that, in pursuance of that determination, he embarked with the troops from Ceylon on the 14th ultimo.

2. Colonel Wellesley was induced to adopt this measure by the consideration that my principal object in assembling those forces at the island of Ceylon, was to be prepared to meet the eventual demand on the part of his Majesty's ministers for the co-operation of a force from India in an attack upon the French possessions in Egypt. By proceeding to Bombay, Colonel Wellesley supposed that he would be enabled to complete the number of native troops directed to be employed in this expedition, and would have it in his power to obtain for the troops a sufficient stock of such provisions and refreshments as are not procurable at Ceylon. Colonel Wellesley also supposed that in proceeding with the troops to Bombay, he should not materially retard the arrival of the armament at the place of rendezvous, and that my orders might reach him at Bombay before the close of the month of March, if I should deem it expedient to employ the troops under his command in any other direction.

3. Under all the circumstances of the case, I entirely approve of the alacrity which Colonel Wellesley has manifested in moving the troops towards the place of rendezvous, and I trust that this measure will accelerate their arrival at the ultimate point of their destination, and will enable you to assume the command under additional advantages.

4. With a view to give the earliest intimation to Colonel Wellesley of the measures which I have adopted for carrying his Majesty's orders into effect, I directed a copy of my instructions addressed to you on the 10th of February, to be dispatched to him by Bombay on the 3rd instant. He will consequently be prepared to receive you either on your arrival at Bombay (to which place I conclude you will have proceeded from Ceylon at the earliest opportunity) or at Mocha.

5. I enclose for your information a copy of the letter addressed, by my directions, to Colonel Wellesley by the chief secretary.

6. By a letter from the Right Honourable Lord Clive, under date the 2nd instant, I understand that his lordship has determined to send six companies of his Majesty's 74th regiment to Bombay by the ships under dispatch at Fort St. George, for the purpose of supplying the place of the 19th regiment left by Colonel Wellesley at Ceylon. The 19th regiment will therefore remain at Ceylon for the defence of that island. This arrangement appears to be judicious, as, in the approaching season, it would require a considerably longer time to transport the 19th regiment from Ceylon to Bombay, than will be occupied in conveying the six companies of the 74th directly to that place from Fort St. George.

7. Advices have recently reached me which induce me to apprehend that the French may have reinforced Mauritius, with a view to hostile operations against India;

I have therefore judged it expedient to leave the governor in council of Bombay the option of detaining the companies of the 74th for the garrison of Bombay, if he should judge it necessary.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WELLESLEY.

Fort William, 18th March, 1801.

If this despatch to General Baird contains an ample justification of Colonel Wellesley's proceeding, the following letter, addressed to Colonel Wellesley by the governor-general in council, in answer to his communication of the 3rd of May, entirely warrants what he did subsequent to its receipt, but before the arrival of General Baird at Bombay.

To the Honourable Colonel Wellesley.

SIR,

I AM commanded by the most noble the governor-general in council, to inform you that I have received, through the chief secretary to the government at Fort St. George, and have laid before his excellency in council, copies of your letters to the chief secretary at Fort St. George, and to the governor of Bombay, dated the 7th ultimo.

2. I am further directed by his excellency to enclose a copy of his instructions to Major-General Baird, and of his letter to you under date the 10th of February, which documents will furnish you with the plan which his excellency has adopted for the execution of his Majesty's commands of the 6th October, 1800.

3. As soon as this despatch shall reach you, his excel-

lency in council directs you to proceedi mmediately to Mocha.

4. If Major-General Baird should not have arrived at that place, you will act as chief in command of the whole force directed to assemble at Mocha, and you will carry into execution, with every practicable degree of dispatch, the plan stated in his excellency's instructions to General Baird, dated the 10th of February.

5. When Major-General Baird shall join the forces destined to be employed on the coasts of the Red Sea, you will act as second in command, according to the tenor of the same instructions.

6. Adverting to your letters to the chief secretary to the government at Fort St. George, and to the governor of Bombay, of the 7th ultimo, the governor-general in council directs me to remark, that under his excellency's orders of the month of October (adverted to in the 11th paragraph of the instructions to you from the most noble the governor-general in council, dated the 11th November, 1800), the government of Bombay were directed to hold in readiness a considerable force of native troops for the purpose of co-operating, in Egypt or elsewhere, with the armament assembled at Ceylon; and that a force of sixteen hundred Sepoys has accordingly been ready for embarkation for some time past at Bombay.

7. His excellency also directs me to remark that the stores embarked on the ships Shah Byramgow,* Cecilia, and Anstruther, contain provisions which, in most articles, appear more than sufficient to meet the demand transmitted by you to the governor of Bombay.

* Shah Byramgow left the pilot on the 14th ultimo.
Candidate ..... 20th ditto.
Cecilia and Anstruther expected to leave the pilot on the 5th instant.

8. Major-General Baird embarked for the port of Trincomalee in the Honourable Company's ship Phœnix, which ship parted with the pilot off the Sand Heads at the entrance of the river Hoogly on the 14th ultimo.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) G. H. BARLOW,
Chief Secretary to the Government.

Fort William,
3rd March, 1801.

On the 31st of March, General Baird reached Bombay in the Wasp gun-vessel, on board of which he embarked on the 23rd, a little to the southward of Goa, in hopes of arriving a few days before the Phœnix, the whole anxiety of his mind being directed to expediting the departure of the transports as much as possible.

CHAPTER XVI.

GENERAL BAIRD ARRIVES AT BOMBAY—FINDS COLONEL WELLESLEY THERE—SAILS FOR MOCHA—COLONEL WELLESLEY'S ILLNESS—LEFT BEHIND—GENERAL BAIRD ARRIVES AT MOCHA—HIS RECEPTION THERE—LETTERS AND PROCLAMATION OF LORD WELLESLEY—HIS CONTINUED ANXIETY CONCERNING THE FRENCH ISLANDS—COLONEL MONTRESOR'S ARRIVAL—GENERAL BAIRD PROCEEDS TO JEDDAH—NEGOCIATIONS WITH THE SHERIFF OF MECCA—THEIR RESULT—ARRIVAL OF SIR HOME POPHAM—VOYAGE TO KOSSEIR—COLONEL MURRAY—ADMIRAL BLANKETT—DESPATCHES FOR GENERAL HUTCHINSON—COMMENCEMENT OF THE MARCH——ORDERS—COLONEL BERESFORD—DIFFICULTIES WHICH ARISE—GENERAL BAIRD ACCOMPANIES THE DIVISION ON ITS MARCH—ACCOUNT OF KOSSEIR—GENERAL BAIRD RETURNS TO KOSSEIR.

When General Baird reached Bombay, he found that owing to the activity of Governor Duncan and Colonel Wellesley, several of the transports were nearly ready, and before the 3d of April six of them had actually sailed, under the command of Colonel Beresford, with sealed orders.

General Baird, whose zeal was indefatigable, reached Bombay several days before the Phœnix; and when she arrived, having calculated the

time which she would require for getting ready for sea, he determined to embark on board the William, which had been represented to him as a remarkably fast sailer. In that ship he resolved to make the best of his way to Mocha, so as to gain as much time there, as possible, for making his further arrangements.

It was then arranged that Colonel Wellesley should sail in the Susannah, another fast sailing ship, which led General Baird to hope that they might reach Mocha nearly about the same time.

In his voyage to Bombay, General Baird had fallen in with some transports off Goa, and finding that they were remarkably dull heavy vessels,* he ordered them into that port to take in their water, and, after having done so, they were instructed to sail under the orders of Colonel Champagné, to whom he delivered sealed instructions, intending to carry from Bombay sufficient provisions, not attainable at Goa, to complete their stock for six months, substituting salt fish for beef and pork; resolving also, for well-founded reasons, to adopt similar measures with respect to all the other transports.

At this period General Baird appointed Major Macquarie, of his Majesty's 77th regiment, deputy-adjutant-general of the army under his command, from a conviction that he was eminently qualified

* These were the London, the Wellesley, the Experiment, and the Hydra, Grab.

for the duties of that important department; and also nominated Captain Wilson, Persian translator.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Colman, the general offered the deputy-quarter-master-generalship, but he declined it, although, as general Baird says, in one of the letters which passed on the occasion, "It is a situation of equal honour and importance with that of deputy-adjutant-general." It appears, however, by the list of the general's staff, which we shall presently submit to the reader, that Colonel Colman persisted in refusing the appointment.

There was one subject of annoyance to general Baird, which circumstances prevented his overcoming,—he was obliged to sail with his expedition without the convoy of any of the men-of-war, then at Bombay. The Trident and Orpheus, which *were* there, were in dock, and the Suffolk was in so bad a state as to require a general repair before she could be trusted at sea.

But this vexation even did not come alone. On the 3d of April, just as every arrangement was complete, Colonel Wellesley was seized with a return of intermitting fever, which had previously attacked him at Trincomalee. His anxiety to embark was with difficulty repressed by the injunctions of Mr. Scott, the surgeon. He had resolved to go, and to that determination he adhered until the last moment, thinking, as he said, that the voyage would be of service to

him, and that he should be completely recovered, long before the expedition reached Mocha.

But these expectations were unfortunately not realized in the sequel, and on the 5th of April, the day which General Baird had fixed for the embarkation, Colonel Wellesley was pronounced incapable of proceeding. General Baird, who was most anxious for his co-operation, hoped that a few days might work such a change in his disorder as would enable him, at all events, subsequently to join him; and as the Susannah, in which he was to take his passage, was a fast sailer, anticipated that his arrival at Mocha would follow close upon that of his own.

General Baird derived some consolation for the loss of Colonel Wellesley's immediate presence at starting, from the circumstance that Admiral Rainier being known to have left Point de Galle on the 9th of March, might be hourly expected at Bombay; for the general felt that considerable advantage would be gained from Colonel Wellesley's having the opportunity of discussing the practical parts of the expedition with the admiral, and urging him to afford whatever assistance to the arduous enterprise he could spare.

It proved, however, with all General Baird's mental anxiety and personal exertion, impossible to get away from Bombay until the morning of the 6th of April, upon which day he commenced an expedition such as has been rarely attempted at any period of history.

It would be superfluous here to enlarge upon the gigantic combination of labour and peril which a general must necessarily have to encounter in an enterprise like this, which had been hitherto unattempted, and which presented, besides the ordinary array of military, naval, and political difficulties, the awful responsibility of conducting a considerable army through an arid and (by him) untrodden desert. It is sufficient to call the attention of the reader to the following details—he will thence be able to judge of the magnitude of the undertaking, and the gallantry, wisdom, prudence, and humanity, with which it was so nobly and successfully achieved.

General Baird reached Mocha on the nineteenth day from his quitting Bombay. On his arrival there he found that Colonel Murray, who had been despatched to that place several months before, had sailed for Jeddah on the 17th, having previously sent off the Bombay detachment on the 12th, under the command of Colonel Ramsay.

The detachment which we have already mentioned, as having left Bombay so late as the 3d of April, under the command of Colonel Beresford, had arrived at Mocha on the 21st, but Colonel Beresford had likewise sailed on the 22d, without leaving any intimation of his instructions with Mr. Pringle, who was placed at Mocha by Colonel Murray in the character of resident; a silence on the part of Colonel Beresford which he no doubt observed in obedience to his orders, which

directed him to deliver his instructions, sealed, to the senior officer in the Red Sea; in pursuance of which, General Baird concluded he had made the best of his way to follow Colonel Murray.

General Baird, when he became acquainted with the actual state of affairs at Mocha, felt convinced that the moment Beresford reached and joined Murray they would make an effort conjointly to attack Kosseir; and the possibility of their failure in such an enterprise seemed to him to be fraught with so much danger to the ultimate success of the great undertaking in which they were all engaged, that he sent off despatches to both Colonel Murray and Colonel Beresford, in order, if possible, to prevent any of the ill consequences which might arise from a misapplication of their well known zeal and gallantry; his object being to await the arrival of another detachment under Colonel Montresor, to proceed with it to Jeddah, and thence carry on Colonel Murray to Kosseir, where he proposed to wait the arrival of the whole armament. In short, Kosseir was the place selected by General Baird for the *rendezvous*, and accordingly he left despatches at Mocha,* detailing the arrangement he had decided upon, for Colonel Wellesley and Colonel Champagné, and for Sir Home Popham, who was also expected from England.

* Mocha, a place of considerable trade in coffee, said to be the best in the world, bears from Cape Bab-el-mandeb

In a letter which General Baird addressed to Lord Wellesley from Mocha, on the 26th of April, he says,

"When I was at Bombay, Governor Duncan informed me of the very high expectations he had from the abilities and exertions of Mehedi Ali Khan in the present service, and recommended him to me in the strongest manner. On my arrival, the Khan came on board and explained his reasons for not wishing to proceed to Jeddah; since which I have had several conversations with him, and being convinced that every possible effort should be made to bring over the Sheriff of Mecca to our interest, or at least to be on friendly terms with us, I have with some difficulty prevailed upon Mehedi Ali to accompany me.

"From the present disposition of the Sheriff of Mecca towards the British cause, no assistance is to be expected from Jeddah. I am given to understand that he has positively forbidden the pilots along the coast to carry any of our ships into that port; and a number of Dhows from this, with horses and forage for the army, are detained at

about N. by W. half W. *true bearing,* distant thirteen and a-half leagues. By the mean of many observations selected from the journals of several intelligent commanders employed in the expedition, Mocha is in lat. 13° 20′ N., long. 43° 20′ E., corresponding exactly with Sir Home Popham's observations, and those made by Captain Charles Court during his survey of the Red Sea; the variation in the road in 1799 was 9° W. —Horsburgh.

Hodeida on that account. It is also reported here that Admiral Blankett has had some disagreement with the sheriff. I have, however, to hope, that through the good offices of Mehedi Ali Khan we shall yet be able to procure some assistance from him.

" Your excellency is to be apprized, that at this moment *there is not one camel with any part of the army*, and should those which Ali Khan has commissioned from this country not leave Mocha prior to the 20th of May, there is every reason to believe, that from the lateness of the season they will not reach Kosseir in time to be of any use to the army. It is also to be presumed, from the influence of the French, that the Arabs in the neighbourhood of Kosseir will be hostile to our cause, and that camels there, will not be procurable at any rate.

" From these circumstances it follows that no movement of the army (in the event of the capture of Kosseir) can be possibly undertaken for a considerable lapse of time, unless the enemy have met with a check in Lower Egypt, and the communication is opened with some of the native Beys, the Turkish, or Sir Ralph Abercrombie's army.

" Of the total impossibility of an army attempting to march across the desert from Kosseir to Ghenna, a distance of 120 miles, without the requisite number of camels, your excellency must be fully aware; and I beg leave to enclose an

estimate of the probable number of camels sufficient to enable an army of four thousand fighting men, and a thousand Lascars as followers, to perform the above march in twelve days."

It appears by the despatch from which these paragraphs are extracts, that General Baird had been compelled to relinquish all hope of reaching Suez by sea, in consequence of the lateness of the season; indeed he had great apprehensions that he should not be able to procure means of conveyance either from the Arabian coast or in Egypt itself, so as to enable him to carry into effect the great object of his expedition, that of creating a diversion in favour of the combined English and Turkish forces, in which case he was prepared, in accordance with Lord Wellesley's instructions, to advise with Admiral Rainier and Colonel Wellesley as soon as they should arrive, upon the most eligible plans of future operations.

The information which General Baird received from Colonel Murray, who had preceded him, and from other sources, was extremely vague and contradictory. It was stated by some, that the French had evacuated Suez and Cairo, but the general prudently resolved to wait until he either met, or could again communicate with Colonel Murray or Admiral Blankett, before he gave credence to any of the numerous reports which were in circulation, or decided upon the measures which those reports were calculated to influence.

At Mocha General Baird was well received by

the Dola; he had an audience immediately after his arrival, and the Dola promised to afford him every assistance in his power; to *him* he also delivered some presents, and left others in the charge of Mr. Pringle, to be delivered to the Imaum of Sana, and the Sultaun of Aden, refreshing the good intentions of the sub-Dola of Mocha, (who was very much respected there, and whose assistance he considered likely to be very valuable,) with a present of five hundred rupees; gratifying also the harbour-master with a purse of three hundred, of which the general anticipated the beneficial effects in the expedition with which, under the inspection of that officer, the transports might get their water on board.

The immediate negotiation which was to conciliate the Arab chiefs, was one of the strong points of Lord Wellesley's policy in the outset of the expedition, and he accordingly wrote to the Sultaun of Aden, to the Imaum of Sana, to the Imaum's eldest son, to his first Vizier, to the Governor of Mocha, to the Sheriff of Mecca, to the first Vizier of the Sheriff of Mecca, and to the Vizier of Jeddah.

These letters, as shewing the political objects and character of the expedition itself, will be interesting to the reader; we therefore insert them, together with the proclamation with which Lord Wellesley accompanied them. The following was addressed to the Sheriff, the Imaum, and the Sultaun.

To the SHERIFF OF MECCA,
IMAUM OF SANA,
SULTAUN OF ADEN.
(*Written* 19*th March*, 1801.)

THE friendship and harmony which, during a long course of years, has firmly subsisted between the Sublime Porte and his Britannic Majesty is well known to you. That friendship has been still more closely cemented by the faithless conduct of the French towards the Ottoman Porte; the French are now become the common enemy of both states. That perfidious people, disregarding all the obligations of friendship and the stipulations of treaties, has sent forth its armies to invade the peaceful provinces of Egypt, the acknowledged territory of the Ottoman Porte. Without urging the slightest pretext to justify this outrage, but, on the contrary, professing sentiments of perfect friendship and regard, these disturbers of the peace of nations have carried war and desolation into the most fruitful provinces of the empire, the venerated sanctuary of the Mahomedan faith. They have attempted to establish their authority upon the ruins of your religion. They have now unequivocally declared their resolution to maintain by force what they have acquired by the violation of every principle of public faith, and of every maxim of civil and religious obligation.

I entertain too high an opinion of your attachment to the interests and independence of the parent state, and of your zeal for the support of the religion which you revere, to believe that you can have witnessed without indignation and alarm this unexampled instance of the inordinate ambition and perfidious conduct of the French nation.

I am persuaded you cannot view with unconcern, the ambitious and encroaching spirit of the French nation,

which, unresisted, must inevitably complete the downfal of the Mahomedan authority, not only in Egypt, but in all the neighbouring territories, and must establish the supremacy of the French power in the most sacred seats of the Mahomedan religion.

It has been the uniform policy of the French to endeavour to disarm the resentment of the people whose country they have invaded, by professing the most amicable intentions, and by pretending that the sole motive of their actions is to mitigate the tyranny of oppressive governments; to establish the independence of oppressed nations, and to secure to mankind the full enjoyment of civil and religious rights. By these insidious arts the French have succeeded in reducing to their absolute power many of the states of Europe, which they have invaded and ravaged without the slightest pretext or provocation.

They have employed the same means to reconcile the inhabitants of Egypt to their unprovoked violence and unjust usurpation; and they will endeavour to practise the same perfidious policy for the purpose of subjugating the remaining dependencies of the Ottoman empire in Arabia.

They will labour to impress you with a belief of their amicable disposition, and of their regard for the sanctity of your religion. Under the pretence of establishing your independence, they will endeavour to subvert your government and to erect their tyrannous misrule upon its ruins.

With the most friendly solicitude I warn you to take example from the unhappy fate of other states, and to beware of yielding to the insidious professions of a nation which has forfeited all pretensions to credit by a systematic contempt of the obligations of public faith, and of the law of nations, especially by their unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of the province of Egypt.

You have no other security for the preservation of your

independence, and for the maintenance of your rights, than by a determination to resist the force and to frustrate the frauds of the French nation.

You are called upon, therefore, by every motive of interest and self-preservation, by every principle of national honour and of religious attachment, to unite your efforts with the combined exertions of the British power and of the Ottoman state for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. A formidable army of Turkish troops is already acting with vigour for the purpose of dispossessing the French of their usurped authority in Egypt, and a numerous body of British troops now co-operate in Egypt with the army of the Porte in effecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt.

With a view to second the operations of the combined army, I have detached a considerable force of European and native troops from India, to unite in a joint effort for the expulsion of the common enemy. This measure, while it favours the success of the operations to be carried on from the side of Syria and the Mediterranean, is calculated to provide for the security of the Mahomedan possessions on the Arabian side of the Red Sea.

As the existence of the Mahomedan dominion in Arabia, and the interests of the Mahomedan religion, are obviously concerned in the expulsion of the French, I cannot doubt that you will employ all the resources of your country and the influence of your authority in promoting the success of the projected enterprise. I am the more induced to rely upon your exertions by the report which has been made to me by Captain Wilson and by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, who were lately deputed, under my orders, to the Red Sea, of the friendly disposition which you entertain towards the Britsh nation.

I trust you will employ every effort to procure and to facilitate the dispatch of provisions and of stores to the

troops employed in the Red Sea; that you will furnish a reinforcement of the troops of your country to act with the British army, and that you will encourage the several chiefs and states in Arabia and in Egypt to make common cause against the common enemy of your nation and of the British power.

Major-General Baird, the commander-in-chief of the Indian forces, or a proper person deputed by him, will have the honour to deliver to you this letter, and will present to you a few articles, the produce of Europe and of this country, as a token of my friendship and regard.

I request your favourable attention to the suggestions and applications which may be made on my part for your assistance in promoting the object of the expedition.

For the rest, believe me anxious for accounts of your welfare, &c. &c. &c. WELLESLEY.

The letter written to the Viziers, although shorter, was conceived in a similar spirit, and written in a similar tone. The proclamation follows:

Proclamation.

THE ancient friendship and harmony subsisting between the Sublime Porte and his Britannic Majesty have recently been confirmed by additional ties of reciprocal danger, and of common injury from the government of France.

That faithless government, disregarding the obligations of amity and the stipulations of treaty, has sent forth its armies to invade the peaceful provinces of Egypt, the acknowledged territory of the Ottoman Porte; the cruelties and outrages practised by the French in Egypt are known to all mankind, and have excited universal horror and indignation.

The French have now unequivocally declared their re-

solution to maintain by force the territory which they have acquired by fraud, and by the violation of every principle of faith, and of every maxim of civil and religious obligation.

It has been the uniform policy of the French to endeavour to disarm the resentment of the people whose country they have invaded, by professing the most amicable intentions, and by pretending that the sole object of the French arms is to mitigate the tyranny of oppressive governments, to establish the independence of suffering nations, and to secure to mankind the full enjoyment of civil and religious rights. By such insidious arts the French have succeeded in reducing many of the states of Europe to the lowest condition of misery and humiliation. The French have employed the same artifice in Egypt, and they will continue to employ it for the purpose of establishing universal dominion and boundless power.

They will profess to maintain the independence of the Mahomedan goverment, to secure to the inhabitants of the country the enjoyment of their property, and the free exercise of their religion, to administer to the people their own laws, and to protect them from oppression.

Can the enlightened inhabitants of Egypt be deluded by professions of the French, who have forfeited all pretensions to credit by a systematic contempt of the obligations of public faith, and of the established law of nations? Can the people of Egypt persuade themselves that the French who, under the mask of friendship, have treacherously invaded and ravaged the dominions of an ally without pretence or provocation, will maintain faith with the people whose habitations they have usurped, and whose government they have laboured to subvert?

A nation which has openly abjured all religion cannot be expected to regard the sanctity or maintain the interests of the Mahomedan faith.

The real view of the French is to gratify their criminal ambition; their object is the absolute subversion of the Ottoman power, and the permanent establishment of their own dominion.

For the salutary purpose of restoring to the dominion of the Porte the territory which the French have so unjustly usurped, of recovering for the inhabitants of Egypt whatever they may have lost by the unprovoked aggression of France, a formidable body of troops has been sent from England to join the army of the Ottoman state; and the combined forces of the Grand Seignor and of his Britannic Majesty are now employed in the most active operations for the purpose of effecting the expulsion of the French from Egypt. A considerable British force is also arrived from the British empire in India to co-operate from the Red Sea with the allied army now acting from the shores of the Mediterranean.

A favourable opportunity is now afforded to the inhabitants of these provinces of deliverance from the tyranny and usurpation of the French; Major-General Baird, the commander-in-chief of the British forces detached from India, invites all the chiefs and inhabitants of these provinces to avail themselves of the protection and assistance of the British troops, and to unite their efforts in the common cause.

The commander-in-chief, while he offers protection and assistance to those who may be induced to join the British standard, warns the chiefs and inhabitants of these countries of the destructive consequences to which they will expose themselves by supporting the cause of the enemy; the commander-in-chief, however, trusts that a just abhorrence of the principles, views, and conduct of the French, and a firm reliance on the benevolent intentions, justice, and moderation of the British nation, will induce the inhabitants of these provinces to embrace with eager-

ness the opportunity now happily offered to them of uniting in a common effort with the friends and allies of the Ottoman Porte, against the depredations, violence, and outrages of the French nation in this quarter of the globe.

General Baird delivered these letters and the presents according to their different addresses; and at Mocha made an arrangement that Seid Hamed Aga should accompany the expedition, taking his passage in the head-quarter ship; an agreement being entered into that he should be rewarded for his services in proportion to their magnitude and importance.

On the 28th of April, Colonel Montresor's division of the expedition reached Mocha, and anchored in safety and good health; but the boisterous state of the weather rendered watering the ships a work of extreme labour and difficulty, if not of actual danger; indeed the impediments which were thrown in the way of completing their stock, induced the general to engage pilots, with a view of touching at the island of Camaran, where the water was said to be remarkably pure and good; a measure of great wisdom and prudence, inasmuch as none could reach the ships from Mocha after the 20th of the next month, and the supply from Jeddah was extremely precarious; but in this design he was unexpectedly thwarted by the positive refusal of the pilots to take the ships to that place. This extraordinary conduct Gene-

ral Baird could never exactly account for; but at the moment it was extremely unpleasant, because, independently of the frustration of his prudential arrangement for the comfort and safety of the troops, it afforded, as he thought, evidence of an undue influence over the pilots, exerted in some hostile quarter. He did not, however, suffer this opposition to delay his movements, and taking into consideration all the circumstances, resolved to proceed, without further delay, to Kosseir, by Jeddah.

While these operations were in progress, Lord Wellesley had dispatched the Mornington Packet to the Cape of Good Hope, to Sir George Young, who was governor of that colony, as well as to Sir Roger Curtis, the admiral commanding the station, requesting their aid in furnishing certain supplies to the Indian army in Egypt, desiring them also to send any information of which they might happen to be in possession, relative to the actual state of affairs at Mauritius and Bourbon, upon which islands Lord Wellesley continued to keep a constant, watchful, and jealous eye; and so anxious was his lordship for the intelligence which he considered it probable the packet might bring, that he directed that she should on her return proceed to Mocha, and that as soon as she had landed whatever stores and supplies she might have for the army, she should sail to Calcutta; at the same time instructing General Baird to consult with Admiral Blan-

kett, so that in case the object of the Egyptian expedition should fail, and the enterprise against the French islands could be undertaken, he might endeavour to secure his co-operation to the fullest extent of his means.*

Affairs, however, were destined to take a different turn, and it was General Baird's fortune to succeed in achieving an object till then deemed impracticable. Every movement of this yet unrecorded undertaking, is full of interest; every letter, illustrative of its progress, teems with instruction and information; and while the correspondence of General Baird, during the continuance of his toils and difficulties, marks his firmness and decision, it exhibits in the strongest light the affectionate humanity of the man, united with the comprehensive intelligence and indefatigable activity of the soldier.

It may be easily conceived that Lord Wellesley's constant anxiety with regard to the French islands, was not a little increased by intelligence which reached Bombay on the 4th of March, that a fleet had sailed from Brest, which was believed to be intended as a reinforcement for those colonies,

* Although that part of Lord Wellesley's design which originally included Batavia in the conquest to be achieved, was, if not frustrated, at all events necessarily delayed by the new destination given to the troops previously designed for its reduction, the still more desirable object—the capture of Mauritius—might even yet have been effected as early almost as it otherwise would, supposing the efforts of General Baird to join General Hutchinson to have been frustrated.

preparatory to some great attack upon our Indian possessions. General Baird, who had, even before Lord Wellesley received this information, weighed in his mind the probable effects of this measure, and coupling it with the avowed hostility of Russia, which he conceived might have a powerful influence over the movements of Sir Ralph Abercrombie in Egypt, began to consider it probable, that his proceeding to Cairo or Alexandria would be superfluous, and that the expedition against Mauritius, would still be undertaken. Under these circumstances he felt an increased anxiety for a reinforcement of European troops; so that, in case of finding on his arrival at Kosseir that the Egyptian campaign was to be abandoned, he might strike at two colonies, the strength of which had always, as we have already shewn, been so judiciously magnified by the French government.

Lord Wellesley, however, formed a more accurate opinion of their real state, upon information which he had derived from Mr. Stokes, who had long been a prisoner at Mauritius, and whom his lordship had appointed, with very considerable powers, as commissary of stores, to the expedition commanded by General Baird; no doubt as well with the view of marking his confidence in that gentleman during the Egyptian expedition, as of securing his services, which he considered might be made particularly available, should the destination of the force be eventually changed to Mau-

ritius, with the localities of which Mr. Stokes appeared to be so well acquainted.

One of the principal difficulties which General Baird contemplated in making his way across the desert, was the hostility, or disaffection, or treachery of the Beys of Upper Egypt. As yet the camels necessary for the transport of the army had not been secured in Arabia, and General Baird's efforts, in the midst of all his uncertainties and difficulties, were constantly directed to the conciliation of the Sheriff of Mecca, upon whose disposition he seemed fully persuaded the success of his great enterprise must depend.

The task of conveying, in the first instance, five thousand troops, and all their followers, from Kosseir to Ghennah, across a barren desert, was one which it required a most unshrinking mind even to contemplate; and although bullocks might have been procured (a large number of those animals having been sent from Bombay), they would have been perfectly useless in the conveyance of the army: for their power, as beasts of draught or burden, would not have been adequate to more than the carriage of the forage and water, absolutely necessary for their own existence

On the 18th of May, General Baird arrived at Jeddah, and found upon his arrival that Colonel Murray, not having received his despatches, had, taking advantage of the earlier part of the season, proceeded with the Bombay detachment, and Colonel Beresford's division, up the Gulf to Suez.

—General Baird's first impulse was at all hazards instantly to follow him.—But his natural desire for action was checked by the absolute necessity of taking in a fresh stock of water—that invaluable article (so little regarded when in plenty, and so ardently sought when scarce or difficult of access); and accordingly he resolved to remain where he was, for a few days, to fill up the stock, taking advantage of the delay, to secure by every means in his power, the friendship and co-operation of the Sheriff of Mecca.*

On the evening of his arrival at Jeddah, a despatch was received by Captain Hardyman, from Admiral Blankett, announcing the British successes in Egypt, the victory of the 21st of March, and the lamented death of the gallant Sir Ralph Abercrombie.

On the following day, the Sheriff of Mecca having arrived, General Baird had an audience of

* Jeddah, or Juddah, according to Horsburgh (founded on observations taken during the Egyptian expedition), is in lat. 21° 29′ N., long. 39° 15′ E.; the tomb of Mahomet, at Mecca, is distant twenty one miles inland.

"It would be very imprudent for a stranger to sail out of Juddah roads without a pilot. The native pilots are guided by the eye, as there are no cross bearings or proper marks to lead them clear of the numerous sunken rocks which, in hazy weather, or when the sea is obscured, cannot be discerned until the ship is nearly upon them."—*Vide Horsburgh's Sailing Directions, Vol. I. p.* 221.

It was on one of the rocks to the southward of the outer gate, as it is called, that his Majesty's frigate *La Forte* struck and was lost.

him, in company with Mehedi Ali Khan, and delivered to his highness the letters and presents destined for his acceptance. It was a matter of very great satisfaction to General Baird, to find that the sheriff was, or at least expressed himself to be, extremely well disposed towards the English; and that moreover he promised his assistance; so that at the conclusion of the interview, the general felt almost assured that he should eventually obtain, under his highness's sanction, as many horses and camels as the vessels then in port were competent to convey.*

It was now arranged by General Baird, that instead of proceeding with *him*, Mehedi Ali Khan should remain behind at Jeddah, and that if his services should be required farther up the gulf, he was to follow.

At this juncture, and just as General Baird was preparing to sail for Kosseir, Sir Home Popham

* This seeming cordiality of the sheriff was the more agreeable to General Baird from being entirely unexpected; the impression upon the general's mind being that his highness's conduct would be unfavourable to the English. General Baird had been induced to form this opinion from the fact that when, as has already been stated, the pilots at Mocha decidedly refused to take the ships to Camaran by water, they alleged as a reason their fear of offending the Sheriff of Mecca. But General Baird subsequently discovered that their unwillingness to go to that island arose from the interference of the East India Company's broker, who got no profit if ships were supplied with water at any other place than that at which he himself resided.

arrived off Jeddah, in H. M. S. Romney, 50 guns, with the Victor, of 20 guns, in company. The rest of his squadron (having on board the 61st regiment, several troops of light dragoons, and a detachment of artillery,) were hourly expected; but it was a matter both of regret and surprise to General Baird, to learn from Sir Home Popham, that when *he* left Mocha, no news whatever had been received there, either of the provision-ships which were expected, or of the division of the army, under the command of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley and Colonel Champagné.

We believe that this was the first meeting between Sir Home Popham and General Baird, and it is clear that a very strong feeling of mutual friendship arose out of their acquaintance. General Baird was greatly struck by the activity and decision of Sir Home, and upon this, as it will be seen he did on various subsequent occasions, he placed the firmest reliance upon his zeal and exertions in accelerating whatever duty there was to be performed; nor was this opinion at all weakened by the manner in which Sir Home, in an audience with the sheriff, adjusted a misunderstanding which had unfortunately arisen with respect to the detention of one of the sheriff's vessels at Bombay. The sheriff was entirely soothed and satisfied by Sir Home's explanations, and requested that the subject might never be mentioned again. Both Sir Home and General Baird were extremely well

pleased with the line of conduct adopted by the sheriff upon this occasion, and met his readiness to forget what he had previously felt as an injury, by declaring their intention to apply immediately and jointly to the governor-general to exempt his highness's vessels from the payment of duties in any of the Indian ports.

In addition to this liberal termination of the difference which had existed, the sheriff offered to raise an Arab force for the purpose of co-operating with the English army; but General Baird hesitated before he accepted this offer, because it was evident to him that he must advance very considerable sums of money to the sheriff for the purpose of equipping these men, without, as he believed, a corresponding certainty of his ever seeing them after the money had once been paid. In consequence of this apprehension, founded upon experience, General Baird directed Mehedi Ali Khan not to conclude any agreement upon that point, until he received further instructions from him.

On the 26th of May, General Baird embarked, at Sir Home Popham's request, on board his ship, the Romney, and sailed for Kosseir, where they expected to meet Admiral Blankett.

In the despatches brought out by Sir Home Popham, many new staff-appointments from England were announced, which had the effect of superseding those which General Baird had provisionally made. Colonel Auchmuty was appointed adjutant-general to the army, and by a

letter from Mr. Huskisson, then under secretary of state, the general was directed to place the whole of the troops from the Cape, on their arrival, on India allowances.

Nothing remarkable occurred on the voyage from Jeddah towards Kosseir. The winds in the Red Sea, as our readers of course are aware, blow six months from the north, and six from the south. The season was now far advanced, and as has been frequently stated, by no means favourable for the voyage; yet on the 8th of June, the Romney arrived at the place of her destination.*

When General Baird reached Kosseir and found that Admiral Blankett was not there, he felt severely disappointed, inasmuch as he expected to have had an opportunity of concerting with *him* the most eligible plan of operations to be carried on against the enemy; and this disappointment

* Kosseir, Cossier, Cosire, or Kosire, lies in lat. 26° 8′ N., long. 34° 15′ E.; the road is confined, and cannot contain more than four or five ships safely, the quality of the ground being very indifferent for anchorage, and much exposed to easterly winds. On the first appearance of an easterly wind, ships should put to sea, for the bank of anchorage being of small extent, they are obliged to lie near the shore, and there is always a heavy swell setting into the road.

"The northern part of the road is formed by a reef of rocks, steep to. A ship may anchor in thirteen fathoms, with the body of the fort N. W. half W. a large half-mile off shore, or further-in where the depths are less, 7, 8, and 10 fathoms, and be sheltered from northerly winds."—*Horsburgh, Vol. I. p.* 224.

was by no means diminished, by finding that the admiral had left no letters, from which the general might collect any information respecting the actual state of affairs in Egypt, or of the force or position of the Turkish and English armies.

General Baird, however, found Colonel Murray with his detachment at Kosseir, having been there nearly three weeks; during which time the colonel had made such active arrangements with respect to procuring camels sufficient for the transport of the troops under his immediate command, to Ghennah, that the general, finding the road open, and the inhabitants apparently well disposed towards the English, resolved to move them forward in the course of a few days; intending as soon as the other division of the army should arrive, for which he determined to wait at Kosseir, to follow with all practicable expedition himself.

After General Baird had been a short time at Kosseir, he received a despatch from Admiral Blankett, informing him of General Hutchinson's success in Lower Egypt, and his consequent junction with the Grand Vizier's army. General Baird immediately wrote off to General Hutchinson, announcing the arrival of the troops from the Cape, and requesting to know as speedily as possible, whether he considered it absolutely necessary for them to join him at Cairo. Colonel Murray, it appears, had written repeatedly to General Hutchinson without receiving any reply,

for in a letter of General Baird's, to General Hutchinson, dated Kosseir, 10th of June, 1801, he says, "As Colonel Murray has repeatedly written to you, without (as yet) receiving any answer, I shall, for fear of accidents, *write daily*, until I shall have the pleasure of hearing from you."

This trait of resolute perseverance on the public service is highly characteristic, more especially when it is recollected how many, and what totally opposite duties, necessarily occupied General Baird's time and mind on the eve of such an expedition as that he was about to undertake. The general, however, was destined to find General Hutchinson a better correspondent than Colonel Murray had found him; for Admiral Blankett, who arrived himself at Kosseir on the 15th of June, brought with him a despatch for General Baird, which appears to be of sufficient importance to merit insertion here.

Head-quarters, British Camp,
15 miles above Rahamenie, on the Nile,
May 13th, 1801.

SIR,

I HAVE heard, with great satisfaction, from Admiral Blankett of your arrival at Jeddah on the 17th of April, and I am very happy to find that his Majesty's troops from India are under the command of so able and so experienced an officer.

I have thought it necessary to send my aide-de-camp, Major Montresor, who will give you intelligence of every thing that has passed in this country.

It is my intention to push forward towards Cairo, so as to keep the French troops there in check, and to prevent the possibility of their attacking you before you have formed your junction with the Grand Vizier. I have also written, and caused the Captain Pacha to write in the strongest manner to the Grand Vizier, to give you all the assistance required for the passage of the desert. I am afraid that you will find great, but I hope not insurmountable difficulties. The season is advancing—the hot weather is coming on, and, I believe, that you will find no water on the route; but I speak with extreme diffidence, as the minds of men in this country are so brutalized that it is impossible to get just information of the state and circumstances of countries which are even within a few miles' distance. I have a sanguine hope, however, that your troops, more inured to a hot climate than those immediately from Europe, may be enabled to bear up against the fatigues incidental to such a march as that across the desert naturally must be.

I mean to continue in my position near Cairo until I hear that you are in a state of security; it is then my intention to descend the Nile, and to besiege Alexandria in conjunction with the troops under the orders of his Highness the Captain Pacha. It is rather my present opinion that you should join yourself to the army of the Grand Vizier, and take the direction of military affairs with him. It will probably be necessary to besiege the citadel and forts of Cairo, which I do not think will be difficult, as we have found that the stone of this country being of a bad quality, and the masonry new, they do not resist cannon for any lengthened period. I must, however, think of procuring you the necessary heavy artillery for that purpose, as you cannot bring any across the desert, and I know the Grand Vizier has none, from having been placed in similar circumstances.

I shall not enter into further details, as Major Montresor, a very intelligent officer, and perfectly in my confidence, will give you every intelligence which you can desire, and much more than could be contained in the bounds of a letter.

I am glad to find that you are accompanied by my friend Colonel Wellesley, to whom I desire to be remembered in the kindest manner.

I suppose, as you are coming from a wealthy country, that you have brought your own means with you; don't hope to derive any assistance from us, for we are plunged in the most abject state of poverty; perhaps, in this respect, you may be able to assist us. If you could lend us ten or twenty thousand pounds it would be a great object. Every thing is in arrear, even the pay of the soldier. You know that this arises from most of the ports of Europe being shut against us.

I fear I shall be under the necessity of making requisitions on the country; I shall endeavour, however, to avoid this painful extremity as long as possible.

Colonel Wellesley being senior to Brigadier-General Oakes, now acting under my command, I suppose he also is to be a brigadier-general; I tell you this for your information, as I do not know how it may interfere with the regulations laid down in India, and whether there are any company's officers acting with you, of the rank of colonel, senior to him.

If I can be of any manner of use to you, I need not say that you may command me, and that you may believe me to be, with much regard,

Sir,

Your most obedient, and most humble servant,

J. H. Hutchinson.

Major-General Baird, &c. &c. &c.

To this General Baird sent an immediate reply, in which he informed General Hutchinson, that Admiral Blankett's opinion against attempting to proceed by sea to Suez was fixed and irrevocable, lamenting at the same time that the difficulties of effecting a junction by that means with General Hutchinson's army were rendered insurmountable by the lateness of the season. Under these circumstances, and under the advice of Sir Home Popham, in whom upon all occasions General Baird reposed the most perfect confidence, the general resolved upon sending off Colonel Murray, the quarter-master-general, to Ghennah, whence he would transmit the letter he was then writing, and that the colonel should either remain at Ghennah or proceed down the Nile, for the purpose of opening an immediate communication with General Hutchinson, and gaining from him every possible information.

According to this arrangement Colonel Murray quitted Kosseir for Ghennah, on the route towards which place General Baird had already established posts for nearly half the distance, at which he had directed the men to dig for water. Having fortunately succeeded in all the spots where they halted, the general was naturally encouraged to push forward by corps, and on the 19th, the first body of troops began the march, having been delayed by the unsoundness of the mussacks or bags in which they were to convey their water.

Just as General Baird was closing his despatch

to General Hutchinson, announcing this movement, and expressing his zealous determination to effect a junction with him as speedily as possible, he received the following letter from that officer.

Head-quarters, Camp near Aksas,
3rd June, 1801.

SIR,

I SEND you this letter by one of Osman Bey's mamalukes: Osman Bey promises every assistance in his power, and I dare say will keep his word. He joined our army three days ago with about a thousand cavalry. We march to-morrow and shall arrive at the head of the Delta on the 7th instant; I mean to besiege the Citadel of Cairo as soon as ever the Turks arrive. The Grand Vizier's army acts on the other side of the rirer; we shall be enabled to assemble a considerable force, and I do not believe that the works of the enemy are very formidable.

There is some difficulty in bringing up the heavy cannon, on account of the present low state of the river; the French have about 5,000 men in Cairo, and Gizeh, and probably near the same number at Alexandria; General Coote occupies an entrenched camp in front of that town, with about 5,000 men; should the enemy not receive reinforcements they will find it hardly possible to continue the contest. We took from them in the course of the last month 1,600 men; some of their best troops; and we are in possession of the whole country but Cairo and Alexandria. I hope after you have once got over the desert, you will find your march an easy one. The country I understand is abundant, and boats are numerous. I do not suppose that the enemy will march into Upper Egypt, in order to oppose your progress; should they venture it, I

mean to march a strong corps of cavalry, and some pieces of cannon to your assistance. I hope you have received my letter of the 13th of May, which I forwarded to Admiral Blankett

I have sent camels to Suez, to bring up the detachments of the 86th regiment embarked on board the fleet; Lieutenant-Colonel Lloyd is to join the Grand Vizier's army, where I have also ordered three other British battalions. I shall be happy to hear from you as often as you conveniently can. I beg my best compliments to Colonel Wellesley. I hope you have brought money with you; for our part we have not sufficient even to pay the subsistence of the troops, nor is there much probability of our situation being bettered; this country affords no money resources, and our communication with England is extremely slow and uncertain.

The plague has by this time ceased in Upper Egypt; you had better, I think, be cautious about entering the villages, as there may still be a lurking remnant of the disorder in the country; it has been in our hospital at Rosetta, and I believe at Aboukir; there has been no appearance of it in this corps, and we are much more healthy than that which is stationary at Alexandria; indeed, I have observed that it is uniformly the case in all armies, and that fixed camps are very prejudicial to the health of the soldier.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Hely Hutchinson.

Major-General Baird, &c. &c. &c.

The contents of this letter were of a nature to increase General Baird's anxiety for despatch, and accordingly the troops destined for the advance began to move.

The corps which first started on this perilous enterprise, was commanded by Colonel Beresford, and as we have already expressed our conviction that every detail by which the progress of the expedition can be authentically traced, even to the most minute particulars, will be interesting in the highest degree, we do not hesitate to subjoin the following order of march, which was issued to the several officers in command.

You will march this evening to the new wells, distance ten miles, there fill your water.

22d. Half-way, if possible, to Moilah, distance 15 or 20 miles.

23d. To Moilah, distance 15 or 20 miles. There you will find water and provisions. You may halt a day there if you find it necessary.

24th. Half-way to Legeta; about 15 miles, no water.

25th. To Legeta, about 15 miles. Water and provisions.

26th. Half-way to the Nile, 15 miles.

27th. To the Nile.

The camels are not to be allowed to drink at the wells at Moilah; if it is necessary the camels should drink, they can have water at a short distance forward from Moilah, bullocks and asses must also be sent there.

Colonel Beresford thinks the best mode of marching, is fifteen miles at night, and five early in the morning, you, however, will judge for yourself. I would recommend marching the whole distance without halting, if you find your men are not too much fatigued.

You will give particular attention to the orders of the 19th instant, for your guidance on the march.

You will not issue more than one gallon of water per man, which may be given to them as soon as you arrive at your ground in the morning, but on no account is any to be distributed whilst on the march.

DESERT
OF
SUEZ
GULF OF SUEZ
Arabs of the Tribe Beny Ouasel
LOWER EGYPT
UPPER EGYPT
NILE
Cairo
Alexandria
Rosetta
Damietta
Suez
Memphis
Heliopolis
Pyramids
Sakkara
Fayoum
Lake Moeris
Lake Mareotis
Nile
Red Sea

The bags which leak most to be first emptied, and as your camp-kettles will not be wanted for cooking, water may be started into them from leaky bags whilst you halt.

As your route is discretional, you will of course be guided by any information Colonel Beresford may give you. He is directed to correspond with you.

General Baird, anxious to watch the first movement of the troops, accompanied the division to its first halting place, nearly twelve miles from Kosseir, and it was then discovered that a very great number of the bags had entirely emptied themselves through the leaks: a circumstance which the more alarmed him, because although the wells which had been dug, yielded water, it was still to be procured but in small quantities.

This misfortune operated dreadfully upon the movement of the troops: however, General Baird was compelled to forward the camels laden with water which were ready and intended for the second division, to Colonel Beresford, delaying of course the march of that division; but during all these harassing events General Baird never lost his presence of mind, nor seemed moved by the difficulties which surrounded him, declaring, even at the moment of this discomfiture, his conviction that he should eventually succeed, and that each division would have crossed the desert in nine days.

But the general had need of all his firmness. The accounts received from Colonel Beresford of the situation of the first division were most dis-

tressing. One hundred camels from the 10th regiment were immediately forwarded, fifty of which were laden with water. The general, under the circumstances, desired Beresford, when he arrived at Moilah, to halt there until further orders, and in the meantime to endeavour to ascertain the exact distance between that place and Legeta, and whether water was procurable at the latter; and if not, whether the plan which they had tried in other places, of digging for it, would be likely to succeed there, and in the event of that being the case, immediately to set working parties to sink wells.

The consideration for others, and the anxiety which he began to feel for the men under his command, operated upon General Baird's feelings in a way which no personal ill or inconvenience could have produced, and at the time the camels were pushed forward, to rescue the advance from the horrors of the most dreadful of deaths under a scorching sun, he sent to Colonel Beresford to desire him to communicate openly, fairly, and fearlessly his real opinions as to the ulterior practicability of the undertaking. He ordered the guns and tumbrils to be sent back, and gave directions to the head camel-man, whom he dispatched with them, to the effect, that if Colonel Beresford should feel convinced that the failure of the mussacks or water-bags had destroyed the probability of their continuing the march—a conviction which General Baird himself appeared apprehensive might be confirmed by the absolute

impossibility of getting the bags repaired or rendered serviceable—the advanced force should immediately fall back.

The general's solicitude for the men is well illustrated by the following extract from a letter to Colonel Beresford, written by Captain Molle, his aid-de-camp and secretary.

"One day's provisions were sent from camp last night, and forwarded by Captain Sturt, which the general trusts have reached you, and he has desired Colonel Quarrel immediately to forward you by the camels now sent, one half day's provision out of his own stock, if possible. The general suggests the expediency of moving on to Moilah as many of your sick and fatigued as there may be camels without burthen, and to desire Mr. Shubrick immediately to forward by them such supply of water and provisions as may be required till you reach Moilah. The general trusts you will husband the provisions at Moilah as much as possible—more will be forwarded in order to make up your consumption. You will order Mr. Shubrick to forward provisions to Legeta. Colonel Murray informs the general that water is to be had about four miles from Moilah, on the road to Legeta—good, but in small quantities; and that about seven or eight miles from Moilah, he found water at a place called Manah-har, and where plenty might be had by digging for. If this is possible, and sufficiency can be found, it would ensure the first stage from Moilah, as this does from Kosseir."

When the 10th regiment, and first company of sepoys began their march next night, it was discovered that their water-bags were in as bad a state as those of Colonel Beresford's division; in-

deed the loss was so great, and their efforts to secure the water so precarious, that they could not depend on more than twelve hours' supply. Under these circumstances, and seeing that it was impossible to march the army on foot across the desert, and equally impossible, under any circumstances, to transport the artillery, General Baird began to falter—not in his hopes—but in the certainty which till now he had felt of carrying his plan into execution.

At this period of our narrative it may not be amiss to give a brief account of the town of Kosseir, which has derived considerable interest from having been the landing-place of General Baird's expedition.

Count de Noé, who served in the expedition as an officer in the English 10th regiment of foot, published in 1826 a work called "*Memoirs relatifs a l'Expedition Anglaise de l'Inde en Egypte*," in which he says, speaking of Kosseir :—

"I shall never forget the deep impression of melancholy made upon my mind by the first sight of this desolate coast. Such barrenness, such solitude, such a total and wretched absence of every thing like verdure or foliage, except indeed in the shape of a few blighted date trees. The heart shuddered at the idea of even a temporary residence upon its arid shores.

"Kosseir itself is a miserable cluster of wretched hovels, built with shells and mud, yet it is nevertheless a port of considerable commercial impor-

tance; in fact it is the point of communication between Arabia and Egypt, and is the regular mart for the exchange of corn and other productions of the country, against the coffee of Mocha and the muslins of India. The town of Ghennáh is the general *entrepot*, and although several days' journey distant from Kosseir, is the source whence the latter derives all the necessaries of life.

"The water at Kosseir is exceedingly bad, and so bitter that even boiling does not correct it; but the merit of finding the springs—bad as the water is—is due to the soldiers of the 21st demi-brigade, under General Belliard; before their discovery all water consumed at Kosseir was brought over from Arabia. The fort which defends the place, and which was built by Generals Belliard and Donzelet, is so well masqued as to be entirely imperceptible to troops in their approach, until they are literally under its fire. In 1800 a detachment of English soldiers were landed here from H.M.S. Fox, who were repulsed with considerable loss and compelled precipitately to re-embark."

The account given by Bruce of this place, and the country between it and Ghennah, is even more unfavourable than that of the count. "Our road," says he, "was all the way on an open plain, bounded by hillocks of sand and fine gravel, perfectly hard, and not perceptible above the level of the plain country of Egypt. About twelve miles distant there is a ridge of mountains, of no considerable height, perhaps the most bar-

ren in the world—between them our road lay, through plains near three miles broad, but without trees, shrubs, or herbs; there are not even the traces of any living creatures, neither serpent nor lizard, antelope nor ostrich, the usual inhabitants of the most dreary deserts; there is no sort of water on the surface, brackish or sweet; even the birds seem to avoid the place as pestilential, not having seen one of any kind so much as flying over. The sun was burning hot, and upon rubbing two sticks together, in half a minute they flamed."*

His description of starting on the march is highly graphic:—"When all was ready, the whole party, at a funeral pace, slowly advanced into the gloomy region of the desert. There was nothing in the prospect to excite the energies of the mind, or to arouse the feelings. Men, and camels, and horses, drooping as they went, seemed alike to be aware, that the courage they had now to exert, was only of the passive description—all that was required of them was to suffer! Anger, hatred, and other revengeful feelings, which, like brandy, too often make men careless and insensible to danger, afforded them no such excitement—they had not the savage pleasure of contending with human beings—the burning sand,

* Vide Life of Bruce, Murray's Family Library, No. 17, p. 90.

and the burning sun, it was out of their power to injure."*

The wilds of Egypt are inhabited, or to speak more correctly, traversed successively by bands of Arabs, known by the distinctive name of Bedouins, who again are subdivided into numerous tribes. They are thieves by profession, and are in themselves the strongest possible living proofs of the existence of honour among that fraternity. The striking point of character amongst them, is that of defending to the death any one once under their protection, either from having purchased their services, or from having been led by accident to their dwellings, and partaken of their hospitality.

They levy tributes on the caravans which pass through their territories; and woe be to those who should refuse to pay. They possess great numbers of cattle, horses, and goats. Their dress consists only of a linen shirt, with large sleeves, which descends to their heels, and over that a black or white woollen jacket. They occasionally throw a shawl across their shoulders, and wear turbans, the under part of which consists of a handsome crimson cap. Always mounted either on horses or dromedaries, of which the fleetness is proverbial, they are constantly armed with fusils and pistols, sabres, and sometimes spears. They are the self-constituted proprietors of the wells,

* *Ibid.*

near which their camps are pitched, a circumstance which renders it impossible for the caravans that cross the desert to escape their exactions.

Kosseir, however, if not fertile on its surface, contains some hidden treasures. Bruce says, "it has been a wonder among all travellers, and myself among the rest, where the ancients procured the prodigious quantity of fine marble with which all their buildings abound. That wonder now ceases; after having passed in four days, in the neighbourhood of Kosseir, more granite, porphyry, marble, and jasper, than would build Rome, Athens, Corinth, Syracuse, Memphis, Alexandria, and half-a-dozen such cities."

We have devoted some space to these accounts, because they serve to illustrate the progress of the gallant subject of our memoir, and enable the reader to form some opinion of what he and his gallant army were doomed to undergo. Only let it be recollected, that in addition to the hardships, the exertions of mind and body, the fatigues and vexations, and the hopes and disappointments incidental to his elevated and responsible situation, General Baird had to endure all the other afflictions so sensitively described by De Noé and Bruce.

Think, too, what must have been General Baird's feelings on the discovery of the failure of the conveyance for water, by which his whole arrangement would be destroyed, and the expe-

dition in all probability itself terminated; add to this another serious evil which he experienced, and which he describes in a letter to General Hutchinson, dated from the New Wells, (to which place he had gone forward,) arising from the misinformation which he almost invariably received as to the relative positions of places on the route—distances estimated by the natives at twenty miles, almost always proved to be double that amount—in some instances more; so that he found the calculations which he had made, not only as regarded time, but in estimating the number of camels requisite for the performance of the journeys on different days, all erroneous.

With his mind full of these distracting difficulties, but with a firm heart and an unshaken resolution, General Baird, having despatched Colonel Murray's detachment, returned to Kosseir, on the evening of the 22d of June.

CHAPTER XVII.

GENERAL BAIRD TAKES NEW PRECAUTIONS — REPORT OF A LARGE FRENCH FORCE AT CAIRO — GEN. BAIRD'S DETERMINATION THEREUPON — STAFF OF THE ARMY — ARRIVAL OF THE WASP — LETTERS FROM COLONEL WELLESLEY — MEMORANDUM — SIR HOME POPHAM'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FLEET—GENERAL BAIRD QUITS KOSSEIR — ARRIVES AT MOILAH—DISTRESSES OF THE MARCH — COUNT DE NOÉ —LEGETA — GHENNAH—CONTINUED SILENCE OF GENERAL HUTCHINSON—GENERAL BAIRD'S ANXIETY—LETTER FROM ADMIRAL BLANKETT — SURRENDER OF CAIRO — GENERAL BAIRD RESOLVES UPON HALTING, AND PREPARES TO RE-EMBARK THE ARMY — DESPATCHES FROM GENERAL HUTCHINSON — MAKES PREPARATIONS FOR MOVING FORWARD TO JOIN THAT OFFICER.

WHILE General Baird continued busily occupied in making the necessary preparations for the march, the perils and difficulties of which seemed awfully to increase in number and magnitude as he approached them more nearly, in repairing the mischief which had already occurred to the mussacks, upon which so much, in fact everything, depended, and in providing against a recurrence of similar misfortunes, his active mind had been employed in endeavouring to turn to advantage some intelligence which he had, as he believed, exclusively obtained from an

Arab, that there was a force of fifteen thousand French troops and ten thousand Greeks and Copts in the neighbourhood of Cairo.*

It appeared quite possible to General Baird that supposing that to be the case, a large detachment of troops might be pushed forward from Cairo to Ghennah by the Nile, in order to check his progress, long before any intelligence of their movement could reach him from General Hutchinson; and considering the practicability of such a measure, he consulted Sir Home Popham as to the expediency of deferring the march of his forces on to Ghennáh until he should be reinforced by European troops; since the detachment which was to advance under Colonel Murray amounted to no more than seven hundred men.

Finding it impossible to communicate with Admiral Blankett, as he very much wished, by an overland dispatch to Suez, on account of the wars in which the different tribes of Arabs, in all directions, round that place, were engaged, Sir Home Popham, at his solicitation, put a fast-sailing vessel at General Baird's disposal, by which the General forwarded the important information which he had received. "Indeed," says the general, in a letter to Lord Wellesley, "I feel myself highly indebted to Sir Home Popham for his ready assistance and cordial co-oper-

* To ordinary readers, the importance attached to the supply of water may appear somewhat over-rated, but it is an established fact, that if General Baird had not, with his inherent foresight, caused wells to be dug at the halting-place on the road to Moilah, every man of the advanced detachment would have perished in consequence of the failure of the mussacks.

ation on this, and on every other occasion; his zeal for the service is so great, that he determined to accompany me to Ghennâh with a body of seamen, in order to assist us in making our arrangements for embarking on the Nile."

After Admiral Blankett's arrival, and that the communication between Generals Baird and Hutchinson was opened, and the falsehood of the story told by the Arab respecting the French and Copts force established, General Baird determined to lose not a moment in pushing forward, to cross the desert and effect a junction with the English army; at the same time, with a view to the ulterior operations projected against the Isles of France and Bourbon, so constantly remembered, and so frequently referred to by him, he wrote to Mehedi Ali Khan not to purchase any additional camels or horses at Jeddah, but on the contrary, to dispose of those which he had already bought, to the best advantage.

But when General Baird had, by every possible care and activity, overcome the leading difficulties which presented themselves in opposition to the march, a new misfortune assailed him. The troops that had advanced under the command of Colonel Beresford and the other officers, were attacked with a dreadful dysenterial complaint, brought on by the badness of the water, the heat of the weather, and the exertion of marching in such a climate over such a country, after a long confinement on ship-board, where indeed, their food (consisting necessarily,

almost entirely, of salted provisions,) had not a little contributed to render their constitutions more susceptible of the malady which so severely assailed them.

Under these circumstances, and as Sir Home Popham, in consequence of orders issued by Admiral Blankett, was unable himself to accompany General Baird, and as the general became more and more convinced of the great difficulty of moving Europeans, he declined taking any of the seamen from the ships. Seamen on shore, unless commanded by their own officers, and those officers accustomed to act with troops, are seldom very efficient.

Another source of uneasiness to General Baird was, the extraordinary delay in the arrival of the detachments under Colonel Wellesley and Colonel Champagné, the hopes of a junction with which he now was compelled, at least for that season, to abandon. To wait any longer on their account would have been an unjustifiable waste of time, because under the circumstances the period of such a delay must have been indefinite; and accordingly the general made up his mind to try the result without the aid and co-operation of that re-inforcement, for which he had been so long and so anxiously looking out.

As many of the names of the officers composing the staff of this gallant force under General Baird have since become familiar to the ears of their countrymen, we think it may not be unacceptable to give them as they stood on the 24th of June 1801.

Major-General Baird, His Majesty's 54th Regiment, Commander-in-chief.

Colonel Samuel Auchmuty,* H. M. 10th Foot, Adjutant-Gen.

Colonel John Murray,† H.M. 84th Foot, Quart.-Mast.-Gen.

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* Colonel Auchmuty entered the army in 1776, as a volunteer in the 48th Foot, and received an ensigncy in the following year. He was shortly after made Lieutenant, and served in the actions of Brooklyn and Whale-plains. He exchanged, and went to India, where he served from 1783 to 1796, having obtained in 1795 the Majority of the 75th Foot. In 1801 he went from the Cape to Egypt, with troops, and the rank of Adjutant-General to the army. He afterwards served in South America, and took Monte Video in 1807, and held the command of the army until the arrival of General Whitelock. In 1810 he was appointed Commander-in-chief at Madras, and obtained a complete victory over the Dutch, the result of which was the capture of the Island of Java. In 1813 he returned to England, and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. He also received the thanks of Parliament, a medal for the capture of Java, and was made a Knight Grand Cross of the Bath. Sir Samuel was afterwards appointed Commander of the Forces in Ireland, where he died in the year 1823.

† Colonel John Murray, a native and Baronet of Scotland, entered the army in 1788, and served in the campaigns in the Netherlands in 1793 and 1794, during which he was aid-de-camp to Marshal Freytag, and subsequently to His Royal Highness the Duke of York. In May 1794 he obtained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He was at the capture of the Cape, and proceeded with a division of troops to Egypt, where, in 1801, he acted with the rank of Colonel, as Quarter-Master-General to Sir David Baird's army. He afterwards commanded the Bombay division at Poonah, and subsequently the British army during the wars with Scindiah and Holkar. In 1805 he attained the rank of Major-General, and from that period till 1808 was on the staff of the Eastern District in Great Britain. In 1808 and 1809 he commanded the King's German Legion

Major L. Macquarie,* H. M. 77th Foot, Deputy Adj.-Gen.
Major S. Wilson, 2nd Reg. Bombay N. I., Persian Interpreter.
Captain H. Falconer, H. M. 71st Reg. Deputy Quarter-Master-General.
Capt. George Molle, Scotch Brigade, Sec. and Aid-de-Camp.
Capt. George Tucker, H. M. 22nd Foot, Major of Brigade.
Capt. W. Cox, H. M. 68th Reg. Assist. Quarter-Mast.-Gen.
Lieut. White, H. M. 13th Lt. Dragoons, ditto, ditto, ditto.
Lieut. T. Budgeon, H. M. 84th Reg. Addit. Aid-de-Camp.
Dr. W. R. Shapter, Inspector of the Hospitals.
Mr. J. Foreman, Surgeon to the Forces.
Mr. R. Moss, Purveyor to the Forces.
Mr. J. Paterson, Field Apothecary.
Mr. J. Rice, Hospital Mate.
Mr. T. Price, ditto.
J. Ryder, Esq. Paymaster to the Bengal Troops.
T. White, Esq. ditto, ditto.

On the 24th of June we find, by a letter to General Hutchinson, that General Baird had, by great exertions, completed such arrangements about the

under Sir John Moore and Sir Arthur Wellesley, and shared in all the actions which led to the expulsion of Soult from Portugal. In May 1809 he was appointed Colonel of the 3rd West India Regiment. In 1811 he became Lieutenant-General, and served with Lord William Bentinck; he was afterwards appointed to command the Anglo-Sicilian army in Catalonia, where, being compelled to raise the siege of Tarragona, he was obliged to retire with the loss of his artillery. For this failure he was tried and found guilty of an error in judgment; he was, however, subsequently appointed Colonel of the 18th Foot, a Knight of the Red Eagle of Russia and of St. Januarius, and a Grand Cross of the Guelphic Order.

* Major Lachlan Macquarie, after a long career of service, became Governor of New South Wales.

provisions and water as made him, as he says himself, "again sanguine in his views." The bags had been repaired, and rendered, as he hoped, serviceable; and on the 24th the General issued the following order, from the tenor of which it appears that some persons, who had neither his perception nor his perseverance, had suggested the absolute necessity of using casks on the march, instead of what no doubt appeared to them the more fragile and precarious receptacles for water, which, besides their general inefficiency, had, in the present instance, given signs of uncertainty and insecurity.

"I have," says the General, "very attentively considered every mode by which water can be carried across the Desert, and can devise no means *in our power*, except with casks or puckallies (mussacks). As to the former, I am now convinced that even if we had small casks, (which we have not,) and they could be slung between two camels, or on the camel's back—both of which modes I have endeavoured to adopt, with larger ones, without success—the plan would not succeed. If a corps with casks were to move from the wells, the next morning, the water of many of the casks would be consumed, and the empty casks exposed to the sun and land-wind during the whole of that day, would be so warped that they would be unserviceable at Moilah.

"Casks, therefore, would not answer, and we must either trust to the puckallies or find water on the desert, or re-embark.

"To-day's march of the 88th will decide the first

point, and if it is possible to carry water, it should be done in this way.

" The 88th should take their bags on to Legeta, and after the next day's march thence, send them back to Legeta, for the next corps.

" The 10th should take their bags to Moilah, and after the next day's march send their bags back to Moilah, for the next division. The artillery, increased to a hundred puckallie camels, should take their bags one day's march to the wells, and send them back. By these three divisions of bags the whole army could, in succession, be supplied. Careful steady men should be appointed to each division, and the principle should be well explained to every body. A European officer should also go with each division of puckallies.

" If the puckallies will not answer, and the 88th get on to Moilah, a company should be sent to clear the wells, seven miles from Moilah, and two companies should be sent half-way from that towards Legeta to dig wells, and, as fast as they find water, more companies should follow.

" In the same manner, the 10th should send two companies half way to Moilah, and endeavour to dig wells.

" If water is found at these stations, the 88th must halt at Legeta, and send on two companies to dig wells between that and Ghenné.

" The sepoys at the stations may go and assist, and the two companies at Legeta should immediately begin between that and Ghenné."

On the 27th of June, the day fixed for General Baird's departure from Kossier, His Majesty's sloop Wasp arrived from Bombay, bringing intelligence that Colonel Wellesley was prevented by serious illness from quitting that presidency. In a letter to General Lake, General Baird expresses his sincere regret at the absence of "that able and experienced officer" on the occasion, and trusts that his recovery may soon take place.

By the Wasp, General Baird received several letters, public and private, from Colonel Wellesley himself, which, for various reasons (independently of the general feeling of interest attaching to the names connected with them) are so important in themselves, in relation to the Egyptian expedition, that it would be something like sacrilege to mutilate them; we therefore make no apology for giving them entire.

We begin with Colonel Wellesley's public letter of the 9th of April, a few days (as the reader will recollect) after General Baird's departure from Bombay.

Bombay, April 9th, 1801.

SIR,

I have the honour to enclose a letter from Captain Moore, the garrison store-keeper of Bombay, which will explain the arrangements which have been made at this Port to complete the supply of provisions to me for six months for the Europeans and natives embarked. Besides the supply noticed in the inclosed letter to have been sent, there is a farther supply on board the other ships despatched from hence, and one will sail in a few days for the

troops on board the Wellesley, London, Experiment, Ann and Maria, Hydra Grab, and Fancy Brig, of the amount of which Captain Moore will apprise you in due course.

I likewise inclose a packet containing the invoices and bills of lading of treasure sent for the service of the armament when I had the honour of commanding it. Inclosed is the receipt of Mr. Rider, the Paymaster, for the treasure on board the Experiment, which he has carried to account.

I have the honour to inclose a packet of papers and returns relating to the armament, the nature of which their titles will explain. In obedience to your orders, I despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Capper to Sir Ralph Abercromby on the 7th instant, with a letter, of which a copy is inclosed.

I have the honour to inclose copies of the Orders which I have signed for money received from the Pay Office at Bombay since your departure. When all the troops will have gone from hence, I propose to take up all the vouchers, and to forward them to Mr. Rider, and to give the Paymaster-General at Bombay a receipt according to the form inclosed.

I beg leave to refer you to my private letter of this date for a statement of the reasons which have prevented me from joining you.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect,
Your most obedient humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The following is another public letter, of a date two days later.

Bombay, April 11th, 1801.

SIR,

I have the honour to inclose a letter from Captain Moore, giving an account of the provisions which have

been embarked in some of the ships in this harbour. I likewise inclose a letter from Colonel Champagné; and a copy of a letter which I have written to the Governor of Bombay upon the subject of the mode of settling the account of the money received from the Paymaster-General since the departure of Mr. Rider and yourself. This mode appears well calculated to insure the satisfactory settlement of the account without the risk of the loss of the vouchers. If it should meet with your approbation, I request that you will order Mr. Rider to transmit his receipt to the Paymaster-General in Bombay, as soon as certified copies of the vouchers, as proposed in the inclosed copy of my letter to the Governor, will reach him.

I have the honour to inclose accounts of the sums of money which have been received from the Paymaster-General under authority from me since I wrote to you last.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect,
Your most obedient humble servant,
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The next is a private letter from Colonel Wellesley to the General, which does so much honour to the manly straight-forward feeling of one party, and the high character of the other, that we are quite sure it will be read with pleasure and admiration.

Bombay, April 9th, 1801.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

The first circumstance I have to detail to you is the state of my health, which is indeed the cause of this letter. I have had no fever since I saw you, but I am sorry to say that the breaking out of which I complained, is worse than it was, and has become so bad as to induce Mr. Scott to order me to begin a course of nitrous baths. This reme-

dy, exclusive of the disease itself, is sufficient to induce me to be desirous to wait at least rather longer than the Susannah will, if not to give over all thoughts of joining you.

I do this, I assure you, with reluctance, notwithstanding that I think it very probable that I shall soon hear of your being recalled; however, considering that circumstance, and the bad state of my body, and the remedy which I am obliged to use, I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment.

As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived regarding going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment. I need not enter farther into this subject than to intreat that you will not attribute my stay to any other motive than that, to which I have above assigned it; and to inform you, that as I know what has been said and expected by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude, by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct.

I shall stay here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round to Madras, and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate.

The Maria Louisa is unable to go on at present, and the 80th will sail by Saturday in the Morad Bey, 150; the Nelson, 70; the Dundas, 70; and about seventy followers distributed in the three ships. They will have six months provisions of every thing, even of meat. The

Asia would have been taken up for this detachment, according to your desire, only that she is dismasted, and wants copper on her bottom, and the owners were desirous that she should go into dock, if only for three days, before she should take her departure for the Red Sea. This operation, however, and the equipment of her with masts, &c. was likely to take more time than will be lost by the slow sailing of the vessels above-mentioned, and I therefore preferred them, and they will be ready immediately.

I inclose the memorandum upon your operations, and I refer you to my public letter for other matters. Wishing you every success, believe me,

My dear General, ever yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The memorandum to which Colonel Wellesley alludes in the above letter, and which was an inclosure in his despatch, we also lay before the reader.

Memorandum on the Operations in the Red Sea.

The object proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor-General, in the expedition to the Red Sea, are—First, to get possession of the forts and posts which the French may have on its shores. Secondly, to urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence hostilities against them. Thirdly, to assist the operations of the natives, by giving them arms and ammunition, or by a junction with them, either of a part or of the whole of the force.

The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez that that object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last, under the orders of Admiral Blankett, may have succeeded in effecting the

objects in view when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez.

Cosseir will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.*

The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate those operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here; and I shall now proceed to the consideration of the second object of the expedition, viz. to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke, and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is evident, will operate most forcibly in favour of Sir Ralph Abercromby; and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced to believe, that after the Turkish army was beat by Kleber, in March last, and after Colonel Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt.

He is now stationed there, and from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt, which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Cosseir. It is probable, that when Sir Ralph Abercromby commences his operations, they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt, and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his own sense of his own interest may point out.

* It may be as well to observe, that Kossier is frequently spelt Cossier and Cosire, and Ghennah or Ghenné equally often used for Kennah, Kenné, or Kené.

I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes, and certainly, till the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English, and shewed his power of doing injury to the French by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army under Dessaix in pursuit of him.

It is probable that he does not deem his tenure of Upper Egypt very secure; he must be aware that as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their engagement with him, and from his own experience of their fidelity in adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed, the fact that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey's army, is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him; and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect, that as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail to exert it to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence. Without being too sanguine, we may expect then that as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt, he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason, the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him; his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him, and he ought to be urged in the strongest manner to exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him; their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him; and finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a

part or the whole of the army in the Red Sea, in order to insure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

The possession of the Port of Cosseir, and of the navigation of the Red Sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favourable to the English.

The trade in corn is carried on by this Port to Jedda in Arabia; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and to Arabia (and to Mecca in particular), that it may be expected that the Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to a consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz. to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cosseir at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the Desert; they are certainly great, but I imagine not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army or detachment which will cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile when they reach them, if they should be certain of having water only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great that the operation ought not to be attempted. It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt

can be neutral in the contest in contemplation; they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and probably some forage; and it is needless to point out, that if the Desert is to be crossed under those circumstances, care must be taken not only to send with the body of troops which will cross, a very large proportion of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle, a number much larger than the Governments of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply; but there is another consideration connected with this subject besides the supply of the cattle, and that is, the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

Upon this point I need only call to the General's recollection the difficulties to which he has been a witness in moving large supplies of stores and provisions even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, well supplied with water, and under every advantage of arrangement in the supply, in the distribution, the care, and the food of the cattle, and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But that is not the worst that is to be apprehended; the cattle will of course land in weak condition, in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state before they commence their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion, that if the

Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the Desert.

This opinion the General will observe is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done; but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve, if they do not return immediately, and upon the inutility of the measure if they do.

It may be imagined that (supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering,) if an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength (not of our weakness) will induce them to come forward, and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it, and to join the French.

But those who will urge this consideration, must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this their history from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will shew to be impossible.

I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke, and to co-operate with us. The first point for the General to ascertain is, their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he will have ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the Desert where it is most wanted, and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile; and he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish

a post at Ghennah, and, if possible, another in the Desert between that place and Cosseir, in order to insure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah, he should make the depôt of his stores, &c. which might be brought across the Desert by degrees, and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

In the consideration of the question regarding the crossing of the Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that operation by the enemy, because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who will cross the Desert.

I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they will have shewn their sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent.

A. W.

Considering the place which its illustrious writer fills in the world, this paper is both curious and interesting. As it turned out, however, General Baird's plans were arranged, and all his measures taken long before it reached him. Indeed, the advantages he possessed, derived from local knowledge, were of a nature to gain no improvement by advice, however ably and distinctly given at a distance from the scene of operation.

Colonel Wellesley's anxiety with respect to the success of the expedition, appears to have been unmitigated by the indisposition which prevented his sharing its perils and its honours. He availed himself of another delay in the sailing of the ships, again to write to General Baird, and the following closes the series of letters which he despatched by the Wasp.

Bombay, April 13, 1801.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

The detention of the ships till this morning has given me an opportunity of sending you a farther report on the provisions sent from hence. You will observe from that report, that Major Bell has a tolerably large quantity of provisions, besides what he brought here. Allowance ought also to be made for about one hundred and fifty natives, taken out and drafted from the Rockingham, which of course leaves a larger share of provisions for those who remain.

I am sorry to tell you, that the Dundas and the Nelson are so small, and have so little capacity to hold provisions and water, that there is not a supply of the latter for more than four months on board of each of those ships. The Morad Bey, however, has provisions and water for six months, as indeed have the two others a supply of provisions for the same time.

Believe me, my dear General,

Yours most sincerely,

Major General Baird. ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I must inform you, that none of the ships have their full quantity of rice; the reason is, that rice is scarce at Bombay, and as I knew there was in the fleet about 10,000 bags of rice, I did not wish to press to have a large quantity taken hence.

The day after the arrival of the Wasp, General Baird sent off a despatch to Marquess Wellesley, expressive of his regret at being deprived of the valuable services and advice of his lordship's brother; at the same time stating, that he felt more sanguine of success than he had for the last few days. In that despatch he refers the Marquess to the numerous details of distress and difficulties contained in various letters which he was daily receiving from the officers in command of divisions and corps in advance; but his hopes were cherished in consequence of the almost unvaried success of his expedient of digging for water, wherever a probability of finding it existed.

In this despatch the General reiterates the high opinion he had previously expresed of the zeal and ability of Sir Home Popham, from whom we believe, just before his departure, he had received the following observations with respect to the Nile, on which it was General Baird's intention to embark the army, as soon as it had crossed the Desert. The information contained in this document is curious, and as it may afford serviceable information at some future period, we give it as we find it; more especially as it is calculated, whatever other advantages may be derivable from it, to illustrate the manifold difficulties which combined to assail the General on every side, and the caution, prudence, and resolution which it required to combat, and as it proved, overcome a combination of opposing obstacles to the attainment of his object.

"The accounts of the winds and currents of the Nile," says this paper, "vary so very materially, that it is impossible to calculate the precise time it will require for the army to move from Cosseir to Cairo; but taking for granted that this monsoon prevails there, which is the rising of the Nile, boats will have a favourable current, but a strong wind to contend against, and will in all probability require twenty days from Ghennah to Cairo. If, after their service can be dispensed with at Cairo, they should be enabled to sail during this monsoon from Cairo to Ghennah, they may make the passage in eight days; but if they are delayed till the ensuing monsoon sets in, it will take them in all probability twenty-eight days to accomplish their voyage. This applies to the water conveyance of the Nile; but if that is not to be procured, a calculation must be made of the march, which can certainly be done by information from the most intelligent Arabs; and from what I have learnt on the subject, it will require thirty-five days to go from Ghennah to Cairo. Wishing to ascertain as nearly as possible the time necessary to move the troops from Cosseir to Cairo and to return, I have taken these different suppositions as so many data from which I shall endeavour to produce the object of enquiry; and after hearing General Baird's views subsequent to his reading this paper, I shall be better enabled to make arrangements for the future conduct of the fleet.

"Taking the quickest and most dilatory passage, as well as the mean passage, it is evident that the army cannot reach Cairo in less than twenty-nine days; and if, on their arrival, there is no occasion for their services, they must halt several days less probably, if they can procure boats, than if obliged to march; but in any case it is fair to give a week for the arrangements it will be necessary to make; and this, with the fifty-eight days to go and return will

make sixty-five.* And from what I see at present, it will be impossible for the army to quit this *in toto* till about this day week, probably later, which will bring their return to Cosseir to the beginning of September, without calculating on the casualties of delay to which an army in such a route must certainly be liable. The embarkation of them and their stores will also take some time, and bring the complete embarkation towards the middle of September, if it were possible for the ships to remain here so long.

"It is possible there may be some error in the theory of this calculation, as it is deduced entirely from information, and not from practical experience; but I dare say it is sufficiently correct to enable a judgment to be formed on the expediency of moving the troops from Cosseir when Admiral Blanket arrives, who is in possession of every information relative to the precise situation of General Hutchinson's army before Cairo. There will be then two bases to consider the embarkation of the army at Cosseir, its future operations, and the disposition of the men-of-war and transports in case the army moves forward. I shall at present confine myself to the latter case, as the other can easily be decided on, when circumstances make it necessary to take it into consideration.

* To Ghennah	8 days	
March to Cairo	35	
		43
Return.—Cairo to Ghennah	8	
To Kosseir	8	
		16
		59
Mean journey . . . . . days		29½
Kosseir to Ghennah		8
Ghennah by the Nile with this monsoon		20
Days		28

"The position of the ships in the present monsoon, and the situation of this bay in the ensuing one, are points of infinite moment and importance; and I am decidedly of opinion, that if the weather continues to blow as it has done for the last twenty-four hours, in three weeks not one-third of the ships will have an anchor or cable left. Two ships parted yesterday, and the Romney's second cable is very much chafed, and I think in the course of a month her cables will be so much strained, that it will be imprudent for her to go on either coast till the monsoon abates.

"This is a consideration in the present monsoon; but when the south-east one sets in, the road will be much more dangerous, and if it blows as hard as it does at present, lying here will be totally impracticable; indeed, if it should fly suddenly round to the south-east, or if we should have an easterly squall, I think most of the ships would be lost.

"The south-east monsoon is fairly set-in in September, and the Company never suffer their ships to remain at Suez after the 10th of August.

"From this it is evident, that if the army moves to Cairo, it cannot be re-embarked at Cosseir on account of the monsoon, consequently it will be necessary to consider how to dispose of the ships to the best advantage, consistently with the subsequent services in agitation for the army, the want of equipment in the different ships, and the provisions and supplies which will be at that time absolutely requisite for the army in its future operations.

"If it is determined to move the army to Cairo, they must return by Suez; and in that case, I see little probability of being able to carry on any further enterprize this year; but, certainly, advantage may be taken of the earliest time in the ensuing year, to prosecute the different objects pointed out by the Governor-General.

"By the journals I am in possession of, I think it possible for ships to beat down from Suez in December; the months

of September, October, and November, being the most violent for the southerly monsoon. But although I say the ships will be able to beat down in December, I do not mean that they should absolutely remain below till that month; on the contrary, I should propose, that the moment the decision is made to move the army to Cairo, the ships (except two or three to contain all the provisions now remaining, and two or three small cruisers which may move to Suez as soon as the monsoon abates,) should proceed to Bombay and Calcutta, and respectively quit those places in the month of August, with a complete and regular supply of every thing which may be necessary for the army, and such reinforcements as the Governor-General may think proper to send.

"The ships in this case will be at Suez by the end of September at the very latest, ready to supply the army with every thing it may want, and to take the earliest advantage of the abating of the monsoon, or its becoming sufficiently variable to allow the ships to proceed downwards, and commence their future operations.

"The troops, if they move to Cairo, and have any service to perform, if General Hutchinson thinks their presence necessary for a short time to give respectability to his force, cannot in that case well be at Suez till September, and if they are obliged to remain a short time for the transports, they will suffer little inconvenience from the climate at that season, and they will be plentifully supplied with provisions.

"Every argument urges the necessity of ordering the transports to Bombay and Bengal, if the troops move to Cairo; and no time ought to be lost in that respect in order to ensure their speedier return to Suez.

"What I have already said has reference more immediately to the army at Cosseir, as it is generally presumed to be morally impossible for the ships with the last division to

get up from Mocha; and, indeed, doubts arise in my mind whether the remainder of the ships at Jeddah will be able to accomplish this object. It however becomes proper to consider how far it may be expedient to negociate or enforce a landing of the troops at Mocha, as essential to their health, or to move them to Aden; in either case the ships will naturally attend upon them; and I do not think it absolutely necessary, on second consideration, for all the ships in Cosseir Roads to go to India; only a proportion to bring provisions and stores, and such reinforcements as General Baird conceives the Governor-General may be inclined to send him. But the whole of the ships should be moved as soon as practicable, to some harbour, probably Jeddah, to save their anchors and cables, and be ready to proceed to Suez when the monsoon abates, laden with bullocks and such other articles as the army may require, and the place produce.

"It is hardly necessary to say, that Le Sensible has but three weeks' salt provisions for her own complement, and not a biscuit on board.

"The Romney has about seven weeks' salt provisions, and three weeks' bread. The latter article can be obtained, or expedients devised in lieu of it, at least for a short time.

"As I have before observed, it is not my intention to say any thing at present on the subsequent operations, till it is determined to embark the army, and not go to Cairo, when I may probably trouble General Baird with my ideas on that head. The present ones have been written in vast haste, hurried probably a little by the weather last night, though it has been my intention, as well as it is my duty, as soon as I became a little acquainted with the subject."

On the 30th of June, General Baird quitted Kossier, and on the 1st of July took up his head quarters at Moilah, determined to move the army

with all possible expedition, having for that purpose entered into a negociation, the object of which was, that the camels, as soon as they arrived at Ghennah, should return direct to Kossier, without being stopped at any intermediate station.

A description of the march is given in a letter from Colonel Auchmuty, the Adjutant-General, to Colonel Montresor, dated Moilah, July 2nd, 1801. He says :—

The 10th marched from Moilah Wells, about five miles in front of Moilah, last night; and the artillery from hence to the wells this morning.

The 10th were met with by Lieutenant Warden, the Commissary of Stores, suffering greatly, and getting on badly. We are certainly in a sad scrape. We can hardly get forward or go back, and the prospect does not brighten; but we must not despair. Among many causes of uneasiness, is not hearing from Hutchinson. The General is much alarmed at it, and his plan now is, to push everything forward on the road to Ghennah, collect all the camels we can muster, (and I fear we shall not muster many,) and send them back to Kosseir until we get a letter—we must then finally decide.

In the mean time you must continue your preparations; order the cavalry to send aboard their painted cloths which are too weighty for their horses, order twelve camel loads of rice to Moilah; the camels to deposit their rice, and then to push forward with two Bengal companies to Ghennah.

These extracts will serve to shew the state of the expedition, which was traversing the sea of sand under the rays of the fiercest sun.

On the evening of the 3rd, the General removed from Moilah Wells, and reached Legeta, a distance of forty-one miles, on the 5th; and on the 6th, he arrived at Ghennah. Colonel Auchmuty describes Ghennah as being in some degree cultivated, that it produced figs and peaches, in which, together with "copious draughts" from the Nile, the nearly exhausted troops indulged themselves, full of gratitude to Heaven for the alleviation of their miseries.

There are some details given by the Count de Noé, in his work already quoted, which, as the narrative of the progress of the army given in this memoir is purely official, may be advantageously brought to the notice of the reader, as having been recorded by an officer whose duties did not interfere with the task of keeping a journal of the march, and from whose notes may be derived a fair and faithful account of the difficulties which he in common with the rest of the army was destined to undergo.

The Count de Noé, who, as we have already stated, held a lieutenant's commission in the English 10th regiment of foot, marched with his corps in the division under Colonel Beresford.

"At four o'clock in the afternoon," he tells us in his narrative, "we began to move from Kosseir; and at two o'clock on the following morning arrived at the first springs, sixteen miles from that place. During the whole of this dreary progress, not the smallest trace of vegetation was visible. It was only when we reached the station where the springs were, that we saw a few straggling stumps of

a plant, the leaves of which were round, and highly aromatic, resembling in appearance pieces of grey velvet. The water, without being exactly good," says the Count, " was better than that which we had left at Kosseir. We established ourselves in the valley, and rested ourselves under a steep and rugged rock, at the foot of which the springs were situated.

" Some of our rear-guard who had straggled, were obliged to increase their rate of marching, in order to come up with us; and to effect this object, they had ventured to brave the scorching rays of the sun, and all the miseries of excessive thirst. They at length rejoined us, but so exhausted by fatigue, that one of the party actually died in my tent soon after his arrival. We buried him at the foot of the rock.

" At this place we made a melancholy discovery; one of our officers having thought proper to climb up the side of the rock, was shocked by the sight of the corpses of five or six English marines, which the sun had completely dried up. They no doubt had belonged to His Majesty's frigate Fox, which had some time before landed some men at Kosseir; and, as we have already stated, received a very warm reception from the French.

" General Baird," continues the Count de Noé, " came to pay us a visit at this place, and told us that Colonel Beresford was in want of provisions and water. We immediately despatched as much of both as we could possibly spare, and sent them forward notwithstanding that our own stock was by no means abundant. The springs were nearly dry, and we were obliged frequently to wait till nature replenished them. In the midst of the suffocating heat, only two bottles and a half of water per man, per diem, could be spared. But our comrades at Moilah were in absolute want, and we did not pause for a moment to calculate the probability of any distress which might arise to ourselves,

but gave them all we could spare. Amongst the expedients which it occurred to me to try in order if not to quench, at least to allay my thirst, was that of carrying a small pebble in my mouth, which kept my tongue moist, and very materially alleviated the distress of the march."

This expedient was found so successful, that it was adopted throughout the English army, by order of General Baird.

Count de Noé proceeds to describe the difficulties they had to contend with, and the painful effects produced on their sight by the drifts of sand, and the powerful reflection of the sun upon it, and attributes the most beneficial properties to tea, the tonic qualities of which, while its grateful flavour overcame the bad taste of the water, he seems to think were highly conducive to strengthening the system against the deleterious attacks of the heat. Indeed, he declares it to be the very best beverage that can be used in crossing the Desert.*

It was on the 9th of July, that General Baird, growing daily more uneasy at not hearing direct from General Hutchinson, and still keeping in view the object for which the expedition had first been

* The sufferers from Ophthalmia have been so numerous, that it may not be unserviceable to observe that the Count de Noé states, that at the time when all his brother soldiers were labouring under the most violent attacks of that dreadful complaint, he never felt the slightest disorder in his eyes; a circumstance which he attributes with great probability to a precaution which he adopted of covering his face during the march, with a piece of green gauze, in the manner of a veil."

formed, addressed a letter to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, expressive of his anxiety to know whether his continuance in Egypt was likely to be productive of any beneficial results to the service; his natural solicitude for instructions being considerably increased by the fact, that so very much depended upon the period of the monsoon, whether he should be enabled (if he were not required to stay and co-operate in Egypt) to secure his return to India in time to carry into effect his other contemplated and favourite enterprize against Mauritius and Batavia.

General Baird, though disappointed and much disturbed by the long delay which occurred in receiving despatches, took every necessary precaution under existing circumstances; and although in consequence of his confident expectation of having free communication with Hutchinson, he had, as it were, cut off the retreat of his own advanced corps by sending back the camels to bring up the troops who were in the rear, his resources did not fail him; and finding the country as he advanced much better calculated for defence than he had anticipated, he made every arrangement that the nature of the ground admitted, to establish himself in force at Ghennah, so that, if any misadventure had befallen General Hutchinson (which his silence gave very plausible grounds for imagining), he should be able to oppose the enemy if they attempted to land a reinforcement at Alexandria.

In this state of perplexing suspense did General

Baird remain; day passed after day, and not a line from the General in command, by which he could form the slightest opinion of the actual state of affairs, till at length he received a letter from Admiral Blankett, containing a copy of a letter written to him by Major Holloway, in which he gave the Admiral the very important intelligence, that the Governor of Cairo, not thinking it prudent to make any resistance to the combined armies, had entered into a treaty with General Hutchinson.

The moment General Baird received, by this very circuitous route, intelligence so vitally important to the interests of his army, he was convinced that there could be no longer any cause for his farther advance, and still less for bringing up any more troops; on the contrary, feeling assured that their presence must be perfectly useless, he directed every preparation to be made for their return and re-embarkation at Kossier, although he did not think proper to begin to fall back until he had obtained something more official and satisfactory than a letter written by one officer to another, having received a copy even of *that*, at second hand.

Accordingly, he despatched an aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Budgeon, down the Nile to Colonel Murray, in order to ascertain from that officer whether it was not possible to open a direct communication with General Hutchinson, through which, even late as it must now inevitably be, he might receive something like authenticated information, and specific instructions. The only active measure General Baird took,

upon the strength of the news he had received, was that of discontinuing the entertainment of the Turks and Arabs, whom he had taken into his pay, and ordering them to be distributed in their respective neighbourhoods.

At last, however, the long-expected despatch arrived, the contents of which immediately decided General Baird's future proceedings. The following letter from General Hutchinson, dated the 10th, which is a reply to the despatch forwarded by General Baird to him by the hands of Lieutenant Budgeon, contains a full account of his proceedings and wishes, and is therefore given instead of that of the 5th, to avoid needless repetition.

Cairo, July 10th, 1800.*

SIR,

I have this morning received your communication by Lieutenant Burdon,† who deserves much credit for the diligence he has made use of. I have written to you frequently; I did not inform you of the surrender of Cairo, because from my letters I concluded that you were then marching towards me, and I did not think it advisable to stop your march, for two reasons—because I doubted the sincerity of the French, and, though the capture of Cairo may be an event decisive of the fate of Egypt, yet still I could not think myself justified in giving you orders which might be contradictory to the instructions of the Government; indeed, every thing that related to *you*, tended to embarrass me in a most extraordinary degree.

* General Hutchinson's letter is so dated by mistake for 1801.

† *Sic orig.*; the officer's name was Budgeon.

Before your arrival, we had nothing but an unauthenticated rumour of a force coming from India, which Sir Ralph himself did not believe; consequently I could not have any idea of your force, or of the time when you were likely to arrive. Your second destination was a matter of which I had never heard, and indeed, when you mentioned it in cypher, I was incapable of comprehending it, as I do not possess the key.

Lord Hobart's despatch, though he says but very little, has put the matter out of doubt, and it is clearly intended that you should march into the interior of Egypt, as it is specified that the sepoys are to compose part of the garrison of Alexandria. I should rather suppose, from the terms in which the letter is couched, that the remainder of the troops are destined for another service; but this is rather conjecture than otherwise, though I have little doubt that I am founded in my opinion, provided the siege of Alexandria should not take up too much time.

Menou has refused to receive the French officer who was sent by General Belliard to lay before him the capitulation of Cairo, of which his garrison might have availed themselves, as it is so stipulated by an express article of the treaty. He is likely to defend himself with great obstinacy, and certainly may give us a great deal of trouble. I should be extremely glad, therefore, to have your able assistance and co-operation. I am thoroughly aware, that from the season, and from the inundation, the march by land will be impracticable. You must do all you can to collect boats, but whether you should use force or not, is entirely out of the question, because, for the last thousand years force has been the only law in this country, and the inhabitants are so little used to think for themselves, that they are at a great loss how to act when it is not adopted against them.

Upon my part, I will do every thing in my power to

procure you boats, and have given Colonel Stewart, Commandant of Giza, directions upon this subject—but there are great difficulties in our way. We were obliged to furnish three hundred to transport the French baggage and sick; the Turks have seized on an immense number; our Commissariat and artillery occupy not a few. Upon this subject you had better apply to Osman Bey Perdicci; he knows the country, and I think will be active and diligent. There is a Frenchman with him, in whom I think you may place some kind of confidence.

In my last letter I gave you some intelligence of what was going on in the ports of France and Spain. They certainly have a great expedition in view, probably against Egypt; a reinforcement of six thousand men is ordered out to us, part of which is already arrived, and I have no doubt of receiving the whole in the course of ten days. The Government at home attaches at least as much importance to Egypt as it deserves—they appear to have set their hearts upon it, and are determined not to be foiled. I should wish you to advance as soon as you conveniently can, without pressing or fatiguing your troops. You may march by detachments; and let them be ever so small there can be no risk in making your general rendezvous at Giza, which I have occupied entirely for your convenience. You have only to intimate your wishes to Colonel Stewart, and every thing will be procured for you that this country affords.

The army marched yesterday, and will arrive at Rosetta about the 29th. From thence I shall proceed, without loss of time, to besiege Alexandria. I wrote you a letter, dated the 2nd or 3rd of this month, but it was detained for several days, and could not have reached you in course. The conveyance in this country is very uncertain; it is often tardy, and frequently *never* reaches the place of its destination at all. I have sometimes received your first,

second, and third copy at the same moment, and from the same messenger. Your last letter was three weeks on the road. I should recommend you either to send forward your Quarter-Master-General, or one of his department, to make preparations for you at Gizeh. I thank you very much for your offer of money, but we have no occasion for it, as we have received lately upwards of two hundred thousand pounds from England.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. HELY HUTCHINSON,

Lieut.-Gen.

The moment that General Baird was satisfied of General Hutchinson's wish that he should join him, and that a new prospect of active service opened upon his view, he proceeded instantly to push forward the troops, who were already in advance, and to bring up as rapidly as possible those who were in the rear.*

He directed Colonel Montresor, to whom he had entrusted the arrangements for moving the army,

* The route from Kossier to Ghennah is thus officially stated:

Kossier to the New Wells	11 miles.		Water may be had.
Half-way to Moilah	17	—	No water.
Moilah . .	17	—	Water and provisions.
Advanced Wells .	9	—	Water.
Half-way to Legeta	19	—	No Water.
Legeta . .	19	—	Water and provisions.
Baromba . .	18	—	Water.
Ghennah . .	10	—	The NILE.
	120		

to put them in motion without loss of time, having assured himself of their being well provisioned, not only from Kossier but from the depôts which he had established on the Desert; by having concentrated an adequate supply of camels for the carriage of water, by having had the mussacks repaired, and by having opened more wells in various places along the route. By thus taking advantage of the experience he had painfully acquired, he provided the means of saving his followers much of the toil and fatigue which he had himself undergone, and at the same time accelerated their progress in a manner most conducive to his own views, for the good of the service, and most in accordance with the wishes of General Hutchinson.

CHAPTER XVIII.

GENERAL BAIRD'S ANXIETY—FRIENDLY DISPOSITION OF THE INHABITANTS OF UPPER EGYPT—THEIR SINCERITY—RISING OF THE NILE—CHANGE OF PLAN—COLONEL CHAMPAGNE PROMOTED—COLONEL QUARRILL ORDERED TO MARCH TO GIRJEE—IMPRESSMENT OF BOATS—PROPOSITION OF COLONEL MURRAY WITH RESPECT TO THE ULTERIOR DESTINATION OF THE ARMY—FRUSTRATED—DESPATCHES FROM GENERAL HUTCHINSON—DISPOSAL OF THE TROOPS—TONNAGE OF VESSELS—GENERAL BAIRD EMBARKS FOR LOWER EGYPT—NOTICE OF GHENNAH—REGNIER—BRUCE.

GENERAL BAIRD'S mind being now freed from all anxiety, but that of proceeding, and all responsibility, except such as attached to the expeditious accomplishment of General Hutchinson's wishes, it might be supposed that he was destined to carry on the preparations for doing so, without any new accession of annoyances; but the difficulty of communication with General Hutchinson, the uncertainty of the conveyance and receipt of his letters, kept him in a continued state of anxiety.

On the other hand, it must be confessed, that in addition to the advantages so surely derivable from the system he had adopted, founded upon experience

and practical knowledge, he received great encouragement in his enterprise from the friendly disposition of the principal inhabitants of Upper Egypt, who exhibited every inclination to assist the army in its progress; but this apparent friendship was greatly deteriorated by an instability and carelessness of obligations quite natural, perhaps, in narrow minds, ignorant of the world, and under the domination of a Government corrupt in itself, and either unwilling or unable to correct corruption in its subjects. In promises, these people were as liberal as Portuguese politicians, but the just fulfilment of those promises, it was soon ascertained, depended very considerably upon the effect it would have upon their personal interests; and not unfrequently upon the possibility of their being able to do, what *in fact,* and in spite of their large professions, they never had it in their power to effect.*

* The liberality of profession on the part of the natives may be tolerably well appreciated by the following letter, addressed to General Baird on his arrival at Ghennah, by the Capidan Pacha.

"*His Highness Hussein Capidan Pacha, &c. &c. &c. to his friend General Baird, commanding a Corps of British Troops.*

"Having learnt that you are happily arrived at Ghennah with the troops under your command, and desiring nothing so much as to provide for the repose and welfare of British troops, we have selected Osman Bey Perdicci, (a Prince of Cairo, and who will join you with all expedition,) and have charged him with firmans, and orders written in Arabic, to facilitate the requisition and procuring of provisions and other necessaries, of

But although affairs looked thus prosperously, and the greater part of General Baird's army had succeeded in struggling across the burning sands of the Desert, with the loss of *only three men*, between Kossier and Ghennah, there were difficulties of another kind now threatening them in their front. The Nile had, during the last few days, risen so considerably, that the intention of marching by its bank, (a circumstance which, it must be evident, was of the greatest importance, inasmuch as upon

which you may be in want during your march, and when you halt. We therefore hope, that on his joining you, you will begin your march and proceed to us with as little delay as possible.

"With respect to us, having in concert with the English troops, our companions, and our dear friend General Hutchinson, and his Highness the Grand Vizier, laid siege to the City of Cairo, to Barlak and Gizeh, and having had some actions, the besieged, convinced that they ought not to resist our combined force, have offered to evacuate Cairo and its dependencies at the end of twelve days, on condition of being sent back to France with their arms and baggage, and they have begun by giving us possession of a fort, and one of the fortresses of Gizeh.

"As we proceed in fulfilling the terms agreed on, the French are employed in transporting their effects from Cairo to Gizeh, and on the Wednesday next of this present month, we shall take possession, God being willing, of the city and the different works that surround it.

"This letter is written in great haste, and hurried off for the purpose of communicating the above intelligence to you.

"*Head Quarters of His Highness Hussein Capidan Pacha,*

"*Before Gizeh, 28th Saphar,* 1216."

(Corresponding to 9th July, 1801.)

that route the essential difficulty of carrying water for the army would have been entirely obviated,) was necessarily abandoned.

This interruption to the arrangements of the General had been, as it will be seen, anticipated by General Hutchinson, who appears by his letter to have considered a march by the inland route out of the question; although dreadful as it appeared to him, and would appear to any one acquainted with the dreary waste of sand which it presented, that course was, in many respects, infinitely preferable to the trials which the same brave troops had already overcome.

General Baird, however, decided upon trying every possible means of conveying the army to Cairo by water; and besides forwarding a despatch to General Hutchinson, begging him to send him as many boats as he could procure, he adopted the General's plan of taking by force all those, which, notwithstanding their protestations of friendship, the natives would not voluntarily grant the use of, and sent out parties in various directions to press whatever vessels they could meet with. This measure was rendered absolutely necessary, not only by the importance of the object in view, but by the great demand for boats at this particular season of the year.

But with all his exertions, General Baird never, from the first, anticipated that he should be able to convey the whole army by the river. On the contrary, he was fully convinced that the means upon which, at the very best, he could calculate, would be

wholly inadequate to the purpose; he, therefore, determined to send the principal part of his guns and stores by water, and as many of the men as were least able to bear the fatigues of a land march as could be accommodated in boats, taking the best men, the cattle, and the remainder of the stores by the inland route; leaving a battalion of Bombay troops in Kossier and on the Desert, and another battalion at Ghennah, so as to keep up an easy and certain communication with the ships at the former place; in order the more effectually to do which, he caused the fort at Ghennah, which the French had (after having built it) dismantled, to undergo such repair as might render it serviceable.

Nothing could exceed the prudence and activity of the General, surrounded as he was by difficulties, and having only a variety of evils to choose from. If he delayed his departure from Ghennah, until he could receive an answer to his application from General Hutchinson, and ascertain from him what number of boats he might be able to send him, and if that number should prove insufficient, he would lose the possibility of using any part of the road along the bank of the Nile; whereas if he proceeded immediately to embark his forces in the boats, of which he was certain, it was evident that the greater proportion of the troops would be compelled to march for a very considerable part of the way by the inland route at all events.*

* The Nile, swelled by the rains which fall in Abyssinia, begins to rise in Egypt about the month of May, but the in-

About this period the General was reinforced by the arrival at Kossier, of four companies of the 61st regiment, Colonel Ramsay and two companies of the 80th, the horse artillery from Bengal, and the artillery and pioneers from Madras; but this addition to his gallant little army brought with it much mortification. The Susannah (the ship in which Colonel Wellesley was to have sailed) was lost on the passage, and the Rockingham, another of the store-ships, unfortunately had struck and was forced to remain at Jeddah. The Rockingham struck at eight o'clock in the evening of June 8th, 1801, upon a shoal which now bears her name; it lies eleven leagues from the Arabian shore, and has other shoals between it and the coast, and more dangers to the northward; the south part of the shoal is in lat. 20° 16′ W. and lon. 39° 39′ E. The coast of Cape Ibrahim, opposite to the shoal,

crease is inconsiderable until towards the end of June, when it is proclaimed by a public crier in the streets of Cairo, about the time it has usually risen five or six cubits; and when it has risen to sixteen, great rejoicings are made, and the people cry *Waffah* ALLAH! — that is, "God has given them abundance." This commonly takes place about the latter end of July, or at farthest before the middle of August, and the earlier it occurs, the greater the hopes of a good crop. In the year 1705; it did not swell to sixteen cubits, and the consequence was a general pestilence and famine.

In order to secure the advantage derivable from this irrigation, canals are cut at right angles with the river, which convey the water to places remote from its banks. Almost every town and village has one of these canals.

appears by the observations of the Rockingham, to be about 1° 50′ west from Gebel Tor.

To these mortifications were added, the protracted absence of Colonel Champagné, who was expected from Goa, and that of the provision ships long due from Bengal; while in minor matters, the General found himself contravened and inconvenienced by the *friendly* Mehemed Ali Khan, who had been making very extensive purchases of camels and horses, on account of the English army. He had made these purchases from the Sherriff, who would not permit anybody except himself to deal with him, and accordingly had sold him beasts of such a description, that out of one troop of forty-nine horses, which arrived in a dow, ten only were serviceable; and although he had *spared* him five hundred camels at his own price, of the first fifty which were delivered, seventeen only were alive, and of those seventeen not one was capable of doing any work.

We mention these circumstances, not as exhibiting any very serious obstacle to the completion of the great design of General Baird, but to show how constantly and how variously employed the mind of that man must have been, who, in addition to all the ordinary details of an extensive expedition, had to contend with difficulties of a nature which nothing but actual experience and practical knowledge could have rendered him adequate to encounter and overcome.

On the 24th of July, General Baird ordered Co-

lonel Quarrill with the 10th regiment to Girjee with all possible expedition. At that place, or coming from it, Colonel Quarrill was to meet Colonel Murray returning to command at Ghennah during the advance of the army, in company with Osman Bey, who had instructions to supply the troops during their march with provisions, according to the promise contained in the Captain Pacha's letter to General Baird; and who brought his orders for the supply of the army with meat, bread, salt, grain, and all other articles of provision from the different towns and villages.

A letter received by General Baird about this period from General Hutchinson, will serve to throw a little light on the character of this Osman Bey, and the carefulness and fidelity with which he executed the trust reposed in him, as well as the activity of his exertions in forwarding the service, the success of which, so materially depended upon the rapid and constant communication between the two Generals.

To Major-General Baird.

Head Quarters, Camp near Gizeh, July 13th 1801.

SIR,

I received your letters of the 22nd of June only three days ago, as they were near three weeks coming. The delay has been very vexatious, but, however, there is no relying on an Arab, or even on a Mameluke. Osman Bey Perdicci, kept my last letter *for you, five days, and then lost it!* The accounts you give of your own proceedings are very afflicting. I was always apprehensive that European troops would find difficulties almost insurmountable in passing the Desert.

I yesterday received despatches from Lord Hobart, dated the 19th of May. From their contents I am led to imagine, that should you not be able to penetrate into the lower part of Egypt, and form a junction with me, it will be a great disappointment.

In my last letter to you, I expresssd some doubts about bringing the sepoys forward, but from a paragraph in his Lordship's letter, it has now become absolutely necessary, as he expresses a wish that they should be left in garrison at Alexandria; and provided that it is not inconsistent with any stipulations entered into with them, I am directed to leave them as part of that garrison, whenever it shall fall into our hands.

I tell you this and what follows in the utmost confidence. There are *six thousand* men to arrive immediately from Europe, and after the final departure of the French from this country, we are ordered to rendezvous at Malta, there to wait for further instructions. I have no doubt, from the tone and tenor of the letter, that it is meant to employ the remainder of this army on some other service. I do not think of leaving above four thousand men behind in Egypt, so that I hope there will remain a considerable body of disposable troops. Should you not be able, however, to approach us, our calculation on the subject will be miserably defective.

We move from this the day after to-morrow, (15th July,) and shall reach Rosetta about the 29th or 30th. I leave six hundred men, under Colonel Stewart, as a garrison for Gizeh. You had better communicate with him as frequently as you can. I shall direct him to do the same by you.

I hear of nothing of any great importance. I am to congratulate you on succeeding to the command of the 1st battalion of the 54th regiment, by the death of General Frederick. Major-General Cradock has got the 2nd bat-

talion. His Majesty has been pleased to appoint me to the chief command of the troops in Egypt, with the rank of Lieutenant-General in the Mediterranean.

I have the honour to be with respect and regard, Sir,
Your faithful and obedient servant,
J. HELY HUTCHINSON,
Lieutenant-General.

P.S. I enclose a letter for Lord Wellesley, the Governor General, which I beg you will be pleased to forward as soon as possible. J. H. H.

This letter was not altogether agreeable to General Baird, inasmuch as he had never yet, during the operations in Egypt, lost sight of the ulterior, or rather, as we have before said, the primary object of his expedition; and, indeed, Colonel Murray, who had been at Gizeh, and was well acquainted with the actual state of the British force there, and the certainty of the speedy reduction of all obstacles in its way, had suggested to General Baird that when the Egyptian campaign was over, General Hutchinson would probably not only spare him adequate stores for his army, without the necessity of making a circuitous voyage back again to India and thence to Mauritius, but that he would allow him to take an additional regiment with him; for which, as Colonel Murray said, room might be made in the ships with a little crowding, and by sending the numerous female followers of the army back by some other conveyance. The announcement in General Hutchinson's letter of a totally different destination for

the whole of the forces, of course terminated all hope of assistance from him.

General Hutchinson about the same time also put an end to General Baird's expectations of seeing Colonel Champagné, whom he had so long looked for, by announcing that that officer had been appointed to the command of a regiment, and that his commission was actually filled up. This intelligence General Hutchinson forwarded under the belief that Colonel Champagné was then with the army. A similar promotion had been accorded to Colonel Ramsey, who had actually arrived.*

Colonel Quarrill was directed by General Baird, on his arrival at Girjeh, to inquire into the state of the roads and the inundations, upon which their practicability depends; and if he found that he could with safety proceed to Syout, or any town capable of furnishing adequate supplies for his detachment, he was to march thither and so proceed as rapidly as he could towards Cairo, taking care never to expose himself to the chance of being overtaken by the flooding of the Nile at any considerable distance from a large town.

He was farther instructed, if he found the roads impassable, to select some high ground, and wait the arrival of the river fleet with the commander-in-chief.

The service of pressing and otherwise procuring

* Colonel, now General Sir Joseph Champagné, who is Colonel of the 17th foot, received the Grand Cross of the Guelphic Order in February, 1832.

boats for the transport of the army, went on briskly, and much more successfully than had at first been anticipated; indeed so plentiful was the supply, that Colonel Quarrill was permitted, when he reached Girjeh, to keep a sufficient number for the conveyance of his regiment down the river. In order that he might form some estimate of the number he should require, he was informed by Colonel Auchmuty, the Adjutant-General, that the largest boats were capable of carrying one hundred and fifty men, three field officers, with the regular proportion of officers not of that rank, and their servants; that the next sized boats would carry one hundred and twenty men, and the smallest size, not including fishing-boats, thirty-five men each. The 88th regiment, consisting of five hundred and ninety men and officers with eight horses, occupied seven boats of these different sizes.

Every arrangement for the march of the force from Ghennah having been made, and Colonel Murray appointed to the command of the troops in Upper Egypt, and having received instructions to remain at Ghennah until the rear of the army should have come up and been forwarded to Gizeh, and himself to proceed with it, General Baird embarked for Lower Egypt on the 31st day of July.

A short extract from the work of M. Regnier may not here be unacceptable to the reader. He says:—

In Upper Egypt a chain of mountains present themselves to the eye of the traveller on either side of the Nile;

the valley between these mountains, through which the course of the river is directed, is nearly five leagues broad, which the periodical inundations of the river completely cover; this valley alone is inhabited and susceptible of cultivation. The eastern chain of mountains by which the Nile is separated from the Red Sea, surpasses that on the west in respect of height, terminating by precipices towards the valley, assuming in different places the appearance of an immense wall broken irregularly by narrow valleys, which have owed their origin to the sudden and temporary torrents of water, and serve as passes over these stupendous mountains. The western chain, by which the valleys of the Nile is separated from that of Oasis, has in general a gradual and gentle declivity, although it becomes more abrupt towards Syout, and is steep from the angle formed by the Nile towards Hennh till it reaches Syene, at which place the mountain has a more considerable height, affording but a narrow passage to the river.

The distance between these two chains of mountains is increased as you approach Cairo, the eastern chain terminating near the extremity of the Red Sea, without the appearance of any junction with the Arabian mountains, which have a similar termination. The western chain declines towards Fayoum, taking a north-west direction near Grand Cairo, and forming the Mediterranean coast in a direction to the west. Lower Egypt lies between these two great chains of mountains and the sea, which has most probably been formed, at least in a great measure, by the slime or mud which the Nile deposits, as it is intersected by its branches and a vast number of canals.

The following military opinion of General Regnier is curious—

"Egypt," says he, "is separated from Asia by deserts of considerable extent, and should a hostile army attempt to

approach it on that side, it would have to take its route through marshy grounds, below its general level, and presenting to the traveller little else than brackish water. Its flat shore towards the Mediterranean and the mouth of the Nile, gorged up with mounds of sand, presents to the enemy very few places which will be found proper for the debarkation of troops. Immense deserts constitute its natural boundaries on the west, on which account it has nothing to dread but the incursions of the Arabs from Barbary. *A desert also separates Egypt from the Red Sea, which gives no flattering invitation to an enemy to invade it from that quarter; the two ports of that sea being destitute of resources, and Egypt itself being the only country from which a hostile army could procure provisions and camels sufficient to enable them to cross the Desert.*

"It is obvious," continues General Regnier, "from this succinct account of the general face of the country, that no invading army could carry on any military operations in Lower Egypt during more than seven months in the year. It may perhaps be admitted with truth, that the confines of the Desert might be traversed during the five remaining months, but the villages in that direction are ill qualified to grant those necessary supplies to an army, which after crossing the Desert *must be in want of every thing.* No communication could be kept open from the Desert with the interior from September to December inclusive. At this period, therefore, an enemy could not carry on any military operations in the interior but by water."

These opinions and statements, made by an officer of Regnier's ability little more than two years before General Baird overcame all the difficulties which he enumerates, are full of interest.

Kenné or Ghennah itself, which had been so long the head-quarters of General Baird, perhaps deserves a word or two of remark here. It is the Coptos of the ancients, and is of considerable extent. To an eye which has rested for days and weeks on the arid sameness of the Desert, the country immediately round it, which is laid out in gardens, where the vine is cultivated with industry and success, and in which fruit-trees of great produce grow even luxuriantly, affords a most delightful contrast.

The town itself is surrounded by a wall, and the houses are flat-roofed and of one story. It has a pottery, in which jars and vessels are made possessing the quality peculiar to Egyptian ware, of keeping water cool and rendering it clear. Of these jars they make immense rafts, by tying them together in vast numbers, and floating them down the Nile, carrying them sometimes afterwards even as far as Rosetta, where, from their singularly advantageous properties, they meet a ready sale. Oranges, dates, and melons are to be procured at Ghennah in abundance, and the sugar-cane has been successfully cultivated there. All this refreshing produce is eagerly sought by the merchants and pilgrims who travel from Cairo to barter the cloths of Europe, the corn of Egypt, and the carpets of Turkey against the coffee of Mocha and the shawls and muslins of India.

The people of Ghennah are darker than those of Lower Egypt, whom, however, they very closely resemble in the form of their features and the character of their countenances; like all Mahommedans

the women remain continually veiled, but nevertheless they blacken their eyelashes, and in order to give an Oriental delicacy to their hands, tinge their finger-nails with red.

During the stay of the troops at Ghennah they were constantly exposed to the whirlwinds peculiar to that part of the world. Their tremendous force, and the effects of their irresistible violence, have so often been described, that an observation upon them may seem superfluous; but as constituting one only of the innumerable ills and difficulties by which the army was assailed, they certainly deserve mention in this place. Mr. Bruce describes a visitation of this sort, which must have been most awful.

"We were here," says he, (at a place called Woadi el Halbout,) "at once surprised and terrified by a sight, surely one of the most magnificent in the world. In the vast expanse of desert, from W. to N. W. of us, we saw a number of prodigious pillars of sand at different distances, at times moving with great celerity, at others stately or with a majestic slowness; at intervals we thought they were coming in a very few minutes to overwhelm us, and small quantities of sand had actually reached us. Again they would retreat so as to be almost out of sight—their tops reaching to the very clouds—there the tops very often separated from the bodies, and then, once disjointed, dispersed in the air and did not appear any more. Sometimes they were broken near the middle, as if struck by a large cannon shot.

"About noon they began to advance with considerable swiftness upon us, the wind being very strong at north. Eleven of them ranged alongside of us, about the distance

of three miles; the greatest diameter of the largest appeared to me at that distance, as if it would measure ten feet. They retired from us with a wind at S. E. leaving an impression upon my mind to which I can give no name, though surely one ingredient in it was fear, with a considerable deal of wonder and astonishment. It was in vain to think of flying, the swiftest horse, the fastest sailing ship, could be of no use to carry us out of this danger, and the full persuasion of this riveted me as if to the spot where I stood." *

In the next chapter we shall have to trace the conduct of General Baird through a series of difficulties, which if not so perilous *personally*, as those which he had already seen, were, to an officer of his character and principles, perhaps not less painful to endure.

* Murray's Family Library, No. 17, p. 467.

CHAPTER XIX.

GENERAL BAIRD ARRIVES AT GIZEH — REMOVES HIS HEAD QUARTERS TO RHOUDA — PROCEEDS TOWARDS ROSETTA — DAMIETTA — LESBIE — REFUSAL OF THE GRAND VIZIER TO SURRENDER THE FORMER — RECALL OF COLONEL LLOYD — SURRENDER OF ALEXANDRIA — GENERAL BAIRD'S DISAPPOINTMENT — SIR JOHN HUTCHINSON RESOLVES TO QUIT EGYPT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS HEALTH — ARRANGEMENTS CONSEQUENT THEREUPON — DESPATCH FROM ENGLAND — LORD CAVAN APPOINTED TO COMMAND IN CHIEF — THE INDIAN ARMY TO BE UNITED WITH THE EUROPEAN FORCE — GENERAL BAIRD'S REMONSTRANCE — REASONS AGAINST THE MEASURE — APPEARANCE OF THE PLAGUE AMONG THE TROOPS.

GENERAL BAIRD, it will be recollected, before he embarked, placed Colonel Murray in command of the whole army of Upper Egypt until the rear should have come up to Ghennah (where his head-quarters were fixed), whence it was to be sent forward to Gizeh with all practicable expedition, leaving two companies of the 1st, and six companies of the 7th Bombay regiment in possession of different parts on the route, so as to keep up a free and constant communication between the army and Kosseir.

Orders were despatched to that place to send forward the 80th, or any other regiment, the moment

it arrived, and Colonels Ramsay and Montresor were ordered forthwith to proceed to Gizeh, which place General Baird himself reached on the 8th of August.*

The General lost not a moment after his arrival in making arrangements for the supplies and comforts of his men, whose welfare and accommodation were always objects nearest his heart; and having completed those arrangements, he shifted his head-quarters to the little island of Rhouda, to which he removed on the 16th.†

* Gizeh is a considerable town built along the banks of the river, which is here above four miles in width. M. De Noé says, that the house in which he was quartered at the northern extremity of the town, on a very handsome quay, was surrounded by gardens filled with flowers and orange-trees; the rooms were spacious, and the stables sufficiently extensive to contain three hundred horses.

This sounds capacious, but falls very far short of Dr. Clarke's account of Murad Bey's residence, in which Colonel Stewart was quartered. "Of this edifice," says the Doctor, "it is difficult to give an idea by description. It contained barracks capable of containing SIXTY THOUSAND MEN, including a *great proportion of cavalry*, a cannon foundry, and everything necessary for the system of war carried on by that prince," &c.—Vide Clarke's Travels, vol. i. p. 83.

M. de Noé writes in favourable terms of the civilization of the inhabitants, and observes, that the greater part of them spoke French. Gizeh is distant from the Pyramids about nine miles.

† It is on the island of Rhouda, situated on the Nile, between Gizeh and Cairo, that the *Mekéas*, or, as we translate it, *Nilometer*, is erected for the purpose of measuring the rise of the inundation. The Nilometer is a round tower, containing an

When General Baird quitted Gizeh he appointed Colonel Ramsay to the command of that place, a situation which, however high and honourable, connected as it inevitably must become with the negociations to be carried on with the Grand Vizier, Colonel Ramsay felt very much disinclined to fill, apprehensive that being fixed at Gizeh he might be deprived of a chance of more active service in the field. The General also appointed Colonel Lloyd to the command of a force destined for Damietta, consisting of about three hundred men of the 80th regiment, and three hundred sepoys, together with a proportionate force of artillery and engineers. The object of this detachment was to garrison Damietta and Lesbie, which General Hutchinson had ordered the Turks to surrender to the English troops whenever they should arrive. But it appears, that some difficulty interposed at the time of their arrival, for the Grand Vizier, whose professions of friendship we have already observed upon, seems to have hesitated about giving up the whole of the works and barracks at that place to the British force, and to have

apartment, in the middle of which, is a cistern lined with marble, the bottom of which reaches the bottom of the river, having a large opening through which the water can freely enter.

The rise of the water is shewn upon an octangular column of blue and white marble, on which are marked twenty cubits of twenty-two inches each. The two lowermost have no divisions, but all the others are divided into twenty-four parts, each part called a digit; the whole height of the pillar being thirty-six feet eight inches.

proposed that the place should be garrisoned by a force half Turkish and half European.

As this was the line taken by the Grand Vizier, and as General Baird found that the works required very extensive repairs, he suggested to the Vizier, that unless the English troops had entire possession of the place, he should not feel justified in permitting his Government to incur any expense on account of it. In the propriety of General Baird's view the Grand Vizier, as it turned out, entirely coincided, and accordingly promised an immediate supply of men and money to put the works in good order.

Although General Baird succeeded in obtaining this promise from the Vizier, he had, on the other hand, new difficulties to contend with, from Osman Bey. Tambourga Osman Bey and Hussein Bey, who had relied implicitly upon General Hutchinson for arranging their several claims upon the Grand Vizier previously to his quitting the country, began to consider themselves in an extremely perilous position, and accordingly pressed the delicacy and difficulty of their different cases upon General Baird, with no small degree of pertinacity; and (as it eventually turned out, not without reason) expressed their opinion to him, that the moment the British force should be entirely withdrawn from Egypt, the Turks would fall upon and persecute them in utter violation of all their most solemn engagements.

The Beys declared themselves ready not only to obey any orders that General Hutchinson might think

fit to make, but even to obey the commands of the Grand Vizier or of the Porte itself, if General Hutchinson desired it; and there can be little doubt that General Baird, who had all along placed great reliance in their affection for the English, most conscientiously coincided in their views, and sympathized in their apprehensions of danger, and pressed upon General Hutchinson the absolute necessity of interposing his authority in their behalf. With what degree of success this interposition was crowned, we shall hereafter see.

By the 27th of August General Baird had assembled all his force in the Isle of Rhouda; and on the night of that day the right wing of the army began to move.*

We have observed, in an earlier part of this memoir, upon the extraordinary difficulty which exists at getting at anything like *truth* in affairs of this world. A very striking instance, certainly not of wilful misrepresentation (for the writer who makes the statement was an amiable and generally veracious man) occurs at page 59 of the late Dr. Clarke's Travels, in which he describes an entertainment of

* As a proof of the energy and activity displayed by General Baird during his arduous enterprise, it may not be uninteresting to observe, that in a letter from General Hutchinson to General Baird, dated Cairo, July 25, 1801, the former says—"Every exertion in my power shall be used to procure you boats, as soon as the French prisoners are once embarked on board the ships. You shall have the earliest intelligence of everything that takes place at Alexandria; but I fear your corps cannot be collected at Gizeh *before the end of September.* —They *had left it* before the end of August!"

which he partook, in General Baird's tent, while his head-quarters were at this very island of Rhouda.

"A dinner," says Dr. Clarke, "given by General Baird to the English officers, and others, our countrymen, in Cairo, took place while the camp remained upon the Isle of Rhoda. We were invited, and the scene was so extraordinary, that it ought to be noticed. The dinner was given in the pavilion before-mentioned. This was lighted by glass lustres suspended from an enormous bamboo cane, sustaining the inner covering of the tent, and by wax candles in glass cylinders. English porter, roasted pigs, and other English fare, together with, Port, Claret, and Madeira wines, appeared upon the table.

"The dinner was cooked by Indian servants, upon the sand, before the tent, and a view of the extraordinary cleanliness observed by these cooks, as well as their peculiar habits, were among the most curious parts of the exhibition. Having drawn a line around them, they suffered no person to pass this boundary. The rules of their caste enjoined that none of their cookery vessels should be touched except by their own hands. After dinner the officers smoked the *hookah:* every pipe had its peculiar attendant upon the outside of the tent, the long flexible tubes alone being brought under the sides of the pavilion to those seated at table.

"The servants in waiting were principally negroes, dressed in white turbans, with muslin jackets, but without stockings or shoes. The upper part of the pavilion was adorned with beautiful net-work; the hangings were of green silk, and the floor covered with Indian mats. The tables were of polished mahogany, and the company present were in full uniform. An association of things so incongruous, with the natural horrors and barbarism of the country, upon the border of an interminable desert,

and in the midst of such a river as the Nile, where persons from India and from England were met to banquet together, that perhaps no similar result of commerce and of conquest is ever likely to occur again in any part of the habitable globe."

It will scarcely be believed, that of all this detail there is scarcely one particular in which it is correct (true is perhaps too strong a word). The glass lustres were two common lamps; the hangings of the tent, instead of green silk, consisted of a green baize lining to the canvass, and the tent itself, instead of a pavilion, was the mess-tent of the 10th Regiment; the mahogany tables were of teak wood; and there was not a single negro present. Such however is the effect of unexpected impressions, and such the difficulty afterwards of believing that those impressions could have been so strong at the moment, unless the objects by which they were produced were much more splendid than in fact they either were or could have been, that the "traveller" is frequently incorrect, even without meaning it.

It is curious enough, that in the same page of his book, Dr. Clarke undertakes to justify Bruce against the calumnies which have been occasionally levelled at his fidelity of narration, and illustrates his justification by the fact, that General Baird himself assured him that he considered Great Britain indebted to Bruce's invaluable chart of the Red Sea for the safety of the transports which had been employed in conveying the British forces.

As Dr. Clarke's description of the magnificent

banquet at which he was a guest has frequently been quoted ill-naturedly, in evidence of the luxuriousness and effeminacy of a portion of the brave men who composed the army under General Baird, and as more recent writers have availed themselves of various similar misrepresentations to substantiate a charge of this nature against their character, it is only justice to the troops as well as to the historian, to give another passage from Dr. Clarke, which we find in page 55 of the same work, and where, although still labouring under a delusion, hardly intelligible, as to the splendour and comforts of the officers, the writer at least does justice to their qualities as soldiers.

"Every morning at sunrise," says the Doctor, "as in Lord Hutchinson's army, a gun was fired, and the whole line of the troops from India were under arms, amounting to three thousand men."

The anachronism in this passage, by which Sir John Hutchinson's peerage is anticipated, is not worth noticing; the strength of the Indian army, however, is inaccurately stated; the force amounted to seven, and not three thousand men as the Doctor states.

"At this hour," continues the Doctor, "we often resorted to the Isle of Rhouda, to view the magnificent parade; an immense grove of the most enormous sycamore fig-trees, larger than any of our forest trees, secured almost the whole army from the rays of the sun. Troops in such a state of military perfection, or better suited for active service, were never seen, not even in the famous

parade of the chosen ten thousand belonging to Buonaparte's legion, which he was so vain of displaying before the present war in front of the Tuileries at Paris; not an unhealthy soldier was to be seen."

The testimony here borne to the actual state of this army—the greater portion of which, as the Doctor says, were volunteers, who never before had been out of their native country—seems to show that the luxury and comfort which he so much magnifies and expatiates upon, had no very ill effect either upon the privates or the officers who commanded them.

But to return to our narrative.—Before the troops were put in motion General Baird had despatched Colonel Montresor to Rosetta, to make all the necessary arrangements for securing there an adequate supply of provisions on the march to Alexandria; for although our ally, the Grand Vizier had *promised* to furnish them with everything essential, not only for their subsistence but their comfort, he had not as yet begun to fulfil those promises, and therefore the General considered it only prudent to take care that the men should be provided for, as in ordinary cases, by the commissariat department.

On the 26th, General Baird took leave of the Grand Vizier, and notwithstanding the want of zeal and activity which his Highness had uniformly exhibited, presented him and his officers and the Beys, according to the custom of the country, with some valuable presents.

The news which was received just on the eve of

the departure of the army, announcing the favourable commencement of the siege of Alexandria, will come more agreeably to the reader in its original shape, namely, a letter from General Hutchinson, which will at the same time serve to throw a little light on the hesitation of the Grand Vizier with respect to Damietta and Lesbie.

Head Quarters, Camp before Alexandria, August 25th, 1801.

SIR,

I received your letter of the 20th of August last night, and am happy to find that we are likely to meet so soon. I shall make every exertion in my power to make your march from Rosetta to Alexandria as little irksome and fatiguing as possible; and I would recommend you to leave all your guns and unnecessary baggage there.

We commenced our operations against Alexandria, both on the east and west side, on the 17th of this month. It is weak on the west side, and cannot, I should imagine, hold out more than three weeks or a month longer; but in this I may be mistaken. We are in great want of engineers and artillery men. I wish you could send us forward a few engineers, and a detachment of artillery, as soon as possible, it would be a great relief to us.

I had agreed previous to my departure from Cairo, to send a garrison of our troops to Damietta; at that time, the Grand Vizier expressed a high sense of obligation, and supposed it was a great favour done him. He ought doubly to wish it now, as his own troops lately mutinied at that place, and insisted on being embarked on board transports, in order to return to Constantinople. I have not heard how the matter ended; but I know that they were in possession of the town for two days, threw every thing

into the greatest confusion, and levied contributions. Should the enemy make their appearance there, the Turks would be very glad to give up the command to the senior British officer. I do not know that it is absolutely necessary that Colonel Lloyd should for the present occupy the fort. He may either encamp, or place himself in Damietta. We are to have nothing to do with the expense of the repairs. I do not imagine that they can be considerable, unless the Turks themselves have been extremely industrious, and destroyed the works. The French left them in a perfect state of defence, and with many guns mounted. Some of the guns have been removed, but can easily be replaced.

When first I spoke to the Grand Vizier, he was extremely rejoiced that we should occupy Damietta; the Turks are as ignorant as children, and as suspicious as women: at any rate, had he even refused his consent, I should have done the same thing. It is a post of too great military importance, to leave unoccupied; besides, it affords such natural advantages, that I understand a few men might prevent the advance of a numerous corps.

Half the stores and cannon captured at Cairo and Gizeh, certainly belong to the British army, and the other half to the Turks. I so stated it to the Reis Effendi, and claimed it on the part of our army. He acquiesced, and thought it very reasonable; but then, as it would be difficult to remove the cannon and stores, the British Government must be ultimately our debtor to the amount of their value. They may claim it from the Turkish Government if they please, or place it as a set-off in part payment for the quantity of forage and provisions which the Turks have furnished to our army. You had better, therefore, supply them with what they demand, and desire Colonel Ramsay to take receipts from their commissaries, not only for what he issues, but for what was issued before. I think you

judge very right, to appoint him Commandant of Gizeh; it was necessary to have an old and experienced officer there. There is no late news. I suppose you have heard of the brilliant success of Sir James Saumarez. Every thing looks like peace. I have no official accounts, however, to that effect. On the 16th of July, the French had twenty-five sail of the line at Brest, ready to put to sea with *fifteen thousand* men on board! *

I have the honour to be, with great respect and regard,

Sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

J. H. HUTCHINSON,

Major General Baird, *Lieut. Gen.*

&c. &c. &c.

With respect to the occupation of Damietta, however, it eventually turned out that it had been agreed upon by our Ambassador, that it should remain *entirely* in the possession of the Turks, and accordingly Colonel Lloyd, with his detachment, was withdrawn from the place, and ordered to join the army at

* Sir James Saumarez was second in command to Lord Nelson in the battle of the Nile, and for his gallantry in the action alluded to by Sir John Hutchinson, received the Order of the Bath. He was born March 11, 1757, and married October 27, 1788, Martha, daughter of Thomas le Marchant, of the Island of Guernsey, of which he himself is a native. In 1831, thirty years after this memorable battle, he was created a Peer of the Realm, in Lord Grey's ministry, by the title of Baron de Saumarez, just before the Reform Bill of that year was carried up to the Lords—The venerable peer voted for it, and in 1832 was appointed to that lucrative sinecure, a Generalship of Marines.

Rosetta, sending however the four companies of the 7th Native Infantry (which formed a part of it) back to Gizeh.

Colonel Lloyd was further directed, before his departure from Damietta, to urge the Turkish Officer, in command there, to put the forts in a proper condition of defence, and also to ascertain the exact state of the works, the number of pieces of cannon, and the amount of military stores in the place.

General Baird left Rhouda on the 27th of August, and arrived at Rosetta on the 30th, where the first division of his army, which had reached it the day before, were already encamped. The moment he found himself so near Alexandria, with his force concentrated, he evinced the greatest anxiety to push forward to that place direct; but his ardour was checked, and his enthusiasm restrained by a letter from General Hutchinson, announcing that the French had sent a flag of truce to him, to treat for the surrender; a measure, no doubt, mainly attributable (at all events as to time) to the arrival of so large an addition to General Hutchinson's force as the army from India under General Baird, The General received the order to "halt," with indescribable dissatisfaction; and much as he rejoiced at the success of His Majesty's arms, the pleasure he felt at the national triumph was not a little alloyed by the reflection, that after all their exertions and toils, he and his gallant comrades should have arrived too late to participate in the honour and glory acquired by their more fortunate countrymen.

The soldier-like apprehensions to which this first check gave alarm, were soon confirmed, and when General Baird proceeded the next day to Sir John Hutchinson's head quarters, he found that the capitulation was actually signed, and that the British troops were to take possession of the outworks on the following morning.*

The terms granted to the garrison of Alexandria

* Sir John Hutchinson had just received the Order of the Bath. Sir John Hely Hutchinson was born May 15, 1757; his father was an eminent barrister, and for a long time member of the Irish House of Commons, and Secretary of State for Ireland. He married 8th June 1751, Christiana, daughter of Lorenzo Nixon, Esq. niece and heiress of Richard Hutchinson, Esq. and she was created Baroness Donoughmore. By her, Mr. Hutchinson had issue Richard, the first Earl of Donoughmore, who died unmarried August 22, 1825, Sir John Hely Hutchinson, and the Hon. Mary, who married Thomas Smith, Esq. and is still living.

Sir John Hutchinson, who at the period to which our narrative here refers, had been honoured with the Red Riband, was subsequently created, in the same year, Lord Hutchinson, as a reward for his services in Egypt. In 1825 his Lordship succeeded his brother; and is now Earl of Donoughmore, Viscount Suirdale, Viscount and Baron Donoughmore of Knocklofty, in the Peerage of Ireland, and also Viscount Hutchinson of Knocklofty, and Baron Hutchinson of Alexandria, and Knocklofty, county of Tipperary, in that of the United Kingdom.

His Lordship, besides being a Knight of the Bath, (termed since the last extension of that Order, a Grand Cross of the Bath,) is also a Knight of the Turkish Order of the Crescent, a General in the Army, Colonel of the 18th Foot, Governor of Stirling Castle, Lord Lieutenant of the County of Tipperary, and Vice-Admiral of the Province of Munster.

were the same as those granted to that of Cairo, excepting that the latter were allowed to take with them only ten pieces of cannon.

Sir John Hutchinson had some time prior to the event decided upon quitting Egypt, immediately after the surrender of Alexandria, in consequence of the delicate and precarious state of his health, and had resolved upon leaving the Indian army, with the addition of the 22d light dragoons, under the command of General Baird, directing him at the same time not to quit the country until he received further commands from His Majesty's ministers; but on the 18th of September, despatches arrived from England, ordering Sir John to leave six thousand men, exclusive of the Indian troops (the particular regiments to be left being enumerated), with the option of remaining himself in the command, or returning to Europe. The latter step, as we have just observed, he had already determined to take, in consequence of the delicate state of his health.

The despatches from home contained farther instructions to Sir John Hutchinson, which, as it turned out, very materially changed the position of General Baird. Sir John was directed to retain in the country under his command, if he remained in Egypt, Major-General Moore,* Brigade-General Hope,† Brigadier-General Stuart, and Brigadier-General Oakes;‡ but in case Major-General Moore

* Afterwards Sir John Moore, of whom much hereafter.

† Afterwards Lord Hopetoun.

‡ Afterwards Sir Hildebrand Oakes. He entered the army

should return to Europe, then Lord Cavan was to be placed in his room.* This despatch left no alternative; for Sir John Hutchinson, who, as General Moore was gone, was compelled to give the command to Lord Cavan in direct opposition to his lordship's own wishes and inclinations.

By the proposed arrangement, it certainly seemed that the intention of the Government at home was to blend the Indian and European armies; for although the Secretary at War distinctly stated that in Downing Street they did not know of what troops the Indian force was composed, or by whom it was commanded, His Majesty's orders were, that whatever the force might be, it was at all events to remain in Egypt.

General Baird saw at once the difficulties likely

in 1787, and served in the American war; in 1792 he went to the West Indies, and remained two years; in 1794, he served in Corsica; became Lieutenant Colonel in 1795; in 1796 went to Portugal; in 1798, as Colonel, was at the capture of Minorca. After the Egyptian campaign, he was employed in the Mediterranean; and in 1808 commanding the force at Malta; and in 1810, Civil and Military Commissioner there. He resigned from ill health 1813; was created a Baronet; in 1814 he was appointed Lieutenant General of the Ordnance, and died Sept. 9, 1822.

* Richard William Lambert, Earl of Cavan, Viscount Kilcoursie, and Baron Lambert of the kingdom of Ireland, G.C.B. and K.C.; born Sept. 10, 1768; married, first, in 1782, Honora, daughter of Judge Gould, by whom he had several children. Her ladyship died October 1, 1803. His lordship married in the following August, Miss Arnold, daughter of the Collector of Customs at Cowes, Isle of Wight, by whom he has three children.

to arise from this scheme of "brigading" two armies, formed upon totally different principles, receiving different pay and allowances, and whose habits and customs were entirely dissimilar. The East India Company's army, as every body knows, is raised in a perfectly distinct manner from, and regulated (as are indeed even the King's troops serving on the Indian establishments) by arrangements so different from those by which the regular European troops are guided, that as General Baird justly said in his remonstrance against the junction of the forces, it required an internal knowledge of India, of its government, of the many different branches which compose an Indian army, and of the various rules and regulations even of the different Presidencies (no one set of which, is exactly like the other two), to conduct it with anything like propriety or safety.

It was quite clear, that if the plan of uniting these armies were persisted in, and that the Indian troops were no longer to be a separate force under a distinct commander, all these regulations and arrangements would be continually broken in upon, or unattended to, and consequently very serious confusion and inconvenience to the service must occur—great dissatisfaction among the officers would ensue, and the three Presidencies themselves would ultimately be brought into collision.

But, as General Baird forcibly urged, independently of all these impediments, one objection on the score of policy presented itself, which ought, unquestionably, to have defeated the intention at once. The flourishing situation of British India is in a

considerable degree owing to, and in a still more considerable degree dependent upon, the treatment of the native troops in our service; by a long course of attention, to their customs and prejudices they had been brought to a state of discipline and confidence in the English, which induced them, contrary to their engagements, and beyond their obligations, to consent to embark on foreign service. To any man at all acquainted with the general character and disposition of these people, it must be evident, that nothing could be so difficult as for a stranger, even with the best intentions, to conduct and command them, without at some time or another offending their prejudices, or outraging those customs which, although to a casual observer apparently trifling, and even ridiculous, are by them considered of the most vital importance.

Indeed, worse consequences than those which might immediately result from the measure, were to be anticipated by the completion of the proposed arrangement; for if at a vast distance from their native country, to which they had trusted themselves on the faith of the British character, they were to fall under the command of officers, and serve with corps entirely strangers to them—strange to their language and their habits, the disgust which they must naturally contract, would, on their return to India, spread throughout the whole native service, and unquestionably put an end to the hopes of the Government, of ever inducing them to embark on a foreign expedition again.

Another very powerful obstacle to this junction presented itself in the difference of pay and allowances in the two services—the jealousies which must arise, were the two armies blended, would be extremely unpleasant to both parties; but as far as the worse paid were concerned, extremely dangerous. The deductions made from the pay of privates on the Indian establishment for rations, is not more than half that which is stopped from the European soldier—a difference so striking would soon have become generally known, and as no ostensible or satisfactory reason could be given to the European soldier for the difference, it might have led to consequences of the most serious nature; while on the other hand, if it were proposed to remedy the inconvenience by equalizing the two establishments, a still greater difference must arise, for, besides the doubt which must naturally exist, that any authority was vested in anybody in Egypt to reduce the pay and allowances of the East India Company's troops, it would have been, supposing it either possible or legal, the severest of all imaginable infractions, the Indian army being always saddled with expenses which European troops—not in India —have no necessity for incurring, and which really consume the allowances made by the Company, in addition to their pay. For instance, the Company's officers were not allowed soldiers to attend upon them, and therefore, according to the custom of the country, and indeed, as a matter of necessity, they had brought with them a number of Indian

servants, at high wages, whom, let what might happen, they were bound to support and maintain during the campaign.

The movements of an army in India vary very greatly from those of troops in Europe, and all ranks are subject to considerable charges in providing and carrying with them European articles absolutely essential to comfort, and cleanliness, and health, which, from the uncertainty of supply, it is found necessary to travel with, and which in India, can only be purchased in the first instance, at a very high price; so that it appears certain, that at the end of a campaign, although the amount actually paid to the Indian army, during the service, might be considerably larger than that received by a force coming from England, the Indian army would, in point of fact, derive no greater pecuniary advantage. This, in the present case, will be even more clearly proved, when it is recollected that the European army was paid in dollars, at the rate of 4s. 6d. per dollar, and the Indian army in dollars at the rate of 5*s.* 5*d.* In short, as General Baird emphatically said, the reduction of the Indian allowances would materially injure the whole body of men, and entirely ruin most of the officers.

General Baird having strongly remonstrated against this most injudicious measure, and as he thought without success, expressed a desire to Sir John Hutchinson to be permitted to give up his command; feeling naturally unwilling to remain in a subordi-

nate position, after having been nominated to the command in chief of a separate army by the Governor-General himself.

In support of his wish to retire, he urged his disbelief that the Government at home intended him to remain in Egypt, because he found that all the other general officers to be retained were specifically mentioned in the despatch to Sir John Hutchinson; and as to the statement made by Sir John, that the Government were not aware what the officer's name was who commanded the Indian army, the General felt sceptical as to the possibility of that circumstance, however firmly General Hutchinson himself might have believed it, because he had received a communication from the Duke of York, Commander-in-chief of the army, dated from the Horse Guards the 10th of May, upwards of two months anterior to General Hutchinson's last despatch, in which His Royal Highness conveyed the gratifying intelligence to General Baird, that His Majesty had been pleased to appoint him to the command of the 54th regiment.

Sir John Hutchinson quite coincided with General Baird, as to the difficulty likely to arise from the union of the two armies; but seemed to think that the stay of the Indian army in Egypt would not be long; and indeed to imagine, that when it did return, the native troops alone would go back to the Presidencies without the King's regiments, which came from them; at all events, however, he declared it to be impossible for him to permit General Baird to leave Egypt without further instructions,

but promised him that he, Sir John Hutchinson, would not of himself think of uniting the force from India with that which came from Europe; suggesting, however, the great probability, that under any circumstances, the King's regiments, if they should remain, would be deprived of the Indian allowances; a suggestion which seems to have been founded upon the evident necessity of equalizing the pay of all the Europeans, and the utter impossibility of incurring so enormous an expense, as that which would have arisen from augmenting the allowances of the army from England, to the scale of those which were made to the army from India.

This suggestion was extremely painful to General Baird, for it involved all the evil consequences to the King's regiments which he had brought with him, which, for their sakes, he so much dreaded, namely, the sudden stoppage to their means of either providing for the followers whom they had brought with them, or of sending them back to their own country, which they were bound to do, as part of the agreement subsisting between them. Another evil of still more serious inconvenience would have resulted to the officers, because they had, upon quitting India, devoted a certain proportion of their pay and allowances to the maintenance of their wives and families whom they had left behind them; which proportion they would have been unable to discontinue for some months, until advices could reach the Presidency to which they belonged, and which they would have been wholly unable to continue to afford to their relations and connexions if

their incomes were so considerably reduced as they must be by the proposed equalization.

General Baird's situation at this period was one of peculiar delicacy and embarrassment. He had arrived in Egypt the commander-in-chief of an army which had achieved one of the most wonderful undertakings that can well be imagined, and now found himself not only reduced to a junior command, but even his name omitted in the despatches from England in the list of officers to be retained on service.

Other causes than mere personal annoyances conspired to harass and agitate General Baird. Disease to an alarming extent began to show itself in the army, and in the hospital of the 88th regiment at Rosetta several cases of plague had actually occurred. Every precaution which ardour and activity could suggest or enforce was of course adopted, but the badness and scarcity of provisions, and the difficulty with which they were procured, contributed not a little to counteract the best and most assiduous exertions which were made for the comfort and security of the men.

Subsequently to this period, in spite of all the measures which had been adopted to prevent the spread of contagion, the dreadful malady broke out in the camp amongst the Bengal Volunteers. General Baird ordered the hospitals to be burned, and again the disease was checked, three sepoys only having fallen victims to its ravages—but at this crisis the appearance was awful and the anticipation terrible!

CHAPTER XX.

SOLICITUDE OF THE BEYS—THEIR DANGER—VISIT OF THE CAPIDAN PACHA TO GENERAL HUTCHINSON—INVITATION TO CONSTANTINOPLE —GENERAL HUTCHINSON SENDS TO THE BEYS—ARRIVAL OF THE MAMELUKES AT GIZEH—COLONEL RAMSAY'S PRECAUTIONS—LETTER OF SIR JOHN HUTCHINSON TO THE GRAND VIZIER—COLONEL RAMSAY'S NEGOCIATIONS—THE VIZIER'S ANSWER—PRESENTS ARRIVE FROM CONSTANTINOPLE FOR GENERAL BAIRD—DECLINES THEM—ARRIVAL OF M. ROSETTI—GENERAL BAIRD SENDS HIM TO SEE SIR JOHN HUTCHINSON—SIR JOHN HUTCHINSON'S DEPARTURE IN THE EGYPTIENNE—LORD CAVAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE WHOLE ARMY.

It may be recollected that the Beys of Upper Egypt, who had certainly fulfilled the expectations of General Baird, and most conscientiously performed all they had engaged to do for the advantage of the English, had more than once repeated their apprehensions that whenever the British forces should be withdrawn from the country, the Grand Vizier would commence a system of persecution against them. They were only wrong in their conjectures, by flattering themselves that the Vizier would wait for the departure of the Europeans before he began to exhibit his tyranny.

On the 6th of October General Baird, whose kind

and conscientious watchfulness of the interests of the Beys is above all commendation, wrote the following letter to Sir John Hutchinson, and sent it off by express; the emergency appearing to his anxious mind, one of no trifling character.

El Hamed, Oct. 6th, 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have the honour to address you at the earnest request of Osman Bey Perdicci, who has just arrived from Cairo with Osman Bey Tambourgi, Ibrahim Behar, and several chachifs. They are thus far on their way to Alexandria, at the desire of the Capidan Pacha, and are extremely alarmed on the occasion, as they have no faith in Turkish promises, and are apprehensive of treachery.

They request your Excellency will have the goodness to give them any information you may be in possession of respecting the object of their being ordered down. I have endeavoured to convince them of the impossibility of the Capidan Pacha entertaining any such idea as they seem to dread; but they declared to me that they would not have trusted themselves thus far, did they not consider themselves under the protection of the British, from the assurances you were pleased to grant them in your letter to Osman Bey; and they hope that, should your Excellency be unacquainted with their being ordered down, you will have the goodness to mention to his Highness the Capidan Pacha, in the course of conversation, my having reported to you their arrival, and endeavour to find out the real object of his sending for them. In short, my dear Sir, they have a perfect reliance on your honour for their safety, and will therefore remain here until they hear farther from your Excellency.

Nothing but the *most earnest* entreaties from Osman

Bey Perdicci, whom I in some measure regard as a personal friend, could have induced me to address your Excellency on this very delicate subject; and I therefore trust you will pardon my taking the liberty. I assure your Excellency that it is neither my wish nor inclination to interfere in the political matters or arrangements of this country.

I have the honour to remain, dear Sir,
Your faithful and obedient servant,
D. BAIRD.

To this Sir John, on the 7th, returned the following answer.

MY DEAR SIR,

I received your letter, but not till four o'clock this evening, as the bearer was delayed till nine o'clock this morning at the Caravansera. *Entre nous*, I believe the Beys have every reason to be apprehensive of the designs of the Capidan Pacha.

His Highness came to me a few days ago, and told me, in tones of honey, and with a most lamb-like simplicity, that the Mamelukes had been very useful to us, and that he was therefore determined to do something to mark his regard for them, for which purpose he meant to invite them to go to Constantinople, where some were to be made Pachas of three tails, others of two tails, and some chamberlains. He did not, however, say a word whether they were to keep their heads upon their shoulders or not; but he said he was certain that I would be his guarantee to them for their security. I was so shocked and confounded at his impudence and wickedness, that at the time I gave him no answer. However, the day before yesterday I sent Vincenzio to communicate to the Beys what had passed, and to warn them of their danger.

In my opinion they had better be very cautious what steps they take. You may assure them of my determination to adhere in the most firm manner to the solemn promises which I originally made them, and which they have rendered still more sacred by the many services they have performed towards the whole of the British troops, but more especially to that part of them which were under your immediate command in Upper Egypt.

They certainly ought to make a visit of ceremony to the Capidan Pacha. To decline it, as they are so near, would be not only a marked piece of rudeness, but it would have the appearance of timidity, which is the most dangerous weakness you can possibly display to a Turk, whose boldness is always in the direct ratio of the timidity of his enemy. I do not say that it is necessary they should hurry themselves; they may linger out three or four days, under the pretence of the badness of the roads or the weariness of their horses. Afterwards they had better mount, taking all due precautions, for I will not answer for it that they are not in an enemy's country.

I shall keep so good a watch, that I think no mischief can befall them; caution them, however, to beware of all boats, particularly of those which belong to the squadron of Turkish men-of-war. Even in passing the ferries they ought to reconnoitre the ground well before they trust themselves.

As soon as they arrive in the camp they ought to wait on the Capidan Pacha, and afterwards, with his permission, to pay me a visit. If he should decline his consent, they are to tell him, they are extremely sorry to act contrary to his opinion, but that they have received the most positive commands from me on that subject, and that I had farther told them, I was determined not to be disobeyed.

I think it will be right for you to send an officer of your army to accompany them, as it would be a demonstration

to the Capidan Pacha that we were serious and determined to protect them to the utmost extent of our power and ability. I send Vincenzio back with this letter; you will of course communicate the contents to the Beys, at least as much of it as you think it right that they should know.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Most faithfully yours,

J. HELY HUTCHINSON.

In the course of the day Captain Vincenzio arrived at General Baird's head quarters, and the General on the evening of the 8th despatched the following reply to Sir John Hutchinson.

Head Quarters, Indian Army, 8th Oct. 1801,
Camp near El Hamed.

MY DEAR SIR,

I had the honour to receive yours by Captain Vincenzio, and also the verbal message relative to the Beys not travelling at night, and timing their journey to-morrow so as to arrive at the Capidan Pacha's tent before twelve o'clock at noon. I afterwards paid a formal visit to the Beys in Rosetta, on purpose to show the Turks that they were under our protection, and explained to them the contents of your Excellency's letter.

I assured the Beys of your Excellency's determination to protect them, and of your being their warm friend. Such, however, is their dread of Turkish treachery, that they did not appear satisfied to go till I informed them that an officer of rank of this army should accompany, and *remain with them* during their visit to the Capidan Pacha, and should also carry them to your Excellency. Upon this they were satisfied, and agreed to go, though they still have their apprehensions that violence may be done them

even in the presence of a British officer. They appear to have a very shocking opinion of the character of the Capidan Pacha, and which I fear is too well founded. They are therefore determined to be upon their guard, and they have the fullest reliance upon your Excellency's keeping a watchful eye over them, and being ready to afford them your protection.

After all, my dear Sir, I think they are in a very critical situation, and I really believe it to be impossible to be too cautious. I have offered them (should they wish it) an escort of cavalry; at all events, I shall send a few dragoons as orderlies to the officer who accompanies them, and I shall give *him* the strictest orders not to allow the Beys to go out of his sight on any pretext whatever till he brings them to your tent.

Soon after I left the Beys yesterday the Capidan Pacha's cousin arrived from Aboukir. He waited on the Beys, and said he was sent by the Pacha to congratulate them on their arrival. In the evening three boats full of Turkish soldiers came, and one of the Turkish men-of-war's boats, on board of which was an officer of considerable importance. This being reported to me by Colonel Barlow, together with the suspicions which had been created in his mind by the circumstance, I ordered the guard (of honour) over the Beys to be reinforced for the night, with as little noise or disturbance as possible. This morning I hear that the stranger is from Constantinople, on his way to Cairo, and last from Aboukir.

The Beys propose leaving this the day after to-morrow, and I shall furnish them with horses and camels. Captain Vincenzio will proceed to-morrow should the Beys maintain their resolution of going; and as he has been present at and acted as interpreter during my interview with them, that gentleman will be able to give your Excellency any further information.

I beg leave to call to your Excellency's attention, that from the bridge at the Caravansera being broken down, and the pontoon at the Block House being destroyed, the communication between this and Alexandria becomes very uncertain.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,
Your Excellency's faithful and obedient servant,
D. BAIRD.

The situation of these Beys was now one of particular interest, and General Baird watched over them with a warmth of friendship, and an anxiety almost parental. On the 10th of October the General expresses his feelings towards them plainly and sincerely, in the subjoined letter to Sir John.

Head Quarters, Indian Army,
10*th October*, 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

The Beys have been guilty of very great imprudence; they have been weak enough to accept of horses and camels from the Turks to carry them to Alexandria, so that they will be completely in their power to halt or march as the Turk pleases. I must acknowledge to your Excellency that I am a little alarmed for the safety of the Beys. Colonel Montresor is the officer named to attend them; a serjeant, corporal, and twelve, go with him as orderlies, and the like number of infantry, under the pretence of guarding the Colonel's baggage.

I think it right to apprise your Excellency of the preceding circumstances, and also, that a party of Turks left Rosetta this morning for Alexandria, with colours, &c. I shall not close this till I hear from the Beys.

11*th October*, 10 *a.m.*

Last night I received intelligence from Colonel Barlow that the Beys propose starting off this morning, but as they did not say to Colonel Barlow whether they wished an officer should accompany them, and as they were by no means explicit, I suspected there might be some underhand business; I therefore resolved to call on them early this morning as *if by accident*.

On my waiting on them, they expressed a wish that an officer should accompany them, and also requested forty horses for their attendants. Upon this, I introduced Colonel Montresor to them, and ordered the number of horses required, with the addition of twenty accoutred dragoons to take charge of those horses. I now think I may answer for the safe arrival of the Beys in your Excellency's camp. I expect them here every moment in their way to Alexandria, and I shall send this off by express the moment they come.

Believe me, dear Sir,
Your Excellency's faithful servant,
D. BAIRD.

Having thus far, as he imagined, provided for the safety of his friends, General Baird found his attention claimed by certain alterations, which were proposed in the staff, which too plainly indicated that his efforts and remonstrances with respect to keeping the army from Europe and that from India separate, and, (as far as their internal economy was concerned,) independent of each other, had been unavailing. The following letter from General Baird to Sir John Hutchinson, a copy of which was also transmitted to Lord Cavan, will best explain the

nature of the changes contemplated, and the feelings and opinions of General Baird respecting them.

Head Quarters, Indian Army,
Oct. 13th, 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

As I have just learnt that it is in agitation to remove to the head quarters at Alexandria from this army my two principal public staff officers, one of whom (the Adjutant-General) is in my perfect confidence, I think it absolutely necessary, before I order them to join (or the above event take place), to acquaint your Excellency that Colonel Auchmuty is appointed by special order from his Majesty, Adjutant-General *only* to the army from India under my command when joined by the troops from the Cape. I beg leave to transmit for your information a copy of his appointment.

Colonel Murray is merely acting as Quarter-Master-General, appointed by my authority, derived from the Marquess Wellesley, Governor and *Captain-General* of India, and that appointment has not even yet been confirmed by his Excellency. It is also necessary to acquaint your Excellency that Colonel Murray does not belong to any corps serving with this army, and that he holds a civil appointment from the East India Company, as Political resident at Mocha. It is not, therefore, at all improbable that Colonel Murray may be ordered by Lord Wellesley to return to his station at that place.

Whilst the Indian army remains a separate corps under my immediate command, I cannot see the necessity of removing any of my principal public staff officers, as it would be of the greatest inconvenience to me to be without them; and, as I conceive, your Excellency must have a great choice of able and experienced officers fit to hold

those appointments, as indeed any other in his Majesty's service.

It is also my duty to apprise your Excellency, that I consider it a matter of course, whenever *any part* of the troops which joined me from the Cape of Good Hope are removed from under my command as Commander-in-chief of the Indian army, they must be struck off the Indian Establishment, as they are ordered by his Majesty's ministers only to be paid by the East India Company while attached to *this* army.

I have to conclude with assuring your Excellency that I am well aware you will determine as you judge best for the public service; and I have only to add, that should that decision be contrary to my views and opinions on the subject, and that I am *compelled* to remain here (until his Majesty's pleasure be known) in an inferior situation to that which I now hold, I shall at all times support your Excellency's measures, or those of the Earl of Cavan, with the utmost zeal for the good of the service.

I have the honour to remain, dear Sir,
Your Excellency's faithful and obedient servant,
D. BAIRD.

On the following day General Baird received the following answer from Sir John Hutchinson.

Head Quarters, October 14th, 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

I am at a loss to imagine whence you derive your information that it was my intention to remove your two principal staff officers to Alexandria. Lord Cavan asked my consent to write for Colonel Auchmuty, and I refused it.

Colonel Murray must also recollect, that I told him that I had no intention to direct him to do duty here, as having

no commission of Quarter-Master-General from the King, I did not know how I could consider him as such. You must be well aware, from the whole of my conduct towards you, that I am little disposed to adopt any improper interference, or to do anything which might give you pain.

I was perfectly conscious of the inconvenience of mixing corps with different allowances and different habits; it was therefore *my* intention to have left you in command. I have been over-ruled by higher authority, and am obliged by the orders of Government to leave the command with Lord Cavan. You know the power will then be in his hands, and he has a right, if he chooses (for the order is in so many words), to bring the sepoys to Alexandria, as they are directed to form part of the garrison; indeed the same order is given with respect to the whole of the troops from India.

As for the allowances, I never have, and never meant to interfere with them in the slightest degree. Had I remained in this country, I should have given Government the most decided opinion upon it, on the most mature consideration I have formed; one, which I think no time or circumstance will ever induce me to alter; but having now done with Egypt for ever, I am determined never to interfere again in its affairs, or to give an opinion which my duty does not call upon me to offer.

I hope to be enabled to pay you a visit by the end of the week, and have the honour to be, with much respect and regard,

My dear Sir,
Your faithful and obedient servant,
J. Hely Hutchinson,
Lt.-General.

While this letter was on its way from Alexandria to General Baird's head-quarters, much was doing

with regard to the unhappy Beys, who had quitted Rosetta with Colonel Montresor the day before. In vain did Sir John Hutchinson inquire about them, in vain did he expect their arrival at his quarters: and we find General Baird in the following letter expressing fears for their security, which soon proved to be too well grounded.

Head Quarters, Indian Army,
Oct. 15th, 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

I am highly gratified by your Excellency's very satisfactory, open, and manly letter of yesterday; believe me, Sir, I feel myself much indebted to you for the truly handsome and delicate manner in which you have all along conducted yourself towards me, and for which I must now beg leave to offer you my best and warmest acknowledgments.

It is with extreme concern I feel myself again under the necessity of addressing your Excellency respecting the disagreeable situation of the Beys. By letters I received from Colonel Montresor, dated last night, it appears clearly to me that they have been forced on board some of the Turkish ships, from their not having made their appearance, or having been heard of in your camp.

They left this with the most solemn assurances from me of protection from you. I read them your Excellency's letter on that subject, and they certainly never would have left this had I not sent Colonel Montresor with them.

On receiving the Capidan Pacha's letter on the road, they were extremely alarmed, not understanding its contents, and were extremely anxious to return, had not Colonel Montresor convinced them of the security and the propriety of their continuing their journey.

After understanding the purport of that letter, and of two others which they received at the Block-house from the Capidan Pacha, and which imported that "he had learnt that they had placed themselves under the protection of the English; that it was not becoming to seek protection from Christians, and that it scandalized him and the Turkish Government: that whatever the English wished, would most certainly be complied with; but if they meant to come into his camp with the English, they had much better stay away; at the same time swearing by the Sultaun and the Prophet that no harm should befall them," (These are the terms of the letter, as it was interpreted to Colonel Montresor,) the Beys considered it advisable to go to the Capidan Pacha unattended by the English, and they desired Colonel Montresor to proceed, as they did not wish it to be supposed by the Pacha that they were under his protection, or that of his nation.

Colonel Montresor told them that it was for them to consider what degree of reliance might be placed on the Pacha, but he adds, that it did not appear to him that they considered the question with sufficient care or anxiety. They, however, adhered to their determination to go alone.

Colonel Montresor also acquaints me, that on his way to Alexandria he met a Mameluke with a letter from the Capidan Pacha to the Beys, desiring them to come over from the Block-house by water, for which purpose he had sent boats for them. I am therefore convinced they have been forced on board some Turkish man-of-war, and as they went entirely upon the faith of English protection, I am convinced your Excellency will take such steps as must ensure their safety.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

Your Excellency's faithful servant,

D. BAIRD.

It appears that Colonel Montresor was accompanied on this march of the Beys by Captain (now Major-General) Middlemore, and that when, after having considered all the circumstances, they had determined to cross the estuary in one of the Capidan Pacha's boats, the Colonel resolved to go with them to the other side, for his suspicion was excited as to their real destination by the size of the boat which had been sent for them, and the number of people in her, and he thought it possible the Turks might have had the intention of availing themselves of that opportunity of pulling out to sea with their unhappy victims.

The sequel proved that Colonel Montresor was in all probability right in his conjecture; however, be that as it may, he determined not to quit them until they were safely landed; and accordingly, he desired Captain Middlemore to draw up the twelve grenadiers, with the serjeant and corporal, close to the water's edge, and if he saw any scuffle in the boat on its passage, instantly to order the soldiers to fire into her, regardless of any consideration for his (Colonel Montresor's) personal safety. Nothing, however, occurred at that time, probably because the English troops were there, and the Beys and their attendants arrived safely on the opposite shore. Thus General Baird's apprehensions with respect to their fate were, luckily, unfounded at that moment, and in addition to this, Colonel Montresor, who arrived at head quarters on the evening of the 10th, report-

ed that he had seen them in the Capidan Pacha's camp that morning. Still, however, their situation was most perilous.

At this period, intelligence having arrived that General Fox had been appointed Commander-in-chief of all the forces in the Mediterranean and Egypt, General Baird resolved upon making one more effort to prevent the junction of the two armies previous to the departure of Sir John Hutchinson, who had, as it appeared, resolved to let things go on as they were, so long as he remained in the country. As General Baird's letter to General Fox contains a clear recapitulation of all the points of the case, we submit it to the reader.

Head Quarters, Indian Army, Oct. 18th, 1801.

SIR,

I take the liberty to address your Excellency on the present occasion, having understood, although not officially, that his Majesty has been pleased to appoint you Commander-in-chief of the forces serving in the Mediterranean and Egypt.

Having been specially appointed to the chief command of the army from India destined to co-operate with that from this side of the Mediterranean, in the expulsion of the French from Egypt, I left Bengal in the month of February, and after experiencing considerable fatigues and hardships, the army arrived near Rosetta on the 30th of August, when it was halted by Sir John Hutchinson, in consequence of the garrison of Alexandria having agreed to surrender.

At this period no specific orders respecting the force to

be left in Egypt had arrived from England; but his Excellency Sir John Hutchinson was pleased to communicate to me his intention of leaving the Indian army (with the addition of the 22nd light dragoons) under my command, in order to garrison Alexandria.

On the 18th ult. I had the honour to learn from the General, that in consequence of orders just received from home, he was directed to leave in Egypt six thousand men, exclusive of the corps from India. His Excellency was also pleased to acquaint me with his having the option of retaining the command, but which his health would not permit of. That Major-General the Earl of Cavan, in consequence of the arrangements from home, would be left senior officer in Egypt, as Major-General Moore, who also had the option of remaining, had availed himself of permission to return to England.

Sir John Hutchinson farther informed me, that he was directed to retain in Egypt Brigadier Generals Hope, Stuart, and Oakes.

I did myself the honour to address his Excellency in answer, and stated to him, that as my name did not appear among the General officers to remain in Egypt, and as the corps from India were actually directed to be retained, I was naturally led to conclude that the Indian army was meant to be kept a distinct corps under my immediate command, but subject of course to the orders of the senior officer in Egypt; or that it was intended that I should return to my station in India.

I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency's perusal, the correspondence which has taken place between Sir John Hutchinson and myself, which I have also judged proper to communicate to Lord Cavan, together with a copy of a letter from his Lordship to me, which will point out to your Excellency the measures he intends to adopt on the departure of Sir John Hutchinson.

We here insert the letter of Lord Cavan to which General Baird refers as an enclosure, in order to condense and consolidate the correspondence which, as relating to a delicate point of service, is extremely interesting. Lord Cavan's letter is dated, Camp, East of Alexandria, Oct. 15th, 1801. His Lordship says—

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I was last night honoured by the receipt of your letter of the 14th, enclosing a copy of your letter to Sir John Hutchinson, and a copy of Colonel Auchmuty's appointment and instructions from his Majesty, to act as Adjutant-General to the forces employed on an expedition to the Red Sea, and I beg leave to thank you for your obliging communication.

I hope you will pardon me for the liberty I shall take in making any observations at present upon some particular points they allude to, but from my presuming it will soon be a duty incumbent on me to consider the army under your command as under my orders, I feel myself more excusable for thus prematurely saying anything.

Before Colonel Auchmuty, or any officer, is removed to this army from any situation or employment he holds in the one under your command, I should conceive it indispensably necessary that your army should be publicly specified in general orders, as forming part of this army under the command of your senior officer; and until then I am convinced no removal will take place.

Colonel Auchmuty's authority to be Deputy-Adjutant-General, I am of opinion, under present circumstances, he might claim whenever the armies are united as one, should he think proper so to do. Evidently, the original object of his being sent to the Red Sea with the troops from the

Cape of Good Hope was, to co-operate with other troops sent from Europe by the Mediterranean, for the expulsion of the French from Egypt. That service has been well and effectually accomplished. By subsequent orders from Great Britain, the troops from India, and those he brought with him from the Cape, and which are now under your command, are directed to remain in Egypt to assist in keeping possession of it and repelling any fresh attack the enemy may make to regain it; and they further specially direct that the sepoys shall form part of the garrison of Alexandria.

From what you have represented concerning Colonel Murray, I do not see how he can with propriety be much longer detained in Egypt.*

Respecting the subsistence of his Majesty's troops that were brought from India and the Cape, I do not think it necessary at the present moment to discuss that point. It is a difficulty that I think can be removed; nor shall I at present trouble you with any ideas of how I intend locally to dispose of the troops, as I have really not formed any that are decisive. It is my intention, unless I receive orders from Europe to the contrary, *not to consider the troops now* under your command as forming a distinct or separate army, but as part of one army under my orders, and with only one military staff establishment.

I particularly mention my intention, as I much apprehend our ideas on the subject do not coincide; should that unfortunately be the case, I am much relieved from my consequent distress by the very handsome manner in which you express, in your letter to Sir John Hutchinson, your readiness and zeal to support and enforce such measures as

* Colonel Murray resigned the Quarter-Master-Generalship on the 16th of October, and returned to his station at Mocha, where he was Political Resident.

I may think best for the present service. These expressions tend to confirm more firmly what I was before assured of, that whenever in the present instance his Majesty's troops in Egypt are entrusted to my command, I shall derive every assistance from you, that your well-known abilities and experience can afford.

I will write again to you to-morrow, and beg you will excuse my concluding so suddenly, as I write this very early in the morning, and just before I am to meet the Capidan Pacha. I will write to-morrow to Colonel Murray and Colonel Auchmuty, but on no official business.

I remain, my dear General,

Yours very much obliged,

CAVAN, *Maj.-Gen.*

This letter was sufficiently explicit, and rendered General Baird's immediate exertions necessary to counteract the mischief which he anticipated from the union of the armies. The General continues to General Fox as follows :—

In thus troubling your Excellency, I have to request your favourable indulgence; and I entertain a confidence that you will see the impropriety of blending the two armies together when there is no necessity for it, who are on different establishments and under different regulations.

I need not point out to your Excellency the confusion that must arise if Lord Cavan's intentions are carried into execution, which I much fear will be the case before I can receive an answer from your Excellency.

My own situation is particularly unpleasant, as it is most probable that the treasure which has been entrusted to me by the East India Company for the payment of this army, will be taken from me by an officer who is neither in

their service nor under their control, and who cannot of course be made responsible for its expenditure.

Should the Indian army be broken up, and blended with that from England, I must either retire from it, or remain in an inferior situation to that which I now hold. On the above event, therefore, taking place, I shall of course consider myself as exonerated from my responsibility and command. It is my intention to return to my station in India, unless positively ordered by Sir John Hutchinson to remain in this country, in which case I hope to be honoured with your Excellency's commands.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,

D. BAIRD.

His Excellency, Lt.-Gen. Fox, Malta.

On the 20th of October, General Baird received a letter from Sir John Hutchinson, stating that he had had a relapse of his complaint, and that it would be impossible to fulfil his intention of visiting him, begging at the same time to see him at Alexandria before his departure.

In the mean while General Baird's anxiety respecting the Beys remained unmitigated, nor was it by any means groundless; for although Colonel Montresor had seen them safe in the Capidan Pacha's camp on his way back to Rosetta, their never having yet visited Sir John Hutchinson, could not fail to cause the most serious apprehensions that, if their lives had been spared, they had been deprived of their liberty.

The truth at last was ascertained. Two or three days after they had (implicitily relying upon the

faith and promises of the Capidan Pacha) surrendered themselves to his power, the Capidan Pacha proposed to them to accompany him upon a visit of ceremony which he was about to make to one of the Turkish frigates in the roads. The reliance which they placed upon this man, mingled with the awe they felt for his office and character, and which had in the first instance induced them to trust themselves to his power, led them also to agree to this proposition; and they accordingly embarked with the Capidan Pacha in one of his large boats, and pulled out to sea.

They had not proceeded far, when a lighter and faster vessel, belonging to the Capidan Pacha, was seen coming towards them in the greatest haste; it soon reached them, and a messenger in it delivered a packet to His Highness, who, upon opening it, uttered some strong expressions of surprise, and immediately declared to the Beys, that sorry as he was to do it, he must leave them, and return instantly to the camp; and for that purpose would avail himself of the swift vessel which had last come off.

At this time the Beys began to be alarmed; their suspicions were excited, and they made strong demonstrations of resistance. The Capidan Pacha quitted them, and a violent scuffle ensued in the boats, in the midst of which one of the frigates opened her guns upon it. Solyman Aga, one of the intended victims, and who is described as being of Herculean strength, seized one of the Turkish boat-

men by the collar, and held him forcibly before him, so as to make the struggling wretch a shield from the fire of the ship.

In this affair three or four of the Mamelukes lost their lives, and several others were wounded; their resistance, however, was vain, and they were eventually placed in close confinement.

While this piece of treachery was acting at Alexandria, the Grand Vizier was pursuing a course equally declaratory of *his* views and intentions at Cairo.

On the 23rd of October the Reis Effendi despatched a messenger from Cairo to Colonel Ramsay, who commanded at Gizeh, desiring that if one of the Beys, Keasif Selim Diap, or any of his Mamelukes, should go to that place for protection, Colonel Ramsay would give him immediate information of it.

The same evening, as the Reis Effendi had truly anticipated, a party of the Bey's Mamelukes arrived at Gizeh, stating that they had been attacked by a party of Turks, and most barbarously treated; that the Bey himself having fortunately obtained information of their intentions, not more than an hour before they carried them into execution, had made his escape in a boat, directing his followers to hasten to Gizeh to claim the protection of the English; their families and their property they had been forced to leave at the mercy of their enemies.

Colonel Ramsay gave them the protection they sought, but in order to maintain a perfect neutrality

with the Turks, sent the Reis Effendi notice of their arrival. The next morning M. Stephano, the principal interpreter of the Porte, went to Gizeh and endeavoured to persuade the Mamelukes to go over to Cairo, and put themselves under the protection of the Grand Vizier; but this they declined, and expressed their determination of remaining where they were.

He then proceeded to question them as to the fate and destination of the Bey himself, but they declared their entire ignorance of anything concerning him, beyond the fact of his having escaped by water.

In the evening M. Stephano returned to them from Cairo, with a firman from the Grand Vizier, offering his pardon and protection to the Bey if he would give himself up; but the Mamelukes continued steadfastly to deny any knowledge of him. Stephano in this visit was accompanied by an officer of the Turkish Government, who was to take charge of the Bey if he should surrender himself, and convey him to Cairo. The officer begged to be permitted to stay at Gizeh; and as the Mamelukes evinced no unwillingness, he was allowed to do so. Colonel Ramsay made arrangements for the accommodation of the Mamelukes, who amounted in number to seventy, exclusive of the Aga and five other officers, all of whom, together with their horses, were provisioned from the garrison; the Turkish interpreter having led Colonel Ramsay to believe that his government would be at no expense whatever on their account.

On the 24th of October the Bey himself arrived at Gizeh, and, as he had advised his followers to do before, claimed protection. Colonel Ramsay granted his request, and, as he had done upon the former occasion, wrote to apprise the Reis Effendi of the fact.

In a very short time similar attempts to those which had been made upon the Mamelukes were tried upon the Bey—the interpreter and the officer endeavoured to persuade him to go to Cairo, but he strenuously refused: indeed his health was so extremely bad, that even if he had wished to avail himself of the clemency of the Grand Vizier, he would not have been able to move.

At Alexandria, however, Sir John Hutchinson took more decisive measures: having immediately on hearing of the infamous conduct of the capudan Pacha, peremptorily demanded and obtained the release of the surviving Beys whom he had imprisoned, he despatched the following letter addressed to the Grand Vizier, which he sent open to General Koïd, with instructions to forward it immediately to Colonel Ramsay, at the same time directing that that officer should deliver it personally to the Grand Vizier, and in his interview, use the strongest possible language, and exhibit a firm determination not to be trifled with.

The following is a copy of the letter.

Head Quarters, English Army, Alexandria, 27th October 1801

I have just heard with the greatest astonishment, that notwithstanding your most sacred promises, you have

caused the Beys to be arrested; that one of them has been assassinated, and that the others are your prisoners. I have frequently notified to your Highness, that the Mamelukes are under the protection of the English Government, and that I had given them the strongest assurances of their property and lives being in safety. You know then, what honour and the right of nations require of me; you have left me the choice to avenge an assassination or to become an accomplice in it. As I will not dishonour my nation in the face of the universe, nor bathe my hands in the blood of the unfortunate, I have formed my determination.

I declare to you, then, in the most explicit manner, that you must deliver up all the Beys and Mamelukes, with their baggage, effects, and families, and send them without the least delay to Gizeh, and place them under the orders of Colonel Ramsay, as he will have the disposal of them until he receives farther instructions from me.

The Capidan Pacha has already given up to me those who were in his possession. But four of the Beys, the Kiage, and two Cachiefs, have perished by the hands of assassins.

Your Highness, there is not a moment to lose; I have just reinforced the Governor of Gizeh, and General Baird is charged with the execution of my orders; be assured that I will never retract them in the smallest degree. You have heaped oaths upon oaths. You have violated them all. I supplicate God to pardon my credulity, but I will not add to it, the baseness of suffering you to enjoy the fruits of your enormous crime, and to say to indignant Europe, that you have deceived the English and massacred the Beys.

Give me up the Mamelukes—respect the rights of nations—adhere faithfully to your promises, or you will be responsible for all the unhappy events which must be the

inevitable result of your obstinately persevering in a system of conduct which has already covered you with shame and opprobrium.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, your Highness's most humble and most obedient servant,

J. HELY HUTCHINSON,
Commander-in-chief.

P.S. You will also have the goodness to furnish provisions and forage necessary for the subsistence of the Mamelukes and their horses. I shall persist in this demand; because it is no more than what justice requires. You have taken everything from them, it is therefore just that you support them.*

The moment General Baird received this letter he forwarded it to Colonel Ramsay, together with another from himself, highly approving of that officer's conduct under the circumstances.

General Baird also despatched the following to Sir John Hutchinson.

Head Quarters, Indian Army, near El Hamed, 28th October 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter to the Grand Vizier, about three o'clock

* There perhaps never was a more striking exemplification of the absurd *formulary* with which public and even private letters conclude, than this before us. After having denounced the Grand Vizier as a monster capable of every crime, and having told him that his conduct had already covered him with shame and opprobrium, Sir John Hutchinson subscribes himself, *with the highest consideration*, his Highness's most humble and most obedient servant.

yesterday morning, which I immediately forwarded to Colonel Ramsay for his perusal and subsequent delivery.

Should the Vizier refuse to give up the Beys, I request to know whether it is your intention that I should embark with this army for Gizeh, as it will be requisite to take immediate steps to press all boats, in order to be prepared for such an event. Most of the boats that are as yet here, have passes either from the Naval Commissary, or from the Commissariat of your army.

Application was made to me about an hour ago by the second Turkish Commandant of Rosetta, for permission to take boats sufficient for the conveyance of about 400 or 500 Turkish troops to Cairo, which I declined complying with, on account of our own probable necessity for them. I request your Excellency's orders on the subject.

The 86th Regiment embarked and sailed yesterday. I have given orders to prevent all boats passing up the river, and made a requisition to Lieutenant Smith, of the navy, who is in command of a gun-boat, to take a station in the middle of the river, in order to examine all boats coming down, in case of the Beys and Mamelukes being on board, and to stop all boats going up with troops.

The soldiers for whom the boats were required, were the same as were mentioned in a letter to me from Colonel Auchmuty, as having arrived from Rahamanie. They now say they came from Cairo to escort Mahomed Pacha thither, in the course of a few days from Alexandria; and it was but yesterday that the Turkish Commandant told me, that they were on their way to Alexandria from Rahamanie. They made a great variety of pretexts in order to get the boats, which they were most anxious to procure by my consent; and I conceive that they want the boats for more men whom they expect from Alexandria, for the men who are here, are still in the boats they came in.

I have manned the gun-boat with seamen from the regi-

ments and artillery, Lieut. Smith having represented to me that the Admiral had withdrawn all the sailors, and has ordered the boat to be sold. May I request your Excellency to have the goodness to explain this to Sir Richard Bickerton.

I have the honour to remain, dear Sir,
Your Excellency's obedient faithful servant,
D. BAIRD.

In reply to this letter, Sir John Hutchinson wrote as follows on the 31st of October.

MY DEAR SIR,

I send you a letter under a flying seal to Colonel ——. I have said to that gentleman as much as he deserves.† * * * * * * *

I beg you will express to Colonel Ramsay my strong approbation of his conduct. By his firmness he has saved the British name from indelible disgrace.

I have received a letter from the Grand Vizier, not at all satisfactory, in which he has the insolence to demand that *I should deliver up the Beys now in my possession.* I rather think it right that you should take immediate possession of Fort St. Julien. I leave this, however, entirely to

† This passage relates to the conduct of an officer of high rank and previously high character, connected with the negociations between the Grand Vizier and the English Government on the subject of the Mamelukes, for which it would be almost impossible to account;—having purposely abstained from any reference to this extraordinary case, lest we might wound the feelings of any of his surviving connexions, we have expunged the passage relative to the letter of Sir John Hutchinson, which is, perhaps, the severest ever written by a general, to a field officer under his command.

your own discretion. You might do so, I suppose, in the quietest manner, and desire the Turks to go about their business. But then I would be at the gates of the fort, and ready to take possession before I took this step, otherwise they might play you a trick. You know what they are capable of as well as I do. Take the government of everything into your own hands: press all the boats you can meet with, to make every show, as if you were preparing to march upon Cairo. I fear it is impossible for at least a fortnight, as the country is still so wet.

I have ordered part of the 79th to be disembarked which were on board the Thetis, and to sail in the morning. I have gone too far to recede. My own and the national honour are committed, and I am determined to persevere.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Sir,

Your very faithful and obedient servant,

J. HELY HUTCHINSON.

Major General Baird,
&c. &c. &c.

In order to exhibit the promptitude and readiness with which General Baird was in the habit of executing the commands of his superiors, we submit the following.

Camp near El Hamed,
November 2nd, 1801.

MY DEAR SIR,

I received your Excellency's express at eleven o'clock A.M. and immediately forwarded by a despatch boat your letter to ———. I enclosed it to Colonel Ramsay for his transmission to that officer.

I had the honour to convey to Colonel Ramsay your Excellency's approbation of his conduct on this critical

occasion, by which he has indeed justly merited the high compliment you have been pleased to pay him.

According to your Excellency's directions, I have quietly taken full possession of Fort St. Julien. Lieutenant-Colonel Harness, with a party of the 80th, and a small detachment of artillery, are now there: they marched from camp about two o'clock this morning, and met with no opposition on entering the fort. The Turks withdrew shortly afterwards, on Colonel Harness saying he did not think there was room enough for the accommodation of all the troops.

I have to report to your Excellency, that the best guns were removed about eight days since, and that three only remain. The Turkish Commander of Rosetta, who has this moment been here, says the guns belonged to a gun-boat which had been stranded, and that he had been ordered by the Capidan Pacha to send them to Alexandria. I, however, informed him, that I understood guns had been removed from the fort which belonged to it, and desired they might be replaced.

The Commandant informed me yesterday, that the Albanians whom I formerly mentioned to your Excellency, had been ordered by the Pacha to proceed immediately to Cairo, and he begged me to allow them to proceed thither in their own boats, which I refused. He has to-day renewed his request, and I said it was quite impossible to grant it, as I required the whole of the boats at Rosetta for the removal of my army to Cairo; and I desired him to communicate my answer to the Capidan Pacha, as well as to represent to his Highness, that the orders of the officer at Fort Julien are not to suffer any boats to go up or down the river without passports, and not to permit any of the Turkish gun-boats to pass the fort. The fort is in very bad repair, but I shall put it into as decent a state as possible.

I shall take the management of everything within my reach agreeably to your Excellency's instructions, leaving the Turks, however, (which I presume is your intention for the present,) nominally in command, and sending my orders through them. They are now as abject and crest-fallen as they were formerly haughty and insolent.

Believe me, my dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient servant,

D. BAIRD.

His Excellency Sir J. Hutchinson, K.B.

While this correspondence was in progress, circumstances had occurred at Gizeh since Colonel Ramsay had received Sir John Hutchinson's letter for the Grand Vizier, which induced him not to deliver it immediately, but to wait the arrival of the 86th regiment, which General Baird had informed him was marching to his support; he accordingly watched with great anxiety in the hourly expectation of its appearance. But before it reached Gizeh, he received a message from the Grand Vizier, stating, that his Highness had heard from the Capidan Pacha, that a letter had been sent to him by the Commander-in-chief, and not having received it, he was extremely anxious to know the reason of the delay.

The Grand Vizier added, that as he had some very important matters to discuss with Colonel Ramsay, he should be glad if he would come over to Cairo in the course of the day, or if that were inconvenient, that he would send over some accredited and confidential officer to whom his Highness

might make a communication. Colonel Ramsay, anxious to gain time until the arrival of the troops, promised that he would either wait upon his Highness, or send such a person as he might safely rely upon.

In the afternoon, Colonel Ramsay sent over his Brigade-Major, charged with a message to the Vizier, stating that he, the Colonel, had in his hands a letter to his Highness from Sir John Hutchinson, and that if he were not prevented by indisposition, he would do himself the honour of waiting upon his Highness the following day, and deliver it in person. The Vizier expressed his entire satisfaction at this announcement, but stated to Brigade-Major Harvey, that he understood the letter contained information, that General Baird or some other British officer of high rank, had been directed by the Commander-in-chief to come at the head of an armed force to Cairo, and demand the Beys and Mamelukes at the very door of his palace—that such a threat, and such conduct, he deprecated in the strongest terms —that he was aware that the alliance between Great Britain and the Sublime Porte was most carefully and anxiously maintained by both Governments, and that they were naturally extremely desirous to strengthen the amity and good understanding which had so long subsisted between them by every means in their power. Knowing such to be the sentiments of his own Government, he professed the sincerest desire for pacific measures and amicable discussions, and that he wished

Colonel Ramsay to let General Baird understand that he was prepared to treat upon the subject with any person duly authorized.

He added, that he was led to make these suggestions, because some of the people about him were impressed with an idea that he was about to be insulted by the English; and that if that feeling gained ground, their anger and resentment would be excited to a degree which would place them beyond his power of remonstrance or control—the consequences of a movement of that nature would be such, as he could not endure to anticipate, and for these considerations he requested Colonel Ramsay's mediation on the following day.*

Colonel Ramsay, however, declined his Highness's invitation, and sent the letter we have already mentioned by the hands of Brigade-Major Harvey, at the same time directing that officer to inform his Highness, that Colonel Ramsay would not fail to make known his Highness's views and feelings to any officer who might arrive in command of any force such as he anticipated.

* Major-General Middlemore, in one of his valuable memoranda, with which we have been favoured, observes upon this conduct of the Grand Vizier:—"The Turks were more particularly alarmed when they heard it reported that Sir John Hutchinson proposed to despatch General Baird against them, unless they came to his terms of liberating the Beys; and I sincerely think that General Baird's character as a soldier, which they had had so many opportunities of studying, awed them more effectually into submission than anything else could have done."

When the Vizier had heard Sir John Hutchinson's letter translated to him by the Reis Effendi, he seemed more surprised than hurt by its contents — he utterly denied any knowledge of the murders with which he was charged—and said with great emotion, "This letter is exactly what the English General ought to have written to me, under the belief that I had been guilty of the crimes he speaks of—but he has been misinformed." He again entreated that Colonel Ramsay would come to him the next day.

Colonel Ramsay accordingly visited his Highness, accompanied by Brigade-Major Harvey, and a conversation of considerable length ensued, in which the Vizier went very minutely into the history of the Mamelukes from the earliest period, arguing forcibly, as he went along, that they, who were originally slaves, had gone on progressively, until they had possessed themselves of the entire revenues of Egypt, which in point of right belonged to the Turks; and that by the manifestation of feeling conveyed in Sir John Hutchinson's letter, he was placed in a situation of great delicacy and embarrassment. That he was quite of opinion, that the friendship and alliance which existed between England and the Porte should not be endangered by a question which he considered of such trifling importance as the surrender of the Beys and their followers; but that, in point of fact, their remaining with him and the Capidan Pacha was a matter of choice on their parts; that he had assembled those who were at

Cairo, and told them they were perfectly at liberty to go to Colonel Ramsay at Gizeh, according to the wishes and directions of Sir John Hutchinson, and to take their families and property with them; but they had positively declined the offer, and declared their wish to stay where they were.

In confirmation of this statement, the Vizier offered Colonel Ramsay the opportunity of interrogating the Beys themselves, or of deputing his Brigade-Major to do so; Colonel Ramsay, however, having no instructions to take such a step, declined his Highness's offer, but agreed to communicate what the Vizier had said to the Commander-in-chief, and to state that he really had no means of enforcing their departure if they were determined not to quit Cairo, which he again and again repeated they were.

Whether the Grand Vizier had worked himself up into believing what he told Colonel Ramsay upon this point, it is impossible to say; but it is true that he wrote to the Grand Sultan, in the name of all the Beys at Cairo, expressing their entire satisfaction with his government and regulations, and declaring themselves to be in the actual enjoyment of his Highness's protection for their persons, families, and property.

To this general testimonial of their happiness and security, it seems, none of the unfortunate captives ventured to refuse putting their seals, although intelligence was conveyed by Ibrahim Bey to the English army, from which it appeared, that upon the occasion of a British officer visiting Cairo, the guards, who

were at all other times placed round the Beys, were removed, in order to make it appear that the movements of the prisoners were perfectly unrestrained; and that after the officer went away, the Vizier sent for him (Ibrahim Bey), and told him that the English wanted him and his Mamelukes at Gizeh, and asked him if he would go; to which, Ibrahim Bey, under the most serious apprehensions from the anger of the Vizier if he were offended, replied, that he was under the Turkish government, and had no connexion whatever with the English.

All these facts Ibrahim Bey communicated, through the Bey Selim Diap, for General Baird's information, and to prove to him that whatever accounts he might receive of the satisfaction which the Beys had expressed at their present situation, their declarations of contentment were only extorted by fear, and were in direct opposition to their real feelings; that their only trust was in God and the English; that the English had promised them protection, and that if they would only replace them in the situation in which they had found them in Upper Egypt, and when they came down to assist in driving the French out of the country, they should consider that promise honourably and completely fulfilled; for that once being reinstated in their original position, they would take care that the Turks should never again obtain any advantage over them.

The Grand Vizier, whose peculiar activity and

energy afforded powerful evidence of his anxiety with regard to the Beys, and the importance he attached to the subject of their liberation or subjection, addressed another letter to General Baird, which he sent by M. Rosetti, who, when he delivered it, was accompanied by a Turkish officer of high rank recently arrived from Constantinople.

This officer was the bearer of a basket of presents, designed for General Baird and the officers of his army, and of a letter from the Grand Vizier, begging the General to accept them. General Baird, however, told the officer that in the present position of affairs it was impossible for him to do so, adding, that it was by no means his wish either intemperately or abruptly to refuse the marks of the Grand Seignior's favour and consideration, and that therefore he begged the presents might be left, but under the seal of the officer, until he returned from Alexandria.

Upon the subject of the Beys, General Baird, (who if not quite so violent in the demonstration of his feelings as Sir John Hutchinson, was at least as fully determined to save them,) told both M. Rosetti and the Turkish officer that it was mere idleness on the part of the Vizier to talk of negociating, until, as the primary step which could alone lead to any discussion upon the subject, the Beys and the Mamelukes were released.

To this observation of General Baird the officer answered, that the case was one of peculiar delicacy, because his Britannic Majesty's ambassador at Con-

stantinople had given the sanction of his sovereign to the Grand Seignior to arrange the affair of the Beys exactly as he thought proper.

General Baird strongly demurred to this supposition; he told the officer that it was wholly out of the question that such an arrangement could have been sanctioned without either his hearing of it, or its having been communicated to Sir John Hutchinson, whose faith and promise, like his own, were solemnly pledged to these active and useful partizans.*

After the interview with the Turkish officer, M.

* Major-General Middlemore, who has previously been mentioned as having accompanied Colonel Montresor on the march with the Beys, says, in a memorandum connected with these events—"The Mamelukes universally looked up to General Baird as a man upon whom the firmest reliance could be placed. His fine manly figure and dignified manner, were quite in accordance with their tastes and chivalrous character. It is well known how much he was venerated by the noble fellows who were afterwards massacred at Alexandria; and when the poor mangled Osman Bey first saw his "friend Baird," after his escape from the slaughter of his too-confiding brethren, he held out his arms to him and burst into tears, lamenting his own folly in ever separating from his noble protector.

"There was," continues General Middlemore, speaking of General Baird, "something about him which gave at once complete confidence in him: his countenance bespoke a mind spotless from guile or subterfuge; you felt that truth beamed in all his features—it was impossible to doubt him—you might implicitly place your life, and honour, and happiness, on his bare word; he *could not* deceive; and as he was firm and inflexible upon every point of discipline and duty, so was he incapable of injuring a human being—with the courage of a hero, his heart was as kind and gentle as a woman's."

Rosetti informed General Baird, in a private conference, that he was the bearer of one of those letters, to which the Vizier contrived to obtain the seals and signatures of the Beys, expressive of their readiness to obey the order of the Grand Seignior and proceed to Constantinople, if they had the permission of the English Commander-in-chief—that they acknowledged themselves subjects of the Sublime Porte, and that they only desired to submit themselves to the will of their illustrious master.

This letter was intended for Sir John Hutchinson, but M. Rosetti told General Baird that the Beys had begged him to explain to the General that in this, as in all the other cases, they had been compelled to sign the letter, and that, so far from acknowledging the government of the Grand Seignior, or wishing to proceed to Constantinople, they still entirely relied upon the English for protection for themselves and their families. Thus enlightened, General Baird sent forward M. Rosetti to Sir John Hutchinson, having previously despatched an express to explain to his Excellency the real nature and value of the testimonial of which M. Rosetti was the bearer, which might reach Alexandria before that gentleman's arrival there.

Whatever might have been Sir John Hutchinson's feelings and anxiety with respect to the unhappy objects of General Baird's unceasing solicitude, they were neither likely to be known nor to be productive of any very powerful effect, for in consequence of increasing debility it appeared that Sir John

Hutchinson had embarked on board His Majesty's ship L'Egyptienne on the morning of the 6th of November, long before the arrival of M. Rosetti or of the letters before *him*, having the evening before that, resigned the command of the WHOLE ARMY to Lord Cavan.

END OF VOLUME I.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY SAMUEL BENTLEY,
Dorset Street, Fleet Street.

00023561

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 20 February, 2016